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Foreword
Every two years, researchers and practioners meet to discuss selected topics in
crime and criminal policy in Europe. The purpose is to see how current research
can inform decision-making on problems that are shared by many European
countries.
The series of European Colloquia on Crime and Criminal Policy was launched
in 1988 by Professor Roger Hood at Oxford University. Ten years later, HEUNI
had the pleasure to organize the VI Colloquium in Helsinki, the last such
Colloquium before the new millenium.
In planning the agenda for the VI Colloquium, HEUNI decided to focus on
five topics that are to be dealt with in the framework of the Tenth United Nations
Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, to be held
in Vienna on 10-17 April 2000. The Congress will feature four workshops,
dealing, respectively, with combatting corruption; crimes related to the computer
network; community involvement in crime prevention; and women in the crimi-
nal justice system. In addition, HEUNI decided that one topic should be the
development of indicators of crime trends and the operation of criminal justice.
The VI Colloquium brought together researchers and practitioners from all
over Europe. The discussions proved to be very intensive, and will undoubtedly
help to prepare the way for more global discussions in Vienna at the Tenth United
Nations Congress.
The staff of HEUNI wishes to express its appreciation to all the speakers at
the VI Colloquium, who laid the groundwork for its success, and to all the
participants, who actively shared their research and experience, for the benefit
of all.
Helsinki, 15 March 1999
Matti Joutsen
Director, HEUNI
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Proceedings of the VI European
Colloquium on Crime and
Criminal Policy
Dr Matti Joutsen (HEUNI)
1 Background
The VI European Colloquium on Crime and Criminal Policy was organized by
the European Institute for Crime Prevention and Control, affiliated with the
United Nations, in Helsinki, Finland on 10-12 December 1998. The purpose of
the European Colloquium was to bring together researchers and policy-makers
to discuss research findings in key areas of crime prevention and criminal justice,
and their possible impact on policy in Europe.
The series of European colloquia on criminal policy and research had been
launched by Professor Roger Hood at the University of Oxford on 3-6 July 1988.
This first colloquium had dealt with policing; victims and criminal policy;
privatisation of social control; ethnic minorities, crime and public policy; and
imprisonment. 1 The second colloquium had been organized in Buchenbach,
Germany in September 1990, and had dealt with environmental criminal law;
organised crime; international comparative research; crime prevention policy;
and mediation, compensation and restitution.2
The third colloquium had been held in Noordwijkerhout, the Netherlands, 5-8
July 1992. The themes had been political ideology and drug policy; ghettoization;
reparative justice; changes in the family and their impact on crime; and legitimacy
and the limits of judicial intervention. The fourth colloquium had been held in
Romainmotier, Switzerland, 14-16 September 1994, and had dealt with self-re-
port delinquency research; victimization surveys; experiments with the control-
led distribution of opiates in Switzerland; crisis in corrections; and the Fourth
United Nations Survey on Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice
Systems, and the European Sourcebook project.3
The first four colloquia had been attended primarily by researchers from
France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, together with a
scattering of researchers from other Western European countries. The fifth
colloquium, held in Bled, Slovenia, 26-28 September 1996, had been the first to
1
1 Roger Hood (ed.), Crime and Criminal Policy in Europe, Oxford 1989.
2 Gunther Kaiser and Hans-Jörg Albrecht (eds.), Crime and Criminal Policy in Europe, Freiburg im
Breisgau 1990.
3 European Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, vol. 1, no. 1 and vol. 2, no. 4, respectively.
have a more balanced distribution of researchers and policy makers from the
different parts of Europe. The themes were crime trends in Eastern and Western
Europe; organized and transnational crime in Europe; designing a European
crime policy; European co-operation in criminal justice; and punishment and/or
rehabilitation strategies.4
In planning the VI European Colloquium, HEUNI gave consideration to the
preparations for the workshops to be held within the framework of the Tenth
United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of
Offenders, to be held in Vienna on 10-17 April 2000. These four workshops shall
deal with combatting corruption; crimes  related to  the  computer  network;
community involvement in crime prevention; and women in the criminal justice
system. In addition, the Secretary-General has been asked to prepare an overview
of the state of crime and criminal justice worldwide for presentation at the
opening of the Congress. In the discussions regarding this overview, it had been
suggested that the overview should be based on a variety of indicators of crime
trends and the operation of criminal justice.
These developments, the fact that the United Nations network of institutes had
assumed the lead responsibility for the preparation of the workshops, and the fact
that  European research  had  a considerable  amount  to contribute to global
discussions on all five of these issues had made it an obvious decision for HEUNI
to select these as the themes of the VI Colloquium.
Although the VI European Colloquium was not an official preparatory body
for the Tenth United Nations Congress, the report of the VI European Colloquium
is to be sent to the various institutes in the United Nations network responsible
for the preparations so that they could utilize the results at their discretion in the
preparations. HEUNI also intends to distribute the report, as appropriate, at the
Tenth United Nations Congress itself.
The structure of each European Colloquium  had been based on careful
advanced preparations. For each Colloquium, persons had been designated to
take over responsibility for preparing a background paper on each of five specific
themes. This background paper had then been sent to several other persons
representing different parts of Europe, for commentary. The background papers
and commentaries in turn had then been sent in advance to all of the participants
so that everyone had had time to review the material already before the Collo-
quium began.
2 Combatting corruption
The first theme of ”Combatting Corruption” was introduced by Professor Petrus
van Duyne. He noted that corruption is possible only in circumstances where
there is a decision-maker who is guided by rules and criteria from which he or
she has the power to deviate, and who is in principle accountable for the propriety
2
4 European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, vol. 5, no. 1.
of his or her decision-making to another authority. Further components include
an exchange relation between a decision-maker and an interested person who
offers or promises an advantage in exchange for a desired decision outcome, and
the hidden, improper nature of this exchange relationship.
Van Duyne emphasized that his approach was not based on ethics or morality.
The focus of his paper is on the individual decision-maker, on what people do
when they are corrupt: what happens, what affects decision-making, who has an
interest in the decision, and so on. He noted that a typology can be presented of
six interactions (in the public and private sector and in politics) between inter-
ested parties who influence one another in ways that are not part of legitimate
decision-making; these interactions are described and illustrated in the paper.
In analysing how corruption develops, van Duyne noted that corruption
frequently, but not always, develops as a ”top-down disease”. He noted what
could be called the ”successful leader paradox”: the more successful the leader,
the more he or she is trusted, and the less he or she becomes accountable. In time,
leaders may come to behave as if they were the ”owner” of the organisation, and
may feel that they can decide freely on how to dispose of the assets and people
of the organisation. Other social processes that may take place are that the leader
begins to assemble a ”court” (which has its own social-psychological conse-
quences), and a deterioration of the recruitment standard (the onset of ”Caligula
appointments”). Such favouritism may in time lead to clientilism, whereby the
new recruits assemble their own courts.
In discussing the prevention and control of corruption, van Duyne noted that
the focus should be on the highest levels of public and private leadership. Two
”truisms” should be applied systematically, the transparency principle and the
”first servant” principle. The transparency principle requires that decision-mak-
ing is open and subjected to control. The ”first servant” principle, in turn,
emphasizes that no one is above the rules on decision-making; no self-exception
may be made.
Each of the three commentaries used the perspective of a single country or
group of countries to examine van Duyne’s paper. Dr Sabrina Adamoli noted that
the ”buyers” and ”sellers” of corruption are rational people who analyse the costs
and benefits. In this, both objective (institutional) and subjective variables are
involved. The subjective variables are essentially the ”moral” costs linked with
the individual’s aversion to committing a criminal offence. In this respect, the
willingness to commit an offence depends on whether the culture in question is
more or less accepting of corruption. In some cultures corruption can be found
on both a high and low level. This is the case, for example, in Italy, which provides
examples of ”environmental corruption”: corruption may spread to the extent
that it becomes systemic. In certain environments the decision-maker does not
even need to ask for a bribe, since the bribe is paid as a matter of course. For this
reason, efforts to prevent and control corruption require action from the highest
level of both public and private leadership. Such action should not be limited
solely to penal sanctions, since not only may sanctions seem ineffective and
inefficient (as in the case of Italy), but may even have undesirable effects. More
attention should be paid to the reduction of the opportunities for corruption, and
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to the development of strategies that touch all sectors of public life, enhancing
the transparency of decision-making. One component of such strategies is codes
of  conduct. Another  component is the reorganization, where necessary, of
administrative processes, especially those that are especially prone to corruption.
Professor Miklós Lévay noted that the approach of the main paper was that
of the value-free researcher. From  the point of view of criminal policy, a
distinction should be made between illegal corruption and acceptable behaviour.
It is also important to study corruption not only as an individual phenomenon,
but as something that has a societal context. Corruption, for example during the
socialist era in Central and Eastern Europe, has system-specific features. Under
a totalitarian regime, the attitude towards corruption can in fact come to be one
of acceptance. It had been said in Hungary that corrupt behaviour was one way
of making life livable in the ”topsy-turvy” world of socialism. This attitude has
been inherited by modern society. Among the factors that have helped to generate
new corruption are privatization, the lack of capital, and inappropriately drafted
or incomplete legislation.
Professor Ahti Laitinen commented on the main paper from the Finnish
perspective. Also in Finland, the question of the definition of corruption is
problematic. Professor Laitinen noted that Finnish law criminalizes bribery but,
in the light of a survey he had carried out during the early 1990s among Finnish
civil servants, it appeared that the operationalization of bribery varied consider-
ably. Professor Laitinen also noted that corruption need not be solely individual
behaviour. It can also be collective behaviour: corrupt activity can take place
between two organizations. For example, the briber may be acting on behalf of
a municipality, seeking an (illegal) benefit from the State not for himself or
herself, but for the municipality as a whole. Another example is provided by the
relationship between states and multinational enterprises. Societies can be di-
vided into two levels: the citizens’ level and the organizational level. The power
of the organizational level has increased dramatically over the past 100 years.
This generates more possibilities for corruption, also as a form of collective
behaviour. Professor Laitinen also emphasised the importance of greater trans-
parency as a means of prevention and control. One example of the application
of this to Finland is the requirement that Ministers provide financial disclosure
statements.
The general discussion on the theme of ”combatting corruption” covered such
themes as research, prevention and control. It was emphasized that research was
needed on the factors (economic, social, cultural, political and so on) that increase
or inhibit corruption. Victimization surveys should be developed, and extended
to both the business community and to higher levels of decision-making. Refer-
ence was also made to the need to study the different dimensions of corruption
(including ”street-level” corruption and business corruption). The example of
the ”corruption index” developed by HEUNI (in its recent report on the results
of the Fifth United Nations Survey) for assessing the degree of corruption as a
whole was noted.
Measures of prevention and control that were mentioned included raising the
salaries of decision-makers, vigorous elimination of ”bad apples”, codes of
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conduct, financial disclosure systems, elimination of the tax-deductibility of
bribes paid, and arrangements that foster the reporting of corruption and the
protection of the ”whistle-blowers”. It was noted that such measures cannot work
in isolation, and each may have drawbacks, requiring careful planning and
oversight of implementation. For example, the procedure for decision-making
can be made more transparent and the level of auditing may be increased, but
this in turn may raise the level of bureaucracy, which would decrease the
efficiency of government.
Particular attention was paid to the role of the media. It was noted that the
media have had a key role in exposing corruption, but at the same time the media
may gain a degree of power that is in itself corrupting. The media, and ”producers
of morality” have a major role in changing the perception of the acceptability of
corruption, and instilling the attitude that State and municipal resources are part
of the ”common wealth” (aka commonwealth or common weal), and thus not
something that is the ”property” of the civil servant, that can be traded away for
personal benefit.
3 Women in the criminal justice system
Dr Katarina Tomasevski’s paper on ”Women in the criminal justice system” was
presented by Ms Kristiina Kangaspunta. The paper reviewed the lessons learned
in the process of developing women’s rights as human rights, and sought to apply
this in a criminal justice context to the position of women. Dr Tomasevski noted
that within the United Nations context in general, little had been done about
women’s issues in criminal justice until the 1990s. One of the reasons for this
was that the original human rights focus had been a ”vertical” one, on the abuse
of power by states against individuals. The ”horizontal” perspective, that of
individuals against individuals, had at first not been regarded as particularly
relevant.
During the 1990s, the perspective gradually changed in three different fora in
the United Nations: the Commission for Human Rights, the Commission for the
Advancement of Women, and the Commission on Crime Prevention and Crimi-
nal Justice. Such ”horizontal” issues as violence against women came to be
addressed, not only in the form of physical violence, but also for example as
psychological violence and sexual harassment. Such abuse of power of one
individual against another was seen as examples of structural violence. Empha-
sizing human rights were regarded as one way of changing such structures. The
1995 Conference on Human Rights proposed the establishment of the position
of Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women as a way of spearheading this
work.
Among the approaches developed was ”gender mainstreaming”, whereby
gender issues were to be considered in connection with all issues – including
crime prevention and criminal justice. One of the debates in the application of
mainstreaming to crime prevention and criminal justice (as has been the case
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also with other sectors), is whether the emphasis should be on fair and equal
treatment of women, or on preferential treatment. The former had been the
original goal. Preferential treatment subsequently came to be advocated on the
grounds that it was the best way to correct an imbalance in power. Both
approaches had their costs and benefits, also in the criminal justice sector. For
example, the use of specialised institutions for women, or the development of
specialised units (such as special police units) may be in conflict with the
principle of mainstreaming, and may in fact hamper the attainment of equal
status. Moreover, the criminal justice system by itself can at the most provide
short-term safety for women, but cannot ensure long-term independence.
Dr Tomasevski’s paper also dealt with the three aspects of women in the
criminal justice system, women as victims, women as offenders and women as
criminal justice practitioners. In reviewing the research on these issues, Dr
Tomasevski noted that more information is needed in particular on women in
custody, and on women as practitioners.
In his commentary, Mr Juan Medina noted the difficulties in developing a
European perspective on the wide variety of topics covered by the present theme.
Among these difficulties are the lack of appropriate statistical and empirical data,
and the poorly developed network of criminologists, institutions and other
entities working on the theme in the different countries. There is a growing
interest in the topic in Europe, and for example more attention is being devoted
to it in the media and by policy-makers. For example, Spain has recently
developed a national plan for the prevention and control of domestic violence.
Regrettably, however, key persons in government are still not familiar with
comparative experiences. For example, in the governmental regulations on
restraining orders, judges are urged to look at the potential harm that such orders
may have on the economic situation of the husband, but no explicit reference is
made to security issures or to the potential dangerousness of the man. Mr Medina
noted that his commentary focused on certain issues, such as on the limits of
criminal justice in preventing violence against women, and on the need for the
criminal justice system to work together with other agencies.
Mr Medina also emphasized the need to study how the criminal justice actors
could improve their response within more proactive and problem-solving frame-
work. He criticized a simple gender inequality explanatory model of violence
against women based on empirical and theoretical grounds, and questioned its
utility for policy purposes. In its place, he suggested the development of a
framework that (1) examines the relationships and interactions between violence
against women and other forms of violence, and (2) takes into consideration a
more sophisticated understanding of the relationship between the structure of
gender identities, relationships and oppression and violence against women and
in general.
In her commentary, Professor Frances Heidensohn noted that issues related
to women and the criminal justice system have in fact been dealt with for over a
century. Examples include violence against women, and trafficking in women.
This early debate had influenced the early feminist movement. The two ap-
proaches to women’s issues in the criminal justice context identified by Dr
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Tomasevski, equality and preferential treatment, are not necessarily the only
ones, but do provide a good start. Previous experiments with preferential treat-
ment ultimately proved to be more damaging than helpful to the position of
women. Professor Heidensohn noted that, in addition to the human rights
approach, attention could be paid for example to women’s issues under the third
pillar of the Maastricht Treaty (i.e. home and justice affairs in the European
Union), and to the possibilities open on the non-governmental level, for example
through strengthening a European network of policewomen. As for research, it
was true that much that is available comes from the United Kingdom and the
United States, but in addition to the references in the Tomasevski’s paper, a
considerable amount of other research could be noted. This should provide a start
in developing strategies nationally, and attention should and can be paid to what
strategies might work in other countries.
In the general discussion, reference was made to the recognition, in feminist
scholarship, of heterogeneity in gender. So-called ”third wave feminism” has
placed most of the emphasis in the recognition of the intersection of social class
and ethnicity with gender in the creation of different scenarios or situations in
which women live. Women with different social and cultural backgrounds, even
in the same country, may be confronted with different problems. This debate has
affected the way in which we think about criminal justice and about women as
victims and women as offenders.
Reference was also made to the emergence of new research and to the
possibilities of the application of the survey method to this issue. Standardized
questionnaires should be used with a sufficiently big sample, and comparative
data should be collected. At HEUNI it had been noted that a number of European
countries had shown an interest in this, and HEUNI was seeking to produce such
data in time for the Tenth United Nations Congress.
At HEUNI, the results of the Fifth United Nations Survey on Crime Trends
and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems had been analysed from the point of
view of possible links between violence against women and the status of women.
Although women tended to be victimised more widely in developing countries
than in developed countries, at a certain level of women’s empowerment it
appeared that the amount of violence against women began to increase. It was
suggested that this could be due to a ”redefining” of violence at a certain level:
more empowered women might tend to regard aggressive male behaviour as
violence, while less empowered women might in turn regard such behaviour on
the part  of  males as ”normal”,  or  alternatively (or  simultaneously) not  as
something that should be reported either to the authorities or even to researchers.
It was also suggested that men might feel threatened by more empowered women,
and react in a more aggressive manner.
In this discussion, reference was also made to the current work of the United
Nations on trafficking in women and children, including the development of a
strategy and the drafting of a protocol on the subject for the United Nations
Convention against Organized Crime. The importance of looking at the close ties
between trafficking in women and prostitution were emphasised.
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4 Indicators of crime and of the performance
of the criminal justice system
Dr Rosemary Barberet presented her paper on ”Indicators of crime and of the
performance of the criminal justice system.” She noted that the paper begins with
a review of the advantages and disadvantages of the most common source of data
on crime, official statistical data, as well as of victimisation surveys and self-re-
port surveys. Although almost all countries produce official data on crime, there
were differences in the degree of transparency, i.e. in who has access to data,
who can report it, and how it is reported. In countries with a poorly developed
criminological community, the quality of official data tends to be weak, because
criminologists, despite being one of the main users of the data, have had little
input in their collection.
Dr Barberet noted that not even survey data on crime are value-neutral.
However, a combination of approaches can be used in order to shed light on other
heretofore hidden aspects of crime. For example, victimisation surveys can be
expanded to include youthful populations, and questions can be included that
could reflect the extent to which victims may in another capacity be offenders.
Dr Barberet also urged the development of indicators that could be ”exported”
internationally, although in this respect she noted that comparative research has
been replete with problems caused by errors in translation and by misunderstand-
ings. Finally, she noted that attention must be paid to helping policy-makers
understand the utility of the results of the analysis, and how to apply these result
to policy formulation.
In respect of performance indicators, much work has been undertaken in the
United States and in the United Kingdom. In particular the Audit Commission
in the United Kingdom has developed performance indicators for various gov-
ernmental sectors that can be applied in much the same way as an audit would
be done in a private company. This process has had the added benefit that
organisations have been encouraged to go through the process of defining
organisational goals.
Nonetheless, it should be recalled that, as was the case with indicators of crime,
also indicators of the performance of criminal justice reflect criminological
theory, and are thus not value-neutral. This is true, for example, of measures of
prison performance. Dr Barberet also cited examples of how the performance
indicators developed for specific fields may raise conflicting goals and conflict-
ing values. Such conflicting performance indicators may confuse the practition-
ers charged with their application.
Dr Barberet argued that the proper development and application of perform-
ance indicators requires a receptive environment. In many countries, policy-mak-
ers, practitioners and the general public do not necessarily understand the rational
cost-benefit model involved. It may be taken granted, for example, that spending
money on a problem is already in itself a solution to a social problem, and thus
the cost-benefit approach is not regarded as relevant.
In commenting on the main paper, Dr Elmar Weitekamp noted that for many
years, little had changed in respect of crime indicators. Suggestions had already
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been made that for example crime statistics should be made more precise so that
they would be more useful as indicators, but police statistics have in practice
changed little. Dr Weitekamp noted examples of how these statistics provide a
misleading view of the extent or serious of crime. Moreover, several countries
do not carry out surveys, at least not on a regular basis, and thus also in this
respect the necessary indicators of crime trends are lacking. As for performance
indicators, very few countries have any rigorous evaluation research. He noted
as one  of  the few good examples  the  recent  evaluation  undertaken at the
University of Maryland of federally financed crime prevention projects.
Dr Weitekamp noted that an example of a positive experience in developing
indicators is the Sellin-Wolfgang scale of crime seriousness. Dr Weitekamp cited
ways in which the application of this scale can be useful not only for theory
construction but also for the development of policy.
Dr Anna Markina observed that her comments focused on the perspective of
a country in transition, where there is considerable reliance on official statistics,
and research is underdeveloped. She noted that the clearance rate is commonly
used as a performance indicator. However, during the Soviet period, crime tended
to be recorded only if the offender was known; this inevitably ensured what
appeared to be a very high clearance rate, but what was actually at odds with
reality. Also other examples can be cited of the way statistical data can be
manipulated to ”produce” what appear to be positive results. Dr Markina also
pointed out examples of problems in the international comparability of statistical
data, and in the comparability of national data over time; examples include
translation difficulties and changes in legislation.
Mr Kauko Aromaa observed that three levels can be distinguished in the
discussion on crime: that of ”all crime”, that of ”recorded crime” and that of
”beliefs about crime”. Although the assumption is that we are talking about ”all
crime”, we are generally referring to ”recorded crime”, and our decisions are
actually being made on how we interpret these data, by our ”beliefs about crime”.
Other measures are needed to come to grips with the level of ”all crime”. We
should also seek to define in respect of what aspects of crime we are seeking to
develop indicators – is it the number of motivated offenders, the presence of
suitable targets, or the presence of capable guardians? Mr Aromaa agreed with
Dr Markina on the possible misuse of official data, and cited an example he had
encountered where the police of a medium-size district in Finland, under pressure
to demonstrate an improved clearance rate, had simply reclassified bicycle thefts
(which are notoriously difficult to ”clear”) as cases of ”unauthorized use”. In the
rare event that the case was solved, the police had reclassified them as thefts.
This had led to an appreciable but artificial increase in the clearance rate for
thefts.
Mr Gordon Barclay focused on the experience in the United Kingdom with
official statistics and criminal justice performance indicators. He noted that in
England, performance indicators were being applied to many aspects of govern-
ments, such as mass transport, schools and health care. The Government had
decided that each Government department should define its aims, objectives and
targets. The successes or failures of the Government would be determined by
this. He reviewed the objectives of the Home Office in this light (listed in Annex
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A of Mr Barclay’s paper). In respect of official statistics, Mr Barclay noted that
these, as was the case with surveys, are subject to error and must be validated.
He noted that in international comparisons, misunderstandings may arise even
over such basic concepts as ”offence”, ”report”, ”investigation”, ”prosecution”
and ”conviction”. Another example is that in the United Kingdom, a reported
offence is an ”input” statistic: it indicates that a person had come to a police
station to report the offence. However, in many other countries, this is in some
respects an ”output” statistic, in that it reflects the result of an investigation. Mr
Barclay concluded by noting that despite — or indeed because of — these
possible sources of error, the data can still be used. The process of making the
data public and then correcting them in response to criticism is often better than
deciding not to publish at all.
In the general discussion on this topic, several points were raised. It was
acknowledged that official statistical data are prone to error, but it was pointed
out that the victimisation survey literature suggests that police statistics are in
fact a relatively good measure of crime. It was also emphasised that supplemen-
tary statistical sources can be used to provide a better picture of crime trends.
Examples of such sources are public health statistics, in particular regarding
violent crime.
One speaker noted that the focus of the ”indicators” theme may be misleading,
in that it implied that the performance of the criminal justice system is the only
factor that affects the level and structure of crime. The point was made that
policy-makers and the public should also be made better aware that the crime
situation is also affected by economic and other factors. For this reason, such
other risk factors have to be taken into consideration.
The question was raised about indicators of those types of crime that are
difficult to measure, such as corruption, organized crime and money laundering.
One problem noted here is that ”common” crime often involves discrete events
(such as thefts or assaults) while for example corruption can be an ongoing
process. Another example is that money laundering can involve a large sum
laundered once, or the same sum laundered in several installments over a longer
period of time. The fundamental problem, however, is that the definition of such
concepts as ”organised crime” is vague, and varies considerably from country to
country and time to time (and indeed from one individual observer to the next).
One suggestion was to seek indicators of system variables that help in assessing
the size and distribution of such crime. It was noted that such entities as organised
crime must be approached by dividing it into the different forms (such as
trafficking in firearms or stolen motor vehicles), and seeking to develop indica-
tors of each. The positive experience of Dr John Walker in analysing the extent
of money laundering in Australia was cited in this connection.
The importance of alerting policy-makers to the utility of indicators of crime
trends and of the performance of the criminal justice system was stressed. Such
indicators can help policy-makers in better understanding the problems with
which they are confronted, and in developing the appropriate response. Regret-
tably, the importance of research on these indicators is not widely understood for
example in many Central and Eastern European countries. Even more widely,
policy-makers and the public may have difficulties in understanding the ration-
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ality of this ”cost-benefit” approach to the criminal justice system. International
surveys can include national components that deal with problems specific to the
country. There is also the possibility of developing ”anticipatory crime indica-
tors”, as suggested by Dr Barberet, although the difficulties involved in this were
noted, and it was pointed out that such indicators tend to be based ”fears, hopes
and a dash of the latest newspaper scares”.
It was suggested that the possibility should be explored of developing an
international ”thesaurus” containing a classification of offences from the crimi-
nological point of view, and a set of commonly-agreed-upon definitions of the
basic criminal justice concepts (such as ”investigation”), perhaps with supple-
mentary information on how the legal definitions in the different countries may
vary from these common definitions.
5 Public/private partnerships in
crime prevention
The discussion on public / private partnerships in crime prevention was based on
case studies. Dr Pawel Mlicki began with a presentation on ”Crime prevention
in Central and Eastern Europe: a psychological analysis”. He began by noting
that although his paper deals with Central Europe in general, there are consider-
able differences between the countries. The structures of police are different, and
they operate differently.
He noted that although there has been much research on the political, eco-
nomic and social transition in Central and Eastern Europe, there has been little
research on the psychological transformation. For example, although research
has been carried out on the police in transition, little is known about police
officers in transition. Such research would be important for crime prevention. In
seeking to start the cooperative projects needed in crime prevention, either
nationally or internationally, it is crucial to know the partners. If we know too
little, there is often a mismatch between expectations.
Dr Mlicki noted that a key element of his analysis is the theory of ”learned
helplessness”, which had been developed in the United States at the end of the
1960s and the beginning  of the 1970s. The theory is based on individual
expectations. If an individual is placed in a situation where he or she cannot
influence the environment, this individual learns to expect that bad things will
occur to him or her, and that there is nothing that he or she can do to prevent this.
Even should the environment change to the extent that an individual could in fact
influence this environment, under ”learned helplessness” the individual does not
realize this change, and remains passive.
There are three dimensions to the theory of ”learned helplessness”: internal
vs external, stable vs unstable, and global vs specific. Learned helplessness is
internal, stable and global. Failure is regarded as innate, and not due to external
circumstances; it is a stable phenomenon, and not something that will change
tomorrow; and it applies globally to all aspects of life, and not just to specific
aspects.
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Dr Mlicki suggested as an application of this theory to the Central and Eastern
European countries that under the socialist regime, the public and the individual
police officer came to learn that there was nothing that the individual can do to
change the environment. This may have been true to a large extent under
socialism, but there has been a change in the environment in several respects.
One change has been in the realm of politics. The single-party system and
ideology has even replaced by multi-party democracy. At the individual level,
political correctness is no longer the basis for the recruiting of police officers.
There is greater diversity within the police force. Different political views are
allowed and can be publicly discussed. This affects the social identity of the
individual police officer, since the greater the variety in one group, the more
difficult it is to create a social identity. Consequently, feelings of weakness have
increased: the police are no longer a clear-cut group. Moreover, since self-esteem
and recognition can now be sought also outside the immediate reference group,
that of the police, an additional element emerges that confuses social identity.
Finally, in most countries there is no clear crime prevention policy. As a result,
every change in Government affects policy, which in turn affects the police. The
police are in a ”permanent state of waiting”, and are not quite clear as to what is
required of them.
The police in Central and Eastern Europe at least on paper have become more
democratic. Consequently, the police are accountable and subject to sanctions.
These are obvious characteristics of the organisation, but it creates a new world
for the individual police officer. There is more room for individual initiative and
personal responsibility. Nonetheless, the expectations are high: the individual
police officer must be responsible and accountable. These are qualities that must
be learned, but which were not learned under the clear-cut political goals of
socialism.
Along with the increase in democracy, the police must be transparent and more
open to democratic control. This is a new situation for the police officer. For
example, it is no longer possible to manipulate data in order to provide the image
of success. At the same time, the police officer in a society in rapid transition is
faced with the reality of increased criminality, and cannot ”hide” this. Democratic
control (and contacts with Western police organisations) have also led to a
delegation of power from the centre to the local level. Individual police officers
are more and more often confronted with tasks for which they have to take over
full responsibility and accountability.
The openness of society has led to international contacts, which had previously
been extremely limited. This has several corollaries for the individual police
officer. There are many points of comparison with foreign, and in particular
Western police organisations. When compared with Western police organisa-
tions, police organisations in Central and Eastern Europe tend to look worse. At
the same time, there have been positive results from the comparisons. Earlier,
police officials would have said that their priority was to obtain more resources.
Now, the priority is on better selection, better training, better organisation, better
management, and better management of contacts with the public.
Yet another aspect of greater openness is the fact that the mass media, now
that it can write freely, tends to be overcritical of the police. The police often feel
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that this criticism is unjustified. The police believe that the public does not realise
the risks that the police take, and that the police appear to becoming isolated from
society, also on the individual level.
Another fundamental change is in the economic sector. The norms regarding
corruption may differ between Western Europe and Central and Eastern Europe;
in the latter, corruption tends to be regarded as the legitimate redistribution of
wealth. It is widely understood that the police are not paid sufficiently, and
corruption is tacitly accepted. At the same time, the shift from a planned economy
to a market economy provides individual police officers with other, and more
lucrative, job opportunities. The police tend to be young, well-educated and
energetic individuals who can often find good jobs elsewhere; this obviously
affects recruiting.
Dr Mlicki concluded by stating that, in order to develop a successful strategy
for crime prevention, we must supplement our criminological analysis with a
psychological analysis. Regrettably, there is almost no research on this aspect.
The theory of learned helplessness could provide an interesting starting point for
the analysis.
In the general discussion, the utility of the theory of learned helplessness in
understanding the situation of the police in Central and Eastern Europe was
discussed. Comparisons were made of the experience of various Central and
Eastern European countries. The question was raised of the implications of the
learned helplessness theory for the strengthening of crime prevention. It was
noted that the theory applies to the individual level, but it could also be applied
to the organisational level. The environmental factors should be reviewed, and
attention should be paid to what should be done to enable the organisation to
change its working environment.
Reference was made to the general lack of legitimacy that has confronted
many social institutions in Central and Eastern Europe. Dr Mlicki noted that
often, the public tends to regard the police as a whole as a legitimate organisation,
but individual police officers tend to be regarded in a less positive light
Reference was also made to gender issues. The learned helplessness theory
may also help to explain the low level of reporting of harassment of female
officers by male officers. Another gender issue that arises is that it is often the
male officers who leave for private enterprise; for economic and social reasons,
female officers tend to stay in the lower-paying police jobs.
Dr Dragan Petrovec emphasized the differences between the countries of
Central and Eastern Europe. The use of the term ”countries in transition” was
misleading, as shown by the fact that many Western experts tend to prescribe
what is in effect a ”universial medicine” for all such countries and for whatever
”disease” they may  suffer from. We should take into account the specific
differences and conditions in each separate country, as well as its historical,
political and economic background. For this reason, his focus was on one country,
Slovenia. He noted that in general, it could be said that under socialism, there
was a strong state but weak democracy. Socialism was based on common
(corporate) ownership, restrictions on private property and on state regulation of
most of the vital areas.
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In spite of these socialist ideas modern and democratic criminal law emerged
in Slovenia after 1959, although there have been occasional abuses of power, for
example in respect of dissidents. There has been a ”withering away of the state”,
also in respect of crime prevention and criminal justice. It is true that in criminal
justice, the traditional pillars of the police, prosecution, court and corrections
remain. Moreover, the social ”self-protection” ideology and practice, and an
informal crime prevention system, had been supported by official ideology. This
had resulted from the positive experience during the Second World War with a
concept called ”total national defence”.
Since 1959, Slovenia as part of Yugoslavia had also used reconciliation boards,
which were autonomous judicial authorities. These had been established by law.
They were composed of lay members, and had contributed to a decrease in the
repressive function of the State. The number of such boards in Yugoslavia had
increased somewhat over time, from 5,148 in 1964 to 6,696 in 1972, although
the number of cases dealt with had decreased from 79,332 in 1963 to 58,904 in
1971.
Since the transition, there has been a slow reanimation of democracy. Political
and economic independence have had side effects. It had been realised that the
state as a whole is an expensive enterprise. Financial restrictions had been placed
on government activities in education, health care, crime prevention and other
fields. Privatization of crime prevention activities (which were formerly the sole
prerogative of the police) is a new phenomenon in Central and Eastern Europe.
Security came to be regarded as a financial commodity. Private security
agencies emerged. At present, there are eleven agencies in Slovenia, with some
2,000 employees. They cooperate with the police and help in investigations. They
are responsible for the security of some 6,000 buildings, and can place in
operation 60 mobile squads as well as sophisticated equipment. They provide
(almost) any security-related service that the clients may ask for. One of the
negative developments in this respect is that there are no unified standards in
terms of ethical neutrality, and no strict adherence to rules or to the law.
A more positive development has been the emergence of private initiatives for
assistance to victims. Some such agencies receive state support. Among these
are eleven centres for victims in the major cities of Slovenia. These agencies
carefully select and train their staff members and establish a network among
private and public institutions (such as the police, prosecution, centres for social
work, medical institutions, schools, mayors and some non-governmental organ-
isations). They are able to provide 24-hours-a-day service for the support of
victims, victim referral and advocacy.
Another criminal justice -related development has been the emergence of
vigilante movements, which are informal committees that are often established
and run by persons who have been victims and who want to prevent the type of
crime in question. Such developments do have positive effects, such as the
fostering of the interest of citizens in preventing crime, the fostering of private
and public cooperation, the reduction of fear of crime in local communities, and
an easing of the burden on the police. However, they also seem to have negative
effects (which unfortunately too often prevail), for example in the form of
aggressive and narrow-minded reactions to deviant behaviour, improper influ-
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ence on court decisions, the stigmatizing of suspects (who in fact are often
innocent), the ignoring of the presumption of innocence, and the encouragement
of xenophobia and hate in general. Dr Petrovec concluded that, in general, crime
prevention measures that cause more harm than crime itself – vigilantism being
one such example – should be avoided.
In the general discussion, the differences among national experiences in
Central and Eastern Europe were noted. For example in respect of reconciliation
boards, some of the countries had had positive experiences, which may have
contributed to a greater willingness to experiment with such boards after the
period of transition.
It was questioned whether vigilante movements actually decrease fear of
crime. It was suggested that even if they may lead to local reduction of fear, they
may also lead to a general increase in fear.
Mr Karsten Ive began by stressing that criminal acts are the result of a
complexity of factors related to motivation, the presence of a target and the
absence of capable guardians. Thus, crime prevention requires a multisectoral
approach. Since society changes over time, also the crime prevention measures
must be adapted. The point of departure must be the local level. This is where
the crime is committed, and this is where crime prevention must be carried out.
The approach to crime prevention must be made more ”professional”. One way
in which this has been done is organisationally, through the establishment of
crime prevention councils, such as in Denmark in 1971. The underlying rationale
of the Danish Crime Prevention Council is that only joint action will prove
successful. The council brings together representatives of over 40 agencies and
organisations. This joint approach must also be evident on the local level; social
issues, educational institutions and the police must be involved nationally as well
as locally.
Crime prevention can be approached through ”objective crime prevention”
(situational crime prevention), which assumes that crime will be committed, and
that citizens must be empowered to prevent crimes. A second approach is through
”subjective crime prevention” (social crime prevention) that seeks to decrease
the number of offenders in society.
Denmark is a society where considerable crime prevention technology exists.
This, however, may lead to a bifurcation of society, which in turn may lead to
even greater demands for protection. Similar tendencies can be seen in other
countries; for example closed circuit televisions are being set up in public areas
in for example Norway and in the United Kingdom. The Danish Council prefers
to see crime prevention as a tool for keeping society together, and wants to
activate members of the public to become involved. The goal should not be solely
to reduce crime; the greater goal should be to improve society; for example, such
bifurcation should be avoided. This is a difficult goal. Public services have a duty
to provide information to the public. Those providing the information must be
alert to negative trends in lifestyles of the citizens, so that the appropriate crime
prevention information can be provided at as early a stage as possible.
In Denmark, the social welfare authorities, educational institutions and the
police have an obligation to promote crime prevention. They have an obligation
to identify criminogenic circumstances (in particular misuse of drugs or alcohol)
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and respond to such problems. In addition to these three authorities, also other
organisations (such as voluntary organisations) have a possibility of cooperating
in crime prevention activities. The Council is seeking to build up local networks
that have an impact on the daily life of the members of the public. Information
is provided on a general level, and in a targetted manner, at groups of young
people at risk. Finally, information may be provided on an individual level. In
this last respect, the principle is that private organisations should not be involved,
due to the need for privacy and confidentiality.
The Council has developed recommendations for how local initiatives should
be initiated. These initiatives are generally quite simple in practice. The Council
recommends that the local network carrying out these initiatives have three levels,
that of management, coordination and implementation. Management brings
together the heads of the various local committees and authorities (school
committee, social committee, chief constable, head of the school administration
and head of the social administration). The coordination level involves social
workers, school teachers and police officers. The implementation of any individ-
ual initiative may vary considerably; no one blueprint is possible. For example,
in response to an increase in shoplifting in one local area the local network may
bring together police officers, school teachers and local retail merchants. Provi-
sional groups may be set up in the form of activity groups. For example, if drugs
are used by youth groups, these provisional groups may involve police officers,
health care workers, members of the youth organisations involved, social workers
and representatives of parent associations.
Mr Ive gave as an example the development of a project geared at a number
of second-generation Danes who had caused concern by engaging in violent
activities in public areas. The project involved mentors who contacted these
young people over a three-year period, seeking to engage them in discussions on
their behaviour, providing them with skills to earn their livelihood as well as the
opportunities to do so. The project started with 40 youths, and 32 persons stayed
with the project to the end. The project had also been subjected to cost-benefit
analysis, and its financial value to society had been shown.
Mr Ive emphasized that an ad hoc problem-oriented approach is not enough
in crime prevention. Such an approach does not allow for the necessary sustained
cross-disciplinary approach. An ad hoc approach also does not give sufficient
latitude for early intervention, with a sufficient level of professionalism.
In the genderal discussion, the question was raised of how the success of crime
prevention programmes can be measured. The ”success” of such programmes
can be operationalised in different ways. The Danish evaluation has been based
on relapse into crime, and also takes into consideration what type of crime is
committed.
Several speakers referred to experiences with crime prevention in the United
Kingdom. The Home Office and the Treasury have produced a report called
”Reducing Offending” which reviewed various crime prevention initiatives, and
had concluded that they were cost-effective. The report had also emphasized the
importance of evaluative research, and had resulted in a decision to invest a
considerable sum of money in such evaluative research. It was argued that crime
control measures based solely on policing and corrections is insufficient; crime
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prevention is possible and it can be effective. An issue that still has to be addressed
in the United Kingdom is the fact that the various authorities do not have the
same administrative boundaries, nor do they have the same structure of account-
ability. Changes in this respect are to be expected, meaning that in a manner of
speaking also the United Kingdom will be a ”country in transition”.
An example was cited of an attempt to replicate a Dutch model in Poland, that
of ”adopt-a-school” where uniformed police officers visit schools to tell young
people about drugs. The replication in Poland had brought up the need to consider
not only the legal and organisational framework for crime prevention, but also
the need to consider the psychological framework, in this case the preferability
of using persons other than uniformed police officers to provide information
about drugs to school children.
One speaker noted that in most countries, it is the police who have the mandate
to prevent and control crime, and the police may be unwilling to share this
mandate with other authorities, much less with non-governmental organisations.
Along the same lines, it was pointed out that in many countries the public, in
turn, may have a very poor image of the police, as shown by the results of the
International Crime Victim Survey. Nonetheless, the public may have very high
expectations of police performance. Even in countries which have been success-
ful in preventing and controlling crime, the perception of police performance
may be decreasing due to this unrealistically high expectations. This is due to
the fact that only the police are regarded as being responsible for crime prevention
and control, and the police are accountable for any failures. Indeed, if there is an
increase in reporting — generally regarded as a positive development — this
may lead to a lowering of the clearance rate, which may in turn be regarded as
a ”failure”.
The importance of fostering crime prevention programmes and community
policing models in developing countries and countries in transition was empha-
sized. It was noted that there is no international crime prevention strategy, no
strategy for example for developing partnership between the various authorities
and organisations involved in the different countries. The importance of an
international approach was also shown by the fact that in many cases, action
solely on the local or even the national level can be insufficient; for example
drugs and firearms are trafficked internationally. It was suggested that the Tenth
United Nations Congress workshop on public / private partnerships in crime
prevention could also serve as a forum for addressing the potential for such an
international strategy.
6 Crimes related to the computer network
Dr Andrzej Adamski noted that he had approached the subject from the crimi-
nological perspective, and had therefore titled his paper ”Crimes related to the
computer network. Threats and opportunities: Criminological perspective”. This
was due in particular to the fact that not only was the issue a new one for the
United Nations, it was a new one for most countries. Crimes related to the
computer network were a side-effect of technological development. The main
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paper deals with four points: (1) the definition of crimes related to the computer
network, (2) the prevalence of such crime, (3) who are the ”network criminals”,
and (4) how to prevent such crime. He noted in passing that in relying on the
available research and literature, he had made heavy reliance on the computer
network: technological development thus has its benefits.
A computer system can be seen as both an object and as a tool of criminal
activity. In the first case, offences involving a computer network can involve three
security aspects, the availability of the network (with the crime involving denial
of service), the integrity of the network (the deliberate introduction of a malicious
programme into the system) and the confidentiality of data (breaking into the
network, eavesdropping). In the second case, ”old” forms of crime can be
committed digitally. Examples are telecommunications and marketing fraud,
deceptive advertising, and securities fraud.
There are few studies of network-related crime as such. However, there are
surveys in for example the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia that
ask various respondent groups about the perception of the threat posed by
computer-related crime. Moreover, the research has to some extent been repli-
cated, thus providing some information on trends. The results indicate that most
computer abuses are not related to network-specific incidents, such as hacking,
but for example with the introduction of computer viruses. Secondly, more
offences are apparently committed by ”insiders” (employees) than by intruders.
Thirdly, there appears to be a positive correlation between the detection of
incidents and the development of measures for monitoring. Fourthly, when the
number of computer hosts are taken into account, it would appear that although
the amount of network-related crime is increasing, the individual victimisation
risk is in fact decreasing. This reflects the fact that the growth of the Internet is
faster than the increase in criminal incidents.
According to the estimates of computer security experts, most ”hackers” are
juveniles. Moreover, these estimates suggest that only 1% of incidents involve a
criminal motivation; 99% could be termed ”recreational” hacking. This raises
the criminal policy question of how to deal with such offenders. Dr Adamski
mentioned that there has already been a proposal to lower the age of criminal
responsibility in respect of hackers in the United States.
Regarding the reduction of the possibility of such crime, priority should
clearly be given to technological means. This refers to target-hardening measures
in particular. A recent survey of security measures demonstrated the very low
level of security awareness, and the fact that the control of access to the computer
network was very lax. Nonetheless, when representatives of the same organisa-
tions were asked about the seriousness of the danger, over 80% stated that they
were deeply concerned about the matter.
Increasing the risk of apprehension involves, first of all, the training of law
enforcement officers. Police forces should establish trained units specifically
devoted to computer-related crime. A second element is cooperation, including
cooperation with service providers. Such cooperation should be national and
international. A third element in many countries would be the reform of criminal
procedure, since often criminal procedure does not envisage the needs of the
investigation of computer-related crime.
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Dr Adamski concluded by noting that when he started working on the paper,
he had had a very pessimistic view of the situation. In the preparing the paper,
he had come to realize that some of the reported data on computer crime had
been misleading, and tended to exaggerate the number and seriousness of
incidents. Many estimates were based on small samples that had then been
extrapolated to arrive at figures that were allegedly more global.
In his commentary, Mr Antti Pihlajamäki noted that Dr Adamski’s paper had
taken a criminological approach. The approach of the criminal justice practition-
er was somewhat different. The practitioner is less interested in why a person
committed a crime, and more in how this crime had been committed. His
commentary looked at the situation from the point of view of Finnish law. This
was justified because, since technological development in Finland was very
advanced, also the legislation was advanced.
Mr Pihlajamäki noted that the number of reported ”information crimes” in
Finland was quite low. This could, of course, be due to the various reasons for
non-reporting noted by Dr Adamski in his main paper. Mr Pihlajamäki stated
that although the legislation in Finland was advanced, there was still reason for
developing the law. One reason for this was that some of the provisions on the
”old” offences (to use Dr Adamski’s terminology) could be extended to cover
information crime, but such expansive interpretation of criminal law was against
the principles of criminal law in Finland.
Criminal law and procedural law was underdeveloped nationally and in
particular internationally. This lack of international development, international
concordance and international procedural cooperation was a problem because
information crime is often an international crime. The problems have become
evident within the framework of the Committee of Experts on Crime in Cyper-
space, of the Council of Europe.
In his commentary, Professor Henrik Kaspersen raised the general question
of the definition and the seriousness of computer crime. He noted the difficulties
in obtaining comparable data. The statistics and the views of victims tend to be
unreliable. Few offences are reported to the authorities; one estimate is that the
reporting rate is only about 5%. One of the reasons many countries have enacted
laws in this field already since the 1970s was in order to clearly stipulate the
limits of acceptable behaviour.
Professor Kaspersen noted that hacking can in itself be a precursor to other
offences, and its seriousness should thus not be underestimated. He also noted
his  disagreement  with the  suggestion that  hacking can  be ”innocent  fun”.
Hacking compromises system security, and those responsible for this system
security may have to invest considerable resources in making their system more
secure. This additional expenditure of resources is in itself is a damage caused
by hacking.
As for prevention, Professor Kaspersen noted that computers as such are
unsecured. Most computer users are not aware of the risks involved when
computers are networked. Something should be done by the industry or the
government in order to promote security awareness. This same process is taking
place in connection with the telephone systems. The cooperation of industry must
be secured; they must be made aware that the product is unsafe. The Government
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should set standards, and should make persons and corporations liable for
violation of these standards. An awareness programme should be directed at the
potential victims. Furthermore, victims should be given information on the
possible threats and given different alternatives, so that the victim can make
informed choices. There are already technical means available by which the
potential victims can decrease the risk of computer crimes, although clearly more
work on the development of such means is necessary. Finally, what is needed is
well-done risk assessments.
In the general discussion, reference was made to the possible application of
product liability to this issue, in order to encourage manufacturers to improve
security technology. Potential users could also be provided with more informa-
tion on how to protect themselves against risks associated with the use of the
product, in this case a computer. It was suggested, however, that high standards
of security are in fact not possible in computer systems, and thus the application
of product liability would not appear realistic. Moreover, product liability is
usually applied to safety issues, for example to the danger that a product may
have for the health of the user. This analogy fits poorly with the use of computer
hardware or computer software, since the health of the user is not at risk.
Professor Kaspersen emphasized the importance of competition in the com-
puter software market. Greater competition could also benefit the user in that
software will be developed that promotes the security of computer networks.
Another speaker raised the international ramifications of computer crime. He
noted the question of motivation, and the seriousness with which hacking should
be regarded. An analogy was drawn to the changing attitudes towards terrorism.
Terrorism at one time was considered primarily a political offence. However, to
an increasing degree terrorism is directed at non-political targets, or at society
as a whole; an example of this is the so-called Unabomber case. It is possible
that hacking may come to have more and more serious connotations. The speaker
also noted that there is a large gap in the awareness of the problem between
developed countries and the developing countries; this may be due to the fact
that 95% of the present ”computer power” is in the Western world. The devel-
oping countries often tend to have a low level of awareness of the dangers of
computer crime also to the developing countries themselves. A third and related
issue is that of cooperation. Some countries are already requesting help in
developing the appropriate legislation and structure for preventing and control-
ling computer crime.
One speaker noted that one computer-related crime so far not discussed at the
VI Colloquium was software piracy, a problem that is very widespread in a
number  of countries. Mr Kaspersen noted that there  were two conflicting
tendencies, one to expand the scope of intellectual property rights, another quite
the reverse to decrease this scope. He recognized the commercial interests
involved, but nonetheless did not regard it as a priority when dealing with
computer crime. Furthermore, he noted that there is a trend among producers of
copyrighted information to look to other distribution channels and protection
mechanisms. They realize that the open Internet environment will cause immense
problems for attempts to prevent and control copyright infringement.
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Another speaker referred to the use of computers for illegal purposes, such as
the spread of child pornography, or money laundering. The speaker suggested
that special police units should monitor those web-sites that have been used by
criminal organisations in order to detect the criminal activities. Dr Adamski noted
that police forces have in fact used hackers to monitor such criminal activities.
Moreover, in some countries the investigative measures allowed by law have
been developed in order to make these more applicable to the investigation of
computer crime. Mr Kaspersen raised the question of the desirability of police
monitoring of the Internet. He also noted that the use of hackers to assist the
police raises some problems. For example, should such hackers destroy web-sites
or otherwise interfere with the computer network, this is an offence in itself, even
if they act as agents of the police. Also police agents are bound by the law. Much
less should ”self-help” in policing the computer network be permitted, if this
involves illegal access to computer networks.
One speaker referred to problems associated with so-called ”chat clubs”,
which may raise concerns regarding the possibility of inappropriate contacts,
especially if the chat clubs involve children or young persons. Dr Adamski
emphasized the controversial nature of the issue of the responsibility of the
internet service provider to control the contents of the server. Such controls have
been opposed by various civil liberty organisations, on the grounds that it
constitutes censorship. Mr Kaspersen noted that the protection of children need
not be a matter of civil liberties. Parents should be empowered to do so, for
example by surfing the Internet together with their children, and by teaching their
children responsible behaviour. Such control need not involve censorship or other
violations of civil liberties.
Mr Kaspersen referred to the present work within the framework of the
Council of Europe on an ”Internet convention”, which would promote the
investigation, prosecution and adjudication of computer crimes. The convention
would be open also to non-member States of the Council of Europe.
Dr Adamski reviewed the needs for international cooperation. He referred to
the ten-point action plan adopted by the ”Group of 8” (P-8) at their meeting in
May 1998 in Birmingham, referred to in his paper. Some more specific guidelines
on the ten points are being developed. He concluded by questioning the role of
the penal law and of criminal justice in controlling computer crime.
7 Closing of the seminar
The VI European Colloquium was closed by Director Joutsen who thanked all
of the participants for their active participation, as presenters of the main papers,
as commentators and as participants. He noted that the edited report on the VI
Colloquium, together with the papers, would be published, in paper copy and
electronically on HEUNI’s web site.
Director Joutsen thanked the HEUNI staff members who had been involved
in the preparations for the VI European Colloquium, including Ms Kristiina
Kangaspunta, Ms Terhi Viljanen, Ms Kirsi Nissilä, Ms Natalia Ollus and Mr Sami
Nevala, and closed the VI Colloquium.
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Combatting Corruption:
Acts and Attitudes
Prof. Dr Petrus C. van Duyne
Tilburg University, Netherlands
The essentials of corruption
In 1517 a Dominican monk called Johann Tetzel sold letters of indulgence near
Wittemberg in Germany. The profits were intended for the new archbishop of
Mainz, Albrecht von Hohenzollern to recoup his high expenses incurred on
entering his dignity. The buyers were told that purchasing such letters would
shorten their stay in purgatory (Elton, 1971). Many pious Christians such as
Martin Luther  and  Desiderius Erasmus  were offended by this commercial
display of religious entrepreneurial skills and condemned it as ”corrupt”. Was
this qualification correct? Or was Tetzel just a fraudster and the whole enterprise
a huge fraud and deceit? This depends on how one interprets the ”rules and
regime of purgatory”. If these are Divine rules under a heavenly regime, known
to nobody, while the Rule Maker on High is accountable to no one, the promise
of ‘buying oneself out of the purgatory’may theologically be considered a deceit
or a fraud, but not corruption. Tetzel was guilty of selling worthless papers, but
he was not guilty of corruption, since there is no decision-maker who might have
freedom to comply or freedom to bend the rules of decision-making with which
he should comply.5
This historical ‘theological’introduction contains in a nutshell the components
of the concept of corruption. On the decision  side the components are: a
decision-maker whose decisions are guided by rules and criteria, from which he
has the power to deviate and who is in principle accountable for the propriety of
his decision-making to another authority. Absolute rulers and leaders, such as
the previous Tsars of Russia (before the revolt of 1905) might be arbitrary and
whimsical, but since they are unaccountable they are also ‘beyond corruption’.
Corruption is also directly related to discretionary freedom or power in the
decision-making process. When decision outcomes are predestined (another
theological concept) there is nothing that can be corrupted. Powerless people are
”below corruption”. One of the problems of a corruptor is to find out who has
the real power to perform his or her corrupt act: corruptors may also become a
victim of deceit by new Tetzels (Della Porta and Vannucci, 1997).
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5 This brief account does no justice to the complicated theological debate of salvation by faith alone
and the rejection of the intermediary priesthood, with which the reformation started.
Two additional components are still missing: (a) the exchange relation be-
tween a decision-maker and an interested person offering or promising an
advantage in exchange for a desired decision outcome and (b) the hidden,
improper nature of this exchange relation. If the decision-maker has to justify
his or her decision, this exchange relationship must remain hidden and has to be
replaced by deceitful, false justifications which are in agreement with the
accepted criteria of decision-making.
Defining corruption
Ordinary, daily concepts such as corruption are difficult to delineate, because
they are used in so many overlapping contexts. Therefore it can be approached
from various complimentary angles (Bull and Newell, 1997) which are parts of
the daily life in which corruption occurs: it can be approached from a legal,
economic, political or cultural comparative perspective (Lancaster and Monti-
nola, 1997). Most definitions contain one or more of the components described
above and are frequently overlapping. Looking for the lowest common denomi-
nator to be found in the literature (Wertheim and Brasz, 1961; Hoetjes, 1982,
Friedrich, 1989 and Huberts, 1992) I come to the following definition:
Corruption is an improbity or decay in the decision-making process in which
a decision-maker (in a private corporation or in a public service) consents to
deviate or demands deviation from the criterion which should rule his or her
decision-making, in exchange for a reward or for the promise or expectation
of a reward, while these motives influencing his or her decision-making cannot
be part of the justification of the decision.
This definition is a behavioural one: its focus is on the individual decision-
maker. It abstracts from politics and public administration, a legal system or
public opinion. As such it is in agreement with the principal-agent model
presented by Groenendijks (1997). It also abstracts from the legal system or the
contents of the reward: corruption as defined here does not need codified rules
which may be broken or the well-known ‘brown envelopes under the table’.
However, this individual decision-maker approach renders the definition rather
broad in its application. Strictly interpreted it may even be applicable in situations
which are considered outside its usual range of application, such as education.
For example, the decision-making parent may be induced to abandon his or her
principles of decision-making in favour of an advantageous trade-off in terms of
love and favours, such as the child bribing his dad:‘If you let me see ”Star Wars”,
I will wash the dishes. But do not tell mom!’ The tired dad accepts the offer and
allows sonny to watch the telly instead of doing his homework, as had been agreed
upon with mom. The father does not need to do the dishes and in addition gets
some appreciation from his son. From the social-psychological point of view
corruption is not exceptionable behaviour; it is all too human indeed. It permeates
many of our human relationships in which we have to make decisions. As Deflem
(1995) observes, it is not a feature of systems but a type of social (inter)action.
We all have principles, values and moral standards which are supposed to guide
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our small and big daily decisions in respect of others, but who among us lives
the righteous life of virtue, never allowing a deviation from the norm ‘in favour
of and in return for’? Puritanical societies may claim to follow strictly the narrow
path of virtue, but they are rarely associated with anything but rigidity and barren
cultures and hypocrisy, when the unsuccessfully smothered sinful tendencies
surface notwithstanding and have to be covered up. Psychologically ‘corruption’
is not an abnormal state of mind.
The broad reach of this definition is as such not problematic. It is precise and
capable of encompassing more specific definitions applicable to the relevant
sectors of social life, whether public, business or private, such as the situations
described by Gardener (1993). As a matter of fact it should also be able to
encompass historical variations of corruption (Johnston, 1992; Beare, 1997) or
national variations owing to culturally different concepts of proper decision-
making and accountability. This means that specific operationalisations may be
deduced from this definition context.
The concept of corruption should be clearly differentiated from fraud, embez-
zlement and the sheer abuse of power, to enrich oneself or one’s associates.
Corruption is not about putting one’s hand in the till and other acts which
prejudice the employer or the state, though such actions are frequently associated
with corruption. Technically corruption may entail fraud (and vice versa), but
that depends on the ‘administrative’ requirements of the surrounding legal
system. Likewise, stealing from the boss or from the state as such is not corrupt,
although corruption may be instrumental, for example the purchase of silence
from those who are informed. This may induce questions with very complicated
answers such as: were presidents such as Suharto, Marcos or Mobutu just thieves
or were they corrupt? Though such real-life situations may be very confusing,
this behavioural definition maintains the conceptual dividing lines.  It  also
provides a suitable compliment to the methodological questions related to
cross-cultural measurement, raised by Lancaster and Montinola (1997).
The observation that corruption itself is not abnormal behaviour should not
be confused with its political and economic appraisal over the last decades: the
moral appreciation and tolerance for this phenomenon has changed dramatically
in the last years and is nowadays found in juxtaposition with organised crime
and money-laundering (Goldstock, 1993; Arlacchi, 1993; Jacobs, et. al., 1994).
Apart from this moral perspective, the empirical basis of this phenomenon are
the decision-makers. Nevertheless, this behaviour has meaning only in the
decision-maker’s social environment, either in politics, public administration or
trade and industry. In the next section I will project this decision-maker in his or
her various social roles.
A classification of corruption
If the individual decision-maker and his or her social position are taken as the
point of departure, we may have to describe a large and somewhat chaotic range
of opportunities of corruption. In order to create some order I have made a simple
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classification based on a rough functional division of the decision situation: the
working environment in which the above components of corruption are present.
We have decision-makers in the public sectors, in the private sector and in politics
(Van Duyne, 1996). Between and within these sectors corrupt exchange relation-
ships may develop which influence the decision-making process in an improper
way.
This classification produces nine categories of corruption, if we differentiate
between corruptor and corruptee, between the person who induces or initiates
the corrupt exchange and who accepts it. In general it is difficult to make such a
differentiation. In simple cases this difference may be discerned: a civil servant
makes its clear he or she will not stamp the paper if . . . . Or: a contractor makes
it clear that granting the contract will result in some ‘extras’. In the typology of
Deflem (1995) these are simple cases of monetary corruption. However, in cases
of what Deflem calls bureaucratic corruption it is not so easy to discern who
initiated the corruption. When corruption has been systematised, as in Indonesia,
Russia or Italy, corruptors and corruptees frequently change roles. Who started
the corrupt deal in the Agusta affair? For this reason I have disregarded the three
extra categories based on which party takes the initiative.
Another aspect which remains implicit in our definition, is the transition of a
corrupt relationship into blackmail. Entering an improper exchange relationship
can imply engaging in lifelong ‘(im)moral bondage’, from which one cannot
walk away at will. The phrase ‘You owe me a favour’ may be a reminder as well
as a threat.
1 Public sector corruption between officials
There is so little known about the potential occurrence of corruption between
civil servants that one may ask whether it exists at all. Only the Dutch journalistic
investigator Bouman (1977) has devoted attention to this phenomenon. One of
the reasons for this blind spot may be that to outside observers civil servants in
their (inter)departmental dealings do not operate in such visible decision situ-
ations, and the ‘venal’exchange relation is more difficult to recognise. Moreover,
civil servants do not bribe each other with the proverbial thick envelopes for
which they do not even have the money. If an improper exchange relation
develops in a decision situation the pay-off will more likely be in terms of
Public Private Politics
Public sector X X X
Private Sector X X
Politics X
Table 1. Categories of corruption.
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non-monetary benefits or favours. Nor need these rewards reflect personal
advantage: the ‘official objectives’ of the department may be served by the
decision so that the appearance of probity may be upheld. Such behaviour may
even be admired as a display of the ‘clever use of sneaky alleys’, ‘unorthodox
management’, ‘greasing good interdepartmental relations’ or other forms of
‘daring leadership’ (Chibnal and Saunders, 1977). As long as there are no
rumours about direct personal gains related to the decisions made between civil
servants, it is very unlikely that the heavy negative label of corruption will be
used. A few examples may help to illustrate this.
• A senior civil servant has a private consultancy firm which silently acts as an
advisor for the building department of the town council. The head of that
department discovers this but consents to the arrangement, because the civil
servant knows how to wrangle difficult assignments.
• The heads of the responsible ministry and the municipal authorities come to
a mutually satisfactory agreement about the assignment of a major project to
a dubious waste processor, despite serious warnings.
• The research department or the scientific advisor of a ministry is cajoled into
producing the ‘desired’, but wrong figures concerning drug addiction and
consumption; or the ‘right’figures concerning sick-leave of teachers. (In these
cases the withholding of the reward functioned as blackmail in the back-
ground).
Though it is difficult to apply a legal definition of corruption to such murky
decision situations, I consider them important social-psychological breeding
grounds for more direct and discernable forms of corruption. For example, if one
accepts the provision of wrong information either for fear of missing a promotion
or because one seeks to improve the relationship with a more important (section
of the) department, one not only accept a corrupt decision situation, but one also
sets a precedent of fraud and deceit. The former socialist countries of Central
and Eastern Europe provide good examples of this mixture of corruption and
public deceit: either for personal gain or for fear of demotion, departments,
production sectors and production units knew that any figure they produced was
false. One can say that virtually all statistics were ‘bought’. No small wonder
that corruption developed in every branch of public life, a social feature which
was to be continued and expanded vastly during and after the transition to a
market economy. As far  as  the  Soviet  Union  (and  its successor  states) is
concerned the phenomenon grew with the unfolding of organised (economic)
crime since the last years of the Brezhnjev’s gerontocratic rule (Rawlinson,
1996)6
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6 The demise of the Soviet state liberated a considerable amount of capital from the ubiquitous
underground economy Sinuraja (1995), from which the nomenclature had always profited by
striking an alliance with the Vor v Zakonyi (thieves-in-law) and the new entrepreneurial professional
criminals, the avtoritety (Handelman, 1994; Kelly c.s., 1996; Waller and Yasmann, 1996).
2 Public/private sector corruption
The most familiar form of corruption is between a private person or corporation
and an official. However, this seemingly simple category covers various subcate-
gories and levels of corruption. The simplest form is one-on-one bribery: an
individual wants a service to which he or she is not entitled, or what the service
more quickly than is usual and offers a bribe. One may call this ‘front office’
corruption. The service to the corruptor is relatively simple and the material gains
are rather small: a stamp, a licence which is provided outside the normal
procedure, a parking ticket which is cancelled for half of the fine. Such individual
bribery may occur in every department, even when it is well managed. If that is
the case one speaks of the ‘few rotten apples in the barrel’. However, this
qualification may be a neutralisation technique of a negligent management,
which does not want to recognise that the barrel itself is affected, even if the
management is not itself willfully implicated (Van Duyne, 1994).
This leads to the higher level of managerial venality: a morally questionable
management which is poorly supervised and which wields broad discretionary
powers, which makes it attractive for valuable exchange relations. This is not the
playground for the individual citizen with his or her petty requests, but for people
with power. Heads of departments or (semi) government agencies bestowed with
the authority to grant licences meet business interests, which requires sensitive
and usually complicated extra-ordinary decisions procedures, which are all but
characterised by transparency (Vahlenkamp and Knauß, 1995). People of influ-
ence who have a perverted ‘credit of trust’ (Della Porta and Vannuci, 1997) know
how to work according to the bureaucratic stealth procedure:‘soaking’, ‘predi-
gesting’ the desired decision, followed by creating an atmosphere of complai-
sance in which colleagues are not supposed to be so frank as to say ‘no’. The
atmosphere of such frankness has disappeared long ago. In other words, corrup-
tion may be imbedded in a strategy of ‘decision cooking’, though such strategy
may succeed only in a dirty and murky organisational kitchen.
• The simplest form is of course one-on-one bribery: the payment of ‘backhan-
ders’ to officials: an applicant firm which has been granted a building contract,
a ‘difficult’ export licence or ‘valuable advice’ on how to circumvent export
quotas. A reward may be provided for this aid in cash or by something of an
equivalent value such as free travel or free decoration of the official’s home
or estate.
• In cases of multi-layer  decision-making the  decision-making process is
spread, since the request has to be channelled through the hierarchical corri-
dors of the bureaucracy. Here improper decision-making becomes a social-
psychological affair, requiring smooth preparation and an accommodating
rubber stamping attitude by several officials. Corruption becomes a ramified
departmental or sectional business, which contains several variations. In this
connection, it is enough to mention two types:
a) There are no daily relations between the lower management or executives
and the ‘outside world’, but the head of the department is corrupt. However,
it is not easy to conceal corrupt relationships and suspicions easily arise.
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The lower management face a difficult choice between showing disagree-
ment or going along and becoming morally implicated, even if they are not
actually a part of the scheme. In the end, they frequently become a part of
the scheme by being rewarded for their silence, ranging from small favours
to speedy promotions. Those who feel uneasy and frown upon what they
observe or surmise are considered a nuisance and removed to ‘safe places’,
leave the organisation or, if they are really troublesome, are threatened with
dishonourable dismissal. Sometimes an individual, disgruntled with the
rotten climate, becomes a whistleblower, a very perilous undertaking,
where legal protection is either absent or imperfectly codified (De Maria,
1997, Bovens, 1987).
b) It also happens that an entire public service unit has become corrupt in its
relationships with firms or individuals, without the knowledge or complic-
ity of the management. This happened in the public transport department
of Amsterdam. While the management locked itself away in its wooden
panelled boardrooms, seeing and hearing nothing, gross mismanagement
of assets and contracting out to corrupting entrepreneurs (who were ‘in-
duced’ or ‘forced’ to do so) had become daily practice, according to the
investigator. In another case an entire section of a customs unit took part in
a systematic VAT scheme to stamp T1-forms that falsely claimed export
from the EU to third countries (Van Duyne, 1995).
In such cases the corrupt attitude has become deeply rooted in the organisational
culture of the department. Such a culture will be continued by (sub)conscious
personnel policy that is aimed at creating a staff with a comparable attitude,
eschewing new staff which may ‘not feel comfortable in our surroundings’. I will
return to this important ‘human resource’ management in later sections.
3 Public sector/political corruption
The following category concerns the interaction between civil servants and the
holders of a political office, such as aldermen, members of parliament or
ministers. In the interplay between these actors the decision-makers may be the
civil servants as well as the politicians. More important is the question of the
improper exchange relation of interests. What are the improper favours and what
are the pay-offs? It is likely that the pay-offs will consist of money or something
which can be valued in monetary terms. The favour to be returned will rather be
of a personal nature.
• A local political dignitary intimates to the head of the environmental depart-
ment that if he tolerates a higher level of pollution then would normally be
permissible he need not worry about his career. It appears that the local
politician is himself a pig farmer who is in breach of the Manure Disposal
Regulation (Van de Berg, 1992).
• The reverse situation occurs when a political figure who wishes to be nomi-
nated for a high position in the public service is told ‘not to rock the boat’ by
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insisting on a critical investigation into the activities of a department. His
‘correct’ voting behaviour is ‘bought’ by the consideration of winning the
support of ‘important others’ in the department where later the decision about
his nomination will be taken.
This is an area with many grey transition zones which provide the social cultural
landscape in which ‘hard core’ corruption can grow and thrive. Hoetjes (1991)
calls such a landscape ‘corruptogenic’. I think such a euphemism does not do
justice to this phenomenon. If influence peddling, pulling strings and the making
of pay-offs in terms of ‘mutual aid’ become the background colour of decision-
making, I would rather call such a landscape outright corrupt.
The problem with this category of decision-making is that it escapes the legal
definition of corruption, while the corrupt conduct is difficult to prove because
of the frequent ambiguity of the decision-making criteria. Nevertheless such
conduct is covered by our definition, since the decision criteria which are
afterwards presented are mere pretenses to veil the real underlying exchange
relationship.
The decision situations in this category are not hypothetical. Within elite
groups in countries such as Belgium, France and Italy it is quite a political reward
for a high ranking party member to become the top civil servant in the town
council or even the mayor (for France, see Becquard-Leclerq, 1990). These are
no neutral nominations based on administrative skills, but politically highly
coveted places as ‘warehouses of rewards’to bestow on political friends, on finds
in the business community, eager for profitable contracts and the ‘respectable’
network of yes-men who get the ‘nickels and dimes’ in the form of smaller jobs
and favours. Does not this corrupt situation look very similar to the promotion
of a political figure to the post of mayor of Paris or Bordeaux? In brief, they are
the most favourable positions to create a personal party machine for the next
presidential election. Which mayor of Paris, later to become president, has not
been tainted with (the suspicion of) corruption?
It is interesting to observe that in this climate all participants usually oppose
any attempt to introduce decision criteria and to further transparency. Take for
example the tenacity with which the Belgian elite or the British Conservative
Party (Doig, 1996) resisted (or rather delayed) demands for transparency in these
matters. Is it not ‘only human’ that one does not vote against the interests of an
organisation or department where one covets a high position? The danger of the
‘only human’ argument is that it veils the lack of awareness of injustice (Un-
rechtsbewustsein, Vahlenkamp and Knauß, 1995) and the accompanying declin-
ing slope of morality.
4 Private sector corruption
Corruption in the private sector is mainly to be observed in trade and industry.
The most obvious situation of corruption is the negotiation of contracts in which
the negotiator solicits for ‘an extra’ or is ‘seduced’ (or hints that he or she very
much would like to be seduced) in return for the coveted order. This is an
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inter-business corruption, which does not exclude the potential for internal
corruption within a firm: the mechanism which has been described in the section
of corruption between civil servants applies here as well. For example, the stock
manager may be bribed to allow the embezzlement or the unauthorised ‘borrow-
ing’ of equipment by providing false receipts.
It is important to be precise in discerning neighbouring phenomena such as
fraud and corruption, while recognizing the ways they interact technically.
Systematic business fraud is rarely an activity carried out by one person alone.
It is difficult without buying at least the silent consent of someone else. As soon
as the corrupt scheme becomes more complicated it requires some accountancy
skills to make the figures ‘balance’: for example, the payments for the bribes
have to be accounted for by higher invoices or by fictitious payments to another
firm. In its turn this firm surmises (and condones) something improper and will
also demand a piece of the corrupt pie for its false invoices. Corruption gradually
spreads, leading to a corrupt market and to a deterioration of business morality.
A few examples can be taken from the broad spectrum of the fraud squads
and the fiscal police:
• The black accounts: unrecorded or black money flows in a firm create
accountancy problems which may be solved by ‘soliciting’ third parties to
provide aid in the form of inflated purchasing invoices, for example to cover
the unrecorded (black) buying of goods or the extra payments of wages. The
return favour may be a coveted contract or the promise (or hope) of estab-
lishing a long-term profitable business relationship. If such cases are discov-
ered by the fiscal police, they will normally not be labelled and recorded as
corruption but as tax fraud. In the construction industry (subcontracting with
black labour) and VAT scams such corrupt business practices have been the
cornerstones of extensive fraudulent schemes (Aronowitz, et. al., 1996; Van
Duyne, 1993; 1995).
• Price manipulation: this phenomenon implies the corrupt cooperation of
several partners in a number of related deals intended to influence prices to
the detriment of third parties. In the real estate market it frequently occurs that
brokers are bribed to inflate the assessed value of real estate, which is sold
and resold by a network of real estate dealers in order to increase artificially
the price of the property. This mechanism may be used to launder black money
or to obtain inflated mortgages to the detriment of the mortgage banks.
• Sales manipulation: this is the well-known practice of using lavish gifts to
seduce clients into buying products or services. This is an age-old and common
practice and every firm which has a purchasing department knows its repre-
sentatives may be bribed by overly lavish gifts into buying more expensive
products or contracts from the most generous firm. In the field of public health,
doctors are less likely to be labelled corrupt even though they nevertheless
accept gifts, free journeys to summer courses and other favours from the
pharmaceutical industry, favours which are intended to induce them to pre-
scribe the more expensive brands instead of the cheaper generic brands from
the parallel market.
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• Bidding manipulation: this is the widely spread practice of tampering with
the regulations concerning fair bidding practices, regulations which are de-
signed to lead to the assignment of the contract to the lowest bidder offering
the most efficient execution of the job. In this area, information is the most
valued and traded article: how can one penetrate the principal and obtain
information about the competing bidders? Andvig (1995) provides a lively
description of information brokers who buy information from employees to
sell it to the bidding suppliers. Information brokerage with all its corrupting
side effects has developed into a global business (De Waal Malefijt, 1996;
Hoogenboom, 1996). If the number of suppliers to the principals is limited,
there may also develop a conspiratorial ring of entrepreneurs who grant each
other contracts by rotation: by consent they determine the lowest bid. Strictly
speaking this is not corruption but bid-rigging, although such a conspiracy
operates most smoothly if it is greased with inside information, which has its
price (Dohmen and Langenberg, 1994).
These are not exotic examples, nor do they concern a gradual slipping into a
corruptive exchange relationship.7 Instead, in the branches of trade and industry
in which they occur they signify an already decayed moral landscape, in which
many actors manage to neutralise their behaviour by calling it ‘marginal’,
invoking the ‘everyone does it’ excuse or (preferably) by referring to the need to
act as a  ‘sharp businessman’ in order  to  survive in  a  world  of  cut-throat
competition and marginalised profits. When businessmen operate in a semi-
closed network, the qualification of being a ‘sharp businessman’ may be some-
what self-glorifying: as soon as entrepreneurs, cushioned by the protecting circle
of their corruptive network, are on their own, it remains quite uncertain whether
their erstwhile success was due to their imagined business skills. The en-
trepreneurial landscape in the construction industry as described by Dohmen and
Langenberg (1994) for the southern Netherlands, and by Ludwig (1992a), Müller
(1994), Kilian (1996) and Stemmer and Augustin (1996) for Germany (e.g.
Berlin) revealed a widely accepted practice of corruption, or at least a ‘mutual
aid’ system in tax evasion, subsidy fraud and illegal price setting. Complying
with the ‘rules’ of such circles appeared to contribute more to the profits of the
participants then did their professional acumen.
5 Private sector/political corruption
In every country there is a continuous interaction between the private sector and
the holders of political office. As soon as the first merchants became a distinct
group they needed the protection of the (royal) authorities, who in their turn
needed money in the form of taxes. Meanwhile the interactions of the modern
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7 At the time of writing an extensive fiscal fraud case involving a Dutch bank and several senior
members of pension funds was revealed. Large amounts of undeclared money had been transferred
to Swiss accounts in order to be reinvested on the stock exchange. Some senior officers of the pension
funds had been bribed to go along.
state have become vastly more complicated. Though in its simplest form the
stereotypical businessman only wants (big) money, while the politician strives
for (more) power, they change roles frequently. In doing so, they frequently do
not shed some old habits, such as their lust for money or power. History has
shown that this mixture yields an interesting potential for corruption. Various
combinations have been revealed of which only the following are presented here:
• Party interests: political figures have corrupt relationships with businessmen,
not for personal gains, but to further the interests of their political party. These
interests are particularly at stake at times of (re)-election, which are increas-
ingly  costly. This has provided the traditional playground  for exchange
relationships with private entrepreneurs, ranging from ‘classical’ organised
crime (Arlacchi, 1986; Abadinsky, 1991) to respectable building contractors
(Ludwig, 1992b). Every monetary support is welcome, but in politics and
business there is ‘no such thing as a free lunch’: not all firms contributing to
political parties do so for ideological reasons, but as an investment in the
benevolent attitude of the benefiting party or office holder towards later
favours in the form of contracts. This is particularly valuable when the elected
office holder has an important role in the allocation of such contracts (as is
the case in France; Ruggiero, 1996). Depending on the social-political culture
such expectations are expressed explicitly in a backstage deal or are implicitly
assumed to be honoured. Although the politicians who are involved invariably
express their ‘selflessness’ (as did the accused in the Belgian Agusta scandal),
there are good reasons to be suspicious, not the least because coming to be
known as a skilled fund raiser will evidently increase one’s prestige and his
or her rank in the hierarchy.
• Personal enrichment: when improper relationships ‘on behalf of the party’are
accepted as non-deviant conduct, the climate is such that the party will not
insist that profitable fund-raisers will fully empty their pockets on behalf of
their party. No one will ask whether there is a personal rake-off for the sly
fund-raisers themselves. Why should they not ask for personal favours in
return for their profitable interventions ‘in high circles’ on behalf of their
generous business friends? In Europe it is not only Italy to which one can point
the finger. Also in Britain during the conservative era, and in France, Spain
and Belgium, cases have been discovered that have lead to dismissals and
arrests (and to accompanying attempts to cover up the matter).
• Conflict of interest, which may more appropriately be called a co-mingling of
interests, because most corrupt politicians or businessmen do not feel any
conflict, such as the unrepentant Berlusconi, for whom a public office appears
to be an extension of his business-empire. Apart from this extreme, but not
exceptional caricature, the interaction or rather the entanglement is frequently
subtle and veiled. As can be observed in the improper exchange relationships
between (top) civil servants and politicians, the most efficient grease consists
of highly valued jobs. Which politician will vote for strict environmental
regulations when he or she covets joining the valued ranks of the ‘captains of
(polluting) industry’? Conversely, a businessman who has become a politician
may keep his interest in ‘his’ branch of industry by retaining his seat in the
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boards of administration of his previous corporations or in a company’s board
of directors. In the Netherlands such a situation induced a high-ranking
Member of Parliament connected to the pharmaceutical industry, to carry his
weight in a decision-making procedure concerning the pricing policy on
medicines by addressing the responsible minister directly on behalf of his
firm. This was more then lobbying: it was sheer influence peddling.
There has always been an interaction between the private sectors of trade and
industry and there are many advocates who plead for more participation of
professional politicians in business life so that they can ‘enrich their insight’ in
‘real life’. There is nothing against such mental enrichment, as long as the various
roles are transparently marked and separate. However, when this principle
becomes diluted and the demand for accountability is no longer insisted upon,
the likelihood of material enrichment becomes bigger. As soon as more politi-
cians and businessmen are engaged in such selfish relationships, neutralising
arguments (‘politicians should not live in ivory towers’; ‘businessman may be
prominent political managers while being in touch with society’) and mutual
covering of interests will become a part of the elite life of ‘highly placed circles’.
We may then enter the next stage of corruption.
6 Corruption between politicians
Some may consider corruption between politicians a tautology: is the stage of
politics not full of dishonesty and corruption? Are politicians not continually
engaged in mutual trade-offs of all kind? Although I agree that the political scene
is frequently not of the highest moral standards, puritanical righteousness is
seldom if ever the success formula in an open multi-party democratic system.
For example, coalition-building requires some deviation from certain principles
in a spirit of give-and-take in order to keep negotiations open. This does not mean
that political decision-making processes could not be improper in the sense of
being reprehensible. According to our definition this is the case when the
exchange of interests should not have been an element in the considerations of
the decision-making and therefore has to remain hidden. In such a case the
principle of accountability will be violated: the exchange of interests is kept from
the records and will not be a part of the public justification or explanation, which
is essential in a democratic system. Although the principle of corruption remains
the same, it will oftentimes be difficult to label a murky incident of decision-
making as ‘corrupt’. There are many and broad grey transition zones in this field
indeed. I will therefore give only a few recognizable examples.
• Cover-ups: although it is not a corrupt act to cover up the evidence of mistakes
and improper conduct, cover-ups may very well slip into decision situations
and become the hidden trade-off in an exchange relation when the support of
a third person or party is necessary to keep an embarrassing situation in the
closet. This is not necessarily an inter-party exchange of interests. Silence or
the right voting behaviour may also be ‘bought’within one party, for example
by the offer of a job or a promotion (or conversely by the threat of ‘an early
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end to a promising career’). The mutual cover-up may become a part of the
political craft between and within parties:‘If my scandal is disclosed, than I .
. . ’. The outcome of such a political climate will be a silent collective
harbouring of skeletons in the political closet: the skeleton of your political
neighbour may be traded off against your own embarrassing past. The network
of solidarity has turned into a network of balanced blackmail, into a kind of
collective negative reward.
• Nepotism itself is not necessarily a corrupt act: helping relatives, friends or
members of one’s own closed circle in order to obtain a job is as old as state
building. During the eighteenth century selling jobs was a normal practice in
most parts of Europe.8 However, it infringes the modern criterion of compe-
tence: the right person in the right place without a leg up. As we have seen
before, jobs represent important assets in the hands of politicians. Already
Louis XIV realised that he could turn an unruly nobility into a herd of creepers
by bestowing jobs in his court. In modern times such a job-creating clientilistic
situation is a pervasive breeding ground for corruption, as can be observed in
every country where the elite vehemently opposes any attempt to privatise
large sections of state-owned corporations. Being in charge of such a corpo-
ration (or having influence) means that one can create a retinue of dependent
yes-men or grateful persons who will later feel obliged to return the favour.
The service in return may be collected years later:‘You owe me a favour’may
very effectively affect the decision situation. Corruption does not need to
consist of an immediate exchange of interests. Providing jobs may be consid-
ered an ideal exchange relation between politicians (and senior civil servants):
it costs no money, and it is hardly considered corruption. It is certainly not
considered corruption by most players in this field:‘Those who hold them-
selves incorruptible bend like a thin cane as soon as they feel the slightest
breeze which may affect their career’ (Van Duyne, 1996).9
Corruption between politicians may become more than just a reprehensible
exchange of interests. It may develop into a polluted political climate in which
democratic and accountable decision-making will be so deeply eroded that only
a few insiders know how decisions are being made. This intransparency rein-
forces corruption, because the only way to serve your interests and to penetrate
this opacity is to become a part of the personal clientilistic network: you must
have a patron who acts as a guide or who may even provide you with a position,
which allows you to build up your own retinue. In such a corrupt political
landscape it is almost pointless to look for evidence of individual cases of
corruption: these are just surface symptoms. Oftentimes the trade-off, the bribe,
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8 For a brief overview, see Swart (1949/1990). For the monarchies the selling of offices was an
efficient way of extracting money while avoiding the costs of running the office, such as the costs
of the collection of taxes. Also in the Dutch Republic the sale of offices and contracts between
families to transfer such office-property was widespread and accepted.
9 Becquart-Leclercq (1990) describes the way successful French mayors establish a kind of personal
fiefdom by a mixture of privileges bestowed on political friends, friendly decisions, nominations,
etc., thereby creating a network of solidarity. The concept of ‘fiefdom’ will be discussed later.
is a silent agreement or even a ‘moral code’ of later favours: only outsiders or
beginners need a verbatim agreement. While the number of corruptors and
corruptees is increasing and they are changing their roles, hard evidence evapo-
rates, such as the awareness of (im)probity. Reminders of ‘accountability’ and
transparency are waved away as ‘bookish’ principles which have nothing to do
with the ‘subtleties of real political life’.
These categories of corruption cover most corrupt decision-making situations.
Together they do not provide a new model, although most of the existing
explanatory models can easily be fitted into this scheme. An important element
of this scheme has not yet been elaborated: the role of the leader.
Corruption as a leadership disease
Like the proverbial fish that starts to rot from the head downwards, in organisa-
tions corruption develops frequently (but not always) as a top-down disease. As
may already be deduced from the description of the six categories of corruption,
this process is quite human and the transition from non-corrupt but questionable
conduct to the first stages of corruption may unfold even to the participants
themselves as an unnoticed growth process. To sketch this process in this section
I will not describe the obvious and blatant forms of corruption, but elaborate on
this ‘twilight’ zone, in which it is not so easy to recognize corrupt conduct, while
the symptoms may easily be explained away as normal management practice.
One can say that there is a self-evident relationship between corruption and
the hierarchical position in an organisation: the higher one is placed in an
organisation  and  the more one  can  decide, the  more one  is vulnerable to
corruption. This is not necessarily a general truth: there are cases of honest, but
disorderly and sloppy managers, who appear to be blind to what is happening in
the lower echelons. Nevertheless, in both cases corruption has developed into an
organisational disease, because of defective leadership, which allows standards
for proper conduct to erode. In this section I will examine this leadership disease.
The hidden seeds of leadership corruption
The tragedy of corruption is hidden in the paradox that it does not need to be
alien to (technically) successful leadership: it can develop alongside successful
management during which it may remain unseen (at first) or veiled and denied
(during later stages) by the halo effect of the successes of the praised leader. If
the road to hell is paved with good intentions, the road to corruption may follow
the shining path of success. Depending on the surrounding social-political
climate, the first steps on this road are not causally connected to corruption and
they may even be rationalised under the heading ‘the good leader deserves the
best’. There is a built-in corruptive trap in this rationale.
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The phase of extravagance
Let me summarize the successful career of a good secretary of state for defence
who did not succeed in becoming a minister. Before becoming secretary of state
the politician had been mayor of a provincial town in the province of North
Holland. After he had been installed as mayor his expenses for representation
began to increase, first gradually, but soon more than tenfold. Despite (in his
opinion because of) this expensive way of fulfilling his office he tried hard to
defend the interests of the decaying maritime town. If only he had been able to
justify his expenses for copious meals, his taxi drivers waiting for hours while
their metres kept running, and other symbols of being-there-as-the-important-
mayor, or had simply taken care to collect the bills and receipts, he might have
got away with such squandering and gaudy conduct, as silent complaints about
this apparently wasteful leader had been kept inside. As secretary of state he
topped this display of extravagance by ordering an expensive but unsuitable
aeroplane for his many trips to his foreign colleagues, against all expert advice!
Otherwise his department and Parliament were satisfied with his handling of
sensitive defence policy issues at a time of shrinkage after the end of the Cold
War, and they swallowed his financial exploits. He survived his first term without
too much criticism. But during the following general elections the clouds of the
past appeared in the sky: journalists started to dig into his financial history as
mayor. Even though formally no misconduct has been established, seniors in his
party began considering him a ‘bad example’of sloppy, indulgent public admini-
stration and his name simply stopped being mentioned for a second term.
There is not the slightest indication that this secretary of state might have been
corrupt or sleazy. Even so, his extravagant conduct may be considered the first
phase in the development of a leadership style which deviates from proper
managing standards. It first affects the principle of proper parsimonious ‘house-
keeping’ in the use of the finances and assets of the organisation. Secondly the
related accountability and the tangible demonstrations of this, such as keeping
the receipts for the expenses, were neglected. In addition it sets the example for
middle management and for other staff.
While sketching and illustrating the winding road towards corruption, I will
extend this still ‘innocent’ example with other non-hypothetical modes of con-
duct of questionable leadership. My starting point is still the outwardly successful
and praised leader.
The erosion of accountability
A successful leader, such as our secretary of state, faces an intricate paradox: the
more successful he is the more people will understandably not only trust him,
but will also make allowances for his whims in other matters. What is the
paradox? The paradox is that the increase in trust is inversely related to the
principle of accountability but also to the mental openness to critical evaluation
of the deeds of the leader. Psychologically the successful leader will gradually
be deprived of negative feedback, simply because of his or her success. Later, on
the occasions when his or her acumen or good luck has left him or her, mildly
36
expressed concern or critical evaluation (even with a positive intention) is not
welcomed or will be treated with impatience.
This may be an important phase in the development of the leader and of his
or her organisation. Will the leader still maintain a sufficient degree of self-criti-
cism and will he or she accept it from others or will the leader develop a real
aversion for a critical exchange of opinion and independent minds? If the latter
tendency develops, one may observe a professional leadership deformation in
which compliance with the principle of accountability and transparency will
gradually be circumvented or avoided, if there is no obligatory external auditing.
Internal auditing tends to turn into a fig leaf of ‘plausible’ explanations for
unplausible expenses. Those who still have the nerve to ask questions are
browbeaten in the social climate of going along with the boss. Bookkeepers or
administrators who become exasperated with the continuous undermining of
their professional ethics and standards leave the organisation one by one. Those
who stay may feel subjected to such continuous humiliation or embarrassment
that they may ultimately become whistle blowers.
Those who leave will naturally be replaced by new staff who fit better into the
‘profile’ of the organisation which is characterised by an acceptance of or a
devotion to the hierarchy of the organisation. This comes down to accepting the
results of the erosion of the principle of accountability: the opacity of the
organisation in general and the intransparency of personal decision-making in
particular. To those who acquiesce in this situation things so far look transparent;
it seems as if the organisation depends on the clear rule of one man, not on the
rule of principles and standards.
The ownership phase
Meanwhile we have reached an important transition phase: while incorporating
the standards of decision-making in his or her own person, the leader of the
organisation starts behaving as the owner of the organisation. He or she virtually
owns the place, the assets and the people, since the leader feels that he or she is
the (indispensable) one who has the ‘natural’ right to decide what to do with all
of it. Although the leader may still pay lip service to conventional standards and
principles of management, he or she determines what is responsible manage-
ment. There is some subtle difference with the display of extravagance with
which I started this description. While there will not be less squandering, we now
face the blurring of the use of the assets of the organisation for private and
organisational aims, understandable if one ‘owns’ the place. With expenditure
for ‘entertainment purposes’ already high, it is increasingly unclear whether the
expenses are made for the promotion of the organisation or for the needs of the
leader to live in the lap of luxury. This ‘need’ will be rationalised as ‘necessity’
(in the early stages) or just taken for granted later (the ‘natural’ rights of the
leader). Case studies and investigations by the police or accountants repeatedly
reveal an exorbitant ‘declaration behaviour’ of managers who considered their
department or company virtually as their own household, the assets of which
they could disburse at will, mixing private and business expenses ‘all for the good
of the firm’.
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Court building and Caligula appointments
Within the organisation two social processes consolidate and eventually further
the growth towards corruption: court building and an unaccountable recruitment
procedure of new staff, which is related to court building.
As stated before, a leader who is accustomed to unaccountability shies away
from employees who might display an independent mind: the very symptom of
it may be enough. Such a leader needs an inner circle of reliable yes-men for his
or her daily monologues and the daily management, just as the feudal lord needed
his chancellor and retainers sitting around and subserviently listening to him. For
middle management, usually the mainstay of the organisation, this negative role
model can be highly contagious. Their loyalty to the organisation is likely to
wane, to be replaced by a personal orientation to getting a share in the spoils and
prerogatives of the leader. To ‘earn’ such privileges one has to be somewhat ‘like
the boss’ in the first place: either in ideas, tastes, values and (very important)
laughing about the boss’s jokes. Displaying some real skill, but -more impor-
tantly- avoiding the risks inherent in independent actions, may also contribute to
moving up the ladder to the panelled board rooms of the inner circle. This inner
circle of the organisation develops like a court, guarding its precious position
and sharing the same opinions and prejudices, particularly towards the ‘others’
lower in the hierarchy or in the outside world.
This court building has far reaching social-psychological consequences. I
mentioned already the pressure on the staff (and its morale) and the bias towards
an obedient ‘profile’. This tendency may become a dominant trait in human
resource management. A tendency to share the same attitudes, reflected in
feelings and values, grows into overriding selection mechanisms which are
applied to newcomers as well as to the existing lower level staff. It leads to one
of the most important losses in decision-making standards: a deterioration in the
recruitment standard which is supposed to protect the minimum quality of human
capital.
Given the building of an organisational court, recruitment develops more
along the line of who is liked by the leader and the leader’s underlings than along
the lines of selection according to the required skills. This does not imply that
no one will pay attention to quality, but it does imply a shift in emphasis which
may become increasingly biassed. One can say that applicants who have an
independent mind will, even if they display the required skills, have a lower
probability of being appointed. This likelihood is inversely related to the distance
to the leader: the nearer to the leader the more important it is to reveal the ‘right
character’ (towards the leader and the leader’s court), not the technical skills. It
goes without saying that becoming a member of the inner court itself will turn
out to be more a character and personality contest than a contest of quality and
skills.
Within this context the phenomenon of favouritism is more likely than not to
slip in. The leader is in a position to ‘reward a good personality’ at will or to
appoint someone from outside, because he or she wants to bestow a favour (or
worse, because the leader owes a favour). Consequently one may witness what
I have called in Van Duyne (1996) ‘Caligula appointments’: in the same way as
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emperor Caligula, the ‘owner’ of the Roman Empire, could appoint his horse a
consul (according to legend) the ‘owner-boss’ may feel free to appoint whoever
he or she likes, irrespective of quality. This quality is usually mediocre at best,
since talented people tend to become troublesome one day, unless they match
their talents with an even greater lack of ‘spine’ and cynicism.
From favouritism to clientilism
Caligula appointments are not necessarily unambiguous symptoms of clien-
tilism, although at this stage we are on the very threshold of it. When it is a favour
bestowed on someone, it is a one-sided generous action. However, very few
people are so generous or full of self-denial as not to turn such a one-sided gesture
into a two-sided exchange, nor is the favourite in a position to neglect his or her
benefactor. Having once ‘received’ a position in the organisation, the recruit is
the boss’ pet and realises that he or she should not bite the hand that feeds him
or her, which means that the new recruit will always lend support. Such Caligula
appointees are usually not harmless lower employees helped with a meaningless
just-being-there job, but frequently the omnipresent ‘right hand’ of the leader,
having a power position of their own, although it will only be a derivative one.
Caligula appointees will try to strengthen their position by attracting their own
little Caligula appointees, while the other courtiers will sense the importance of
following the example in nominating their own retainers or little Caligula clones.
Gradually clientilism permeates the social fabric and the way of running the
organisation. When a Caligula can appoint his horse a consul, the ménagement
may become a ménagerie.
We can say that the organisation has now passed the threshold of corruption.
The proper decision-making standards have been eroded and replaced by com-
plicated social exchange mechanisms such as: we vote for the suggestions of our
benefactors lest their protection or the flow of their favours might dry up. This
attitude radiates downwards along the ladder of the hierarchy, while the organ-
isational aims have been replaced by an internal competition for the crumbs
which have remained from the bigger spoils. As the staff has already been
‘cleansed’ of any independent minds or professionals who would uphold their
standards, the lower executive echelons are likely to copy the examples of the
boss and his or her underlings. In some way they may feel justified in acting as
‘shareholders’ in the firm, which has developed some features of a mediaeval
‘fief ’, including the privileges and prerogatives of the boss and the derivative
privileges of his or her retinue and their retainers. From the psychological point
of view this is quite understandable. It is much more satisfying to wield some
personal power than it is to be part of a system of abstract, impersonal standards.
Psychologically, the objective Weberian bureaucratic standards may seem a
deviation from the human tendency towards such personal households or ‘fiefs’.
The pre-bureaucratic management principles of mediaeval and early capitalist
times are a very natural outcome of a personal leadership style indeed.
In this example the development of clientilism has been described as a
social-psychological growth process, isolated from the surrounding culture,
although it may be embedded in a wider social system. The reason for describing
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it in isolation is that it demonstrates the gradual ‘sneaky’ but psychologically
‘normal’ growth of corruption. I consider clientilism the first unambiguous
symptom of it. Allowing clientilism to become part of the recruiting process
implies deviating from the decision-making standard of recruiting the best. The
personal exchange relation starts permeating the decisions: I will appoint you
and further your career if I can rely on your support. Or: I will support you if you
help me with a job or promotion. Within the right social climate (as is the case
with ‘gentlemen’ in higher circles), it is most unusual and vulgar to express such
things. Of course not! Nothing has happened but that we have ‘helped some
friends’. Who will call this corrupt, when this is exactly ‘what friends are for’?
When we summarize the growth process of corruption within our hypothetical
organisation, we have described an organisation managed like a personal house-
hold, in which decision-making is no longer considered a rational process
potentially tested against standards and accountable to others. It has become the
product of the unquestioned personal insight of the leader, who is supported by
his or her court of yes-men who tend to reproduce his or her example in matters
of (ab)using the organisational assets as well as in matters of personal court
building. A personal decision-making habit has developed and it is considered
natural that the outcome of decisions are favours bestowed on favourites or
clients, while withholding a favour is considered a punishment. In such an
organisation the seeds of corruption have sprouted and grown, shaping a non-
transparent landscape. The extent of corruption depends on collateral factors,
such as the surrounding political and business culture.
Corruption in a broader landscape
As is the case with every disease, the leadership disease described in the previous
section may have many manifestations. These depend on the nature of the
interactions with the environment, which determines the rules of external ac-
countability. This external accountability may be imposed by the law and the
enforcement policy as well as by normal business practice and public morality.
For example, all countries with a capitalist market economy will have a kind of
corporate law stipulating the minimal administrative requirements regarding the
external accountability. These not only safeguard the interests of the public
finances, safeguarded by the Inland Revenue Service, but also those of private
debtors and investors. In addition, public morality will contain mainly unwritten
and unsystematised and sometimes populist standards for the accountability of
public services and political office holders. The emergence and development of
the disease, growing from circumventing (some) rules, possibly followed by
purposeful evasion of accountability and eventually in the end leading to venality
(although this linear development is not necessary) has to be projected against
this background of positive law (and the enforcement of it) and public morality
at large.
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Commercial fraud, corruption and accountability
In a commercial organisation external accountability is financial in the first place,
leaving the entrepreneurs within their enterprise much legal latitude to act as they
deem fit. There is nothing wrong with that and it should be pointed out that in
the context of a legitimate enterprise some aspects of the suggested ‘leadership
disease’ are legally not an expression of any venality; indeed, they are even
heavily protected by private law. For example, the ‘ownership’ concept: in
one-man firms, majority shareholderships or family enterprises such ‘ownership
feelings’ by a boss or by a group of principals has a well-established legal basis.
The managers/owners have the freedom to appoint whom they like and dismiss
them at will (within the requirements of labour laws) without any corruption,
simply because there are no impersonal decision standards or codes of proper
conduct for these matters. This management may be considered whimsical,
unethical, dishonest and deceitful towards the staff, but as long as the owner(s)
of the enterprise do not defraud other entrepreneurs, the customers or the public
finances, there is no violation of applicable accountability standards for the
decision-making within the firm. Hence, in principle there need be no erosion
towards corruption despite possibly blatant unethical conduct.
Where does corruption come into play? Let us analyse the development of
corruption from inside to outside: from corruption within the enterprise to
corruption with the outside word. Our point of departure is the simple baseline
of a small firm in a surrounding with little corruption.
Complicity and inducement
Psychologically corruption within a company is likely to start as a form of
seduction or inducement into complicity with the wrongdoing of the manager or
someone in charge of a section. A need may arise to share the spoils. The
perpetrators either find out that it is technically impossible to carry out the
scheme themselves, or their misconduct is detected and they attempt to buy their
way out: ‘If you keep quiet (decision not to report) there is something in it for
you, too.’ This basic interaction is likely to grow with the size of the company
and the scale of the transgression; for the simple technical reason of internal and
external rules of accountability, the books must ‘balance’. For example, the
systematic embezzler within a firm who has no access to the ledgers will soon
need the support of the bookkeeper. Only bookkeepers who operate ”solo” may
be in a position to defraud their boss or firm without needing to buy silence or
complicity. In the CID files describing the scams of companies or their staff this
corruptive element is frequently neglected, and remains in the shade of the basic
offences: the suspects who were corrupted into complicity are labelled only as
accomplices, not as corruptees. From the investigatory or prosecutorial perspec-
tive this ‘neglect’ is understandable: when managers bribe their own staff or this
bribing takes place at the executive level, this is not covered by the penal code
as corruption but as criminal incitement. Also in the literature on corporate
misconduct one does not find this conduct described as corruption, but as a
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deviation from professional ethics. For example, the cases of corporate (criminal)
misconduct summarised by Mokhiber (1988) are described in terms of conflict
of interest, criminal neglect, pressure on staff (‘do you value your job?’, ‘Who
pays your salary?’). These are correct qualifications, but they are not labelled in
terms of corruption, which also applies.
When the dishonest scheme unfolds and grows, this simple baseline of
corruption becomes increasingly ramified, although the extent and nature of it is
technically a derivative of the basic offence and of the branch of trade or industry.
When we first look at the inside ramifications and assume a fraudulent managing
director (or his or her adjunct), the first person who is at risk to be bribed is the
bookkeeper or accountant. When the objective is ‘only’ embezzlement, the
ramification will remain very restricted. However, if the core business of the
company itself is involved, the fraudulent provision of (legal) goods and services,
the ramifications of corruption are bound to sprout along the sensitive points of
accountability. In such cases, not only does the money flow have to be tampered
with, but also the stock of goods and the registration of the services (such as the
work hour registration) have to balance fictively. Rewards (and its shadow side,
threats) follow the control points of the paper work. The following example from
Van Duyne (1995) may illustrate the development in which fraud, corruption and
violence were intertwined.
Boris Rawfist was an important link in the fraud scams in the meat industry
in the Dutch southern province Brabant, where he ruled as a despot over his
meat company. As the profit margins in the meat industry are meagre indeed,
he has found fraudulent ways to increase his net profits. His staff complied:
if he could not corrupt his staff, he threatened them verbally and physically.
However, when he needed a new accountant, he forgot to get the accountant
accustomed to his way of doing business. One day the accountant learned that
the whole paperwork of the company was a complete fraud, and every
employee appeared to have been bought with black payments or intimidated
into compliance. He reacted naively and told his boss, who exploded into his
usual rage, waving his heavy fists, calling him names, alternating this with
promises of a good salary. The accountant took the threats and his professional
ethics more seriously than the promises and left in fear and disgust. After his
dismissal he became victim of continuous threats. His place was taken over
by the boss’s relatives, who did not need to be bought because they already
shared in the spoils.
A similar development could be observed in a case of organised toxic waste
fraud at a disposal plant in the Rotterdam harbour. The company started as a
legitimate firm. However, the managers soon began to tamper with all the
procedures of disposal and processing, which implied creating a phoney paper
trail of the successive control steps in the recycling of the waste. This was
facilitated by a mixture of ‘ethical cleansing’of the staff and high wages for those
who were willing to comply with the fraudulent system set up at the control
points of all the processing units of the plant. Needless to say, the plant was being
run by very satisfied employees (Eshuis and Van den Berg, 1996). This collective
satisfaction with the generous rewards for law-breaking was no longer experi-
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enced as collective corruption, but as a natural consequence of daringly success-
ful management, which was finally being disturbed by a ‘narrow-minded bu-
reaucracy’. In two other companies (one waste processing firm and one construc-
tion firm) of which the managers were prosecuted, the incensed employees, who
might have feared losing their surplus income, took to the streets to demonstrate
on behalf of their ‘hero-managers’ who had ‘only defied the system’ in making
the company profitable again. All of these are local Dutch examples. However,
it would be of interest to review international fraud cases such as the Guinness
affair, the Banco Ambrosiano case or the BCCI case also from this perspective
of complicity and inducement (Kochan & Pym, 1987; Cornwell, 1984; Adams
and Frantz, 1992)
The legitimate market, commercial fraud and corruption
Fraudulent and corrupt firms as described above operate in real markets, selling
real goods and services made cheaply through fraudulent means to ‘non-crimi-
nal’ entrepreneurs. This requires some stability and satisfied customers. There-
fore, we should also look at the surrounding entrepreneurial landscape of traders
who benefit  from these  scams. In  order  not  to confuse commercial  fraud
conspiracies with corruption, I differentiate between the two conducts: on the
one hand the mutual intentions of the perpetrators are already directed towards
a common fraud scheme, and on the other hand there may be a need to bribe a
fellow entrepreneur into complicity. The difference is important, conceptually
as well as from the perpetrator’s point of view, although in the dynamics of the
fraud scheme the difference may soon fade away.
Corruption in the context of fraud may be considered an investment in safety,
albeit an ambiguous one. Operating within the well-known and relatively safe
‘fraudulent orbit’of fellow fraudsters provides relative safety, but the commercial
outlets may turn out to be too narrow. As soon as fraudsters expand their business
they have to leave their circle and must enter the broader legitimate market,
operating below market price (for example because of VAT or EU-fraud), facing
an increased risk of disclosure; the same is true of the eager buyers, who may
have to answer awkward questions from the fiscal inspector (‘You have changed
from your regular supplier to one who is really very cheap, haven’t you? Were
you not aware . . . . ?’). Since most people are not only greedy but want to avoid
risk, making people accept such risks requires the provision of ‘extras’ to the
management (or the purchasing director) to enter the scheme, either silently or
explicitly. These extras are more than the ‘odd side of a smoked salmon or a
bottle of champagne’,  creating moral  and commercial  dilemmas  for  those
wavering between tough or fair competition (Levi, 1987).The more the external
accountability is at risk, the higher the price, but also the more elaborate the
mutual constructions to veil (parts of) the transactions. Fraud investigations
reveal a variety of corruptive involvement, ranging from minor ‘blind-eye’
corruption to direct payments to keep the corrupted customer happy. Needless
to say, the demarcation lines between the various shades of corruption are faint
indeed.
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Willingly accepting cheap goods or services supplied by a fraudster is the
‘lowest degree’ of corruption, which may not even be recognized as such. For
example the Belgian import-manager of a multinational electronics firm
bought his products from an enterprise engaged in Dutch-Belgian VAT-fraud
carousels. He broke the internal rules but stated that he ‘only bought cheap
products’, pretending to be unaware of the criminal backgrounds of his
suppliers. The managers who condoned his ‘sharp business practice’ at first,
sharpened the rules after disclosures by the Belgian fiscal police. As since that
time the general management could no longer close its eyes to this criminal
involvement, the executive manager faced an increased risk, which was
overcome by some additional favours: he got extra consignments of videos to
sell for himself. It is interesting to note the continuous scale of corruptive
involvement, from one extreme of ‘turning a blind eye’ to the other of being
bribed pure and simple. In between these two extremes one can situate the
benefiting firm which accepts unclear invoices against cash payments. Detec-
tives and prosecutors are well aware of the shortcomings of the legal definition
of corruption. Is the manager of a milkpowder plant corrupt if he buys very
cheap milkpowder from unknown suppliers, who were engaged in a EU-scam
with Baltic organised crime figures, or is he merely a ‘sharp businessman’
finding his ways to cheap, but dubious offers (Van Duyne, 1995)? Although
the fiscal police could not detect any technical legal defects in the paper work
of the purchasing milkpowder plant (no black payments or phoney firms), they
still suspected him of being bribed into becoming a most favoured customer
of the organised combine. However, he could formally account for his decision
to buy from the cheapest supplier, since this is the most ‘normal business’
practice indeed.
It is interesting to observe that the division of roles between corruptors and
corruptees is highly flexible. Full accomplices in a successful scam may even be
bribed by legitimate traders striving to become a beneficiary of the combine so
that also they can obtain cheap products or services (or alternatively they may
be blackmailed by threatening to report their scam to the authorities), while the
traders in their turn may bribe other merchants further down the distribution line.
Those who have been bribed may, after some time, be accepted into the inner
circle of the scam, profiting from the fraud rather then from the pay-offs. In
addition to the full participants, it may be necessary to buy the assistance of
‘service men’. At the low end of the expert scale are the universal dummy straw
men serving as directors, and at the high end are the professionals, such as lawyers
or accountants, who straighten out the paperwork and design the legal structures
in order to keep the kingpins ‘out of the heat’.
There are sufficient examples of such legitimate markets ‘layered’ with
commercial fraud and collateral corruption, although the extent to which these
appear varies by jurisdiction: the European meat industry; the (parallel) cigarette
trade; the construction industry and the garment industry to mention a few
branches (Van Duyne, 1995; Koch, 1988). Recently the market in computer chips
has witnessed large-scale fraud patterns. With respect to the number of people
involved one may differentiate roughly between the ‘product producing/process-
ing’ branches and the ‘service providing’ branches.
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Branches that handle goods (fraudulently) are more likely to operate within
narrow social channels up to the last distribution link with the retail market. They
can restrict any information about the transgressions to the confines of manage-
ment and the necessary executive staff. The service providing enterprises are
usually highly labour-intensive production units, for example subcontractors in
the construction industry that serve numerous customers. They operate in a
broader social-economic circle. This increases their external accountability risks,
requiring more elaborate fraud constructions, frequently cross-border. This is
difficult to accomplish without at least the (tacit) aid of professionals. Alterna-
tively, if such professional finesse or opportunity is not available, fraudsters may
resort to a ‘cash and bust’ method: installing a strawman, cashing in the profits,
stripping the company of its assets and letting the debts pile up, which is followed
by its final bust. Although this may sound robust and easy, it requires much
connivance, whether or not bought. The (black) labourers have to accept frequent
changes of (phoney) management, while the background managers remain the
same. The customers or principal contractors have to rely similarly on the
contractual performance of the hired labour within so much ‘flexibility’. They
have learned to rely on these subcontractors, who provide good and cheap work
as well as extras.10
Doing business, the authorities and levels of corruption
The previous section provided a sketch of the interactions between corruption
and fraud within and between companies, the technical form of which will be
determined by the requirements of external accountability. However, it is not
only the techniques of circumventing the accountability risks which interest us
here. Of equal importance is the interaction with the authorities: the regulatory
bodies or law enforcement agencies. These players in the public field are
supposed to have a formal ‘bureaucratic’ role, but depending on the policies of
their departments (and the interests at stake) they are not detached controllers
and umpires. Oftentimes regulatory authorities have high stakes in the branches
of trade and industry which they supervise, for example the ministries of trade
and industry, agriculture or finance. These interests may play a very sensitive
and sometimes personal role in the encounters with the entrepreneurs. When their
way of doing business is such that they have problems with their external
accountability, they must find ways to circumvent its unwelcome consequences.
This requires investing in the authorities in financial as well as social terms.
In the hard life of business such corruption investment is cost-increasing with
an uncertain or even counterproductive outcome if the corruptee proves ineffec-
tive in his or her social leverage or is exposed himself or herself. Corruption
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10 Since the mid-1980s this mutual interest between criminal subcontractors and the principals has
been eliminated in the Netherlands, as the principals have been made liable for the unpaid taxes and
social security payments due by the defrauding subcontractor.
always implies a spreading of information which increases the accountability
risks. Hence, a smart corruptor will act on the basis of the requirements of his or
her core business. A crime-entrepreneur who operates primarily in an illicit
manner has another core business than does a legitimate entrepreneur who has
some improper transactions to hide. Some have broad interests for the simple
reason of the scale of their business, others have their daily worry of moving
goods and services against moneys, which is the hamstring of their account-
ability. At what level will there develop an interaction with the authorities and/or
office holders in order to affect decision processes, if alone on the level of law
enforcement?
There are three types of entrepreneurial interests, corresponding with three
levels of corruption. (a) The daily concern about the market operations: getting
the goods and services into the market. (b) Neutralising undesirable effects of
the authorities, whether in the regulatory or penal law enforcement. (c) Gaining
supporters or protectors who are in strategic positions. This may lead to three
levels of corruption (Van Duyne, 1997):
• the executive level;
• the law enforcement level; and
• the strategic level.
These levels are not mutually exclusive and they may even overlap. Let us look
at them one by one.
Executive corruption
As stated above, this type of corruption concerns the daily practice of entrepre-
neurs. In the section on public/private sector corruption, I called this ‘front office’
corruption: a stamp, a licence or a blind eye by an inspector. Although I noted
that the monetary values of the bribes often happen to be petty, systematisation
of this front office corruption is the ‘golden key’for companies that defraud only
marginally or for full-fledged crime-entrepreneurs that are developing a whole-
sale crime-business. For example, EU fraud schemes with pretended transit
goods, for which no taxes or excises are levied if they are duly exported, but
which are sold illegally on the inner market of the EU. Such schemes expanded
quickly and grew into a wholesale organised criminal business owing to inter-
mediaries who had access to corrupt customs officers in various member states
of the EU. While shielding the corrupt officials, they returned the T1-documents
with the necessary stamps of the last customs office of export. Of course, many
fraudsters resort to (badly) counterfeited stamps, which sooner or later are
detected after which the fraudsters have to resort to new techniques or go into
hiding. Having a corrupt customs officer on one’s payroll means more efficient
handling of the documents, and at the same time the detection rate is considerably
lowered. The successful VAT and EU cross-border fraud schemes involved
widespread corruption in Spain, Germany and the Netherlands (Van Duyne,
1990; 1995). Toxic waste fraud between the Netherlands and Belgium was
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facilitated by the availability of corrupt deposit site guards (who appeared to be
only the lowest ranking corrupt officials in the entire chain; Van Duyne, 1990).
An extensive network of traffickers in women in Belgium was similarly served
by some civil servants and a few supervising police who were greased with some
free extra sexual services (Stoop, 1992).
Executive corruption is not always initiated by fraudulent companies or
crime-entrepreneurs. The officials who wield some power to withhold from
entrepreneurs their lawful rights or serve them so nerve-rackingly slowly, can
make clear that ‘some extras may speed up things’. Businessmen even rate
countries according to the corrupt ‘extras’ needed at the executive level to get
anything done (Lancaster and Montinola, 1997). Needless to say such ‘enterpris-
ing’ venal officials are much valued by crime-entrepreneurs.
Law enforcement level
Depending on the nature of their tense relationship with the law, entrepreneurs
may be willing to ‘invest’ in law enforcement officials in order to keep the
criminal investigators at bay. This applies to crime-entrepreneurs as well as to
legitimate, ‘respectable’ entrepreneurs who have to be concerned about the
consequences of the criminal defects in their paper work. As is the case with
executive corruption there is some economy-of-scale effect in this level of
corruption as well. Although there is some wisdom in the proverb ‘better envied
than pitied’, successful (crime)-entrepreneurs see their risks increase with their
success, just because the competitors are green with envy and keen to inform the
law enforcement agencies.
It goes without saying that criminal entrepreneurs value complete immunity
above all, although such an objective is difficult to obtain in complex (or
frequently chaotic) organisations such as the police or the special agencies. Even
in the most rotten organisations there is always the chance of a conscientious
official nullifying the attempts of his or her corrupt colleagues. If this objective
proves hard to realise, criminal entrepreneurs are at any rate anxious to learn
about the ‘information position’of the CID or the special investigative branches.
‘Is there an investigation going on? What do the detectives know? Is there a ‘rat’
in one’s own house?’ This is most valuable information. At the law enforcement
level corruption is basically a weapon in the ‘information game’between criminal
entrepreneurs and the crime squads, both sides probing the weak sides of their
opponents: the police ‘corrupting’ criminals into become informants, and crimi-
nals corrupting the police into providing them with information. Although it
occurs frequently that law enforcement officers literally sell information to
criminals, an internal affairs investigator conveyed to me that most of his cases
concerned overzealous CID detectives who thought that they could recruit a
criminal informant against a ‘Mr. Big’ by giving him some ‘innocent’ police
information about his ‘own case’. Afterwards this information is not considered
that innocent, and despite his ‘noble intentions’ the CID officer gets the label
‘corrupt’. Oftentimes in the process of an undercover investigation, the unau-
thorised information exchange and the social relationships between the inform-
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ants and the CID officers become so entangled that the roles of the suspects and
the investigators get very confused indeed.11
Developing corrupt bridgeheads in order to interfere with investigations
requires more than investments in the investigative frontline. Also law breakers
know that prevention is better than cure and that preventing an investigation from
getting started is better than frontline interventions with uncertain outcomes. The
difficulties French, Italian and Belgian investigative magistrates experience in
pursuing highly placed targets show the importance of pulling strings at the
‘command level’. At this point we arrive at a higher level of corruption.
Strategic corruption
The previous  levels of corruption  are primarily tied to the daily  unlawful
operations or are intended to be instrumental in reducing (or preferably in
eliminating) the threat from the authorities. At the end of the previous sections I
indicated the importance of systematically preventing the authorities from car-
rying out their duties. This requires access to a strategic command level, which
touches the nerves of a state ruled by law. What are the conditions for penetrating
that high and who has the capacity to accomplish such a feat?
A recently expressed worry, which sometimes grows into a moral panic,
concerns the potential of organised crime to penetrate these ‘command rooms’
of society. Do organised criminals develop such a broad and more far-reaching
corruption strategy? There is no general answer to this question, since it depends
very much on the type of (crime-)entrepreneurs and on the society in which they
operate. Most crime-entrepreneurs stem from the mainly cash-based under-
ground economy: the self-made thugs and heavies, used to equate power with
compulsion through violence or with easy compliance bought with packs of
money. In countries where violence and corrupt governance are endemic, such
as Colombia (Visser, 1991), Russia (Handelman, 1994), Turkey (Bovenkerk and
Yesilgöz, 1998) or Italy (Savona, 1995) (to mention only a few examples), this
approach may result in temporal, but always much contested power, which has
to be upheld by increasingly violent and expensive means, which usually prove
to be self-destructive in the end. Power that is based on violence never provides
an easy seat. In the words of Tayllerand to Napoleon:‘Sire, with bayonets you
can do all sort of things, but you cannot sit on them’. Do such crime-entrepreneurs
also strive strategically to establish a stable power position which gives them a
‘seat’ in society, albeit with corrupt legs?
For most jurisdictions in the industrialised Western hemisphere the answer to
this question depends on the congruence between crime-entrepreneur and their
surrounding social-economic landscape. Looking at the category of crime-entre-
preneurs from the ‘traditional’ underground economy, the answer is ‘yes, but
rarely’, to which one may add ‘and rarely with enduring results’. There are
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11 This happened in a large-scale investigation against some supposed “top-ten” hashish traffickers in
the Netherlands, during which secret investigators were too closely involved in the affairs of a
criminal infiltrator who smuggled staggering amounts of hashish (Middelburg and Van Es, 1994).
several reasons for this. In the first place the power structures in most Western
jurisdictions are complex networks that are characterised by many public con-
trols, checks and balances. In these power control mechanisms the media play
an important role in spotting and exposing the rise to power of a personality with
a questionable background. After all, nothing sells better than scandals, which
are very important in exposing and repressing corruption (Sherman, 1978).
Therefore, the first thing a crime-entrepreneur has to do is to manipulate, bully
or get hold of the media. For most crime-entrepreneurs this is usually ‘a few
bridges too far’, not only because of the great technical difficulties, but for a more
important and more mundane reason: the psychological attitude of these under-
ground entrepreneurs. Most are self-made men with a limited social interest and
are not very eager to expand their acquaintanceship beyond what they feel to be
safe. Even those who appear to be rolling in wealth, appear to show little strategic
shrewdness in using their criminal funds to establish social bridgeheads near
power junctions. Even the wealthiest of these heavies did not show much interest
in translating their financial power potential into real upper world power (Van
Duyne, 1997). They indulged in the power they could wield over their fellow
crime-entrepreneurs, however. But beyond this social circle of like-minded
Lombroso-heads they face grave social uncertainties in socialising with crooked
potential aides in higher classes:‘Can you trust these educated city slickers?’
However, there are favourable circumstances which facilitate this rise to a higher
social circle: a docile press, compliant politicians who are dependent on crime-
money at election time and the avoidance of public disorder or nuisance. This
may result in a lon-lasting strategic alliance between organised crime and a local
authority such as a town council, even in a democratic jurisdiction, as has been
elaborated by Gardiner (1970) in his description of the corrupt relationship
between the Democratic party and organised crime in an American town.
More interesting examples of social power development are provided by the
category  of business crime-entrepreneurs who operate  in  the upper world,
delivering legitimate cheap products and services for which they receive social
recognition or even respect. The established business crime-entrepreneurs do not
need to climb the social ladder from bottom upwards. They are used to moving
easily around in higher circles consisting of the ubiquitous ‘friends of friends’
(as long as there are mutual profits). Whether they use ‘friends’to exercise power
indirectly or come into the open is a matter of taste and risk evaluation.
No matter whether they come out into the open or remain behind their screens
of ‘friends’, they act with the self-confidence of being smarter than the law, not
hampered by any bad conscience. They consider themselves just ‘sharp business-
men’, daring and inventive entrepreneurs (Levi, 1981), such as the Belgian oil
baron (Van Duyne and Block, 1995) or the Dutch meat wholesaler, against whom
every prosecution grounded to a halt. The adventurous Italians Parretti and
Fiorini, who contributed to the fall of the Bank Crédit Lyonnais, at any rate the
Dutch branch of that bank, represent similar self-confident egos who knew how
to establish a strategic social power position, notably in France (d’Aubert, 1993).
Psychologically they share the arrogance and inflated egos of business-politi-
cians (Della Porta, 1996) such as Berlusconi and Tapie (Bouchet, 1992), the apple
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of president Mitterand’s eye. To this psychologically corrupt Pantheon one may
add the previous secretary-general of NATO and his cronies, or the Parisian
‘court’ of the erstwhile mayor of Paris, if not this ex-mayor and the present
President of France himself.
The keys to such strategic corruption are of a psychologically, sociologically
and material nature. I consider a direct psychological understanding and a shared
attitude towards values such as ‘common good’ or ‘public interests’ to be basic
conditions. Corruptors and corruptees do not need winding or convincing expla-
nations about the supposed uselessness or futility of such values. Who does not
understand a snigger or a confidential look to be a risk to be avoided. Additionally
there needs to be mutual or complimentary interests and a safe social or cultural
proximity. If the parties are not equal in this respect and do not speak the same
‘social dialect’, misunderstandings may soon arise. Where smooth, slick talk is
the common tongue, a deliverance of thick browns envelopes-with-contents is
not the right move to begin with, betraying an overly vulgar attitude to be a ‘friend
of friends’, even if such a monetary gesture is expected in the end. For such action
a lower status underling or murky intermediary is to be used. Della Porta and
Vannucci (1997) have elaborated on this social interaction between arrogant
business politicians and private industry in Italy. Apart from these cultural
backgrounds they represent something of value: they run a licit enterprise and
have jobs to offer in their community, and public officials have to deal with them
for licences, taxes and industrial planning and supervision. They can weave a
subtle social network of highly placed law-abiding people who share various
important interests and -most important- one highly developed sensitivity: the
fear of loss of reputation should even one of them become tainted. If such a
dreaded event should occur, they face the most unwelcome choice between
distancing themselves from the deviating companion or finding a way out by
covering up, realising that one ‘tall tree’ that is cut down may drag down others
in its fall. This could be observed when the Dutch Slavenburg Bank, which was
suspected of handling undeclared moneys, was raided by the fiscal and regular
police during the 1980s. The minister of justice happened to be socially very
close to the general manager of the bank. He was suspected of smothering the
investigation by proposing a reduction in the CID-task force.12 The major Dutch
meat fraudster (Van Duyne, 1997) had even stronger clout. Not only did he
succeed in appointing one of his cronies into the board of a supervisory agency,
in addition no public prosecutor could approach him without risking his or her
career. I have been informed that as soon as the first prosecutorial move was
being made the secretary general of the ministry of agriculture was informed and
through regular meetings with his colleagues it was suspected that pressure was
applied on the head prosecutor who advised his prosecutor to be ‘prudent’, which
is a serious warning to stop.
At such levels of strategic corruption there is a subtle, ‘velvet-lined’ peddling
of influence. Whether there will be any discernable exchange of tangible goods,
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12 The bank was bought by the ill-starred Banc Crédit Lyonnais, which fell victim to the criminal duo
of Parretti and Fiorini.
rewards or the promise thereof is a matter of developing mutual interests. The
interest of the corruptor is clear: to invest in protective social relations in the first
place, becoming accepted under a ‘social umbrella’which may provide a minimal
shelter against exposure. Under this social umbrella the ‘friends of friends’ will
develop the appropriate system of exchange of favours, favourable decisions
against rewards according to the customs of their social circle. In countries which
do not have adequate regulations on political party financing the rewards will
consist of payments to the party election fund. In countries in which hierarchical
authoritarian relations are strongly developed, venal cliques are likely to develop
along closely guarded social authority lines: small circles of political power,
locally connected with ‘captains of industry’ are characterised by a ‘closed
window’ mentality, keeping intruders out. Money may be important, but more
important is the perpetuation of the system of mutual favours and understanding
in semi-closed circles (Becquart-Leclerq, 1990). Of course, as soon as elections
come around in which voters may decide over (a part of) the power, funds from
any social direction are welcome (if properly veiled), after which the social ranks
will close again. This appears to be the social climate in France (Ruggiero, 1996),
in which interested parties even went as far as to propose legislation in order to
prevent corruption investigations being reported in the press as long as there is
no trial. Such legislation would be the codification of the judicial/political
cover-ups behind the closed windows.13 This ability to penetrate the highest
function of the state of law, the legislature, may be rated as the highest level of
strategic corruption in a democratic society. In countries with a weak democratic
system the aims of strategic corruption are the executive, as can be observed in
eastern Europe during the post-Communist era (Holmes, 1997).
Prevention and the fight against corruption
During the last decade of this millennium Western governments have discovered
the emotional and symbolic value of proclaiming a ‘fight’or even a ‘war’against
some ‘threatening’phenomenon: drugs, organised crime, money-laundering, and
also the ‘fight’ against corruption. This presupposes a visible threatening phe-
nomenon, depicted in alarmist headlines and broad television coverage. Looking
back at the analysis in this article and the literature, the term ‘fight’ misses the
essence of corruption. ‘Corruption is very similar to a mushroom (or rather a
toadstool): what one can observe is the head and the stem, often provided with
a white collar. . . . the essence [is] the underlying mycetes of hyphal threads
extending through numerous invisible branches in rotten and sick wood’ (Van
Duyne, 1996). Trying to fight the spread of mushrooms seems a bit futile if the
rotten wood remains untouched. Being tough against such vile enemies is
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13 In France the judiciary is less independent than in most European democratic countries: particularly
investigative judges complain of frequently being put under high pressure to abandon ‘sensitive’
cases or they are assigned to other investigations (Ruggiero, 1996).
popular: in China during the mid-1980s, apprehended corruptors (who had also
lost political support!) frequently saw their career end in execution. In Russia
Andropov and Gorbachov also tried to clamp down on corruption (Levi, 1987),
but all they hit were the mushrooms. Ten years later the hyphal threads are still
growing in the rotten wood which are not targets for fights but for cleaning
operations and overdue maintenance. By turning a blind eye to the growth of
corruption in large parts of the world during the Cold War, Western US-domi-
nated institutes, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund,
have furthered this development in virtually  every client state (apart from
destroying the local indigenous economies and the environment). Belatedly these
institutions have begun to take a real interest in the contagious and disruptive
impact of corruption in the Third World (Theobald, 1997). They realised that a
broad repressive and preventive educational approach, such as the one experi-
enced in Hongkong, have a better chance of success than the ritual ‘war-against-
language’.
The prevention and repression of corruption is a laudable social aim, which
no one would dare to question. But to realise this lofty aim one has to face a basic
human trait: the tendency to tinker with established decision rules, because life
tends to move faster than these rules, while life has much more to offer than
compliance with impersonal rules-on-the-books. It is a ‘normal’ tendency which
is highly valued in a society in which flexibility is considered a virtue and rigidity
a dead-alive business: the exceptions are allowed to prove the rule, until the rule
becomes obsolete. But it is also most human to ‘prove the rule’with self-serving
exceptions, some of which happen to be ‘bought’ by a reward. This happens at
every level of life. Let us return to the domestic situation I described in the section
about the definition of this phenomenon: sonny bribing daddy to bend the rules,
which suits both well, ‘but only this once’. For this innocent family situation,
which may reflect just a sensible ‘give and take’, the qualification ‘corrupt’ may
have too much a hint of puritanical fundamentalism, although moralists may
indignantly disagree with this immoral relativism.
As a matter of fact the placing of such a domestic situation between the
extremes of ‘give and take’ and ‘corrupt’ provides in a nutshell the essence of
the continuing debate between ‘north and south’, between Protestant northern
and Catholic southern Dutchmen; between Belgians and Dutchmen; between
North Europe and South Europe, or between the Western ‘bureaucratic-rational’,
industrialised hemisphere and the Third World. To a certain extent both sides talk
about the same underlying psychological traits, although with different emphasis.
On the one hand it is a human tendency to eschew the uncertainty of arbitrariness,
which is experienced as unfair and whimsical, and to strive for predictable
‘rational’ rule-directed behaviour. On the other hand there is the basic social
requirement to smooth and grease (human) relations by friendly gestures and
being grateful for such gestures in return, preferably when these are not merely
symbolic and contain something tangible! To return to the opening ‘theological’
section of this article: this attitude is deeply rooted and finds its expression in
most popular religious rituals. Are most temples not market places for Divine
favours?
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Keeping this in mind, preventing and combatting corruption entails a delicate
interference with very basic tendencies, which should not be dismissed as
something pathological. Designing technical measures to raise barriers against
corrupt acts without doing something to develop a corresponding public attitude
is like designing iron chastity belts while ignoring the sexual drive. Although I
appreciate the latter drive more than a lax attitude towards corruption, in both
issues one faces human basics, or truisms, which are stronger than moral crusades
or ‘cast iron’ prevention techniques. In this last sections I will not elaborate on
the various administrative techniques to prevent fraud or the legal possibilities
and difficulties in repressing it, but will concentrate on these behavioural ‘basics’.
Material and social basics
The prevention and control of corruption cannot be formulated in social-eco-
nomic and culturally neutral terms. In many countries there are the brutal
economic facts of income and subsistence. If a government pays executive civil
servants $ 120 a month, while the subsistence level is $ 150 or $ 200, no package
of ingenious prevention measures will prove effective, let alone some moral
lectures about the evil of corruption, presidential ukases from Yeltsin or EU aid
programmes which do not change this harsh reality. The policeman or customs
officer has other worries, such as the electricity bill or the rent that has to be paid.
In such situations it is not the existence of corruption that is amazing, but the
finding that part of the civil service is in some way or other not (yet) corrupt.
This amazement will only increase when one observes two concomitant
adverse social-economic factors. The first concerns the distribution of income in
such countries, which appears to be very skewed, indeed. Skewed income
distributions as such are not causally related to corruption, but the combination
with a second factor, the illegal kleptomanic origins of the amassed wealth of
the ruling elite, may function as a major amplifier. Every underpaid civil servant
has a ready excuse at hand for his or her petty ‘subsistence’ corruption as an
attempt to reduce the income inequality by selling their services or extorting
payments by withholding them. In a jurisdiction that has a kleptocratic elite ruling
over an impoverished public ‘service’ there is hardly any remedy other than an
economic and social collapse of the state, or what might resemble a state. The
economic (near) collapse of the Russian Federation, Congo or Indonesia may
well be interpreted in these terms.14 These are brutal economic and social basics
which do not require any deep philosophical reflections, even though they should
be included in any sober risk assessment (See Quah, 1994/5).
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14 It should be added that also these societies know their uncorrupt ‘white knights’, such as the
dismissed prime minister Kirijenko, who is alleged to have been pushed aside for being too
threatening to the corrupt oligarchic clique.
Cleaning top down
In the previous sections I characterized corruption as a leadership disease. If that
observation is correct it may provide an answer to the question ‘where to start?’
The attack on and the prevention of corruption must start by concentrating
preventive and repressive efforts on the acts and attitudes of the highest levels of
private and public leadership, as has successfully been done in Hong Kong and
Singapore (Quah, 1994/95). The staircase has to be cleaned top down. The
principles which have to be applied are again rather simple and basic. As a matter
of fact they are basic management rules addressing not only corruption but any
form of arbitrary and wasteful leadership. It goes without saying that the actual
application will be shaped by the concrete circumstances of the organisation and
its social-economic surroundings. The approach stands on two simple legs,
which may be considered mere ‘truisms’ than ‘principles’, although the corrup-
tion issue is largely based on their systematic neglect:
• The transparency principle and
• The first servant principle.
Both principles can be supplemented by additional organisational measurements
or rules, which are related to these principles.
a. The transparency principle
The validity of this principle can be considered self-evident, since it is the basis
of accountability: no accountability without transparency, whether this concerns
the paper work or decision rules. To prevent shady deals and to further transpar-
ency (and to boost their public image) many multi-national corporations have
devloped codes of conduct (Kaptein en Wempe, 1995). In countries which have
a parliamentary democracy, transparency is supposed to be guaranteed by the
political control exercised by Parliament. At first sight there are no problems here
if all such provisions are present. However, the implementation and tightening
of this principle is accompanied by much uneasy evasion and circumvention,
which increases with every step upward in the hierarchy.. As soon as it is to be
applied above the level of the executive management, whether this concerns the
board of directors, the board of directors-general of a ministry or the senior party
member, the doors will be closed and the curtains drawn. There are many good
reasons for doing so, which have nothing to do with venality. But despite this
well-meant secretiveness, at a certain point in the decision procedures transpar-
ency has to prevail and the decisions have to be accounted for; the city council-
lors, the back benchers in Parliament or the shareholders have questions which
have to be answered. On this level of decision-making the seeming ‘truism’ of
transparency becomes an achievement that has been hard fought-for and which
has to be protected with the utmost vigilance against erosion. Doors which have
remained closed ‘for the good of the organisation’or for the ‘general benefit’ too
often and too long, foster a common secretive attitude among the decision-mak-
ers. Meanwhile, uneasy feelings arise among the outsiders that ‘the high-ups are
just cooking up something’, ‘are merely playing their little power games’ and
paying only lip service to the transparency principle. Given the talent of the
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high-and-mighty in veiling their indoor reality with high-sounding rhetoric, such
feelings of distrust are easily reinforced. Although the light has to shine from
above, oftentimes it is rather a thick fog which comes down the stairs.
If such observations are not considered mere cynicism, the preventive appli-
cation of the transparency principle will soon run against tenacious obstacles,
which are clothed in ‘objective arguments’. Whatever the sincerity and reason-
ableness of such arguments, they are the reverse side of the coin to providing the
breeding ground for the hidden seeds of leadership corruption: the erosion of
accountability, the ‘ownership feeling’ of the office-holder (‘no poking around
in my kitchen!’), the building of courts of like-minded officials, and Caligula
appointments of unctuous yes-men within the (semi) closed circle of office
holders. Depending on the shared (hidden) interests even the democratic watch-
dog, the Parliament, may falter. This is particularly the case when corrupt or
questionable acts of the government may endanger the position of the ruling
party. In the United Kingdom, the Conservative Party accepted and condoned a
good deal of sleaze, except for the sexual escapades of some of Major’s ministers
(which would not stir a soul in a less prudish society). The Belgian parliament
functioned for decades as an elected carpet under which much corrupt mischief
has been swept. Only recently, under the pressure of the Agusta affair and the
public loathing caused by the Dutroux case, have politicians become nervous.
Many Belgians are of the (justified) opinion that the impact of these scandals has
not gone further than this transit state of nervousness. If top-down transparency
is a truism, its preventive potential is much neglected.
This preventive potential can only be enhanced when members of an organi-
sation agree on what constitutes undesirable and dishonest behaviour and forms
of conduct which may lead to venality, and when they support rigorous compli-
ance. This will create a climate in which people dare to come forward to report
such ‘undesirable’ behaviour (Gorta and Forell, 1995). This is recommended for
the lower forms of corruption, but reporting ‘undesirable’ behaviour on the part
of the management requires the desperation (or the self-destructive drive) of a
whistleblower. Moreover, much ‘undesirable’ behaviour concerns the preroga-
tive of the higher decision-makers, such as appointments and promotions, the
risky areas of Caligula appointments, court building and clientilism. Is the
management not the most qualified level to judge ‘outstanding talents’? (I may
refer to the section about the decay in recruitment standards.)
It is not only the preventive use of the transparency principle that faces
tenacious resistance, but also its repressive applications may soon run into
difficulties. This is not a surprising finding, although the degree of tenacity may
vary according to the ramifications of the interested social network. When highly
placed persons are themselves directly involved, the resistance hardly needs
further elaboration. The ‘clean hands’ operation in Italy is a model of such
resistance towards penal surgery involving the higher political echelons. A more
subtle resistance is experienced when there are no direct reprehensible links to
higher placed people, but when nevertheless the corrupt acts took place in a social
environment of condonation, in an environment marked by a collective venal
attitude. As soon as an investigation starts, nervousness spreads through such a
social network. The ‘bagman’ is caught, but will he implicate those who are or
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should be morally responsible? Will the social fabric protect those corruptors
who invested strategically in human connections at the ‘command level’? If the
repressive approach remains restricted to what can be proven under the penal
code without investigators peeping behind the scenes, the hidden actors pulling
the strings will welcome a quick and clean penal law surgery:‘hang the bagman
high’, dismiss a few executive managers and the ‘rotten apples’ are out of the
barrel. Justice is done, the public is satisfied! However, the repressive application
of transparency may be more fruitful if it goes beyond this narrow penal law
approach,  even if the  penal code cannot be applied  to those ‘respectable’
functionaries, who are ‘only morally’ responsible. Here the repressive cleaning
top-down is a matter of public and political accountability aimed at a transparent
light from the top window. In this respect the social effects of the scandal may
prove just as effective (Kjellberg, 1994/5). Since scandals can only be brought
to the attention of the public through the media, nothing may blunt this repressive
effect better than the accumulation of the media outlets in the hands of the corrupt
business-politicians. The case of Berlusconi may be a proper warning. The
accumulation of the media in other countries, such as in the United Kingdom,
can only be observed with great concern.
b. The first servant principle
The leader, whether in politics or in a private corporation, is ‘the first servant’ of
his or her organisation. This principle sounds ‘natural’, even though historically
it is not a very old one. It is embodied in Frederic the Great’s adage that he, the
King, is ‘the first servant of the state’, by which he meant that the rule of law
applied to him as well. This contrasted strongly with the absolutist adage:‘L’état
c’est moi’. This principle may also be called the rule of non self-exception:
nobody is so highly placed that the rules of his or her own house, be it the state
or an organisation, do not apply to him or her.
Although today this principle may be considered self-evident, compliance
with it is as problematic as was the case with the transparency principle. Even if
no manager would deny that someone may be so important that he or she is above
compliance or considered beyond the rules, to act accordingly is another matter.
Rules, especially decision rules, embody all sorts of restrictions on acting as one
would like to, which can be awkward. As set out above, the tendency to bend the
rules with the excuse of the proverbial exceptions-proving-the-rule, is natural
enough. In addition, it is difficult to argue against ‘flexibility’ in favour of rigid
compliance. As long as there is a clear and objective justification for ‘the
exceptions proving the rule’ one is still at the non-personal transparent or
accountable side of this flexible transition zone. However, the more the excep-
tions become personal, even if no material interests are at stake, the more the
manager may develop a ‘beyond the rule’ attitude for which there is no account-
ability. The first destructive impact is the bad example. This is too obvious for
elaboration:‘Just look at him!’. The second impact concerns the reduced freedom
of the manager himself or herself to interfere with rule deviations among the
staff, which derive just from his or her own example. Even if not expressed
verbally, the smart ‘beyond the rule’ manager knows intuitively at what point
interference in the behaviour of the staff may lead to self-exposure. The same
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tendency applies to members of a traditional ruling elite, who consider them-
selves ‘special’, a euphemism for indulging in collective ‘selective’non-compli-
ance with which they think they can get away, because they have always wielded
power. Are they in a position to enforce transparency?
This neglect of the ‘first servant’ principle (or its compliment, the non-self
exception rule) can only be sustained when the players comply at any rate with
one collective rule: the (silent) rule of non-intervention, which is the best
guarantee of keeping transparency out. This rule has a wider range than corrupt
situations only, while it has a universal psychological and social acceptance. The
common upholding of this rule can even be the best ‘reward’ or a pressure in a
corrupt exchange:‘So far, I have not interfered with your ‘interesting’ deals and
affairs, and I expect you to do the same!’ (Otherwise . . . .) This tacit, subtle
reward may be valued higher than gold, although no law will label this as
corruption. There is no ‘real act’, nothing changes hands, but there is a mutually
sustained precarious silent balance based on the mutual recognition of attitudes.
Corruption is very much a state of mind indeed.
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Combatting Corruption
Commentary by Sabrina Adamoli 15
TRANSCRIME
Research Group on Transnational Crime
University of Trento, School of Law
1 Summary and purpose of the commentary
The philosophy of Prof. van Duyne’s paper is that corruption is ”a state of mind”
and that, although corruption is immoral, it is human conduct that people
undertake sometimes deliberately, but also gradually. In democratic systems
public officials, who operate on behalf of the community, should act with a view
to pursuing the public interest. Each of them, however, has private interests and
goals that do not always coincide with those professed in public, and might
therefore be induced to exercise their discretionary power in their own interest.
Van Duyne provides a straightforward and yet general definition of corruption,
according to which corruption is ”an improbity or decay in the decision-making
process in which a decision-maker (in a private corporation or in a public service)
consents to deviate or demands deviation from the criterion which should rule
his or her decision-making, in exchange for a reward, or for the the promise or
expectation of a reward, while these motives influencing his or her decision-mak-
ing cannot be part of the justification of the decision”. He therefore states that
the most important aspects influencing the levels and manifestations of corrup-
tion are the accountability of decision makers and the erosion of this account-
ability.
Taking into consideration van Duyne’s paper, and with the parallel aim of
providing some information on the situation in Italy and other European coun-
tries, this commentary is divided into two parts.
The first paragraphs contain a commentary on van Duyne’s theoretical analy-
sis of corruption. On the basis of the elements of corruption defined by van
Duyne, the opportunities and risks connected with corruption will then be
identified in a theory of corruption as rational choice, in order to delineate more
appropriate policies to combat it. The situation of corruption in Italy is also briefly
described.
In the second part, the action against corruption is analysed and the counter-
strategies introduced by some European countries, and by Italy in particular, are
described.
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2 Corruption as a ”state of mind”
In his paper van Duyne develops a behavioural theory of corruption in which he
starts by highlighting five necessary components of the concept from the decision
side. The first of these is a decision maker with discretionary power to deviate
from the rules in the decision making process, and who is accountable for the
propriety of the decisions made. Two further components are involved: the
exchange relation between the actors of corruption and the hidden nature of this
relation. This behavioural definition of corruption as being a state of mind
focuses on the individual decision maker, and in van Duyne’s opinion is therefore
very wide and can be applied in every context and legal system. He uses a
social-psychological approach, and clearly states that, psychologically, corrup-
tion is not an abnormal state of mind, but on the contrary rather human. He then
classifies corruption into nine categories, in all of which social-psychological
factors leading to corruption cases are identified. This behavioural approach,
however, seems to leave little if any space for human rational thought and the
possibility that people make a rational analysis of the advantages that can be
reached through corruption, and of the costs involved.
In van Duyne’s analysis the natural development of simple one-to-one cor-
ruption is towards the spreading of such illicit conduct, all the more if the corrupt
scheme becomes more complicated and requires the involvement of other actors.
Widening this behavioural perspective, therefore, corruption gradually spreads,
leading to a corrupt market and a weakening of public morality.
In such a situation, corruption will increase and spread in every sector due to
the combined action of a decrease in the legitimacy of democratic institutions, a
decrease in the accountability of decision makers with discretionary power, and
a decrease in transparency in general. A lengthy and important section of van
Duyne’s paper, in fact, examines the development of corrupt attitudes in a
working environment. In the scheme of corruption the role played by the leader
is fundamental, since van Duyne argues that corruption frequently develops in
organisations as a ”top-down disease”. In the cases of both a leader with a great
deal of decision-making power who is also prone to corruption, and an honest
but sloppy manager unaware of what is happening among his or her subordinates,
corruption develops because of defective leadership, where standards of proper
conduct have been eroded. Van Duyne states that corruption is a ”process [which]
is quite human and the transition from non-corrupt but questionable conduct to
the first stages of corruption may, even to the participants themselves, unfold as
an unnoticed growth process”. Again in the example here provided it is clear that
fundamental importance is given to psychological factors influencing corrupt
behaviour, while the positively and rationally calculated choice to engage in
corruption is not considered as a contributing factor.
2.1 The paradoxical story of the successful leader
The paradox thus delineated is that corruption may develop alongside successful
management. At first it may even be unseen, and then later denied by the success
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of the leader. Taken in a more general sense, in van Duyne’s opinion this process
also accounts for the development of corruption into systemic proportions, as in
the case of Italy.
The first phase of corruption by a successful leader consists of extravagance.
The example provided is that of a leader who does not justify his or her excessive
expenses: although there is no indication of corrupt behaviour, this is the first
stage in the development of a leadership style which deviates from the proper
management of public resources.
The next phase is that of the erosion of accountability. The paradox here is
that the more successful the leader is, the less he or she receives negative feedback
on his or her actions. ”The increase in trust is inversely related to the principle
of accountability, but also to the mental openness to critical evaluation of the
deeds of the leader.” This will create a climate in which implausible expenses
will be justified by ”plausible” explanations. Employees who do not agree with
this conduct will frequently be replaced by more obedient ones willing to accept
the erosion of the leader’s accountability and the opacity of decision making
processes.
Van Duyne then identifies the ”ownership phase”, where the leader of the
organisation starts behaving as if he or she were its actual owner. Extravagance
now gives way to the leader’s unrestrained use of corporate assets for his or her
own private and organisational purposes. The leader now needs a court of
yes-men who share his or her opinions and do not complain about the non-trans-
parent decisions taken. This also gives rise to a change in recruitment procedures.
New employees are now selected because of their appreciation of the leader and
not because of their skills. These are what van Duyne aptly calls ”Caligula
appointments”.
This behaviour quickly leads from favouritism to the phase of clientelism,
where the personnel appointed will tend to follow the example of the leader and
to appoint, in their turn, their favourite yes-men. The organisation has now
surpassed the threshold of corruption, and proper decision making standards have
been eroded.
In this example it is again very clear that only socio-psychological factors are
directing the action of the corrupt leader and his or her court of yes-men. The
attempt on the leader’s part to ”justify” unjustifiable actions and decisions
does not seem to use logical, rational reasoning. The development of favour-
itism and clientelism is characterised by a series of ”rules” which do not seem
to follow objective, rational requirements. Even the recruitment procedure,
which is based on an oath of obedience to the leader rather than on the actual
skills of the prospective member, again does not involve the use of rationality.
In van Duyne’s opinion, the manifestations of this leadership disease differ
depending on the interaction with the environment, which determines the rules
of external accountability. This accountability may be imposed by the law and
the enforcement policies, as well as by normal business practice and the public
morality. There is, in fact, a second phase of corruption in which the phenomenon
moves from occurring solely within the enterprise to corruption with the outside
world. The first person at risk of being bribed is the accountant of the enterprise,
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because the external rules of accountability imply that the financial situation must
show no sign of mismanagement. Then it might be necessary to bribe a fellow
entrepreneur into complicity. At some stage of this process, interaction with the
authorities might begin, according to the different entrepreneurial interests. The
degree of intensity of this interaction gives rise to three different levels of
corruption, which van Duyne identifies as:
– the executive level, where corruption concerns the daily practice of entrepre-
neurs;
– the law enforcement level, when entrepreneurs are willing to bribe the law
enforcement authorities to prevent or postpone investigations;
– the strategic level, where preventing the authorities from carrying out their
duties requires access to the strategic command level. In this case there may
not be a discernible exchange of tangible goods, but rather a development of
mutual interests.
The examples of different categories of corruption made here highlight that,
although van Duyne defines corruption as human behaviour driven by psycho-
logical factors, other external conditions are necessary in order for corruption to
develop and spread. First, the power to make decisions, either lawful or unlawful,
is necessary, because a person who does not have power will neither corrupt nor
be corrupted. Second, the existence and effectiveness of external accountability
rules will determine the different levels of corruption and variations in its
diffusion.
Therefore, in order to explain variations in the diffusion of corruption and in
order to curb it, hypotheses must be formulated on the factors influencing the
phenomenon and on the role played by these components. Only then will it be
possible to elaborate proposals for policies to combat corruption.
One main question arises from the explanation of van Duyne’s theory on
corruption, and is particularly relevant in the phase of development of corruption
into systemic proportions, where ”corruption spreads to a corrupt market and a
loosening of business morality”. Since the analysis made by van Duyne empha-
sises the psychological factors influencing the action of an individual and doesn’t
directly include rationally taken decisions to engage in corruption, the question
remains regarding the role which can be played by an economic approach towards
corruption.
3 Corruption as a rational choice
Starting from van Duyne’s analysis, and using three of the components he has
identified, it is in fact possible to develop a framework that considers corruption
as a phenomenon operating according to the rules of the market place.16 The
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assumption here is that corruption is an illicit good, bought and sold according
to market conditions, and that the actors in this market, the seller and the buyer
of corruption, are rational human beings who engage in an illicit transaction in
order to maximise opportunities while at the same time seeking to minimise the
costs of being arrested and convicted, and of losing their good reputation – a
valuable commodity, especially for politicians. In terms of counter-policies, the
implication of this analysis is that, in order to curb corruption, it is necessary to
affect the market by reducing the opportunities and incentives to commit such
offences, and by increasing the risks at the same time.
If we accept that corruption is a rational choice17, the main question to be
answered is: why do individuals, whom we assume are rational human beings,
decide to behave in a corrupt manner? And a second consequential question:
what is the effect of this decision on institutional development? In other words,
how does corruption, after infiltrating a system, become systemic?
A summary of the variables taken into consideration by the various theories
on corruption shows that a combination of factors tends to increase opportunities
for corruption. These factors are the number of decision-makers, the amount of
their discretionary power, their amount of responsibility for the decisions made
and enforcement of formal procedures for the control of this power. In fact, when
there is only one decision-maker, ”monopolistic corruption” increases, while the
higher the number of decision-makers (”competitive corruption”), the fewer
opportunities there are for corruption. Moreover, when discretionary power
increases, so also do opportunities for corruption18, because the public official
can allocate the rights at his or her disposal so that some people have more
advantages than others.
Finally, the existence of formal procedures for the control of this power bring
about an increase in the ”value” of corruption, thus increasing the cost for the
buyer while at the same time increasing the advantages for the seller. Therefore,
besides the strict economic advantage of a monetary bribe, the benefits of
engaging in corruption comprise every other kind of advantage connected with
a secret exchange of favours.
A consequence of what has just been said is that, as discretionary power
increases, so too do opportunities for legal corruption, while the existence of
precise formal procedures for the control and regulation of discretionary power
have the effect of increasing the corruption value, in the sense that they increase
the cost for the buyer and augment the opportunities for corruption available to
the seller.
On the other hand, since corruption is a criminal offence, the actors in this
market have to take a number of risks connected with the commission of a
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corruption offence into account. The costs of corruption can be analysed by
making use of Becker’s model as a theoretical framework for an economic
analysis of this crime.19 According to Becker, ”a person commits an offence if
the expected utility is higher than the one he could receive by using his time and
other resources for other activities”.20
Criminal law can play an important role in influencing human behaviour: it
imposes risks and therefore additional costs for criminal activities and provides
the offender an economic disincentive to commit the crime.21
The costs calculated by offenders before choosing to commit a corruption
offence influence the level of corruption in a country, and can be of two different
kinds: objective and subjective. On the one side, there are what can be called
institutional, objective costs. Among the costs involved in this rational choice are
the risk of law enforcement (that is, the risk of being identified, prosecuted and
punished) and information costs arising from the loss of reputation in the
community caused by a criminal charge for corruption.
On the other side, there are also subjective costs, more difficult to observe and
measure since they reflect internal rather than institutional judgements, but which
nevertheless can be equally influential. There are in fact the ”moral” costs linked
with an individual aversion to doing something illegal. From this perspective,
the willingness to commit a corruption offence depends on whether the culture
or the subculture in which the subject operates possesses moral rules which
sanction political or bureaucratic illegality. In fact, there seems to be an attitude
of general acceptance towards illicit conduct intended to ensure an enterprise’s
success. Like other white-collar crimes, corruption is a criminal offence closely
connected with licit activities that have a positive social value. The manager who
corrupts therefore behaves in a twofold manner: although he or she abides by the
general rules of a system, he or she at the same time may violate rules which
interfere with the goals of his or her enterprise.22
The interaction between opportunities and costs will determine different
amounts of corruption. Van Duyne gives an example in which the role played by
an ineffective piece of legislation regulating one of the variables, namely ac-
countability, combined with a low set of moral rules, can significantly favour the
spreading of corruption.
The diffusion of this behaviour and its manifestations depends primarily on
the extent to which the rules of external accountability are imposed by law or
law enforcement, as well as by public morality. In countries where opportunities
for corruption are high and are combined with low accountability and moral
rules, the trend will be towards the growth of corruption to systemic proportions.
This is, for example, the case of Italy, where this development results from
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mechanisms whereby illicit conduct has become the rule and where corruption
is so routine and institutionalised that organisations reward those who act illicitly
and penalise those who comply with the rules. 23
4 Applying the paradox of the successful
leader to the Italian case
Corruption in Italy seems to display the following features: it results from highly
rational choices made by political, economic and administrative actors; and it
ends in, but also flows from, continuous and stable relations among public and
private subjects. Traditional survey methods designed to penetrate such corrup-
tion have fallen short of  their goal, largely  because  of  the high levels of
sophistication achieved in the processes of corruption and the evident mutual
interest of actors in hiding a favourable but illicit exchange. It causes devastating
damage which affects both the economic system and democratic institutions.
Finally, it is circular in nature because it tends to duplicate itself and spread,
thereby becoming ”systemic”.24
In short, corruption in Italy has been the product of an old individualistic and
opportunistic culture combined with weak ethical and juridical rules. When it
becomes environmental corruption25, as described by the ex-judge of ”Mani
Pulite”, Antonio Di Pietro, corruption may render the rules of the market devoid
of content. This is an evolved form of corruption in which a bribe is not paid in
order to win a particular contract, but in order to enter the small group of
businessmen with access to a certain market. The payment of bribes becomes a
practice which continues even when the official changes. In this way corruption
infiltrates the market machinery and eliminates the rules of competition that
should favour the strongest.
Cases of corruption are certainly much more numerous than those which have
actually been discovered. Investigations and trials have highlighted the existence
of a system in which the necessity to pay bribes – in order to obtain subsidies or
to conclude agreements – has become the generally accepted rule. It is therefore
possible to argue that the cases detected are not exceptions, but rather a small
proportion of a much more widespread pathology. On the other hand, recently
discovered examples of corruption demonstrate that scandals and trials, far from
eliminating corruption, in many cases only make paying bribes riskier (and thus
more expensive). Thus corruption grows more sophisticated and the fight against
it is consequently becoming more difficult.
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5 Action against corruption
Given the picture outlined above in which corrupt behaviour is defined as a
leadership disease, the problem is to devise measures that can succeed in
preventing corruption.
The economic analysis of corruption developed in section three above can
provide guidelines for policy makers. In other words, an effective fight against
corruption must be directed at creating a market with a low level of corruption.
According to the economic analysis, the fewer the decision makers, the higher
their discretionary power, and as the level of responsibility of decision makers
decreases, the opportunities for corruption increase. In a low-corruption market,
there are likely to be more sources of regulation, i.e., more institutions which
offer contracts, and more competition among the firms participating in the
bidding procedure. Those responsible for making decisions should be con-
strained by a system where the decision-making process is rationalised (discre-
tionary power) and reported in written form (responsibility) and consequently
accessible to everyone.
Although penal measures have a deterrent effect, since they increase the cost
of corruption, it is evident that their essential function is to control crime by
punishing offences already committed. However, corruption cannot be combated
only by penal means. Penal sanctions should be adopted with caution, since they
may also have undesired effects: for example, they may increase the price of
corruption, that is the bribe.
Starting from the fact that corruption is a leadership disease, efforts to fight
and prevent it must seek to change behaviour and attitudes at the highest levels
of private and public leadership. Such action, according to van Duyne, should
follow two basic principles: namely, the transparency principle and the first
servant principle.
The transparency principle is the basis of accountability, and to ensure its
application, for example codes of conduct have been elaborated. Van Duyne,
however, highlights that the preventive application of this principle might be
rather difficult, and, especially when applied above the executive level, only
formally applied. This would again erode the accountability mentioned above.
Its repressive application may also prove to be difficult: if closely linked to what
can be proven under the penal code, and if there is no in-depth investigation,
rapid penal action will be welcome: a few executives will be dismissed and public
opinion satisfied, but they will soon be replaced by others who behave similarly.
The second principle mentioned by van Duyne is the first servant principle.
This holds that the leader should be the first servant of the organisation, and that
no one is so important that rules do not apply to him or her. Compliance with
this principle seems to be as difficult as in the case just mentioned. Using the
excuse that the exception proves the rule is a human trait which nonetheless
creates the tendency to bend the rules in one’s own interest.
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5.1 What instruments should be developed
in order to fight corruption?
As a criminal offence, corruption is covered by the penal codes of many countries
and is severely punished. Penal sanctions, however, have proven to be inade-
quate: they are both ineffective and inefficient. It is therefore necessary to
elaborate different policies which aim to reduce opportunities for corruption. The
following sections provide an overview of the strategies recently introduced by
some European countries to control and prevent corruption. They show the
practical application of the two principles analysed by van Duyne.
5.1.1 A comparative analysis
In the last few years the fight against corruption has been the topic of studies,
proposals, reforms and conventions in various countries and at the international
level. The level of corruption, though, differs significantly from country to
country: whereas in some (such as France and Italy) it is systemic, in others (like
Sweden, Finland and Denmark) it is casual.26
Many countries,  such as Austria27,  Germany, Finland, the  Netherlands,
Greece, Portugal and Norway are trying to reform the organisation and structure
of the public administration, the aim being to reduce the opportunities for
corruption.28 Many have recently elaborated and  introduced new  codes of
conduct for public employees and officials. Some countries, notably Germany,
Finland, the Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium and Portugal, have introduced an
obligation for public employees to make financial declarations of their assets in
order to improve transparency in the public sector.29 Another common ground
for action in many countries is the creation of ad hoc anti-corruption authorities.
Over the last ten years France has enacted three important items of legislation
that pay particular attention to the financing of politic parties. In 1988 a law was
passed which requires members of the Government and of Parliament, presidents
of regional assemblies and mayors to provide information on their initial and
final assets. The same law for the first time disciplines the financing of political
parties and of elections. In 1993 a study commission, tasked with proposing
modifications to the legislation in force, recommended the adoption of codes of
conduct, increased transparency in the public administration as well as in private
corporations, the tightening of controls over corporations in order to prevent
slush funds and tax evasion, and the modification of some penal provisions. In
1993 a Service Central de Prévention de la Corruption30 was also established
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with the tasks of providing documentation and information for judicial authorities
investigating corruption cases, and of giving advice to the public administration.
As far as the United Kingdom is concerned, important recommendations for
combating corruption are set out in the report by the Nolan Commission which
was set up in 1995. The report stresses the importance of codes of conduct, of
internal and external checks on the public administration by independent bodies, and
of the training of public employees. Greater transparency is required in the lobbying
activities of members of Parliament and in the authorisation of consultancies.
The causes of corruption in Spain have been identified as the ineffectiveness
of the rules on the financing of politics, the great presence of the state in society
and the economy, and the weakness of the structures of the state. The debate,
however, has centred mainly on repressive measures, such as a tightening of
sanctions, revising the penal procedure or creating a special jurisdiction for
economic crimes with advantages for those who collaborate. In 1995 the Anti-
Corruption Prosecuting Service was set up with special powers to investigate
crimes against the public administration. Consisting of investigating magistrates,
this service also has a special police unit and experts in tax and administrative law.
5.1.2 The Italian experience
The Italian experience since 1992 has shown that penal action may be unable to
affect the origins and causes of systemic corruption rooted in popular attitudes
and behaviour.31 Besides the magnitude of the problem, Italy differs from other
countries in that corruption has infiltrated every level of public decision-making.
Corruption has been discovered both in large-scale decisions involving extensive
financial resources and in local ones of ordinary administrative procedure.
For this reason, attention should focus not on the tightening of penal sanctions,
but on legislative measures intended to ensure transparency in sectors where
corruption may more easily develop. The problem is one of prevention and
administrative controls, of the deregulation or re-regulation as the case may be
of markets more susceptible to corruption. Little has been done to introduce
measures to reduce discretionary power, to limit monopolistic decision-making
by individual public administrators and to enhance accountability at the same
time.32 A correlated problem is that of creating incentives for more moral
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behaviour by public administrators, working on levels of discretionary powers
together with responsibility.
Italy has recently enacted a number of laws covering the public administration.
In 1990, two laws were enacted, respectively on local authorities33 and on
administrative proceedings34, with a view to improving the efficiency of the
administration and providing citizens with greater opportunities to control the
decisions made by the public administration.
More recently, in 1997 the Italian Parliament enacted three important pieces
of legislation concerning institutional and administrative reform in order to
change the rationale of the public administration. The laws decentralise local
autonomies, reform public-sector employment, simplify administrative proce-
dures, change control systems, and reform the state budget.
Two of these laws act in the direction highlighted by van Duyne by enhancing
accountability and increasing transparency. Law n. 59 of 1997 empowers the
government to issue, by legislative decree, a general code of conduct for the
public administration and to adopt special codes for the various sectors of the
administration. The government is also empowered to create institutional bodies
with control and counselling functions in relation to these codes. Moreover, law
n. 94 of 1997 sets out a new structure for the state budget. Each individual item
of state expenditure is now linked with what has been termed a ‘function-goal’,
by which is meant that the objectives of every item of expenditure must be clearly
specified. This linking of every expense-creating public sector policy to a
well-defined goal makes it possible to measure output by the public administra-
tion in terms of the quantity and quality of the services supplied to citizens. The
law also establishes ‘centres of administrative accountability’ responsible for the
management of each single item of expenditure and headed by senior public
officers accountable for their performance.
These legislative changes, however, have not had the desired result of radically
modifying the structure and attitudes of the public administration. Analysis of
the causes of corruption as well as proposals for action has been conducted by
two different initiatives, respectively, by the Italian Parliament and the Govern-
ment.
On 27 September 1996 a Study Committee on the prevention of corruption
was established with the task of proposing legislative measures to prevent
corruption. The means to be adopted for this purpose were identified in accord-
ance with the constitutional principles of the impartiality of the public admini-
stration and of the loyalty and responsibility of employees.
Among the measures considered more appropriate in the short term are codes
of conduct and financial declarations for public officials. In the medium term,
the more appropriate measures seem to be the reduction of state intervention in
the economy, the separation of the selection and career of public employees from
politics, and modification of the stipulation of contracts in the public sector.
Finally, in the long term, the effective means are those aimed at preventing
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corruption: the re-organisation and simplification of legislation, the simplifica-
tion of administrative proceedings, and a system of controls based on results
rather than on processes.
On 26 September 1996 a Special Commission for the examination of bills on
the prevention and repression of corruption was set up by the Chamber of
Deputies and tasked with analysing twenty bills on the repression and prevention
of corruption. Working with a deadline of 31 October 1996, the Commission
identified four main issues: the control of legality and transparency in public
administration; transparency in politics and its disciplining together with eco-
nomic activity; the awarding of contracts by the public administration; and the
relation between penal and administrative proceedings by public employees.
On 31 March 1998 the Commission presented eight bills to Parliament. Four
of them are of particular relevance, since they seek to enhance transparency and
accountability.
The first deals with lobbying activities. It defines what is to be considered
lobbying activity and regulates it for the first time, listing in detail all actions
which are unlawful and the obligations which must be fulfilled. The second bill
deals with controls on contracting activity by administrations: it provides for a
new system of external controls on the awarding of contracts in order to ascertain
conformity with the general objectives of the administration, legitimacy, effi-
ciency and profitability.
A further proposal is to establish an authority ensuring legality and transpar-
ency in the public administration. Among the tasks of this authority would be the
gathering of information and data in order to supervise public offices. It would
also monitor the fulfilment of obligations and investigate the financial situation
of public employees, informing the judiciary or the competent administrative
bodies of any irregularity.
Finally, a fourth bill proposes changes to the penal code. In an endeavour to
devise remedies to facilitate investigations and to sever the relationship between
the actors of corruption, rather than tighten sanctions, the bill proposes a variety
of sanctions, which are reduced in the case of collaboration and aggravated in
that of obstruction of the action of magistrates.
Apart from these initiatives by Parliament, a Ministerial Decree of 7 Novem-
ber 1996 set up a study commission to curb corruption and improve action by
the public administration through measures to improve the quality of administra-
tion and to prevent corrupt practices. The Commission was of the opinion that
the malfunctions which permit the development of corruption can be eliminated
by re-organising the public administration, and that the best instrument to prevent
corruption is an efficient administration, where transparency and efficiency are
ensured, and the responsibility of public officials is better defined. It is therefore
necessary to eliminate the gap between the law ”in the book” and the law ”in
action”. The Commission has made several suggestions: increasing the role of
technical  bodies both in  national  and local  administrations; increasing  the
decision-making powers of public managers, reducing the political pressure on
them; fostering the territorial mobility of public employees; and promoting the
adoption and implementation of codes of conduct, ensuring that effective disci-
plinary sanctions are applied to those who do not comply.
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6 Conclusions
Some brief conclusions can be drawn from this analysis and might be useful for
further discussion. The analysis of corruption, particularly in Italy, has made it
clear that criminal law remains an essential component in the fight against
corruption. In fact, ”criminal law can play an important role by influencing
human behaviour, imposing  additional costs on the criminal activities and
providing the single person with an economic incentive not to commit an
offence…”.35 However, penal sanctions can play their most effective role only
if aided by a number of other measures, thus constituting a comprehensive,
far-reaching and long term anti-corruption strategy.
First, incentives should be provided for the ”producers of morality”: schools,
families, cultural, religious and political associations. There are various means
to do this, and they might involve appropriate legislative reforms, the redirecting
of public expenses, and additional public investments. Second, as regards the
disincentives for the ”destroyers of morality”, whether these are organised crime,
managers of corporations creating slush funds, international corruptors, all the
possible strategies should be used. For example, a more intelligent use of penal
and administrative law can make great inroads in anti-corruption efforts, as can
a more efficient deployment of the law enforcement and judicial authorities
responsible for preventing and controlling corruption. Greater emphasis should
be given to self-regulation by means of codes of conduct providing for a variety
of administrative sanctions, to the expulsion from the corporation or the public
administration office.36
Finally, since the focal point of corruption still remains the public administra-
tion, it is important that, in the long term, legislative reforms such as those
envisaged in Italy are implemented, in order to de-regulate and re-regulate a
sector which is often characterised by great confusion and which thus provides
enormous opportunities for the illicit exchange of favours.
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Combatting corruption
Commentary by Dr Miklos Levay 37
1 General remarks
In his excellent paper Professor van Duyne represents corruption as a constant
concomitant of social life. Although the author evidently considers corruption a
social phenomenon he concentrates on its human dimensions due perhaps to its
permanent presence felt through all the various periods of the history of mankind.
This ”social environmental pollution”, as a Hungarian sociologist (Hankiss, E.,)
calls corruption, is studied by van Duyne basically as an individual phenomenon.
We can say that the author’s analysis of corruption, which has become general
by now, has a behaviourist approach. In my opinion this view is reflected in the
definition of corruption appearing on page 3 of the paper, the ‘hidden’ explana-
tion of the author for this phenomenon and his viewpoint on the means and
methods of the reaction to corruption. The author speaks about acts and attitudes
when he examines corruption and comes to a conclusion which is in line with
the above mentioned view, i.e.: ”Corruption is very much of a state of mind
indeed.”
I think that with this approach van Duyne wants to emphasise the universality
of corruption and the individual responsibility in the responses to and fight
against this phenomenon.
The advantage of this view is that it is able to present the general characteristics
of corruption independently of historical periods and social systems. It has further
positive features, i.e. this aspect does not give way to a moral relativist judgement
on corruption, which would be that ”the system is corrupt and the individual only
conforms to it.”
However, I feel that this approach has certain shortcomings. One of them is
that the historical interpretation of corruption, which concentrates on its universal
character and has a behaviourist approach, does not give enough scope for
sufficient differentiation with regard to the phenomenon.
Thus for instance the paper presents a well-grounded and acceptable classifi-
cation of the forms and levels of corruption. Nevertheless it falls short of
discussing questions related to the difference between the legal and illegal forms
of the phenomenon. This is, however, an unavoidable question from the aspect
of criminal policy since
a) ”corruption” and ”corruption-related crimes” are not identical terms, and
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b) defining the borderline between legal and illegal phenomena can help in
the demarcation of the criminal justice competence in the field of reaction
to corruption.
The paper is partly lacking in the systematic account of the major socio-economic
factors that give rise to the current phenomena of corruption. In my view, it would
have been worthwhile to emphasise that in addition to the common general
features of the corruption present in every society, corruption also has different
traits in the various socio-political-systems, traits which are characteristic of the
given system only. Corruption does not show the same incidence in every society.
The paper naturally exposes the characteristics of a certain system, i.e. those
of the corruption present in the well-developed societies of Western Europe. It
is not sure, however, that these represent fully all the characteristics of corruption.
This is why, as a supplement to van Duyne’s paper, I will discuss the charac-
teristics of corruption present in the states undergoing transformation in the
Central-Eastern European region and especially in Hungary.
2 Corruption in Central-Eastern Europe
with special regard to Hungary
A. The ”socialist/communist” era
The  common distinguishing characteristic  of  the  states  of Central-Eastern
Europe (of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) is that
they are undergoing transformation. After the collapse of the so-called socialist
system during the late 1980s, the state began to be transformed into a society
based on parliamentary democracy, market economy and respect for human
rights. Prior to discussing issues related to corruption in the period of transfor-
mation I would like to discuss briefly the characteristics of the previous regime
that are relevant to our topic. Two particular features of corruption also justify a
brief account of the characteristics of its socialist version. One of these is that
corruption has system-specific features (Kende, P., p. 91). The other feature, as
is emphasised in van Duyne’s paper, is that in the background of corruption we
can find behaviour that deviates from the rules, and an attitude which accepts
illegal, immoral access to preferences, advantages and possessions.
This type of consideration makes it possible to identify the differences and
system-specific features and to determine what kind of attitude to corruption the
new democracies in the region inherited from the former regime.
The distinguishing feature of the socialist politico-economic system was the
concentration of power as well as of goods and services. The concentration of
power was based on the single party system, the control over parliamentary and
local elections, and the lack of an independent judiciary and of the freedom of
the press. In respect of the socialist era we cannot speak about truly representative
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democracy or about the transparency of political power and practice either at the
local or the national level. We can rather speak about a particular political
clientism the sole basis for which was loyalty to the Party. In view of these
peculiarities we can state that the former socialist system, as was the case with
every totalitarian and dictatorial system, is a type of political corruption in itself.
As for the concentration of goods and services, this was based on the dominance
of state property, on the integration of the state authority and the management of
state ownership and the planned economy. Among its consequences was the
economy of shortage i.e. the legally unfulfilled demand for goods and services.
The corruption induced by the shortage economy, in my opinion, is perhaps a
peculiar socialist version of market corruption.38
Essentially this means that corruption takes place in the interest of the
provision of supply and not in the interest of the demand, and every member of
the society of all rank and kind takes part in it.
Furthermore there were other factors enhancing the corruption, i.e. the trans-
formation of services that could be provided privately into a public service and
keeping the wages of those who carried out this service at an artificially low level.
This was justified by the fact that these people (e.g.: taxi-drivers, hairdressers,
barbers, doctors) did not live on their wages or salaries but on the tip they were
given.
As a consequence of this, ”the tip-related occupations created a system of
re-division of tips and thus with the assistance of the state several substructures
of corruption were born” (Kránitz, M. (1996) pp. 181-182). (With regard to this
it could be mentioned in passing that one of the most nauseating legacies of
socialism encountered in everyday life is the corruption existing in health care.
In Hungary people still feel that they can get proper treatment only if they slip
that certain brown envelope into their consultant’s pocket. After the treatment
the prescribed procedure is to pass another envelope with a ‘gratuity’ – this is
what the tip given to doctors is called officially – to the consultant with the
discretion.)
Naturally the phenomena outlined above were not present to the same extent
during the entire  period  of socialism  or in every country. The lack of an
independent judiciary for instance continued into the early 1960s, and this
represented a corruption factor that provided an opportunity for fabricated
lawsuits. The concentration of power and goods was much lower in Hungary and
Poland during the second half of the 1980s than was the case e.g. in Czechoslo-
vakia. There are two other factors which resulted in the difference in the extent
of corruption in the various member-countries of the former ‘Communist block’.
One of them is the traditions that emerged in any given country. The other factor
is the attitude and activity of the number one leader of the country with regard
to ”parochial” corruption – under socialist conditions this concept includes the
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phenomena of corruption within the so-called socialist connections or system of
protection – and ”market” corruption.
During the period in question, also the responses to corruption had their
system-specific characteristics. Reference should be made first to approaches to
corruption-related questions with an ideological character and the purpose of the
propaganda. Announcements and declarations about the ”purity of public life”
and the assertion of a ruthless response to corruption served as proof of supe-
riority of socialism over capitalism rather than a reflection of reality. The
campaigns that were called for invariably had only a modest and temporary effect
on the spheres of public and business life. However, these campaigns hardly
affected, if at all, the existence and spread of the various forms of parochial
corruption. The contemporary leaders of politics may not have regretted this at
all. The following remark, which characterizes Czechoslovakia prior to the
transition, may well describe every ”socialist” country: ”corruption, and cor-
rupted behaviour… was also a method of making life bearable in this upside
down world.” (Varga, Gy., (1998) p. 230)
One of the ways of fighting against corruption was the expansion of the range
of criminal law. Thus for instance in Hungary from the early 1960s more and
more sorts of corrupted behaviour became criminalized and the circle of those
officials who bore criminal responsibility for their actions was enlarged. As a
consequence of this the 1978 Criminal Code in force at present lists the crimes
against the purity of public life (i.e. bribery, trafficking in influence, etc.) under
separate sections, in addition to the ”traditional” crimes of corruption related to
justice. Bureaucratic and economic bribery are both punishable. The circle of
passive corruptees includes managers and those with discretionary power of
decision-making in addition to public officials as well as employees who commit
the crime of corruption with the characteristics of bribery as defined by law.
Despite the above-mentioned widening of criminal responsibility, the proportion
of reported ”crimes against the purity of public life” was insignificant in Hungary.
During the 1970s these crimes made up 1% of the total number of reported
crimes, and later the proportion was even less.
Summing up the phenomena of corruption during the socialist era we can say
that the totalitarian political system and the economy of shortage acted as factors
enhancing corruption. In the field of discretionary decisions we qualify as
system-specific the fact that the decision-makers mostly deviated from the
prescribed criteria with respect to the political interests of the Party; therefore
their rewards also had a political character (promotion, etc.)
Also another characteristic feature should be mentioned: the transnational
forms of corruption were not yet present in the countries of the region, which
was due to the closed character of the Communist block. The attitude towards
corruption was actually that of acceptance. In the political and economic sectors
the ”socialist connections” ensured success, and parochial corruption provided
the existence or welfare in everyday life. One characteristic of the attitude related
to parochial corruption was that it was not considered immoral by the majority
as a result of the lack of legitimacy of the political system. The new democracies
of Central and Eastern Europe therefore inherited the ”acts” and ”attitudes” noted
above, as far as corruption is concerned.
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B. The transition period
The contents of the ”legacy” changed considerably in the countries of the region
during the transition period during the late 1980s and the early 1990s. The
contents of the changes were fundamentally determined by two factors. The first
is the direction of the transition, which was the establishment of a society based
on market economy, the freedom of enterprise, parliamentary democracy and
respect for human rights. The second is that the most important characteristic of
the 1990s, the transition itself with the establishment of the above-mentioned
institutions, has recently been  concluded  in the  respective countries. As a
consequence of these factors the phenomena of corruption have also changed.
In line with the direction and essentials of the transition the forms and categories
of corruption existing in the Western countries have appeared, in the forms
described by van Duyne. The corruption of the region, at the same time, has a
particular character as a result of the transition or of the recently completed state
of this transition. These peculiar characteristics are vividly described by György
Varga, the Hungarian scholar, in his paper that is quoted above:
”… the new anti-corruption restrictions of the evolving democracies and
market economies have not been established as yet. I am not primarily thinking
of the legal ones but of those informally enforced by society, the market and
the competitive environment of politics. This state, somewhat similar to the
”Wild West” and the phase of ”early capitalism”, is the state of decentralization
of the so far concentrated power and concentrated disposition of goods… This
is a different world, therefore, (and will remain different for a long time),
different  from the  well-established democracies and capitalist  countries.
Corruption, however, exists in well-established democratic systems as well…
This corruption is exercised by the well-established participants of well-es-
tablished capitalism in order to maintain their current posts and enrich their
wealth … while of course they acquire unfair advantages over others…”
(Varga, Gy., (1998) p. 233)
The author goes on as follows: ”I call these well-established (but not entirely
safe)  forms of  corruption  applied under  the conditions of well-established
democracy and capitalism ”operational” corruption, something that is required
for the operation of the system similar to a (theoretically redundant) component.
In our region the period of transition and privatization is primarily characterized
by a peculiar ”position-gaining corruption”, while the operational corruption has
also appeared as a concomitant to the market economy and the evolving demo-
cratic institutions, to some extent as a heritage of ‘socialist courage’.” (Varga,
Gy., op. cit. p.233)
The passage quoted above properly emphasises the major characteristics of
the phenomena of corruption during the transition period, which is corrupt
behaviour in the interest of gaining a position. The distinctive channel for gaining
a position is privatization. The unavoidable process of the transformation of the
state property into private properties is at the same time the major process inciting
corruption in the transition. The fact that it has turned out this way can be traced
back to several factors. One of them, which should be stressed, is that the
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privatization followed the transformation of a system and not the simple change
of the government. The new owners of the political power put their own people
in political as well as economic positions related to the privatization in order to
counterbalance the ”connection capital” of the nomenclature of the previous
regime. As a consequence of this the political and economic power became
entangled or interpenetrated to an incredible extent. The reasons for and conse-
quences of this phenomenon in Hungary are appropriately reflected in the
following remarks that concern the period of the first democratic government
(1990-1994):
”people who were not used to power and who were basically poor received,
and  put  their own companions into, positions which partly  involved an
encounter with corruption and through this the possibility of becoming rich.
This had a mentally detrimental effect on them. This was because they simply
were not prepared for exercising power, for the possibility of becoming rich,
or for the refusal of the unfair means of accumulating wealth.” (The barrister
Péter Bárándy’s statement quoted in Szöke, Zs., 1998, p. 3)
We must add that the interpretation of the political and economic power
continued also after the next elections, from 1994 to 1998, which entailed the
continuity of corruption (although this continuation took place with different
participants, with different motives and with different traditions of exercising
power). The fact that in Hungary, and in the other new democratic states as well,
politics and economy became interpenetrated so much can be traced back to the
statutes that were lax in ”regulating” the possible positions that could be taken
up by politicians and public officials in companies, or to the lack of statutes that
clearly prohibited such roles. The Hungarian law on conflict of interest demon-
strates vividly the legislation which leaves a ”back door” open or creates an
opportunity for corruption. In 1992, the Hungarian Parliament passed Act No.
XXII on the legal status of public officials. Although one of the purposes of the
law on economic conflict of interest is ”to enhance and improve the purity of
democratic public life” and to support ”public officials in carrying out their duties
impartially free of any influence”, it did not categorically pre-empt taking up
positions in companies. In 1991, one leading governmental politician explained
the causes of this in the following way in the debate on the Bill that led to this:
”…the government must face the fact that it cannot pay enough to its loyal
experts, i.e. to provide the access of wealth justifiably expected of the state. This
is why the top public officials generally cannot be prohibited from taking part in
certain economic and company activities.” (Iván Szabó, quoted in: Szöke, Zs.,
ibid, p. 3)
The ensurance of ”back doors” was explained by many with the fact that
following the democratic changes a great number of highly qualified experts left
the public administration, and they to be replaced by people loyal to the new
political power. Simultaneously the ”newly arrived” public officials had to be
given the chance of making incomes higher than the average.
The fact that the issue is more complex than this is proved by the 1997
amendment to the Act. It proved to be impossible even in 1997, with a different
government and on the basis of its proposal and with an established body of
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public officials, to clearly regulate conflict of interest among public officials.
Following the amendment, taking up a position in a supervisory board or board
of directors is still not incompatible with the legal status of public officials. In
accordance with the law any public official can enter into a contractual relation-
ship on condition that he or she receives permission from those exercising the
authority of the employer for taking up a position which is prohibited as
incompatible. I think that the development of the Hungarian legislation on
”conflict of interest” well demonstrates how legislation can generate corruption,
or to use van Duyne’s category, how it exemplifies strategic corruption.
Privatization did not become a generating factor for corruption simply because
it was carried out within the transition, but because it took place in societies and
economies lacking capital. As a consequence of this, on the one hand multina-
tional companies took part in the process with better chances, on the other hand
the role of ”connection capital” was increased from the point of view of the
acquisition of privatised assets and wealth. The consequences of this for example
in Hungarian privatization is demonstrated by the following:
”…during the period between 1990 and the first quarter of 1994 some 300
billion HUF worth of company assets were sold and paid for with cash,
restitution vouchers or credit out of the original total book value of 2000 billion
HUF. 60% of this was bought with foreign currency, mainly by professional
multinational investors. The proportion of the Hungarian investors was di-
vided in the following way: 15% paid with cash, 10% of the sold assets was
bought with restitution vouchers below nominal value and 15% was bought
on credit. According to experts, during the period between 1990 and 1994 the
devaluation of the assets was 200 billion HUF as a result of these transactions.”
(Szöke, Zs. op. cit., p. 3)
This happened despite the fact that a state organization with a board of
directors of members delegated by the parliamentary parties had been set up to
supervise the privatization. In addition to this the distinguished public officials
were appointed to the board of directors and the supervisory board of companies
to be privatized, whose task was to assist and enhance the best possible privati-
zation serving the interest of the given company as well as of the country. In the
light of the above statistics we can justifiably suppose that in Hungary as well as
in the other countries with similar conditions in Central and Eastern Europe,
privatization has not been free of corruption.
The lack of financial resources and capital generates corruption in other fields,
too, and not only in the privatization. Thus for instance the financing of the parties
still has not been solved in the new democracies. (However, this does not seem
perfect in the ”old” ones, either.) This leads to the well-grounded suspicion that
the biggest corruption scandal so far to have become known in Hungary (the
”Tocsik-case”) was but an action for ”filling the party’s till”.
All this discussed so far may prove that  the  system-specific feature of
corruption in the states of transition is linked to the acquisition of positions. ”The
corrupt behaviour in the acquisition of positions is a means which will mainly
decide who will get into the key positions of the economic and political power
in our developing capitalist societies and democracies, and it will therefore
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decide, among others, who will have the roles with benefits from the future
”operational” corruption to the extent as the morals and rigour of society will
allow. (Varga, Gy., op. cit. p. 233) What preventive measures did the new
democracies fail to take in order to exclude the possibility of the acquisition of
positions being attached to corruption both in reality and in public opinion? If
we look at Hungary we can say that despite the numerous anti-corruption statutes
and governmental decrees and measures one basic requirement was missed, i.e.
to ensure the transparency or the easily comprehensible mechanism of the
privatization process. The events and turns in Hungary seem to justify van
Duyne’s emphasis that anti-corruption measures must be based on the principle
of transparency. As long as the transparency of the processes determining the life
of a society or community, or the public life in a country (e.g. the privatization
in our region) is not ensured, we must expect corruption to spread, and we must
also expect the fact that we may hear rumours about certain cases, but full
disclosure will scarcely ever happen.
The enforcement of the principle of transparency is of course not the respon-
sibility solely of the government. The mass media have a significant role in this
as well. A survey conducted in 1997 among journalists in Hungary shows that
two-thirds of them maintain ”that there are still subjects which are taboos, that
cannot be reported honestly, and corruption and the interpretation of politics and
the economy were put at the top of the list.” (Vásárhelyi, M., p. 139) This fact
indicates also that in the field of anti-corruption measures the ensurance of the
freedom of the press and the independence of the media is a prerequisite in the
countries of the region.
It is not only the economic leaders and politicians of the region who could
have made more effort to curb corruption. ”Position-gaining corruption” was
sometimes part of the strategy of market and asset-acquisition of the multina-
tional companies that have become so influential in business life. It was not by
chance that the Hungarian Catholic Episcopacy stated the following in their
circular ”For a Fairer and More Brotherly World!”:
”The multinational companies will fulfil their real role only if they bring the
order of well-developed countries with them thus enhancing the morality of
the domestic economic culture.” (The circular of the Hungarian Catholic
Episcopacy to All Benevolent People In Hungarian Society. Budapest, 1997,
p. 36)
We can claim that these companies could be expected to behave as a kind of
”first servant” in the manner suggested by van Duyne.
3 Closing remark
Having discussed the system-specific features of corruption in the countries of
Central and Eastern Europe we must agree with van Duyne’s conclusion that
”corruption is very much a state of mind indeed.” The remarks discussed in my
commentary will perhaps verify that the contents of this state of mind depend
greatly on the social conditions.
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Combatting Corruption
– Honest Graft?
Commentary by Ahti Laitinen
1.
First, I want to say that Professor van Duyne’s paper is an excellent analysis of
corruption. The definition of corruption is in general a good one, and the
classification of the different forms of corruption is reasonable.
One seeming and obvious feature is that the approach of the writer is mostly
quite an individualistic one. This is in itself neither a bad nor a good thing, but
it must be taken into account when we consider the conclusions drawn.
We tend customarily to think of crime as an abnormality. The enlightened even
speak of ”deviance”. Van Duyne, on the contrary, sets corruption in everyday life
and business as arising almost naturally (see, e.g., Noonan 1984). In his text he
refers to it as ”a sneaky but psychologically normal growth.”
If corruption is not subsumed into deviance, it might still be considered as a
deviation. These deviations occur so frequently as not to be considered ”excep-
tionable behaviour”. Van Duyne has an example from family life. A child trades
off washing the family crockery for a chance to stay up late to see ”Star Wars”
– with the additional condition that mother is not to know. This is some kind of
clandestine oral contract and because it is clandestine it is not told to the world
– as presented by mother.
Following Deflem (p. 4), the author sees a certain social interaction penetrating
and defeating a system. Hence the naturalness of it all. I should prefer to see not
merely in this situation something ”human”, but in fact a hidden contract.
Certainly corruption thus penetrates ordinary life and as such is expressed in our
ordinary jargon – ”you owe me one”, characteristically an expression engendered
in the  United  States,  a  country  founded  on  contract and  notorious for  its
adherence to the clandestine. Van Duyne uses the term ”flexibility” to express
this life-giving corruption as opposed to rigid cold systems.
I agree with van Duyne when he emphasizes that it is not necessary for money
to be passed as a conditio sine qua non for th eestablishment of corruption. The
term used in English common law is ”favours received”.
This all-too-human quid pro quo style of life becomes dangerous when it
”informs” the organizational level of society, what van Duyne calls ”the organ-
izational culture of the department”. Here its most obvious impact is upon the
career structure, upsetting, although van Duyne does not quite put it like this, la
carrière ouverte aux talents. The latter aspect van Duyne does not, perhaps,
sufficiently take into account. In the end, corruption is inefficient. In fact, in the
beginning, ”right from the start” corruption is inefficient.
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2.
Some alternatives or different approaches can, however, be offered for the
problems of definition, and for some substantial characteristics of corruption.
Following Paavo Isaksson’s (1997) definition, corruption can be seen from a
wider perspective. Isaksson, a Finnish researcher, considers corruption on a
dimension of inappropriate – appropriate influence, and of illegal – legal action.
In this way he defines different types of corruption, including also some legal
forms of action. I am not at all arguing that van Duyne dismisses the question of
moral – immoral and legal – illegal, but these do not come out very clearly from
his paper.
On this basis we can ask, what are the connections between amoral, but legal,
and illegal acts? Some of the actions described in the following figure are
regulated by law, some are regulated by ”a national character”, and the regulation
of some actions depends largely on the situation. In my opinion, it is useful to
notice that only a part of corruption falls under the laws, and Isaksson’s (1997,
152) analyses gives a clear picture of this.
Briefly described, bribery is an illegal and inappropriate action between
individuals and individuals, corporations and individuals and finally corporations
and corporations. According to Finnish legislation, bribery is defined as an
inappropriate influencing of a state official by an individual or corporation. The
relationships between corporations are more complicated, but also legally regu-
lated. However, bribery as a form of corruption is quite clear. The other forms
of corruption are, in practice, often mixed together. Conceptually, bribery is
Illegal
Illegal
Legal
Legal
Inappropriate
Appropriate
F bribery
F
F
F
F
state bribery (deceitful action)
state bribery (infuencing
voters)
self corruption
conflicts of intrest F
F
financing of parties by firms
“old boys” -networks
F
F
state bribery (political appointments
to office)
legal bribery
(e.g. regional
development)
84
usually understood as an action, where the objects are in the public sector. A
corresponding phenomenon in the private sector is usually called ”inappropriate
behaviour” or something else, but not bribery. Of course, the last mentioned
action can be called ”corruption”. (See, e.g., Friedrichs 1995).
I will clarify a little bit the concept of self-corruption. In this form of corruption
a civil servant or a politician operates at the same time as ”a player” in different
roles. He or she can exert influence, for example, through a contract in a way
that gives advantage to his or her firm. Another example is a doctor working in
the public health care area, who at the same time requests that a patient use a
private health care firm owned by him or her. At least in Finland we have some
clear examples of these types of corruption. In one case, a high official in the
health care administration was at the same time the owner of a private firm
producing machines  or  devices for  medical investigation. He  forced some
municipalities to order just these products, although the decision was against the
wishes of the local government officers. The products were not as reliable as the
products of the competitors, and they were more expensive. Because the civil
servant in question was involved in other corrupt actions, he was punished by
the court.
The concept of self-corruption itself is not a legal concept in Finnish legisla-
tion. The concept of self-corruption nevertheless related closely to the form of
corruption known in everyday language as the operation of the ”old-boy net-
work”.
If we extend the concept of self-corruption to include these other intimately-
connected persons, we are, actually, speaking about this network. A case has been
coming to head in Finland recently about the considerable reductions allowed in
the natter of civil damages already ruled upon by the court. The case is that of a
Mr. Sundqvist, a former bank director, party leader, and government minister.
The decision to allow these astonishing reductions from what the court had
originally proposed was apparently taken by the junior minister of finance, Ms.
Arja Alho. These reductions were not in line with corresponding cases. Thus,
suspicions have arisen that the reductions are due to the ”network” since the
minister and ex-minister belong to the same party.
Isaksson’s analyses show how difficult it is draw a line between permissible
and prohibited actions. Many of the corrupt actions are not prohibited legally,
but they are clearly immoral. Some years ago I made a survey of the attitudes of
high state officials in the face of different offers. I asked, among other things,
whether or not they had received some offers, and whether they saw these as
corruption or bribery. Most of the interviewed had got offers. Some were very
valuable. Their impressions about the real nature of the offers varied very much.
Some officials were ready to accept ”a small present” (for example, a bottle of
cognac), a few were more strict. Once it was said in Finland that a state official
could accept ”a cold sandwich and a warm beer, but not a warm sandwich and a
cold beer”. It depends quite a lot on a person’s ethics, how the line between
permissible and forbidden has to be drawn. That is why ethical codes for different
groups of professions have been introduced.
The financing of political parties by firms is a very problematic phenomenon
as a form of corruption. Contributing to party coffers, and especially the election
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campaigns of political candidates, is not prohibited. On the other hand, the
financing is not very open or transparent in many countries, including Finland.
Sometimes there have been suspicions that this kind of financing means tipping
the balance for the contributor in a situation of conflict of interest.
3.
In fact, van Duyne deals with this kind of problem in his paper, but perhaps from
a somewhat different perspective. In the author’s section entitled ”public sec-
tor/political corruption”, the question of political influence in the gaining of
positions in the civil service or local government is looked at. Van Duyne argues
that these appointments in France, Belgium and Italy are not based on ”admin-
istrative skills” but are rewards for political friends. However, in many countries
it turns out that the recipients of these posts are lawyers by training, a form of
training that – curiously – is nevertheless supposed to bring with it administrative
expertise. It is sometimes difficult to know which is the key factor; the basic
training in law – a system requirement with a ring of objectivity – or the fact that
the appointed is a ”political friend”. Of course, if being a lawyer is the starting
requirement which cannot be got over, then it could also be argued that there are
lawyers and lawyers and some of those who are not ”political friends” may be
more effective in the position. Hence the point about corruption: that it is
inefficient, frustrating in this case la carrière ouverte aux talents. These problems
were very much discussed in Finland, too, especially during the 1980s.
Van Duyne is right to raise the question of the relation between the political
and public administrative sector. In Finland, ambassadorial and even consular
posts are sometimes given as a political reward or favour. This does not improve
the mentality of career diplomats. Most notorious of all is the system pertaining
in the United States where contributions to party political funds may, if large
enough, result in an ambassadorship for the donor. Do the Americans regard this
as a piece of political corruption or not? If they do not, is the legitimation in their
minds about this form of  behaviour sufficient to offset any imputation of
corruption arising from the comments of an outsider to the system? In short, is
there any deviation from the criterion in this case since – question – has a criterion
been set? The point is the same as the one made later by van Duyne about the
difference between the south and north in Europe, between, put crudely, Catholic
and Protestant. Clientelismo itself may be the criterion in Italy and Greece. On
what grounds does van Duyne dare to challenge this? Above, one answer has
been given, namely efficiency. But there are other answers. One of them concerns
international relations. I will highlight this by using an example given by Docent
George Maude.
Docent Maude refers to contributions to US campaign funding in party
politics. If there is no criterion or only a wishy-washy one, what distinguishes in
this age of globalization Wilbur J. Hodge, Sr., (the name is fictitious) when he
”buys” his ambassadorship to the Republic of Begorra (the name is fictitious)
from the Begorran People’s Party (the only party in Begorra that is allowed) when
it contributes to Bill Clinton’s campaign fund?
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This example, Docent Maude continues, takes us easily into a mingled world
of inter-state relations and private interests. Since Berlusconi is mentioned at
least twice in van Duyne’s paper, let us throw in the media into this world of
public and private interest. Some years ago it would have been possible to have
relegated Berlusconi to the level of an Italian finangling. But this is no longer
the case. Clean Mr. Blair is also in the picture. It goes like this. In the last general
election in Britain, the Sun newspaper backed Blair and Blair won (there were
other factors in his success). Nevertheless, the Sun newspaper is owned by a chap
called Murdoch. He is not British, but an Australian bearing a US passport.
Recently, Mr. Blair interceded with the Italian prime minister Romano Prodi to
get Murdoch a slot on Italian TV. At least the European has touched this story
(issue of 30.3.1998 – 5.4.1998). Blair’s intercession can be portrayed in the nicest
of current terms: as an attempt to challenge the corrupt monopolist Silvio
Berlusconi and as a piece of internationalism – letting foreign competition
challenge a hitherto nationally-closed sector. But why did not Murdoch apply
directly to the Italians for a slot? It looks as if Blair ”owed him one”. And, in any
case, is it a function of a British prime minister to argue for the private interests
of an American citizen – or indeed to argue for the private interests of any
country’s citizen? (The European).
Who in these international issues is the decision-maker in terms of van
Duyne’s definition of corruption:
”a decision-maker consents or demands to deviate from the criterion which
should rule his or her decision-making in exchange for a reward ...”
If Prodi gives Murdoch a slot, what does he get in return? If nothing, is there
still corruption? If he refuses to do anything, is there still corruption? If he only
tells Blair that Murdoch may apply for a slot, is there still corruption? In all these
situations it would be possible to argue that there is corruption – not necessarily
of Prodi, but always of Blair. Blair could hardly be called here a decision-maker;
rather he appears in the role of ”hidden persuader” or even bagman. Between
Murdoch and Blair and possibly for Prodi – if only a better place in the ”culture
of the department”, that is, the cosy department of the EU prime ministers.
Precisely because in the current world of international relations states are often
important but yet secondary actors, the whole question of defining the criterion
also becomes difficult. But essentially the issue is enormously complicated by
the fact that there are several links in the chain, no single decision-maker, and an
intense mingling of interests.
4.
There are a couple of issues which are not dealt with in van Duyne’s paper. These
are corruption between different branches of public organizations and the social
preconditions of corruption.
Van Duyne does not touch very much, if at all, on corruption – more precisely
bribery – between different organizational units. In Finland, for example, we
have cases where municipal officers have given bribes to state authorities in order
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to get advantages for their own municipality. In one case, an official of one
ministry was furnished with a boat and an engine for it, while the local govern-
ment officers who gave the bribe wanted nothing for themselves but only
something extra for their local government area.
One thing that van Duyne does not deal with very much are the preconditions
for corruption. I want to say something about these, and I use the concept
corruptive interface. By this, I refer to an increased and increasing interaction
between the political-administrative machinery of society, and business life. The
wider the corruptive interface is, the greater are the (potential) possibilities for
corruption. The reasons for the widening of the corruptive interface lie in the
extension of the role of the so-called organizational level of society. For example,
the state is involved more than previously in private business life. The range of
matters the public sector is responsible for is wider than before. That gives an
idea about the matters I am referring to. (Backman 1972, Laitinen 1989).
5.
In my opinion the solutions recommended by the author are in themselves good,
namely transparency and the first servant principle. I have myself also recom-
mended these types of principles. We can, however, ask whether these principles
are enough. A certain ethic of professionalism is required along with a definite
career, both for the guild of lawyers and the civil servants.
There is a dangerous trend in the world today of people swapping jobs – civil
service, then private industry – and taking that valuable quality of information
with them. If you examine the case of B. Cornfeld (”Do you sincerely want to
be rich?”), you will see that members of the Securities Commission changed
sides to go to work for private firms. Since the support for regulatory agencies
appears to be growing in the Western Europe, the switch in staff from such
agencies to private firms (instead of their remaining in the agencies as dedicated
and career-oriented watchdogs) can be a great source of corruption.
Globalization has extended the field of activity for ”special interests”. There
are no corresponding institutions on a global level to match them. What should
also be questioned thoroughly is the extent to which our competitive economy
is wasteful, the inherent corruption forming a part of that waste. That is to say,
to set the problem of corruption in a context that could be changed by a different
type of economics.
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Women in the Criminal Justice System
by Katarina Tomasevski
Summary
The purpose of this text is to contribute to discussions about women and criminal
justice during the preparations for the Tenth United Nations Congress on Pre-
vention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders. Its starting point is the likely
influence of the contemporary international political priorities – violence against
women and gender mainstreaming – on policy-making. This slant reverses the
request contained in the invitation by the organizers to consider the impact of
research findings on policy, and begins instead by inquiring into the possible
impact that recent changes in international policy will have on the system of
criminal justice and reflects upon the role of research in this process.
Too little research has been generated thus far on the feasible options for
changing criminal justice systems in line with the previous postulate of ‘fair and
equal treatment’ for women. The specific meaning of gender or mainstreaming
in the area of criminal justice has yet to be defined. The text therefore begins
with an outline of the main features of current international priorities, highlight-
ing the requirements of gender mainstreaming and combatting violence against
women. Both of these create substantial challenges for policy making and its
application in criminal justice. Gender mainstreaming does not have research-
based proposals to build upon. Combatting violence against women, on the other
hand, has too many such proposals, but these have been generated outside
criminal justice systems and may not be easy to apply.
Both the vocabulary of gender mainstreaming and the underlying concepts
are new to most criminal justice policy-makers and professionals. The demand
for rapid adjustment might lead to a repetition of the practice adopted by
institutions in a similar situation, which consists of replacing ‘women’ by
‘gender’ in the pertinent policy documents and employing a gender advisor in
the name of mainstreaming. The focus of the text is on the United Nations because
preparations for the Congress are due to reflect the Organization’s priorities, and
on the Council of Europe as the most relevant European regional organization.
The latter shows how little change can be detected in the Council of Europe’s
activities concerning the prevention of torture or the development of criminal
justice statistics, and highlights the principal concerns of this text. The formula-
tion of a policy requires defining the ends (what is to be achieved, and preferably
why) and specifying the means (defining who should proceed, and how, in order
to attain the specified ends) In this area, three distinct policy-making structures
– women, human rights, and criminal justice – are involved. The application of
concepts and approaches generated within various bodies dealing with women’s
issues to the area of human rights has generated a great deal of controversy, and
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it is thus safe to predict difficulties when the two – separately or jointly – are
applied in the field of criminal justice.
Part one describes and discusses the pillars of the international policy of the
1990s.. The reorientation from sex to gender has created an enormous intellectual
challenge, especially in the area  of criminal justice where even sex-based
differences were traditionally marginalized. A demand for gender mainstreaming
risks a repetition of this marginalization if linguistic adaptations (gender instead
of women) are substituted for required changes. How criminal justice systems
will come to grips with the other prominent policy issue – violence against
women – is an inevitable and urgent question for both international and domestic
policy makers. The marginalization of women within the official criminal justice
structures has been amply compensated by a great deal of feminist research and
writing outside these structures. Unfortunately, most of it is of Anglo-Saxon
origin and thus not readily ‘exportable’ to other legal and political systems.
Moreover, the slant towards an image of women as victims has created an
imbalance because too little research is carried out on women as victimizers, be
they terrorists or traffickers in female prostitutes. Consequently, research-based
proposals for different treatment of women offenders as well as for an enhanced
role for women professionals throughout the criminal justice system have yet to
be developed.
The issue of victims has entered criminal justice law and policy recently while
the practice lags behind. The speed with which violence against women acquired
prominence during the early 1990s has caught many international and domestic
actors unprepared. Nevertheless, many actors initiated specific programmes
aimed at eliminating violence against women, but in the absence of in-depth
studies of the problem. Because the system of criminal justice is bound to operate
within the margins of the international and domestic legal framework, a legal
basis for adjustment to changing political priorities is crucial for its operation.
Differences between domestic legal responses to violence against women, or
definitions of rape, illustrate how little has been accomplished thus far in
developing a common legal basis. Europe is unique in that it is the sole region
with a dual law-making structure (the Council of Europe and the European
Union), in addition to the global normative and policy framework of the United
Nations.
Overcoming institutionalized neglect of women within criminal justice – as
victims, offenders or professionals – is seen as the priority to which a great deal
of thought ought to be devoted. Other than is the case with other categories for
which detailed regulations and guidance have been developed, little has been
done about or for women thus far. This is illustrated in the text by highlighting
the uncertainty regarding the very approach – should the guiding principle be
defined as equal or preferential treatment? The formula used by the United
Nations during the 1980s – fair and equal treatment – opened possibilities for
exploring both options. The specification of ‘what’, the definition of the ends, is
deemed crucial before the ‘how’ is discussed, especially with a view to the
profoundly changed international political priorities which require rapid devel-
opment of criminal justice policies.
91
Introduction
A great deal has been accomplished during the past decades to make women
politically visible. The United Nations takes much credit for the process the
Organization started in the 1970s, with widely publicised global conferences,
each of which generated a diagnosis of globally relevant problems and long-term
programmes of action to address them. This process has encompassed criminal
justice, although fairly little as well as rather late. One reason was that the issue
of the advancement of women was defined primarily as one of development.
Another reason was that criminal justice was orientated towards offenders,
amongst whom women constituted a minuscule minority. With the refocus of
criminal justice policies towards victims during the 1980s, an entry point was
provided during the 1990s with the global mobilization around violence against
women.
The main feature of international policies to make women’s problems and
perspectives visible has been a trial-and-error strategy; it was and remains a
learning process. International prohibitions of discrimination initially concen-
trated on sex while gender emerged much later and created a great deal of
controversy.39 The initial focus on explicitly discriminatory legislation that
denied rights and freedoms to the female half of humanity was subsequently
supplemented by the identification and removal of obstacles to women’s equal
enjoyment of all human rights. The search for causes of discrimination against
women led to the pursuit of parallel – structural and individual – redress for the
past discrimination and safeguards to prevent its perpetuation. These develop-
ments originated from women’s rather than human rights bodies, and none from
international bodies dealing with crime prevention and control. It was not until
the 1990s that a comprehensive international policy became possible; before this
women as the subjects of equal rights and women as the victims of their denial
were at the margins of the international agenda.
Multiple challenges are inherent in that change – the terms and underlying
concepts generated within distinct international structures do not merge easily,
let alone strategies and methods for putting them into practice. Terms such as
‘gender’, ‘mainstreaming’ or ‘empowerment’ are unlikely to be familiar to most
criminal justice professionals. The learning process that began fifty years ago
thus promises to continue into the next century, although the enhanced interna-
tional priority for women is likely to nudge criminal justice systems into hasty
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39 The term ‘gender’ is accompanied by a footnote in the final document of the 1995 Beijing
Conference, which clarifies that the term should be understood in the sense in which it was previously
used by the United Nations, namely within women-in-development policies. (United Nations -
Report of the Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing, 4-15 September 1995, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.177/20 of 17 October 1995, para. 3) The background to this was a protracted political
disagreement amongst the negotiating governments about the exact meaning of that term besides
its original purport of classifying the concepts behind words such as masculine or feminine. An
agreement was ultimately reached to endorse gender as previously used by the United Nations,
namely to denote women’s and men’s roles in development, but to preclude the introduction of
definitions developed outside the United Nations that could associate with that term issues related
to sexuality and lifestyles.
adjustment. This entails a risk of token gestures (the simplest being the replace-
ment of ‘women’ by ‘gender’ in policy documents and the addition of a woman
to policy-making bodies in the name of ‘mainstreaming’), which obviously does
not generate the required change.
The change which is required is substantial. The postulate that all people have
equal rights necessitates redressing unequal power. Violence against women
provided the manifestation of unequal power and therefore obtained international
prominence. Within the field of human rights, the background was the father’s
(but not mother’s) ownership of his daughter or the husband’s ownership of his
wife that provided for legally sanctioned abuse. Moreover, human rights guar-
antees from their very inception included the protection of the family against
arbitrary interference by the state and thus the individual girl’s or woman’s right
to protection against violence within the family necessitated a great deal of
change within international human rights law itself.
Human rights law was originally designed to safeguard individuals against
abuses of power by the state. The application of human rights within criminal
justice concentrated on the treatment of offenders so as to protect them from
abuses of the state’s coercive power. The vertical orientation of human rights
safeguards was subsequently extended horizontally to prevent individuals abus-
ing their power over other individuals. The granting and enforcement of equal
rights for all required that the powers that parents have over their dependent
children as well as the marital powers that husbands have over their wives were
recognized and challenged. This process evolved from challenging and changing
discriminatory law, to questioning and altering discriminatory effects of gender-
neutral laws, and to the adoption of gender-corrective laws and policies.
A changed approach within criminal justice is vividly illustrated by comparing
the discussions at the Seventh UN Congress in 1985 with the preparations for
the Tenth UN Congress in 2000. Under the title The fair treatment of women by
the criminal justice system the UN included in the 1985 documentation sections
on female criminality and delinquency, discussions about differential treatment
of female offenders, and a brief mention of women as practitioners in criminal
justice systems. 40 Women as victims were not mentioned at the time. The 1997
discussion guide for the Tenth UN Congress41 advocates that the focus of
preparations be on violence against women. It calls for ‘reformative action to
remove gender bias within criminal justice’ and a new model for mainstreaming
gender within criminal justice, assuming that a focus on combatting violence
against women could lead in that direction. The inclusion of this new terminology
– gender and mainstreaming – is unlikely to lead to immediate and substantive
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40 United Nations - The fair treatment of women by the criminal justice system. Report of the
Secretary-General, Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment
of Offenders, Milan, Italy, 26 August to 6 September 1985, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.121/17 of 1 July
1985.
41 Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice - Preparations for the Tenth United Nations
Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Discussion guide on
workshops, ancillary meetings, symposia and exhibits, Vienna, 21-30 April 1998.
remoulding of criminal justice systems, from which the issue of gender has
traditionally been absent.
For a long time, criminal justice systems have been criticised for being
gender-discriminatory. Initially, sex had been deemed irrelevant, and offenders
or prisoners were treated uniformly. The initial critiques led to making the sex
of prisoners visible and led to separate prisons for women. The approach
alternated between equal treatment and preferential treatment for women, but
that dilemma was routinely avoided because women constitute a minute propor-
tion of prisoners or offenders.
Endorsements of preferential treatment for women emerged through some
policies on the elimination of violence against women. Advocacy of a typical
criminal justice response (arrest, trial and imprisonment of the male abuser)
entails a risk of doing more harm than good. Criminal justice systems have yet
to adapt to dealing with victims in addition to offenders. There are many
arguments that have been put forward against a criminal justice response to
wife-beating or verbal abuse. They are reinforced by the truism that problems
which society cannot solve are channelled to the criminal justice system. One
could anticipate a future focus on violence against children in international policy
for the 2000s, for example, where such a typical criminal justice approach would
advocate arrest, trial and imprisonment of adult abusers (mothers and fathers in
probably equal numbers) and would re-victimize children, with whom criminal
justice systems would be incapable of dealing.
The initial definition of human rights as safeguards against the abuse of power
by the state resulted in the marginalization of abuses of power in the private
sphere, within marriage, the family or the household, or else in the labour market
and the workplace. The shift from sex to gender discrimination revealed multiple
layers of discrimination which impede gender equality and revealed the scope
for abuse inherent in lesser rights for women.
Our global discriminatory heritage was identified as the culprit for the states’
previous acquiescence in violence against women. The marginalization of eco-
nomic and social rights for women could not be blamed solely on the discrimi-
natory heritage, however, because it was exacerbated by the redefined role of the
state in the economy and the corollary absence of safeguards against abuse of
economic power. Combatting discrimination is a permanent process, where the
interplay between discriminatory heritage and newly created discrimination
requires constant monitoring and corrective interventions.
The International policy framework of the 1990s
The early 1990s marked a substantive change in international policy-making.
The iron curtain dividing Europe had been dismantled, the United Nations
liberated from the cold-war constraints, and a brief spell of enthusiasm prodded
‘the international community’ (as we tend to call it today) into forging global
policies through a series of global conferences. Many of these dealt extensively
with women, whether the general theme was environment, children, human
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rights, population policies or housing. The 1995 Beijing Conference – the biggest
meeting in the history of the United Nations – provided the opportunity for
encapsulating a new approach. Against the accomplishments of previous dec-
ades, and having overcome disagreements about the very term ‘gender’ as noted
above, the international community defined this new approach as gender main-
streaming.42
This new terminology reflects a changed approach. The Commission on the
Status of Women called for mainstreaming a gender perspective into all policies
and programmes throughout the UN system, for advocacy of gender equality and
for the enjoyment by women of all human rights.43 The System-wide medium-
term plan for the advancement of women 1996-2001 commits the United Nations
to ‘highlight gender-based differences in women’s enjoyment of their human
rights’and to promoting ‘a rights-based approach to the advancement of women’
with the specific mention of violence.44
Gender mainstreaming is defined differently: the UNDP (United Nations
Development Programme) has defined it as a ‘process to pursue gender equality
goals’,45 while the Economic and Social Council defined it as a process of
assessing the implications for women and men of any planned policy, programme
or action, in any area, at any level.46 The Council of Europe defined gender
mainstreaming as ‘the (re)organization, improvement, development and evalu-
ation of policy processes so that a gender equality perspective is incorporated in
all policies at all levels and at all stages by the actors normally involved in
policy-making.’47
Mainstreaming conceptually broadens the inquiry into the status of women
within the household, family, community, economy, society and state, and
encompasses the full range of women’s human rights. It also rejects the previous
treatment of women as a group or a separate category and advocates instead a
focus on relations between women and men, from intra-family or intra-household
decision-making upwards to the level of the state and the international commu-
nity. This analytical focus follows the human rights rationale by making safe-
guards against abuse of power the key issue and spans all pertinent decision-mak-
ing structures, private and public, local and international.
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42 It is important to add that the much-quoted final document of the Beijing Conference alongside the
agreement expressed in the Declaration and Platform for Action includes reservations by sixty-five
participating states.
43 Commission on the Status of Women - Agreed conclusions on the critical areas of concern, Draft
resolution II forwarded to the Economic and Social Council, para. 3, Report on the forty-first session
(10-21 March 1997), U.N. Doc. E/1997/27 & E/CN.6/1997/9, p. 3.
44 United Nations - Proposed system-wide medium-term plan for the advancement of women. Report
of the Administrative Committee on Coordination, U.N. Doc. E/1996/16 of 16 April 1996, para.
184.
45 UNDP - Senior Management Consultation on Gender Mainstreaming, New York, 5-7 February
1997, Final report prepared for the Gender in Development Programme by Waafas Ofosu-Amaah,
p. 9, mimeographed.
46 United Nations - Draft agreed conclusions of the Economic and Social Council, U.N. Doc.
E/1997/L.30 of 14 July 1997, para. 4.
47 Council of Europe -Gender mainstreaming. Conceptual framework, methodology and presentation
of good practices, Final Report of Activities of the Group of Specialists on Mainstreaming, Doc.
EG-S-MC (98) 2, Strasbourg, 6 April 1998, p. 13.
Anglo-Saxon48 terms – such as gender or mainstreaming – are difficult to
translate into most languages, and are also foreign to many professions, including
criminal justice. The meaning of mainstreaming, , however, is intuitively clear
to most people – it requires that each policy or strategy be developed with its
impact on women in mind and evaluated by the criterion of that impact. A cursory
response by criminal justice professionals may be that most strategies or policies
are irrelevant for women because women tend to be absent from crime and thus
also from criminal justice. The application of mainstreaming necessitates pro-
viding evidence that this is so. The search for such evidence would require that
a gender perspective be defined, likely to create a considerable conceptual
challenge.
The conceptual shift from sex to gender
The  shift  from sex to gender aimed to  focus  attention on the  historically
constructed inferior role for women in public and private life, in politics, in the
family, in the community, in society. The reproductive role of women was
reflected, in the worst-case scenario, in treating women as instruments for
child-bearing and child-rearing. Terminological changes, for example from
”maternity leave” to ”parental leave”, accompanied the discovery of the differ-
ence between sex and gender. The introduction of terms such as workers with
family responsibilities by the ILO (International Labour Organization) or paren-
tal leave in European Community law were signposts on the road to differenti-
ating between sex and gender. A similar conceptual change is likely to affect the
criminal justice system. Much as segregating prisoners by sex is a routine
operation within criminal justice, the identification of gender roles has yet to be
institutionalized: for most adult female prisoners, it is not their sex but their
responsibility for dependent children that is the reason for differentiated treat-
ment amongst female inmates. The treatment of female juvenile delinquents
needs to move further than just separating them from males, but it cannot follow
a focus on pregnancy and motherhood, and should thus develop girl-specific
policies and measures because there is no guidance as yet.
Terminological changes and legal reforms – international or domestic – cannot
accomplish much  unless they are accompanied by liberating women from
traditional family functions, especially from caring for dependant family mem-
bers. Comprehensive social rights and the corresponding obligations of the state
relocated the burden of family obligations from women to the state. The corollary
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48 In her commentary, Frances Heidensohn points out that the term “Anglo-Saxon” as used by
international lawyers is not self-explanatory. With regard to terminology, it refers to the common
practice of drafting international legal or policy documents in English. Translating a term such as
‘gender’ into French, for example, depletes this term of the specific meaning it is attributed in
English, while the translation of a term such as ‘mainstreaming’ is routinely avoided, and the term
is used in the original English. With regard to legal systems, the term “Anglo-Saxon” refers to the
common-law heritage, distinguishing United Kingdom and Ireland (and to some extent Cyprus, due
to British rule in 1879-1960) from continental Europe.
was the disappearance of marriage as the basis for family formation. Elimination
of discrimination against unmarried mothers and against children born out of
wedlock contributed to – and reflected – changes in lifestyles. The statistical and
legal definition of the family as the basic societal unit became obsolete in some
European countries. The family was remoulded into single-parent or single-per-
son households. The single parent is still regularly the mother, however, while
pro-natalist policies stimulate childbearing in many Western European countries.
Problems associated with single motherhood are transplanted into the system of
criminal justice, even if seldom discussed as such. A good illustration was
provided by Hélène Mathieu. Through the words of one of her interviewees, she
found that a mother – different from a father – does not have a right to commit
a crime. 49
The ‘discovery’ of gender
Current efforts to forge a gender-integrated policy framework coincide with rapid
changes within the United Nations and in its environment. The choice of gender
to guide conceptualization necessitates an analysis of relations between the two
sexes as the background to designing policies. Previous women-specific policies
originated in a narrow definition of the means for the advancement of women
and contained activities designed to meet some of the identified needs of women,
more often than not needs that had not been identified by the women themselves.
These were routinely biased towards the reproductive role of women. The system
of criminal justice is a good illustration because the only women-specific legal
norms (whether concerning death penalty or imprisonment) dealt with pregnancy
and motherhood.50
The shift from ‘women’ to ‘gender’ was partially a consequence of the
realization that approaches, policies and projects that deal only with women
failed to address the causes of the problems that were to be solved. Perhaps the
clearest expression of that conceptual shift took place in the realm of population
policy. The ICPD (International Conference on Population and Development)
devoted a section to male responsibility. Similar shifts took place within inter-
national development agencies with the discovery of power structure within the
family and/or household. The household used to be their smallest analytical unit,
and the previous assumption was that the household was a homogenous unit.
Regretfully, the human rights approach – an affirmation of the rights of an
individual woman within the family and/or household – did not inform interna-
tional policies until recently. The importance of intra-household inequalities was
reinforced in efforts to determine causes of violence against women.
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49 ‘Une mère n’a pas le droit d’être délinquante. Un père si.’ Mathieu, H. - Prisons de fammes,
Marabout, Alleur, 1987, p. 90
50 Alfredsson, G. & Tomaševski, K. - A Thematic Guide to Documents on the Human Rights of Women,
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995, pp. 348-350.
Before the human rights strategy51 urged scrutiny of the status of each person
within the family, relations within the family had been beyond governmental
powers. Family autonomy was strengthened by the prohibition of arbitrary
interference by the state. Marriage routinely entailed lesser rights for married –
as compared with unmarried – women. The minimum age for marriage remains
lower for women than for men. Law routinely recognized the marital power of
the husband over his wife; a wife’s power over her husband did not exist in any
language, let alone in law. The husband’s marital power was reinforced by the
notion of the head of the family, placing the wife in a dependent relationship
towards her husband, father, or even her own son. Demands upon the state to
interfere and equalize the status of women and girls with that of men and boys
overruled family autonomy, domestically and internationally. International liti-
gation often preceded domestic changes and validated the reliance of human
rights upon the rule of law rather than democracy. Where legal reform did not –
perhaps could not – take place through domestic political processes, it was
mandated by decisions of international human rights bodies. Human rights law
as a corrective to political processes proved necessary and effective. Criminal
suspects, detainees and prisoners also benefited from legal safeguards because
they could not have secured their human rights protection through the political
process.
Translating the current emphasis on gender-integration into policies, pro-
grammes and projects will be a long-term process. Previous changes provide
valuable guidance. Changes that took place during the past decades are easy to
detect through screening the contents of relevant inter-governmental resolutions
and implementing policies of agencies, funds and programmes. Cross-temporal
comparisons  reflect changing  terms and underlying concepts,  changed  ap-
proaches, and further modifications based on evaluations. One noticeable feature
is the evolution of specialized units (previously with ‘women’ and today with
‘gender’ in their name), sometimes also accompanied by changing personnel
practices within the respective agencies. The development of guidelines was a
frequent response to the  perceived need  for  gender integration,  and  many
guidelines have been elaborated and adopted. The effects of such guidelines on
the programmes and projects of the agencies has not yet been assessed, one
important reason being that most have been in place too short a time, and another
that many are discretionary.
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51 Only a brief summary is provided here. A detailed analysis of the evolution of international human
rights law with regard to equal rights for women can be found in Tomaševski, K. - Women & Human
Rights, Zed Books, London, 1993; Tomaševski, K. - Rights of women: from prohibition to
elimination of discrimination, International Social Science Journal, vol. L, 1998, No. 4, pp. 545-558;
Tomaševski, K. Effective implementation of women’s rights, In Our hands. The Effectiveness of
Human Rights protection 50 years after the Universal Declaration, Council of Europe Publishing,
Strasbourg, 1998, pp. 110-124.
The terminological maze surrounding gender
Current efforts within the United Nations to forge a common platform around
mainstreaming entails a risk that the specific contents of gender equality – which
should be the ultimate objective – may become blurred. The current terminology
used within the United Nations varies a great deal. The term gender is sometimes
used interchangeably with women, and previously women-specific programmes
were rapidly re-named as gender-specific programmes.
Empowerment has entered the UN language as well (it was launched by the
ICPD) and remains vaguely defined. The instinctive reaction to the term empow-
erment endows it with the aim of increasing the power of women to make their
own decisions and carry them out, and thus the term fits well with the increasing
interest for unequal power with the household, family, community, economy,
society, state, and the international community.
The process of policy-making within the United Nations transposed the
terminology developed by bodies dealing with women’s issues to human rights
bodies. It was neither smooth nor coherent, and can thus provide lessons for its
further ‘transplantation’ to criminal justice bodies.
Critiques of UN policies from a gender perspective proliferated and were
followed by demands for mainstreaming. It was not only the criminal justice
programme, but also the human rights programme that was found at fault. A
UNICEF/UNIFEM (United Nations Children’s Fund/United Nations Develop-
ment Fund for Women) leaflet on CEDAW [Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women] and Women’s Human Rights states that ‘guar-
antees of equality in the core human rights instruments are inadequate and, to
some extent, irrelevant, because these rights have been defined in relation to the
lives of men and to those few women who live their lives as publicly as men.’52
This example indicates that a shared gender/human rights perspective does not
exist as yet, much as it would be helpful for the development of criminal justice
policy.
The attention to women’s human rights had surged during preparations for the
1993 Vienna Conference on Human Rights and was followed by calls for
mainstreaming. The process of mainstreaming has barely begun in the absence
of a policy. Post-1993 resolutions of the Commission on Human Rights are
illustrative of continuing confusion. They can be divided into women-specific,
those calling for an integrated approach (with or without using the term ‘gender’),
and those that do not mention women. The subject-matter of these resolutions
does not appear to be the principal criterion whereby specific resolutions mention
women, or gender, or neither.
The women-specific resolutions include those on violence against women,
violence against women migrant workers, female genital mutilation, or traffick-
ing in women and girls. The resolution on violence against women utilizes the
term ‘gender’and condemns all gender-based violence, while its sister resolution
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52 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women Information Pack,
CEDAW and Women’s Human Rights leaflet, UNICEF and UNIFEM, undated.
on violence against women migrant workers does not mention the term ‘gender’
nor does it assert that such violence is gender-based.53 Other resolutions articulate
the need for gender specificity, such as those on thematic procedures, which posit
that violations specifically targeting women or primarily directed against them
should be identified, while resolutions on freedom of opinion and expression
object to the persistent under-reporting of incidents of gender discrimination. A
series of resolution adopted in 1997 does not mention the human rights of women
at all (such as  those dealing with foreign  debt and economic adjustment,
migrants’, minority and indigenous rights, or independence of the judiciary).
Even resolutions  on  topics for which gender discrimination  has generated
international jurisprudence, such as access to and loss of citizenship crucial for
the status of migrant women,54 fail to mention women or their rights. Termino-
logical variety in other resolutions testifies to the persistence of divergent
approaches. The resolution relating to HIV/AIDS identifies women as a vulner-
able group, alongside children.55 Similarly to the uneven terminology in UN
gender policies, results of the work of the Commission on Human Rights reveal
a terminological confusion.
Adaptations of criminal justice systems to the priority assigned to eliminating
violence against women are likely to raise a great deal of controversy. The
General Assembly called for a comprehensive review of the entire criminal
justice, from guiding principles to specific practices, in order to determine
whether there is any negative impact on women so that it can be eliminated. It
thus called for the removal of a gender bias, emphasizing that its simultaneous
calls for the elimination of violence against women does not aim at preferential
treatment of women but at elimination of discrimination in women’s access to
justice. Significantly, the Assembly insisted that gender balance should be
achieved in decision-making related to the elimination of violence against
women,56 and should thus not be left to women alone.
Such adaptations are not facilitated by the lack of unity within the United
Nations, and thus also in the resulting policies, with regard to the ultimate
objective to be attained. There is indeed a diversity of objectives embodied in
gender  perspectives  –  equity, equality,  balance  or  parity. Radhika Cooma-
raswamy, the UN Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, warned
against that terminological variety, where equity was seen as a flexible replace-
ment for equality, allowing governments and inter-governmental organizations
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53 Commission on Human Rights - The elimination of violence against women, and Violence against
women migrant workers, resolutions 1998/52 and 1998/17 of 17 April 1998.
54 Resolution 1997/36 on human rights and arbitrary deprivation of nationality of 11 April 1997 does
not mention the relevant provisions of the  Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women, and lists racial, national, ethnic and religious grounds in arbitrary
deprivation of nationality, omitting sex.
55 Resolution 1997/33 on the protection of human rights in the context of the human immunodeficiency
virus (HIV) and acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) of 11 April 1997, Annex, Guideline
8.
56 General Assembly - Crime prevention and criminal justice measures to eliminate violence against
women, resolution 52/86 of 2 February 1998, paras. 1 and 4; Model strategies and practical measures
on the elimination of violence against women in the field of crime prevention and criminal justice,
paras. 3 and 5.
to depart from the principle of formal equality and thus to restrict women’s
rights.57 Gender equity might legitimize perpetuation of discrimination. Where
girls and women have lesser inheritance or property rights than boys and men in
accordance with religious or customary norms, a conflict with the aim of
elimination of gender discrimination is apparent. Gender equality is an objective
shared between some gender perspectives and the human rights approach, but its
definition often varies. The term gender ‘parity’ illustrates one instance where
human rights law cannot go as far as gender perspectives. For example, the
CEDAW Committee (Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against
Women) objected for example to Denmark’s failure to reach gender parity in
women’s political representation,58 while the European Court of Justice found
Germany’s attempt to reach gender parity in public employment to constitute a
breach of the European Community law. The Court found that ‘national rules
which guarantee women absolute and unconditional priority for appointment or
promotion go  beyond  promoting  equal  opportunities.’ The Court based its
conclusion on the substitution of the original aim – equality of opportunity – by
parity, namely the achievement of equal representation of both sexes.59
The focus on violence against women
The strategy for eliminating violence against women is exemplified by the
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, which was negoti-
ated within the Commission on the Status of Women and adopted by the General
Assembly. This document is used as the starting point for the development of
both human rights and criminal justice approaches. As a consequence, three
different sets of concepts, terms, substantive and procedural rules of conducts
have been merged.
Concerted international action to expose and oppose violence against women
was possible only after equality for women had been accepted as the yardstick
for scrutinizing the phenomenon of violence. Because abuse of power is a
structural problem, structural remedies are necessary. The purpose of human
rights safeguards is to prevent abuse of power, to alter those structural variables
that make women vulnerable to abuse. This approach is not followed in many
policies on eliminating violence against women which define the problem as
abuse of one sex by another; the problem is thus defined as abusive and/or violent
men. Defining what the problem is – violence against women or gender-based
violence – is routinely avoided by using these two terms interchangeably. As
noted above, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights has started
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making small steps towards distinguishing gender-based violence from non-gen-
der-based, such as violence against women migrant workers.60
If a structural approach is followed, the key question is: can the causation of
gender-based violence be identified and the vicious circle broken? It is possible
to articulate a human rights approach, as is done below, and to highlight the
limitations inherent in the violence-against-women alternative.
Violence against women became a central topic on the rights agenda of the
United Nations during the early 1990s,61 but it does not encompass all pertinent
human rights problems of women. Indeed, the absence of full recognition of
equal rights of women and their protection in the public sphere (such as political
participation and representation) severely constrains opportunities for improving
women’s legal rights in the private sphere and thus women’s options for leaving
an abusive marriage and/or family and living on her own. The system of criminal
justice can, at best, provide temporary safety. Permanent solutions pertain to the
sectors of employment, housing, child-care entitlements for single mothers, or
equal property rights for women.
Background to international policy development
The merging of two agendas – the women’s agenda and the human rights agenda
– led to the prioritizing of violence against women on both. The cursory
description of the underlying political process below aims to highlight the impact
of such a merger because of its obvious importance for the development of
criminal justice policies.
The agenda for the World Conference on Human Rights, adopted with General
Assembly resolution 47/122 on 2 December 1992, included ‘the consideration
of contemporary trends in and new challenges to the full realization of all human
rights of women and men.’ The CEDAW Committee (Committee on the Elimi-
nation of Violence against Women) requested an emphasis on ‘women’s equality
as a significant human rights issue.’62 Proposals regarding the human rights of
women from the Nordic Seminar (Lund, January 1993) exemplify the approach
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which is often called ‘mainstreaming’, namely specific gender issues are raised
with respect to every agenda item rather than confining them to a single item.
These proposals indicate the range of important issues which have to be ad-
dressed, from guarantees for equal political representation of women, to the
attention to human rights of women in the administration of justice, and to the
need to abolish gender-specific criminal offences.63 The Human Rights Advo-
cates stressed the need to ensure ‘that consideration of women’s rights should be
integrated into the overall discussions of the Conference. Women’s issues should
not be relegated to a separate agenda item.’64 That explicit recognition of the
need to address all human rights of women created many verbal and political
conflicts, and ultimately led to reservations to the final document adopted by the
Beijing Conference by more than one-third of participating governmental dele-
gations. The implications, essentially the lack of global consensus on both the
‘what’ and the ‘how,’ are seldom discussed.
Various options regarding the appointment of a special rapporteur – as the
focal point for women’s human rights – were discussed during the preparations
for the World Conference on Human Rights. The 1993 session of the Commission
on Human Rights debated this briefly. Some governments argued in favour of a
broad human rights mandate for a special rapporteur, but ultimately a restrictive
view prevailed. In the final text of resolution 1993/46 the Commission postponed
deciding on the appointment of a special rapporteur on violence against women
(rather than human rights of women) to 1994 to take into account the results of
the World Conference on Human Rights.
The proposal for appointing a special rapporteur on violence against women
came to the Commission on Human Rights from the Commission on the Status
of Women.65 As the Commission on the Status of Women elaborated the Draft
Declaration on Violence against Women, it would have been the obvious place
for continuing work in this area. However, two reasons may have prompted its
proposal to the Commission on Human Rights: firstly, the momentum for
increased attention to the human rights of women created during the preparations
for the World Conference provided an opportunity for suggesting that violence
against women be subsumed under the human rights agenda, and, secondly, the
human rights bodies are the only part of the UN system which reaches beyond
information originating in governments and could therefore reach beyond the
limitations within which the Commission on the Status of Women operates.
NGOs (non-governmental organizations), such as the Women’s NGO Caucus
or WILDAF (Women in Law and Development in Africa), proposed that the
rapporteur’s mandate includes systematic gender discrimination.66 The underly-
ing objective was to discontinue the previous practice of confining women’s
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human rights to one issue only. This is evidenced in the multitude, range and
quality of proposals aimed at addressing all pertinent issues. If one recalls that
traditional practices, particularly genital mutilation, was the single gender-spe-
cific agenda item for the United Nations human rights bodies, the danger of
perpetuating a restrictive view of women’s human rights concerns is obvious.
Another analogy is useful: both traditional practices and violence against women
belong to the private sphere, which is notoriously difficult to change through
public action. This does not mean that governments are free to disregard their
obligations regarding private life. Nonetheless, the focus of human rights on the
public sphere should not be lessened when it comes to women. In the situation
where many basic rights are not formally recognized for women in many
countries and thus the public authorities are failing in their fundamental obliga-
tion to recognize the equal rights of women, an exclusive focus on violence
against women is not justified: it is but one out of many symptoms of the
vulnerability of women to abuse. Dealing with symptoms rather than addressing
causes, as we know all too well, is not a good recipe for improvement. The
acknowledgement that violence against women is a consequence rather than
cause was stressed by the United Nations in 1989:
Violence against women in the family and elsewhere is the product of women’s
inferiority, and the eradication of violence will only occur if steps are taken to
guarantee women equality in all spheres of life.67
Research into the chain of causation routinely individualizes the problem by
focussing on the couple or family affected by violence. The contribution of
structural factors such as male unemployment, housing shortage, or absence of
child-care benefits, is certainly considerable as all the existing research on
violence shows. Concerning violence against women, this contribution remains
unknown. Cross-national and cross-temporal research could reveal correspon-
dence between the pattern of women’s equal-rights guarantees and the pattern
of violence against women. A merging of research into women’s rights and
research into violence against women is perhaps the most fruitful path for the
near future.
Definition of violence
The Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, as adopted by
the Commission on the Status of Women, proposed and the General Assembly
affirmed that ‘violence against women both violates and impairs or nullifies the
enjoyment by women of human rights.’ For the authors of the Declaration,
violence against women means ‘any act of gender-based violence that results in,
or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to
women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivations of
liberty, whether occurring in public or private life.’ This definition raises more
questions than it answers, starting from the fundamental one: How would one
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determine whether an act of violence is gender-based? Unless some guidance is
provided, every violent act or threat against a woman could be deemed ‘gender-
based’.
A subsequent illustration of difficulties in delineating what violence against
women was and what was not gender-based was provided by the Commission
on Human Rights. In 1998, it adopted three resolutions relating to violence
against women. The first one dealt with violence against women in the sense
attributed it in the declaration and thus used gender-based violence. As already
mentioned, the second one dealt with violence against women migrant workers
and did not use the term ‘gender-based,’ nor did the third resolution, which
addressed trafficking in women and girls.68 While the Commission’s rationale
was much more likely to have derived from the political negotiations amongst
governmental delegations, the varying terminology in documents that are sup-
posed to provide guidance for criminal justice systems indicated the need for the
development of research-based terminology.
The utilization of the terms ‘‘violence against women’ and ‘gender-based’
violence as if the two were synonyms69 does not solve the problem but merely
avoids it, and creates problems for criminal justice agencies. Would every act or
threat against a women be considered ‘gender-based’unless the (male) perpetra-
tor proves the contrary? How would this definition apply to violence against
women committed by women (for example, female genital mutilation carried
out by adult women against young girls, or mothers’ abuse of their children)?
The adoption of such a broad and vague definition necessitates further elabora-
tion regarding the definition of criminal offence, presumption of innocence and
burden of proof. Otherwise, it cannot be applied within the system of criminal
justice.
Moreover, the Declaration broadened the definition further in providing
examples of what violence  against  women  encompasses. Thus it included
‘psychological violence’ in  the family, within  the general community, and
perpetrated or condoned by the state. In early discussions of a possible draft
declaration on violence against women ‘a number of experts found the proposed
definition to be too wide-ranging’ and ‘questioned the wisdom of attempting to
define violence beyond its physical manifestations.’ 70 However, these objections
were not heeded.
In defining violence against women, the Declaration did not differentiate
between the public and the private sphere. While this was hailed by advocates of
the eradication of violence against women, it created problems for human rights
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human rights advocates because the obligations of the state are substantively
different. While the government is obliged to ensure that public officials do not
commit prohibited acts, it cannot undertake such an obligation for all individuals
because of the simple impossibility of implementing such an obligation; private
behaviour continues to be individual responsibility and the state breaches a
human rights obligation only if it fails to secure equal protection for all.
Proposed strategies for eliminating violence against women go far beyond the
human rights obligations of governments. The International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women requires states to
‘take all appropriate measures to modify the social and cultural patterns of
conduct of men and women’ and thus addresses some causes of violence against
women, but does not mention it. The text of the Convention conforms to other
human rights obligations relating to the private sphere in that the obligation is
confined to undertaking measures, governments cannot be obliged to achieve
results (namely, achieve change in the conduct of men and women or eliminate
violence against women). The limitations of human rights approaches in mould-
ing private behaviour are well-known, as the example of child abuse illustrates.
Similarly to child abuse, the logic of preventing wife abuse through specifying
governmental obligations is not likely to justify high expectations.
In the Declaration on Violence against Women, governments are required to
‘exercise due diligence to prevent, investigate and, in accordance with national
legislation, punish acts of violence against women, whether those acts are
perpetrated by the State or by private persons.’ This merged two different areas,
public and private. In suggesting that states should punish violence against
women according to their national law, the Declaration fell short of advocating
an improvement of the existing situation: one of the main reasons for addressing
this problem internationally is the inadequacy of national laws.
Some proposals relating to violence against women focus on the public sphere,
most often on the role of the judiciary, and indicate areas where international
action is necessary. Specifically, the relative neglect of equal treatment of women
in the administration of justice has often been emphasized. Thus the Calgary
Group Workshop on Global Strategies for Achieving Fairness in the Courts:
Domestic Violence emphasized the importance of an impartial judiciary, and
added:
In the past we have given close attention to discrimination in the administration
of justice by reason of race. Now is the time to give such attention to
discrimination against women.’ 71
The mandate of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women includes
causes, not only manifestations, but a single person can hardly be expected to
offset the absence of an institutionalized United Nations response. The Commis-
sion on Human Rights emphasized in the very first paragraph of its resolution
on violence against women that eradication of discrimination constituted an
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integral part of efforts aimed at eliminating violence against women,72 but has
not followed that up. Efforts to address consequences rather than tackling causes,
much as with any other issue, are not likely to result in sustainable improvement.
Projects aiming at assisting battered wives easily do more harm than good by
disregarding the crucial importance of the wives’financial dependence upon their
husbands. The recognition or absence of the wife’s legal rights concerning
housing, family property, or child custody and maintenance, should – but often
does not – inform such projects. Projects designed to assist battered wives often
include penalization of abusive husbands, routinely seeking their imprisonment,
which then leaves the battered wife homeless and penniless.
International programmes and projects dealing with violence against women
have been put in place by numerous UN bodies and agencies. While no overview
exists as yet, one finds such projects supported by UNIFEM (United Nations
Development Fund for Women) and the World Bank, as well as UNDP (United
Nations Development Programme) or UNESCO (United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization), and many have been initiated within the
crime prevention and criminal justice programme, to mention but a few.
The global mobilization around violence against women as the symptom of
unequal power between men and women has certainly provided an incentive for
the rapid mushrooming of these projects. The number and variety of UN-sup-
ported projects raises proverbial concerns about duplication and repetition, as
well as a profound concern about the impact of projects addressing, at the
micro-level, symptoms of a structural problem. Because violence against women
was ‘recognized as a human rights issue and an obstacle to development’, any
agency, programme and fund that deals with development has obtained a mandate
to carry out activities related to violence against women. Although the plea was
made to accord priority to causes, the operational activities indicate that the
operational focus remains on alleviating consequences rather than addressing
causes.73
Although criminal justice systems have taken on crime prevention as part of
their mandate, they are notoriously constrained in that task. Acting in the name
of the state, policemen and policewomen cannot simply broaden their policing
powers to the surveillance of intra-marital or intra-family relations and justify
this by their commitment to preventing violence against women. Even if they
obtained legitimacy for their intrusiveness (which would necessitate dispensing
with the protection of individual privacy), it is questionable how much they would
be able to achieve because the chain of causation requires simultaneous action
by a large number of actors, most of who are outside the criminal justice system.
It is sufficient to illustrate this chain of causation by one example, which is taken
from the aftermath of the tragedy in Bosnia and alludes to the multifaceted
causation of intra-martial and intra-family violence:
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The reintroduction of thousands of demobilized soldiers into an economy
unable to generate jobs has been identified as one of the main causes of high
rates of domestic violence throughout Bosnia.74
What should be the guiding principle for
criminal justice policy:
Equal treatment or preferential treatment?
The question of what the goals of criminal justice should be in this sector has
thus far been avoided at the international level, probably because of the novelty
of the issues of both gender mainstreaming and elimination of violence against
women. The necessity to define what it is that criminal justice systems should
be committed to achieve revives the unfinished debate about the fate of women
within criminal justice, a debate which predates gender mainstreaming and
violence against women.
That international debate was opened with the first time that the issue of
women was placed on the UN crime prevention and control agenda, as it was
then that the objective was defined as the fair and equal treatment for women.
The implicit requirement of both gender mainstreaming and the elimination of
violence against women is preferential treatment for women. The former aims
at the attainment of gender equality (or balance or equity), the latter mandates
criminal justice systems to prioritize female victims of violence.
Different approaches that have been followed outside the area of criminal
justice are illustrative of the experiences thus far. These can be summed up as
follows:
1) preferential treatment has proved necessary to redress the imbalance between
men and women in policy- and decision-making bodies, and
2) without mandated preferential treatment, redressing this imbalance proved
impossible.
The role of law in changing gender roles differs a great deal. Law can be an
obstacle to change when it legalizes lesser rights for women, explicitly or
implicitly. The former is evidenced in openly discriminatory legislation (such as
the transmission of citizenship from husband to wife and their children) and the
latter in apparently neutral legislation (such as laws regulating part-time work).
Law can be an engine for change when it enhances gender equality.
Domestic laws differentiate between the two sexes for example by imposing
compulsory military service upon men or prescribing a younger age for marriage
for women. The former has created a great deal of controversy because it was
deemed to constitute discrimination against either sex. The latter was challenged
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by the Committee on the Rights of the Child as a form of discrimination against
girls. Although a lower minimum age for girls is part of our global heritage, the
Committee insists that the minimum age for marriage should be equal for both
sexes.75 Most countries in the world should accordingly change their legislation,
but few have done so. Much as with other human rights issues, the process of
change begins with the articulation of the human rights approach to prompt
reconsideration of discriminatory attitudes into which we have all been social-
ized.
A great deal of research is necessary to reveal the impact of our discriminatory
heritage on both men and women. An illustrative example is prostitution and
proposals for what to do about it. An indicative conflict of approaches emerged
within the Council of Europe. The Group of Specialists on violence against
women placed the burden squarely on men (‘prostitution is about men’s sexual-
ity’),76 with which the expert appointed to look into trafficking in women
disagreed, arguing that prostitution was women’s responsibility as well because
they contribute to its perpetuation.77
Gender-neutral legislation apparently does not differentiate between women
and men but can be discriminatory when failing to address the obstacles faced
by women. Governmental human rights obligations therefore encompass iden-
tification and elimination of such obstacles. By definition, this process cannot
be either fast or easy. Corrective legislation is often necessary to give women
preferential treatment in order to redress the consequences of our universal
discriminatory heritage.
Gender-neutral laws, such as regulations pertaining to part-time work, were
challenged by the European Court of Justice, and in part this has led to change.78
Because the majority of part-time workers were – and are – women, non-existent
or diminished labour rights affect women disproportionately and were thus
outlawed as a form of gender discrimination. The difference between sex- and
gender-based discrimination was confirmed by data on the implementation of
equal-pay guarantees. Differences between the earnings of single women ap-
proached those of men, but the earnings of married women lagged behind. Single
women’s earnings in the western part of Germany were higher than men’s (103%)
but for married women they were only 57% of men’s. Similarly, in Norway and
Sweden, single women earned 94% of men’s salary but married women only
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72%.79 An important reason for the persistent gap in earnings is the (married)
women’s need to reconcile out-of-house work with family responsibilities.
Because of necessity rather than choice, many women still opt for part-time work.
It is possible that the right to rest and leisure, thus far marginalized in international
human rights law, represents a key to understanding gender differences. The
women’s proverbial double burden of in- and out-of-house work indeed impedes
not only rest and leisure, but often also women’s political, social or cultural
activism. Time-constraints are added to all well-known obstacles to women’s
equal political representation. Indeed, women’s political rights may be nominally
equal to men’s but women’s political representation remains minuscule. Europe
remains heterogeneous and this is reflected in the regional bodies. Within the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, nine parliamentary delega-
tions had no women delegates as late as 1995.80 A survey of members states
showed that in 1998 women were represented in every parliament but their
representation ranged from a low of 2% in Turkey to a high of 40% in Sweden.
Moreover, retrospective analysis revealed that women’s increased political rep-
resentation was not self-sustaining – in early 1990s it decreased in six members
of the Council of Europe (the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Italy,
Latvia, Liechtenstein, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia).81 These developments
demonstrate that a Council of Europe strategy to sustain the increased political
representation of women has yet to be developed. The many recommendations
routinely directed at members states obviously failed to mould the states’practice
or policy thus far.
Comparisons between the political representation of men and women are
carried out in the light of their legally affirmed nominally equal rights. Distin-
guishing between women with and without  family  obligations,  single and
married women, able-bodied and disabled women, deepens the knowledge about
differences in the enjoyment of rights among women. This moves the inquiry
from differences between men and women (highlighted in the prohibition of
discrimination on the ground of sex) to differences amongst women as well as
amongst men. Nevertheless, the nominally equal rights have so far not been fully
attained, as access to citizenship demonstrates. This still follows the head-of-
family approach, bestows rights upon husbands and denies them to wives.
Women migrants in most countries derive their right to residence and/or citizen-
ship from that of their husband. The pre-1973 pattern of labour migration to
Western Europe had been driven by the demand for ‘foreign labour’ (defined at
the time in terms of male manual workers), and most women migrated sub-
sequently on the basis of family reunification. Admitted as dependant family
members, the position of wives cumulates legal with economic dependence upon
their husbands. After immigration had become legally impossible, a vast and
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diverse – if clandestine – market was created. A new crime of alien smuggling
was created and offences of trafficking in human beings were re-defined. This is
a sad reminder that slavery has not been eliminated but merely modernized.
The vulnerability of the victims of smuggling and/or trafficking is com-
pounded by their lack  of legal  rights in  the countries in  which they find
themselves. By no coincidence, women tend to be victimized more than men,
but women’s fate is routinely cloaked behind the sexless category of ‘migrants’
or ‘illegal aliens’. Women have been explicitly mentioned many times, and there
has been growing publicity for trafficking in women, especially for prostitution.
A great deal of media attention has been devoted to the issue, and this has been
followed by a large number of resolutions and plans of action. And yet, the
existing law embodied in the Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in
Persons and the Exploitation of Prostitution of Others lies dormant, with less
than half of countries in the world (72) having ratified it, excluding Denmark,
Germany, Netherlands, or Sweden.82 It is paradoxical that only a few European
countries – Germany, Malta, the Netherlands and Slovenia – have included
trafficking in people as a criminal offence into their legislation.
There is a correlation between the representation of women in policy and
decision-making bodies and the outcome of the work of such bodies. In countries
which have achieved high women’s political representation, laws and practices
are protective of the equal rights of  women. The  reverse is  true  as  well.
Nevertheless, it is axiomatic that migrants – not being politically represented in
the country of their temporary residence – proverbially lack legal protection.
That a proportion of them are women, many of them victims of trafficking, does
not make a great deal of difference because they are not defined by sex or gender.
Application to criminal justice
The rapid development of international policies for the elimination of violence
against women has prompted different criminal justice responses. At the inter-
national level, a great deal of guidance has been generated and an endless stream
of projects designed and implemented, as has been the case with any other issue
that is singled out as a political priority. Similar changes have taken place at the
domestic level, although the development has been uneven. Anglo-Saxon coun-
tries (the United States, Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom) led the way in
prioritizing violence against women: most research has been generated in these
countries, and the largest numbers of organizations specifically dealing with
violence against women have been established there. This momentum enhanced
the visibility of violence against women. Continental European countries have
been slower. One reason for this has been the difference in the orientation of
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opinion leaders amongst women’s organizations, another the different process
of law and policy making.
Guidance on how the criminal justice system should respond to violence
against women is largely contained in non-legal instruments, which provide
options for it to act but not the requirement to do so. Legal guidance has been
slow in emerging, as comparisons of developments in Europe show below.
Women as victims
A profound change was introduced into criminal justice systems during the 1980s
with the recognition of the rights of the victim. This process led to assertions that
the rights of the victim ought to be at least equal to the rights of the offender,83
reminding criminal justice professionals that the focus on the rights of the
suspects, offenders and inmates is intended to prevent the professionals from
abusing their power. Until recently, criminal justice professions had virtually no
exposure to the rights of victims, because victims were absent from the original
model of criminal justice, which pitted the state against the offender. The initial
human rights guarantees had been developed so as to protect the (presumed)
offender against abuse of power by the state. With the entry of the victim as an
actor, the affirmation of victim’s rights was often perceived as seeking to repeal
the rights conferred on the (presumed) offender.84 This slant has affected the
advocacy for rights of women victims, where many proposals have been gener-
ated to diminish free trial guarantees for suspected rapists so as to affirm the
rights of presumed victims of rape. Debates about a proper balance are often
carried out in the form of a zero-sum-game, where affirmation of the suspect’s
or offender’s rights is seen as a loss of rights for the victim. A way out of that
deadlock can be found in the original (vertical) design of human rights protec-
tions, which does not pit the suspect/offender against the victim but affirms for
both parties specific rights against the state.
The statistical profile of women within criminal justice is slanted towards their
role of victims rather than offenders, and conventional wisdom holds that there
is  a  disproportion between a great  deal  of victimization  of  women and  a
minuscule women’s pattern of offending. Many theories on the causation of
crime which emphasize economic, social, or political disadvantage are belied by
the statistical profile of women as offenders. The question why women are not
committing crimes emerged, and supplementary theories have been developed
to attribute women’s paucity of offending to internalized constraints upon their
behaviour.
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It is still customary to use the syntagm ‘innocent women and children’ to
reinforce this image. The current popularity of studying victimization of women
has generated a great deal of generalizations. Assertions that a large proportion
of women are victims of violence increase the pressure upon the criminal justice
system to react to women’s victimization.
The Anglo-Saxon dominance in studying violence against women and gener-
ating policies towards its elimination was not based upon a particularly high
political representation of women. It is possible to speculate that the priority for
violence against women did not originate in the Nordic countries because the
approach focussed on attaining equality in the public sphere and on equal rights
guarantees in the private sphere. Conversely, the Anglo-Saxon focus on the
private sphere extrapolates a fragmentary governmental commitment to equal
rights for women as well as the absence of the welfare-state model with its
corollary individual entitlements.85 The role of the state is defined differently: in
continental Europe, where the state has a much larger role than in Anglo-Saxon
countries, based on its powers of intervention into the free market, and on
progressive taxation so as to enable the state to fund welfare-services. The
minimalist-state concept, developed the furthest in the USA, defined human
rights protection in terms of the prohibition of state intervention. Because of the
process of ‘free marketization’ in Anglo-Saxon countries in the 1980s, the role
of the state and its consequent human rights obligations was further constrained.
A part of the battle to make violence against women a human rights issue was
thus fought over a broadening of the role of the state, about shifting the focus
from restraint to intervention. The fact that violence against women (rather than
social rights, for example) was chosen as the battleground has much to do with
the orientation of powerful feminist constituencies in Anglo-Saxon countries.
Changes of law and policy in Anglo-Saxon countries ruptured the previous
high degree of protection for privacy (much higher than in continental Europe)
by criminalizing many forms of violence against women, increasing the powers
of the police to intervene, or instituting a mandatory arrest policy with regard to
male abusers.86 Assessments of the effectiveness of these changes vary a great
deal. As violence against women obtained a great deal of visibility, it was
‘recognized’ more than beforehand and thus it seemed to increase rather than
decrease. The symbolic importance of defining violence against women as a
crime that triggers off the response by the criminal justice system was undoubt-
edly a huge step forward. The unanswered question is: where to?
113
85 The extreme model is the USA, where the definition of human rights includes only protections
against abuse of power by the state and excludes any entitlements, such as the right to health or
education. Human Rights Committee - Initial report of the United States of America, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/81/Add.4 of 24 August 1994, para. 1.
86 United Nations - Domestic violence. Report of the Secretary-General, Eighth United Nations
Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, Cuba, 27 August to
7 September 1990, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.144/17 of 20 July 1990, paras. 35 and 43.
The Anglo-Saxon approach to violence against women has been exported to
other regions, such as Eastern Europe. The Minnesota Advocates for Human
Rights carried out studies in Albania and Bulgaria, introduced with the assertion
that ‘an estimated 40-80% of women in the world are beaten by their husbands
or intimate partners;’ the lack of specific data for the countries under study was
explained by women’s reluctance to report abuse.87 A great deal of literature has
been generated on violence against women and it is uniformly critical of the
inability (often unwillingness as well) of the criminal justice system to cope. It
is routinely suggested that specialized institutions and services be established
within the criminal justice system. Specialized institutions and services raise a
question that already generated controversies because it is in conflict with the
objective of mainstreaming.
The key question is: how far should the criminal justice system be reorientated
from public to private (women’s) security? Views as to what the appropriate
response should be vary. One extreme demands resort to the full range of coercive
powers against abusive men  (arrest, detention, prosecution, conviction  and
imprisonment), another proposes an increase of supportive services rather than
coercive powers of the state. If the decreased vulnerability of women to violence
means their safety and independence, criminal justice approaches can – at best
– cope only with the former. The latter entails the full range of civil, cultural,
economic, social, and political rights to enable women to be independent, to
which criminal justice approaches can scarcely contribute at all.
Within Europe criminal-justice approaches vary. Specialized police units,
composed of policewomen, have been established in Germany, while in France
there are no specialized units but training is provided to all police officers. Ireland
merged both approaches, providing training to all police and establishing spe-
cialized units for domestic violence and sexual assault. These models are too new
to have generated evaluations, but in countries that have started earlier, some
experiences are being gathered. Olga Zoomer found for the Netherlands that the
police could protect potential victims by removing an immediate and direct risk
of violence, while concluding that women victims did not seem to desire that
abusers be arrested, tried and imprisoned. 88 This reinforces the plea in most
international recommendations that a multi-pronged approach be developed.
Whether the system of criminal justice should encompass all manifestations
of what is commonly called ‘domestic violence’ remains an open question. The
terms itself is differently defined. While it was originally conceived as an
umbrella-term for intra-family violence, with the surge of attention for violence
against women it became confined to the victimization of women. The definition
was broadened from physical to sexual abuse and then to verbal abuse. Cam-
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paigns under the slogan of ‘zero tolerance’mobilized the public to denounce any
abuse and to demand public intervention. In this atmosphere, criminal justice
policy-makers have a difficult task of arguing that criminal-justice intervention
should not be undertaken in cases of, for example, verbal abuse.
Proposals that options other than criminal justice intervention be developed
are emerging and are being experimented with. A survey of 146 NGOs (non-
governmental organizations) working on violence against women revealed that
most recommended that separate family courts be created,89 and this path
reinforced the broadening of civil rather than criminal suits. The UN Special
Rapporteur on violence against women emphasized that a conventional criminal
justice approach does not and cannot adequately respond to the problem because
its mandate relates only to violence, while relations ‘between persons who are
emotionally and financially involved with each other’90 falls outside its mandate.
Implications of criminalizing violence against women
As long as the thrust of human rights was to protect individuals against abuses
of power by the state, gender-based violence was beyond the reach of human
rights law, domestic or international. Precedent-setting cases in international
human rights jurisprudence affirmed during the 1980s that states were obliged
to prevent human rights violations as well as to protect individuals against abuses
by other individuals. A state can therefore violate women’s rights when it fails
to enact and enforce legislation guaranteeing women equal protection against
violence. Such protection is often lacking because of the obstacle of marital
power, the remnant of a husband’s ownership of his wife. In a precedent setting
case concerning a husband’s immunity against prosecution for the rape of his
wife, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that ‘the essentially debasing
character of rape’ was compatible neither with a civilised concept of marriage
nor with the fundamental objectives of the European Convention.91
The diminishing differences between unmarried and married women in their
protection against violence necessitated the elimination of the husband’s owner-
ship of ‘his’ wife in order to move towards what the Court called ‘a civilised
concept of marriage.’ Elimination of all forms of discrimination is a prerequisite
for combatting violence against women. However, the European Convention
provides a basis for eliminating some – but not all – forms of discrimination, by
exempting the social and economic rights of women (and men for that matter)
from the realm of justiciability. Vast areas of discrimination are thus precluded
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from an assessment of their compatibility with the fundamental objectives of the
Convention. The protection of a wife against abuse by her husband is typically
impeded by the fact that all family property is owned by the husband while the
wife – and not he – is responsible for their children. Social and economic rights
are absent from the European Convention on Human Rights. As a corollary,
comprehensive equal rights guarantees that would give women realistic possibilities
of rupturing an abusive relationship remain beyond the realm of the possible.
Partial elimination of unequal rights as well as a tendency to address conse-
quences rather than tackling causes are not likely to result in sustainable improve-
ment. Projects assisting battered wives do not reach beyond the alleviation of
consequences when they disregard the crucial importance of the legal and
financial dependence of wives upon their husbands. The legal rights of wives
concerning housing, family property, child custody and maintenance, should –
but often do not – inform projects intended to combat violence against women.
When wives are non-citizens, their paucity of legal rights extends to residence
and citizenship; escape from an abusive relationship routinely entails return to
the country of origin. The conflict between a desire to facilitate the wives’
acquisition  of legal rights  and a wish  to  decrease  the  number  of resident
non-citizens regularly produces self-contradictory legal responses. The nature
and scope of governmental human rights obligations is therefore subjected to a
constant re-examination.
The global mobilization around violence against women as the symptom of
unequal power between men and women has intensified. The European Parlia-
ment called for 1999 to be designated the European year against violence against
women.92 From the human rights perspective, this focus on physical abuse as the
most visible consequence of the absence of human rights protection should lead
to a search for enhanced protection rather than solely dealing with consequences.
Because the state has a monopoly over detention and imprisonment, and
potential victims are in the custody of the state, its human rights obligations are
far-reaching and demand the eradication of torture.  No government could
eradicate violence in the family and society but is obliged to undertake all
necessary measures to prevent and suppress such violence, and hence its human
rights obligations are substantively different. The previous attitude was that a
state violated human rights only when its agents had committed abuses. Prece-
dent-setting  cases in the international human rights jurisprudence  affirmed
during the 1980s the states’ obligations to prevent human rights violations, as
well as to protect individuals against abuses by other individuals. States can
therefore violate women’s human rights when they fail to enact and enforce
legislation guaranteeing women equal rights.
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Some agencies have merged their activities tackling violence against women
with their human rights work. The UNFPA (United Nations Population Fund)
broadened its terms of reference to include advocacy for enacting and enforcing
legislation against female genital mutilation,93 while UNIFEM (United Nations
Development Fund for Women) subsumed projects dealing with violence against
women under its women’s human rights programme. This testifies to possibilities
for technical co-operation, but the necessary support is often not forthcoming
from  the former Centre for  Human Rights or the DAW  (Division for the
Advancement of Women). 94 Perhaps the continued fragmentation of topics (such
as the dissociation between harmful traditional practices and violence against
women) impedes mobilization of international actors around a unified platform.
The variety of domestic legal responses
The level of public awareness and concern about violence against women has
been heightened by reports of dramatic data whereby every fourth or third
woman in the world is abused by her husband. The difficulties in finding the
sources for such data, as well as differences in the definition of abuse for those
that included them make such assertions interesting for media reporting, but their
value as a basis for policy development is doubtful. It is possible that abuse is
prevalent in many marriages and families, but it is also possible that women who
are self-defined victims in surveys of violence against women are also victimiz-
ers. The absence of parallel surveys of women’s abuse of their children or
husbands prevents a comprehensive portrayal of the pattern of victimization. It
also provides the background for unidimensional strategies, notably blaming
men, and seeking the typical criminal justice response of relocating such men
from the marriage and/or family into prison. The full range of causes which
generate violence  in the marriage and family  thus remains  unknown, and
violence may be neither controlled nor prevented. The variety and complexity
of factors that contribute to violence lie beyond the criminal justice system.
Concluding its review of violence at work, the International Labour Office
suggested that the priority be on a micro- rather than a macro-level strategy:
In terms of long-term strategies to tackle the general problem of violence in
any society the most significant positive outcomes are likely to be achieved
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through a concentration on child development programmes linked to the family.
It is within the family that aggressive behaviours are first learned.95
Different areas of law have been used to combat sexual harassment at work,
ranging from health and safety law to criminal law. Criminal law did not prove
particularly effective because of the presumption of innocence for the suspected
offender and the corresponding burden of proof on the victim.96 Indeed, criminal
justice approaches create difficulties for victims through such rigid procedural
rules. This was one of the reasons why many countries have not relied only, or
even mainly on criminal law and its enforcement and indeed have combined legal
with extra-legal approaches.
An overview of different legal approaches to violence against women is
presented in Table 1, which highlights the range of options pursued within
Europe. Only two countries – Cyprus and Ireland – have adopted specific
legislation on intra-family and/or domestic violence. Ireland follows the common
law heritage and thus belongs in this author’s Anglo-Saxon category, while
Cyprus exhibits a mixture of continental, civil law, features and the pre-1960
heritage of British rule. A large number of countries have not yet adopted any
legislation, but the practice of countries that combined legal reform with non-le-
gal approaches is illustrative of the trend in continental Europe.
Not recognized in domestic law:
Albania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania,
Malta, Moldova, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia,
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom
Special legislation:
Cyprus (1994) – Violence in the Family (Prevention and Protection of Victim) Act
Ireland (1996) – Domestic Violence Act
Combination of legal and extra-legal approaches:
France (1986-) – preventative programmes, inter-ministerial committee
Netherlands (1983-) – governmental policy, constitutional amendment,
Norway (1983-) – programmes of action, legislative changes
Sweden (1982-) – changes in prosecution and sentencing policy, plan of action
Source: Radford, J. – Violence against women: Comparative legal study of the situation in Council of Europe
Member States, Strasbourg, 19 August 1998, Doc. EG (98) 1 prov; Documentation of the CEDAW (Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women) Committee.
Table 1. Legal responses to violence against women.
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Difficult definition:
Public/private distinction, physical/sexual violence
The dominance of violence against women on the agenda of both women’s and
human rights structures has generated considerable progress in nudging govern-
ments towards improvement of the protection of women from violence, but has
also created much confusion. One aspect has been the blurring of the distinction
between governmental obligations concerning public and private sphere. An-
other aspect is the on-going process of translating the incrimination of violence
against women into specific offences. The importance of attaining a clear-cut
definition for the system of criminal justice, which has to interpret, apply and
enforce it, cannot be over-emphasized.
Differences between the public and private sphere are a key component of
human rights law because its primary purpose is to safeguard individuals against
abuse of power by the state. One consequence of that difference, the insufficient
protection of women against victimization in the private sphere, encountered a
great deal of critique with respect to the previous neglect of violence against
women. That neglect was then replaced by an over-emphasis of violence against
women, which threatens to subsume the entire women’s human rights agenda.
An assertion that violence against women is a violation of human rights has
been a frequently used slogan and has contributed much more heat than light to
the on-going debates about governmental human rights obligations. Misconcep-
tions about what human rights are – and are not – proliferated with regard to the
difference between torture of persons in the custody of the state and physical
abuse of wives by their husbands. The UN Expert Group on the development of
guidelines for gender integration into human rights programme, criticised ‘the
interpretation of the right to freedom from torture [because it] has failed to
encompass violence in the family.’97 That ‘failure’ is a reflection of differentiated
governmental human rights obligations.
Governments have the obligation to eliminate torture because they have the
monopoly over legally detaining and imprisoning people and are responsible for
people in their custody. Rape in custody was subsumed under torture by the
European Court of Human Rights.98 Governmental obligations concerning vio-
lence in the family and society are obligations of conduct, rather than result as
is the case with obligations relating to torture. The necessary measures to prevent,
suppress and penalize violence include safeguards against abuse of power. In the
case of X and Y v. The Netherlands, the European Court of Human Rights clarified
the distinction between different types of governmental human rights obliga-
tions. The Court refused to subsume, under the prohibition of torture, safeguards
against sexual abuse of a girl in a private home for mentally handicapped children.
Rather, it subsumed protection of the physical and moral integrity of the individ-
119
97 Expert group meeting on the development of guidelines for the integration of gender perspectives
into human rights activities and programmes. Note by the Secretariat, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1996/105
of 20 November 1995, para. 20.
98 European Court of Human Rights - Case of Aydin v. Turkey, judgment of 25 September 1997, para.
83.
ual under the states’ obligation to protect private life, which encompasses ‘the
sphere of the relations of individuals between themselves’. The Court found the
Netherlands in breach of Article 8 of the European Convention because the legal
gap existing at the time had not criminalized such sexual abuse, and endorsed
the view of the Commission that the government could not be held responsible
under Article 3.99
The European Court of Human Rights had no difficulty in subsuming custo-
dial rape under the definition of torture:
Rape of a detainee by an official of the State must be considered to be an
especially grave and abhorrent form of ill-treatment given the ease with which
the offender can exploit the vulnerability and weakened resistance of his
victim.100
Specific incrimination of custodial rape has been included in the criminal law
of Germany (defined as sexual assault against a prisoner, a person in care of an
authority or in a public institution), Norway (defined as rape by abuse of position,
committed by a police or prison officer, or against an inmate of any other
institution) and Slovenia (defined as aggravated rape, including against offenders
serving sentence in prison).101 Virtually nothing is known about enforcement of
these laws. Custodial rape still remains on the margins of human rights work,
vividly illustrating the necessity of mainstreaming. This entails a great deal of
change in research priorities for human rights work as well as for research.
Suffice it to recall how uninformative information on custodial rape is when the
only source of information are governments. A topic entitled physical violence
against detained women that is specific to their sex was placed on the United
Nations agenda in the 1980s (it was a misnomer because the intention was to
address rape, whose victims are also detained men) and generated a typical
exercise in ‘fact-finding’: governments were supposed to report whether this was
a problem and they reported that it was not, enabling the United Nations to
conclude that only two cases of rape against detained women had been re-
ported.102
Most countries lack a legal definition of violence against women or gender-
based violence. The same goes for a distinction between physical and sexual
violence, with the effect of undermining ‘the seriousness of sexual violence that
fails to be manifested by physical violence.’103
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An illustration of the variety of domestic legal approaches to the one offence
that has been part of criminal codes for a very long time – rape – is provided in
Table 2. The range of options applied within Europe demonstrates how hetero-
geneous law is. The classification of rape as a crime against morality is still
upheld in some countries; some countries recognize marital rape while others do
not; the victim can only be a woman in some countries; the legal distinction
between rape and sexual intercourse is consent in some countries, while it
continues to be physical violence in others.
Legislative changes have taken place in Anglo-Saxon countries, especially the
elimination of the term ‘rape’ and its replacement by a gradation of offences
within the new category of criminal sexual conduct (as in Michigan) or sexual
assault (as in Canada).104 These have been widely publicised and analysed.
Nevertheless, the definition of rape is not the only factor which facilitates its
prosecution, as is well known, and a great deal of criticism has been voiced
against many governments for failing to prosecute rape effectively. Such gener-
alizations leave many questions to be investigated. For example, statistics from
the Russian Federation show that rape constituted 14.1% of recorded crime in
1991 and fell to 8.7% in 1995.105 No change of legislation took place during that
period, and it is unrealistic to assume that the amount of committed rape
decreased. The question points to the need to scrutinize possible explanations –
both within and outside criminal justice – to find out the reasons for that change.
Classification
– crime against public morals (Italy, Malta,
Netherlands, Norway, Turkey)
– crime against sexual liberty (Greece,
Spain, Slovenia)
Victim
– only woman (Albania, Bulgaria, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
Ireland, Romania)
– woman or man (Latvia, Malta, Poland,
Russia, Slovenia, Spain, United Kingdom)
Marital rape
– criminalization (Cyprus, Czech Republic,
Finland, France, Netherlands, Poland,
Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland)
– rape defined as extramarital intercourse
(Germany, Hungary)
Definition
– force/violence/threat/intimidation (Cyprus,
Finland, Germany, Iceland, Latvia, Malta,
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania,
Slovenia, Spain, Turkey)
– absence of consent (France, Ireland,
United Kingdom)
Source: Radford, J. – Violence against women: Comparative legal study of the situation in Council of Europe
Member States, Strasbourg, 19 August 1998, Doc. EG (98) 1 prov.
Table 2. Definitions of rape in domestic criminal law.
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And yet, the usual response of human rights organizations is to lament the
absence of reliable statistics and go no further.106
Women as offenders
Little attention to women as offenders is routinely justified by the conventional
view that their absolute and relative numbers are small. The pattern of offending
among women is often summed up as non-violent petty property crimes. When
the first global survey was carried out, it noted the emergence of all-girl gangs
or women’s involvement in drug trafficking, but the general description was as
follows:
Family-related offences, such as infanticide, child abuse, murder of spouses,
adultery or abortion, those that relate to the role of consumer housewife such
as shop-lifting and other petty theft, passing bad cheques and welfare fraud,
as well as prostitution and other moral offences were cited as conventional
female crimes in many countries and constituted the majority of female crimes
around the world.107
The study of the causes of crime generates an endless stream of factors that
are singled  out as explaining and predicting offending (or non-offending).
Adherents of the much-quoted assertion by Freud that anatomy is destiny
attributed principal importance to biological differences between the two sexes.
These views belonged to pre-gender times, when theorizing focussed on sex at
birth rather than socialization into gender roles. Criminogenic factors specific to
women, such as PMT (pre-menstrual tension) thus entered the research on
causation of crime. Proponents of the environment in the search for the cause of
crime emphasized differences between masculine and feminine upbringing (the
slogan was ‘nurture, not nature’) and differentiated between sex- and gender-
based differences. Theorizing about the genetic predisposition of men to aggres-
sion is unlikely ever to end because its interplay with socialization makes
causation of aggression and/or violence difficult, if not impossible, to prove.
Different trajectories of research concentrated on inquiries into reasons for
women offending so little (in comparison with men). There was a trend during
the early 1970s in England to perceive women’s offending as an extension of
their sex roles. Shoplifting received a great deal of attention as a ‘typically
women’s crime’ that illustrated the shift of their role from shoppers to shoplift-
ers.108 Another trajectory explored the fate of this minority of women within the
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system of criminal justice (some studies finding that women were treated more
– others less – leniently than men).109
A  move beyond  over-aggregated categories of ‘women’ and  ‘pattern of
offending’ necessitates studying the interaction of gender and race, ethnicity,
provenance, religion, age, family status, marital status, family responsibilities,
employment/unemployment status, or generally class (poverty/wealth). The
existing research has shown that overlapping categorizations provide valuable
insights, and the addition of minority/indigenous/foreign status to the simple
differentiation between men and women leads to different statistical profiles of
women as offenders. Secondary analyses of the existing research into minor-
ity/indigenous/foreign patterns of offending (and responses of the criminal
justice system) is likely to yield interesting findings. Within research into juvenile
delinquency, one might also find further refinements of the routine distinction
between boys and girls.
Once research moved beyond sex towards gender, differences in socialization
led to analyses of the interplay between race and sex, ethnicity and sex, or
minority status and sex. William Wilbanks found race to be a better predictor of
women killing or being killed than sex.110 Societal norms impose different
behaviour upon girls and women, while systems of criminal justice respond to
offences committed by women who are assigned also a minority status by
prioritizing their race or ethnicity rather than their sex. In prison statistics,
‘foreigners’ still represent a non-differentiated category and women who are
foreign are not identified by their sex. Moreover, rules for housing detained or
imprisoned foreigners sometimes depart from the otherwise accepted segrega-
tion by sex.
Research in the USA found that sex and race seem mutually contradictory in
the study of offending by black women,111 and the pattern of offending among
young black women was similar to that of young white men.112 The theory
notwithstanding, in practice discrimination multiplies and it is difficult to disen-
tangle different grounds. Nancy Stoller Shaw argued that imprisoned women in
England can be victimized by quintuple discrimination (sex, race, poverty,
imprisonment and mental ill-health113 to which one could easily add foreignness
and age.
Under the category of ‘illegal aliens’ one can find both men and women,
housed together, in specialized detention centres for foreigners awaiting expul-
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sion or deportation, or in prison. The CPT (Committee for Prevention of Torture)
has argued that ‘women and men should not be obliged to share dormitories and
separate accommodation had to be provided for women unless they have ex-
pressed a wish to be placed with persons with whom they share an emotional or
cultural affinity.’114
The numbers of foreign women in prison have been increasing faster than the
numbers of foreign men, although the absolute number of women remains much
smaller. In France, for example, the percentage of imprisoned foreign women
was close to that of men (30.7 for men and 27.1 for women) although the absolute
number of women (569) remained much lower than that of men (14,149).115 In
Canada, indigenous men represented 12% of federal inmates and indigenous
women 15%,116 which led to the claim of double discrimination against indige-
nous women.117 This path of moving beyond recording only sex is yet to be
translated into official statistical categories used in most penitentiary systems.
The pattern of officially recorded women’s offences is influenced by differ-
ences in the criminal codes. Sex-specific offences can be defined so that only
men can commit them (rape, wife-beating), while offences such as abortion and
infanticide can only be committed by women. Offences such as prostitution can
be committed by men but are routinely recorded only for women. In countries
where abortion is criminalized, women’s rate of offending might be higher if the
criminalization of abortion is enforced. France retained in 1992 the categoriza-
tion of self-induced abortion as a criminal offence punishable by two months of
imprisonment.118 Similarly, for infanticide women will constitute the bulk of
offenders. If prostitution is criminalized, women are also likely to be the sole
offenders because the ‘discovery’ of male prostitutes is recent in most countries.
The current concern about trafficking in women has exposed how often women
find themselves in the double role of offenders and victims.
The gap between officially recorded and committed crime is notorious, and
raises interesting questions about women’s offending. Because women’s offend-
ing tends to  be  slanted towards  the  private  rather than the  public  sphere,
arguments are routinely launched that men-women differentials may be smaller
than is generally assumed. The entry of women into terrorism in Europe gener-
ated a great deal of literature, as well as prompting an agonising dilemma about
equal or differentiated treatment between male and female terrorists. The in-
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volvement of foreign women in drug trafficking had probably been launched to
take advantage of the prejudice of ‘innocent women’. These fragmentary excur-
sions into women’s ‘untypical’ involvement in crime have not yet led to system-
atic research into the over-all pattern of women’s offending. This could lead to
a dismantling of the unidimensional definition of women by their sex to search
for differences in the pattern of offending between women in western and eastern,
northern and southern Europe, and within these broad categories a search for
further differences by age, provenance, ethnicity, religion, marital and family
status, responsibility for dependent children or its absence, economic self-suste-
nance or dependence.
The marginalization of women in penitentiary policies and statistics is well-
known although this knowledge has not yet led to any change. There is a paucity
of international guidelines or recommendations for anything other than mother-
hood. In 1985, the first UN survey revealed that the bulk of differential treatment
consisted of health care and child-care services.119 This generalization no longer
holds true, but a great deal of difference must exist between penitentiary systems
which apply individualized treatment and those that house all female inmates
together. The literature about women’s prisons remains scarce (the exception,
again, being Anglo-Saxon countries), especially in Eastern Europe.
Because women constitute a minute proportion of inmates, as Table 3 illus-
trates, there is often no classification among women, and they are housed together
regardless of age or crime. The Prison Officers Association of England and Wales
testified in 1978 that homosexuality was one of the dominant features of women’s
prisons.120 There has been little written about this, except for accusations against
prison officials for their intransigent opposition.121
Perhaps the worst accusation of the prison regime for women is embodied in
the term ‘infantilization,’which appears as a descriptor of female prison life with
unusual frequency. It was used by an Italian terrorist, whose image of her
imprisonment was that she was taken back to childhood (‘infantilized’) and
deprived of all responsibility for herself.122 Barney Bardsley, an English journal-
ist, also used the term infantilization in her description of a paradox: ‘women
craving safety (and thereby abdicating power) and the prison regime fostering
that process’123 Pat Carlen used the identical term when writing about the
imprisonment of women in Scotland.124
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Elaine Genders and Elaine Player noted that ‘there has never been a major
review of the women’s prison system.’125 Canada responded to that call, but the
results were disappointing. When prison reform is carried out on the basis of the
perceptions of outsiders of how prisons function, the reform is not likely to be
successful, and Canada learned this by doing. With the growing interest in
imprisoned women and critique of the criminal justice system for their maltreat-
ment, proposals for reform logically followed. The Canadian experiment had
been launched by a 1990 call for a drastic reform of the prison regime for women
and led to the establishment of a women-friendly prison sub-system, which could
INCREASED PROPORTION OF WOMEN
Austria
Belgium
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
Finland
Ireland
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Slovak Republic
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
United Kingdom (England and Wales)
1993
4.8%
4.8%
3.2%
1.7%
4.8%
3.5%
1.6%
2.9%
3.8%
4.6%
2.4%
7.3%
3.0%
5.2%
6.1%
3.2%
3.7%
1996
5.4%
4.9%
6.4%
3.7%
6.0%
4.8%
2.2%
4.0%
6.0%
5.7%
2.5%
9.0%
3.5%
5.6%
6.3%
3.9%
4.1%
DECREASED PROPORTION OF WOMEN
Bulgaria
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Italy
Netherlands
4.9%
4.1%
4.3%
4.6%
5.7%
5.5%
4.3%
3.0%
4.0%
4.1%
3.5%
5.5%
4.3%
3.7%
Source: Council of Europe annual penal statistics (SPACE).
Table 3. Women in the prison population, 1993 and 1996.
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not cope with violent disturbance by women prisoners.126 One important reason
for this was that it had been based on an erroneous image:
women offenders were often multiple victims of physical and sexual abuse
who needed understanding and healing, that they were not dangerous, and that
any violence was likely to be self-injury or could be handled by supportive
female staff.127
The notion that all staff dealing with imprisoned women should be female,
and also that female staff should be excluded from male prisons, has two distinct
origins. One concerns the conventional operating procedures, where sex-segre-
gation figures prominently with the corollary male staff for male, and female for
female prisons. Another is more recent, and relates to the image of women
offenders as victims, and victims of male abuse, which has to be eliminated from
the prison by staffing women’s prisons with women only. How this approach
works in practice is an interesting topic for research.
Women as criminal justice professionals
The dilemma about a (or ‘the’) women’s role within criminal justice has been
present for a long time and revived with the current focus on gender mainstream-
ing and violence against women.
Experiences from all fields where there have been experiments with increased
participation and/or representation of women show that no qualitative change
can be discerned until women’s representation reaches a critical mass of one-third
or at least 25%. This is far from what has been accomplished thus far in any
criminal justice system. The distinction between ‘participation’ and ‘repre-
sentation’ is borrowed from the field of human rights, where the former denotes
a mere quantitative presence of women (or any other previously under-repre-
sented category) in a specific profession or occupation, while the latter refers to
decision- and policy-making strata. Calls for gender parity, especially frequent
within parliamentary bodies of the Council of Europe and the European Union,
place the ultimate goal even higher. A comparative review of the existing
personnel policies of criminal justice systems could reveal whether such a policy
has been adopted, and if so, how it is pursued and what the impact has been.
The entry of women into criminal justice was initially the outcome of political
decisions made outside and above the system of criminal justice. The first UN
survey found that the entry of women into the criminal justice system was
attributable to ‘some form of government policy or legislative action.’128 The
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first entrants were thus seen as ‘quota women’. In the USA, this was part of
affirmative action policies,129 in other countries a result of political commitment
by the government or legislative changes aimed at equal opportunities for women
in all professions and occupations.
The  institutionalization of violence  against women into criminal  justice
created a considerable need for policewomen, women prosecutors and judges.
Cees de Rover perceives as a problem the segregation of policewomen into
‘feminine’ aspects of law enforcement, which keeps them at lower salary levels
and absent from strategic, namely management and policy-making levels.130 The
policy routinely requires that female victims of (male) violence be dealt with by
female criminal justice professionals. The assumption behind this approach is
that the male criminal justice profession inevitably embodies a masculine under-
standing of violence (as a means of perpetuating the subordinate status of
women), while ‘the shared gendered experience of life’ argues in favour of
replacing male by female criminal justice professionals.131 A mere change from
male to female professionals may not enhance gender-sensitivity, as has been
illustrated in Poland. The UN Special Rapporteur on violence against women
was surprised to encounter a female-dominated judiciary (half of the judges
countrywide and two-thirds of the judges in major cities are women) that was
neither activist nor sensitive to trafficking in women and prostitution; perpetra-
tors of trafficking were routinely given suspended sentences regardless of the
legal requirement for imprisonment.132
Policies and practices within Europe vary a great deal, not only along the
West-East line. In northern Europe, women’s access to high-level positions
within criminal justice is no longer reported by the media, which signifies that
change has taken place. In some countries, the legal profession (including
judiciary) has been feminized and efforts are made to redress the imbalance in
the opposite direction.
Cases of discrimination against women are litigated, especially within the
police in England and Wales. The application of the prohibition of discrimination
against women to the police in 1975 led to conflicting views relating to the role
of women. Both within and outside the police arguments in favour and against
the entry of policewomen into all types of policing (from the night shift to
carrying firearms and training in armed combat) proliferated. The exclusion of
policewomen from carrying firearms was litigated before the European Court of
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Justice, and discrimination against policewomen was litigated before the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights.133 The problems have apparently not decreased,
judging from the publicity given to allegations of harassment of policewomen
by their colleagues as well as to cases of sex discrimination in promotions.
Researching multifaceted reality
A range of interesting issues for research emerges with the abandonment of the
uni-dimensional focus on womanhood, coupled with the uni-dimensional focus
on their single role. This has been tackled already with the emergence of the
‘battered-wife syndrome’ in Anglo-Saxon countries, which forced attention to
the interplay between the role of women as victim and offender. A similar
approach could be generated with research into women’s victimization within
the system of criminal justice, where, as noted above, not even the notorious
problem of custodial rape has yet generated comprehensive studies.
Women offenders as victims
A popular question during late 1960s was whether women offenders were treated
within criminal justice more leniently than men. Evidence for this was found in
England and Wales in the pattern of sentencing, but this was ultimately attributed
to gender rather than sex, primarily to women’s child-care responsibilities. This
rationale was indeed a part of the sentencing policy. The Home Office advocated
that negative consequences for children of imprisoning their mothers  be
avoided.134
It is often claimed that women are victims of criminal justice policies which
simply neglect  the fact  that some offenders or prisoners are women. The
conventional wisdom of policy design informed by the majority of offenders
being young men still keeps women offenders invisible. The paucity of women’s
prisons prevents classification and all adult women are necessarily housed
together. For migration-related offences, separation of women from men has
often not been institutionalized because the status of migrant takes precedence
over their being women, and migrants are deemed to be sexless in penitentiary
statistics, although not always in law (to the detriment of women, one should
add).
The attention to women as victims originates in feminist literature. As articu-
lated by Hilary Allen: ‘The positioning of female subjects as victims rather than
aggressors is to some extent a structural characteristic of all feminist discourse,
as is the refusal to allow female subjects to appear as morally guilty or personally
129
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discreditable.’135 The further fáf factors that lead women to crime provided
further arguments for treating women offenders as victims. Meda Chesney-Lind
found that 58% of imprisoned girls grew up with their mother alone, with drug
or alcohol abuse present in 34% of cases and abuse of the girl in 32%. The initial
response of the criminal justice system was often to criminalize the girls’ coping
strategy, such as running away from such home, and led to their first entry into
the criminal justice system.136 Subsequent abßnal justice system remains poorly
documented.
The work of the European Committee against Torture (CPT) is illustrative of
the slow and haphazard ‘discovery’ of women amongst detainees. Because most
detainees are men, the CPT’s prison visits are necessarily slanted towards
detention facilities and prisons for men. Its visits to establishments housing
women137 did not revealuse, which may be the consequence of the CPT not
having looked for it. During its visit to Hungary, it ‘heard a number of allegations
from women detainees that they had been subjected to verbal sexual harassment
and that police officers had treated them in a demeaning fashion.’138 It is truly
ama ‘custodial rape’ does not emerge anywhere in the CPT documentation.
Women victims as offenders
The statistics on inter-personal violence often reveal women in the role of victims
much more often than offenders. They provided a basis for legitimizing women’s
counter-violence. In a number of court cases in Anglo-Saxon countries, a
woman’s killing of her abusive husband was treated as an act of self-preservation.
In Canada, a precedent-setting Supreme Court decision in 1990 prompted the
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process of further reform of the law.139 In England, two well-publicised court
cases led to diminished charges against women who killed abusive husbands.140
This path towards legitimizing violence by the victim against the perpetrator
opens an interesting issue for research because it combines violence against
women with violence by women, again looking into the interplay between the
changing roles of the same person. Nevertheless, it also raises the key question
about the avenue to be taken. One can ask whether legitimizing any violence
ultimately leads in the direction which is opposite to the general aim of enhancing
freedom from violence. Perhaps the question which was posed with regard to
violence by men will ultimately have to be asked for women as well, namely the
perpetrator is provided ‘with an opportunity to search endlessly for the cause of
his violence without ever actually taking full responsibility for it.’141
A different facet of multiple women’s roles in the system of criminal justice
is associated with a phenomenon that is sometimes called ‘structural violence’
and is manifested in trafficking in foreign women for prostitution. These women
are victims of trafficking, but are offenders because they are also illegal aliens.
The routine coping strategy of criminal justice systems is to ignore the latter. The
commitment to suppression of trafficking in women and assistance to its victims
thus remains rhetorical.
Exceptions have been made in some countries in order to facilitate the
prosecution of traffickers. A temporary residence permit introduced in 1988 in
the Netherlands for victims of trafficking who are willing to testify against the
traffickers postpones deportation till the trial is finished, and there is no infor-
mation what happens to the women afterwards. Criticism has been directed
against this practice (and a similar one introduced in Belgium) because of its
restrictiveness.142 The thrust of the criticism has been directed to the obvious
priority for suppression of immigration over concern for victims of trafficking,
or prosecution of traffickers.
Challenge for the future:
Overcoming Institutionalized neglect of women
International human rights bodies started systematically addressing the human
rights of women only during the 1990s. Criminal justice bodies are likely to
follow during the 2000s, and the experiences of the human rights bodies thus
might be useful. An overview of violations of the human rights of women still
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necessitates sifting through mountains of documents produced by various global
and regional human rights bodies; mainstreaming has yet to be accomplished in
the area of human rights. One can review documentation relating to indigenous
and minority rights without finding a single reference to the fact that half of an
indigenous people or a minority are women and likely to be victims of double
discrimination.  A  similar  fate might befall criminal justice bodies, if they
concentrate on ‘womanhood’to the exclusion of all other factors – race, ethnicity,
religion, provenance, age. The illustrations regarding trafficking in women
provided above demonstrate the necessity of recognizing the multiplicity of
defining features for women. The replacement of ‘women’ by ‘gender’ should –
but often does not – force policy-making beyond womanhood.
The small proportion of women amongst detainees and prison populations
keeps them statistically and legally invisible. This legal invisibility is also a
feature of human rights law, where women are mentioned only if pregnant or
mothers of dependent children. The political invisibility of women in criminal
justice policy-making is notorious. The current political priority for violence
against women is likely to make the situation worse rather than better. Specialized
programmes and units for violence against women are likely to be staffed with
women, and – both institutionally and personally – these new units and staff will
remain apart from the mainstream.
The rapid growth of interest for violence against women has yet to translate
into detailed knowledge about the fate of women in custody. It is paradoxical
that the principal objective of human rights – to prevent abuses by the state – has
not led to an analysis of the victimization of women in prison but rather of
physical abuse of women at liberty. A possible explanation is that the topic of
violence against women originated from women’s rather than human rights
bodies, and was designed with a view to the vast majority of women in the world.
The usual human rights priority for people in the custody of the state has yet to
be remoulded to recognize that some of them are women, and quite a few are
likely to be victims of custodial rape.
The question as to what should be accomplished in the application of research
results to policy-development is particularly pertinent. Two approaches are
advocated so as to change the system of criminal justice. One of these approaches
seeks equality (and criticised from succumbing to the implicit male-based model)
while another advocates differentiation, an affirmation of women’s different
needs and experiences. The former was illustrated by the inclusion of women
prisoners into chain-gangs in Alabama in 1996, following a lawsuit that chal-
lenged previously male-only chain-gangs as unconstitutional.143 This example
highlights the risk of a catching-up approach, where the treatment of women is
likely to get worse so as to be equal to that meted out to men before it gets better
for both.
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The question about equal or preferential treatment also entails different views
about what women can contribute both to crime prevention and to criminal
justice. Anne Worrall thus summed up a still prevalent image of women:
Being a normal woman means coping, caring, nurturing, and sacrificing
self-interest to the needs of others. On the other hand, it is characterized by
lack of control and dependence.144
This was supplemented by a related issue, that of how the socialization of
women prevents their large-scale and serious offending. Ngaire Naffine pointed
out the resulting dilemma: ‘the very qualities which have traditionally been
linked with women’s oppression, in particular their compassion, have the positive
impact of making women good citizens. From here it is but a short step to the
anti-feminist proposition that women should be encouraged to shoulder their
current load of responsibilities because it keeps them out of trouble.’145
Conflicting views are voiced about women’s contribution to crime prevention
and crime generation in their traditional role of mothers. A great deal has been
written about the importance of early child development for the future of the
child, as well as about the role of mothers in transmitting behavioural norms to
their children. Carol Smart objected that mothers were ‘held to be responsible
for the delinquency of their children but it is the feelings and actions of children
that are studied.’146
The finding that children below the age of one constitute the highest risk
category of being killed by a member of the family has been replicated in
Australia and England.147 Their vulnerability is self-evident, but the role of their
mothers is clouded in ignorance. Too little has been done thus far to study
intra-family violence comprehensively, including its inter-generational transmis-
sion. Frances Heidensohn pointed to one line of research by asking: ‘Why is it
that girls and women accept stricter social control and discipline than boys and
men, and how far are the processes transferable?’ She added a thought that
highlights how little is known about the process of socialization. Asking whether
‘feminization of socialization’ 148 could be a feasible path to explore, she opened
a Pandora’s Box: one side of motherhood is perceived as caring and nurturing
role but its dark side is revealed in child abuse and killing of children under the
age of one. The fact that women commit a great deal of child abuse continues
creating controversy because it does not fit into the pattern of caring, nurturing,
responsible motherhood, nor does it necessarily conform into women-as-victims
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image.149 Violence against women has further shifted attention from violence by
women and creates a huge gap that research should strive to close in the future.
It is possible that a comprehensive definition of gender-based violence should
include both violence against women and violence by women. Allison Morris
argued that ‘given the opportunity and the appropriate social context’, women
are as violent and/or criminal as men, and pointed to the need to differentiate
amongst women so as to explain which ones are protected from criminality. 150
Further research along this line seems particularly urgent today.
Women were – and often remain – invisible in criminal justice. They constitute
a minute proportion of offenders, detainees and prisoners, as well as criminal
justice professionals. Women’s absence from serious offending prompted a great
deal of study to identify those factors that impede criminality in women. The
attention for women as victims reinforced that orientation. The ultimate goal that
should be achieved within the system of criminal justice – gender equality – was
defined by the Council of Europe as ‘an equal visibility, empowerment and
participation of both sexes.’151 Equal visibility and participation are easy to
translate into changes that should be set in motion, but what empowerment of
women should mean in the area of criminal justice is an open question with which
this text began.
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Women in the Criminal Justice System
Commentary by Mr Juan Medina
The paper by Dr Tomasevski starts with an interesting discussion of the interna-
tional policy-framework of the 1990s on gender issues and then focuses on the
challenges that current international priorities represent for policy-making and
research in the area of criminal justice. I think that the main topics of the paper,
the traditional neglect of women by the criminal justice system and the difficulty
of translating feminist claims into the criminal justice discourse, are today
accepted by most scholars as realities that we have to deal with and, thus, I will
not discuss them thoroughly. I can also easily agree with many of the ideas
presented by Dr Tomasevski. In particular, I want to emphasize my agreement
with the following:
1. There is a risk in linking gender/human rights and violence against women
issues if we allow the latter to become the dominant topic. Certainly, although
”violence against women became a central topic on the UN’s rights agenda in
early 1990s... it does not encompass all pertinent human rights problems of
women”. The description that Dr Tomasevski provides of this problem and
how it originated deserves praise and careful attention.
2. The origins of violence against women issues in US and UK as somehow
related to the concept of the minimal-state and the very scant attention given
to social rights and the problems with exporting their models of response.
3. The recognition that the criminal justice system cannot deal alone with all the
problems that women victims of violence face.
4. The problems associated with the development of specialized units within the
criminal justice system that usually work with only female staff.
5. The need of considering different women realities (such as, for example, the
ones exhibited by immigrant women).
6. The interest of the concept of gender mainstreaming and its application to
criminal justice thinking and practice.
There are, fortunately, other issues where I think I have a different view or ,
perhaps more appropriately, I emphasize a different interpretation. I say fortu-
nately because that facilitates a debate. In particular, I will refer to the assumption
that the criminal justice system does not have much to offer to women victims
of violence and to the assumption that the elimination of all forms of discrimi-
nation is a prerequisite for the eradication of violence against women. But before
I do so, I would also like to suggest the possibilities of semantic problems
surrounding these issues.
Although when we talk about violence against women we are usually thinking
of interpersonal aggressive behavior or, in a broader sense, about acts of women
abuse, it is possible that some of the problems that are making communication
in this area difficult derive from the use of different interpretations of violence
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from some feminist segments. Certainly, we criminologists, as well as criminal
justice practitioners, tend to think of violence as a form of interpersonal behavior.
However, that is not entirely true when we think about feminist scholarship. From
the latter perspective, violence is also conceived in a broader sense, as institu-
tional, structural or symbolic violence. As Lima Malvido, from Mexico, has put
it: ”beating up a woman is an example of behavioral violence, but the patterns
of socioeconomic and political organization that allowed women to be victimized
by their partners are examples of structural violence”. From this perspective, as
important as is visible violence, it is the hidden violence in the form of confine-
ment of women to the domestic dimension as a cultural expectation, the subor-
dination of a mother’s will to everybody else in the family, the lack of recognition
of women’s desires, and so on. Indeed, these broader concepts of violence refer
to a large extent to most forms of patriarchal cultural practices and forms of
discrimination against women. Perhaps this is also a factor that should be
considered when we try to think about the predominance of violence against
women as a framework for international action.
The author recognizes in several parts of the paper the limitations of the
criminal justice system in dealing with the prevention of violence against women:
• ”Advocacy of a typical criminal justice response (arrest, trial, and imprison-
ment of the male abuser) entails a risk of doing more harm than good...
Arguments against a criminal justice response to wife-beating or verbal abuse
are many”
• ”Projects aiming at assisting battered wives easily do more harm than good
by disregarding the crucial importance of the financial dependence of wives
upon their husbands. The recognition or absence of the wife’s legal rights
concerning housing, family property, or child custody and maintenance,
should -but often does not- inform such projects. Projects designed to assist
battered wives often include penalization of abusive husbands, routinely
seeking their imprisonment, which then leaves the battered wife homeless and
penniless”
• ”Although criminal justice systems have obtained crime prevention as part of
their mandate, they are notoriously constrained in that task. Acting in the name
of the state, policemen and policewomen cannot simply broaden their policing
powers to surveillance of intra-marital or intra-family relations and justify this
by their commitment to preventing violence against women. Even if they
obtained legitimacy for their intrusiveness (which would necessitate dispens-
ing with the protection of individual privacy), it is questionable how much
they  would be able to achieve because the  chain of causation requires
simultaneous action by a large number of actors, most of who are outside the
system of criminal justice”
• ”The key question is: how far should the criminal justice system be reoriented
from public to private -women’s- security? Views as to what an appropriate
response should be vary. One extreme demands resort to the full range of
coercive powers against abusive men... another proposes an increase of
supportive services rather than coercive powers of the state. If the decreased
vulnerability of women to violence means their safety and independence,
criminal justice approaches can -at best- cope with the former only. The latter
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entails the full range of civil, cultural, economic, social, and political rights
to enable women to be independent, to which criminal justice approaches
cannot contribute almost at all”
• ”The variety and complexity of factors that contribute to violence lie beyond
criminal justice system”
These quotes create the impression that the author does not believe that the
criminal justice system can do much for women who are victims of violence. It
seems also as if the author contrasts two different models of response to the
problems of violence against women: a social service/support response and a
criminal justice/punishment response. In the best case, the author seems to
believe that the criminal justice system alone cannot do much to solve the
problems of women victims of  violence  and, in  the worst, can be  highly
counterproductive. Indeed, there are numerous arguments that can be made to
support this reasoning, particularly if we have a specific vision of what the
criminal justice system is and does based on more traditional or mainstream
models in contemporary Europe. There are no doubts that the criminal justice
system alone cannot solve all the problems that women victims of violence face
and there are many issues that have to be resolved through more responsive civil
legislation and the work of social service agencies. Nevertheless, I do not think
that the criminal justice system contribution to the prevention of violence against
women is a minor or a secondary one. This, however, derives from a different
interpretation of the functions and goals of the criminal justice system. In
particular, I do not view the criminal justice system as a set of organizations
whose only functions are case-processing and the delivery of punishment. I agree
with Dr Tomasevski when she argues that the criminal justice system as we know
it and the way it still operates in most European countries does not work to
prevent domestic violence. Nevertheless, I think that we can develop a vision of
a more responsive criminal justice system to the needs of women who are victims
of violence. I think that it is already time to move our emphasis from the
recognition of the limitations of the criminal justice system to start thinking and
debating how we can use the criminal justice system to improve the situation of
women victims of violence.
Although I recognize the historical neglect of criminal justice professionals
and structures to violence against women, as well as the limitations of the
criminal justice system in addressing all human/gender/social rights issues in
their complex multidimensionality that the victims face, I still think that the
criminal justice system can play an essential role in the prevention of violence
against women. Indeed, it can play a role that no other social agency can play in
the prevention of violence against women. The criminal justice system is in an
ideal position to develop procedures and programs with the goal of providing
safety to women. Dr Tomasevski seems to downplay the importance of this by
putting the emphasis on the independence of women, understood as economic
or social independence, but we should not forget that no independence is possible
when we cannot guarantee first the safety of women victims of violence. Indeed,
safety and independence are interrelated concepts and although we can wonder
about the use of personal safety without independence, what remains clear is that
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safety is a prerequisite of independence. In addition, because the police is the
only public service that remains open 24 hours a day, seven days per week, with
offices even in the most remote areas of the different European countries, and
people usually call them in instances of domestic disputes, the police remains
the branch of the public administration that first detects many instances of
violence against women and, therefore, can also play an important role as liaison
with other social and public health services.
The matter here is, to some extent, answering the question of to whom the
problem of violence against women belongs. By emphasizing the responsibilities
of other agencies and political actors outside the criminal justice system, we are
supporting the view of many criminal justice professionals who do not want to
take responsibility for it and perpetuate a particular view about the capabilities
and function of the criminal justice system, not just regarding violence against
women but crime in general. But evidence exists that shows that the criminal
justice system can effectively prevent crime when it adopts the right approach.
We are used to the way politicians use the criminal law to ”solve” ”problems”
and ”crises” such as the drug epidemic, terrorism, drunk driving, and so on, and
how many social scientists and analysts comment on that by saying that the only
real way of dealing with these problems is by eradicating their root causes and
that the criminal justice system cannot do anything about it. (The difference with
the violence against women situation is that some of the moral entrepreneurs that
advocate for the criminalization of this problem are political groups that we are
more used to see among the people who usually have criticized criminalization).
The problem with both approaches is that they seem to equate criminal justice
and criminal law and are, thus, not based on a real understanding of how the
criminal justice system works, or might work, and can be used to prevent crime.
Even within that limited understanding of what the criminal justice system
does, there are problems with the arguments emphasized against its use. First,
critics of criminalization focus on the, perhaps, more complex scenario: male
battering in intimate relationships; and make most of their arguments around this
particular situation. However, this is far from being the only example of violence
against women. Rape, stalking, or illegal traffic of women are some other
examples. This is clear, for example, when we hear the critics of criminalization
arguing that throwing the book at male batterers ends up making the situation
worse for battered wives because the wives depend on the economic resources
of the batterers. There are, however, additional problems with this argument. To
start with, is it true? In the discourse to achieve social support for the battered
women movement we have relied on particular public images of women victims
that pictures them as white, married, heterosexual, non-violent, non-alcoholic,
non-drug addict, nonimmigrant, and economically dependent on their husbands.
But this image does not always reflect the real picture of battered women. Usually
they are a much more heterogeneous group than this image suggests. In a recent
study conducted by Victim Services in New York City public housing projects,
we discovered that the large majority of these women were not married, were
not even cohabiting with their partners, and were not economically dependent
on them. That is not to say that they were living in the abundance, but this
somehow questions the argument about incarcerating the batterers as something
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that is going to have a direct impact in the economic situation of women victims
of violence. Actually, what seems to have a negative impact on the labor
opportunities of women and, therefore, on their socioeconomic situation is the
pattern of abuse and control that they suffer. In addition, we also know that many
men who batter their wives are unemployed and cannot provide decent resources
or the resources, anyway, to their families. Indeed, there are scholars who argue
that this may be an important factor in understanding the etiology of domestic
violence. If this is the case, again, the argument weakens.
But what do we really want to emphasize when we say that criminalization
worsens the economic situation of battered wives? Does this mean that we should
not arrest and incarcerate men who batter their wives? This question raises
important ethical issues and also leads us to think about gender mainstreaming
in ways that are not explicitly envisioned in this paper. To argue that we should
not use the criminal justice system resources in this situation raises not only
questions about just desert, but also about equality issues. Why don’t we hear
this argument in other cases? Indeed, that would be the most accurate interpre-
tation of gender mainstreaming. It is not only in these cases that women might
suffer economically from the incarceration of their husbands. This might also
happens when their husbands are incarcerated for other crimes. Nevertheless, we
hear over and over the same argument applied to domestic violence cases, and
not in other cases, leading to the formation of prejudices among criminal justice
professionals that help very little in the effective prevention of domestic violence.
Ultimately, and still considering this limited interpretation of what the criminal
justice system is all about, we should not forget that there is evidence showing
that some of the remedies offered by the criminal justice system seem to have,
at least, a minimal deterrent effect. Nevertheless, one of the more common
arguments of critics of criminal justice interventions is that they are not very
effective. An argument that, by the same token, could be easily extended to other
criminal situations as well. But the evidence is far from conclusive. The most
recent analyses of the Spouse Abuse Replication Program with merged data from
all the sites showed that the arrest of the offender has a weak, but significant,
deterrent effect. Given the weak nature of the intervention, this cannot be simply
interpreted as a failure of these policies, but, as evidence that the police, even by
doing something as simple as arresting the offenders when they respond to a
domestic violence situation, may be preventing violence against women. There
has also been some initiatives that have been successful in reducing the level of
fear  experienced by battered of women, as well as other experiences that
demonstrate that the police can make a difference on preventing rape and
combatting the organized groups that exploit women’s sexuality. In addition, the
literature on the treatment of male batterers as a criminal sanction also include
some examples that achieved success.
In any case, do we mean by implication of the criminal justice system that we
ultimately have to throw the book at male batterers and incarcerate them? Is
punishment the only answer that the criminal justice system can provide? I hope
not.  Indeed, the use of coercion as a last resort is what characterizes the
functioning of criminal justice, but that does not mean that the only activity of
the criminal justice system is to deliver punishment. I think that sometimes we,
139
in a very simplistic fashion, equate the criminal justice system and the enforce-
ment of criminal law. The truth is that the reality of the criminal justice system
is far more complex than that. Indeed, the fact that in Europe most criminological
debates are monopolized by lawyers does not help to unveil these realities and
this is a challenge that, as part of the European criminological community, we
have to face. The truth is that even the concept of the criminal justice system as
a ”system” is in crisis today, and more and more people starts to understand that
criminal justice organizations are something more than case processing agencies
that operate in a fashion that is isolated from other agencies or the community
and with the only function of being ”the mouth of the law” or enforcing the
criminal law. Concepts such as problem-oriented policing, community prosecu-
tion, community courts or the use of civil and administrative remedies by criminal
justice actors are not simply new solutions to old problems, but constitute the
following logical step in the recognition of the complexities of the work carried
out by criminal justice organizations. If criminal justice organizations never did
simply ”just that”, case processing, how can we make visible, more reasonable,
more democratic and effective their actual practices? That may possibly be the
question that we should be trying to answer instead of simply displacing the
responsibility of the criminal justice system in preventing crime to other social
agencies. Indeed, the work of other social agencies is crucial to maintaining
change and the process of recovery from victimization. But as criminal justice
scholars our main role probably should be to discuss how that work can be
facilitated by the criminal justice system and to talk about other ways in which
the criminal justice system can help to prevent this problem.
Dr Tomasevski then touches on a more philosophical question, that the police
cannot broaden their mandate to intervene in intrafamily situations, since this
affects the intimacy of the family, and violence against women cannot be used
as an excuse to break that intimacy. It is not evident from the paper if this
statement reflects a personal opinion or what the author believes most profes-
sionals in European criminal justice systems think. I do believe that in these cases
the criminal justice system is not only justified but forced to act in order to
preserve more important objects of legal protection, such as personal freedom
and dignity, personal health and life. The police, in these cases, is not trying to
”broaden their surveillance” to deal with intrafamily situations, they are not
trying to teach the partners how to go about their relationships, they are just trying
to do something more concrete: they are trying to stop the violence and to create
the conditions that would allow the victims of violence to decide what to do with
their privacy and with their intimate relationships. This is a very legitimate
objective. Historically, the privacy argument has been employed to justify the
lack of response from the criminal justice system to this problem and, indeed,
many criminal justice professionals may still share this argument. But from a
strictly legal viewpoint this is an argument that is no longer sustainable, and the
so-called ”privacy concerns” are no more appealing than the ones that can show
up  in other criminal cases from  drug-dealing to medical malpractice. The
questions that we should be trying to answer, once we recognize this, is ”and
now what?” What can we do to change the perception and discourses of those
criminal justice professionals who still hold this set of beliefs? And how can we
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fulfill our responsibilities to preserve the health and safety of women without
detracting from their agency?
As criminologists our responsibility and function is to help the criminal justice
professionals and policy makers come up with concrete proposals and ideas on
improving their response to violence against women and the way they use their
discretion and problem-solving skills to deal with this phenomenon. It is true
that the criminal justice system is not perfect and is going to need to coordinate
its efforts with other agencies. We already know that. The question now is ”what’s
next?” How can we carry out these efforts at coordination? What particular
programs and solutions are more promising? What is actually being done in
different parts of the continent? What are the particular problems that the
changing and progressively more interrelated and complex Europe is adding to
the complexities of the problem of violence against women? These are the kind
of questions that I think we should be focusing on instead of continuing to
emphasize the limitations of the traditional or current response of the European
criminal justice systems to this problem. I will come back later to some of these
issues, but now I want to discuss something else.
Dr Tomasevski very nicely describes some of the problems of linking violence
against women and more general gender issues in the political debate because
of the possible problems of co-optation. However, she, as many others, then
pushes the argument that what we really need to prevent violence is to achieve
gender equality. Here we end up with the same problem of co-optation but from
a different angle. I know I’m entering here into the dangerous domain of
politically incorrect discourse, but sometimes you have to be the devil’s advocate
and show that dominant discourses or politically correct discourses are not
always completely accurate.
I think that is wrong to link women’s liberation to the elimination of violence
against women in the way that Dr Tomasevski and many others argue. Indeed,
today it has become a very powerful and commonplace rhetorical figure to argue
that the ”elimination of all forms of discrimination is a prerequisite for combat-
ting violence against women”. This is based on the notion that ”comprehensive
equal rights guarantees... would give women realistic possibilities of rupturing
an abusive relationship” and in the idea that unequal rights are THE cause of
violence against women. But this is true and it’s not true. It is true and it is not
true in the same way that saying that poverty is the ultimate cause of crime is
true and is not true.
Indeed, this theory would lead us to expect that women, because they are in a
secondary and more vulnerable position in society and the family, are more likely
to be victimized than men are. However, those who maintain this position never
explain why then most victims of crime are men who, at least in theory, occupy
a position of privilege in the current societal arrangements. I have no doubts that
improving the economic and social situation of women would place them in a
better position to cope with the phenomenon of victimization, violent or not. But
that is one thing, and it is a very different one to expect that the prevalence of
victimization among women is going to be reduced by improving the economic
and social situation of women.
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One of the most popular theories of personal victimization is the lifestyle
theory. This theory precisely explain the lower level of victimization of women
and the higher level of victimization of men because of the unequal and unfair
societal arrangements and norms about gender roles. According to this theory,
women are less likely to be victimized because, unfortunately, culture and society
still defines the home as the right place for a woman to be. From this point of
view, the less exposure to criminal opportunities, the lower the chances of being
victimized. If women improve their socioeconomic and cultural situation and
begin enjoying the degree of freedom that they obviously deserve, they may as
well be more exposed to the same kind of dangerous situations than men
frequently are. No doubt, the lifestyle theories of criminal victimization don’t
pay enough attention to women’s victimization at home, but even when we do
so, the fact remains that this theory might provide a plausible and consistent
explanation of victimization that is inconsistent with the liberation hypothesis.
Now, does this mean that women’s liberation is wrong or a step that we should
not take? Of course that is not my point. My point is that there are political causes
and human rights issues that are worthwhile by themselves. Women’s liberation
is one of them. This issue does not need any additional evidence to merit social
and political support. By overemphasizing violence against women as one of the
reasons why we need to eradicate all forms of discrimination against women we
jeopardize the solutions to both problems. Why? Dr Tomasevsky explains part
of the problem. The other part is also easy to understand. Women’s victimization
is a complex phenomenon that cannot be explained simply from a feminist
perspective. There are other ecological and psychological factors that can be
conceptualized as risk factors for violence against women. If we only consider
gender inequality, we may be forgetting the relevance of those other factors. In
fact, we do not know yet what is the comparative relevance of gender inequality
versus those other factors. The existing literature seems to suggest that, at the
individual level, patriarchal attitudes toward women may be more of a distant
influence  that only  becomes  relevant  as a justification  for violence in the
interaction with other more direct and relevant factors.
Indeed, we cannot understand the social response to violence against women
and  the  way the criminal  justice system  deals with gender issues without
understanding our cultural heritage of discrimination against women. Of course,
we may have to apply the principle of preferential treatment, as suggested, to
address these issues within the criminal justice system. In addition, we need to
understand this heritage in order to understand the problem of violence against
women. In fact, we can still argue that all things being equal, even with more
exposure to criminal opportunities, traditional norms about gender roles and
particular conceptions of masculinities and femininities can be interrelated with
women’s victimization at home and outside the home. Moreover, in a way it is
true that the elimination of all forms of discriminations is a prerequisite. It is
unlikely that the system will even care about safety issues and deal with them in
an effective way in the context of an absolute disregard for other gender issues.
But we should avoid simplistic explanations of complex problems. To say that
violence against women is only or primarily caused by discrimination against
women is a simplification of a complex problem. The challenge is to be able to
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develop a theoretical framework that incorporates modern criminological think-
ing and, at the same time, is gender sensitive.
Finally, I do not share the same pessimistic view about the negative repercus-
sion of the emphasis on violence against women on the practices and organization
of the criminal justice system more generally. Indeed, the creation of specialized
units staffed with female personnel only and the discovery of feminine aspects
of police work is an example of the risks and problems that we face in this area.
(And, by the way, this does not speak against the creation of specialized units in
this area. I do think that might be a good idea if they are properly designed.) But
the debate about violence against women may have also a positive impact in the
ways of thinking about women and practices of the CJS or, at least, it can be used
in that direction. And, although there may be resistance, and although the
presentation of women as ”victims” and vulnerable can reinforce some stereo-
types, I do think that this issue can be employed to challenge and work against
those stereotypes and that, indeed, some criminal justice professionals might be
developing a particular sensitivity about gender issues that they did not have
before.
Besides these points, there is a set of topics that I think we also have to discuss
and cover when we talk about violence against women and about women and
the criminal justice system more generally. First, I do think that it is important
to consider the intersections between general violence and violence against
women. Although from the traditional feminist perspective there was an empha-
sis on separation, the evidence suggest that there is not only a high degree of
similarity regarding risk factors, but also a fair degree of overlapping. Indeed,
more traditional feminist thinking has been challenged by current conceptions
that use a gender-sensitive framework to explain violence generally by using the
construct of masculinities. Second, I think that current perspectives on female
and male  offending  should  be  considered.  The  old  fashioned reference to
patriarchy as a concept that could explain everything has been substituted by
discourses that recognize a higher degree of heterogeneity and agency when we
think about gender. Theories of masculinities and femininities are currently being
developed to explain both male and female offending, and also the different ways
in which male and female victims react to their victimization. In addition, there
is a growing concern about the possible similarities among the factors that explain
female and male offending. Although there are criminologists who have empha-
sized different etiologies for female and male offending, now we also see a new
generation of scholars who are challenging this view, or at least the most extreme
manifestations of this view. Third, although I believe that Dr Tomasevski has
done an excellent job in framing the problem of women and the criminal justice
system within an international policy context, nevertheless I think that it is also
important to frame this problem within the context of new developments and
transitions in the ways we conceptualize and think about the criminal justice
system. In particular, I think that it is important to understand how the shift toward
a model of community justice and proactive responses to crime can affect the
way we think about violence against women. Fourth, Dr Tomasevski also hints
at some important problems when she talks about the Council of Europe and
refers to issues of immigrant women. I think  we need a more systematic
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understanding of how the issues that the New Europe will face in the near future
as a consequence of the demographic, economic, and political changes that are
taking place in the continent will affect the situation of women in their relations
with the criminal justice system. Finally, and coming back to something that I
hinted before, I think that we need to discuss the responsibility of the European
criminological community in this discourse. Before doing this, perhaps we need
to question whether we can really talk about an European criminological com-
munity, and if the answer to this is negative, what can be done to create one.
There are many more innovations than we can imagine taking place in different
countries of Europe that are related to the issue of women and the criminal justice
system. However, we know very little about them, and the governments and
agencies that are experimenting with these new approaches have not much
interest in evaluating these proposals. Although Europe is becoming more of a
community, knowledge about experiences in other countries is rather limited and
this, to a very large extent, is due to the non-existence of a strong criminological
community that exchanges and discusses these experiences. Indeed, initiatives
as these European Colloquiums are the right step in the right direction, but we
should start considering less elitist and more open forums of discussion. When
the Caribbean division was created last year within the American Society of
Criminology I could not avoid thinking about the fact that we still do not have
any kind of association or organization that brings together European criminolo-
gists to discuss this and similar topics. There are many organizational possibilities
such as, for example, the creation and stimulation of an effective European
division within the International Society of Criminology with more regular
meetings. In fact, I do think that institutions such as HEUNI and the other
criminal justice related United Nations institutes in this area should push in that
direction and promote that kind of change that, ultimately, would produce a real
European Colloquium about crime and crime prevention issues.
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Women in the Criminal Justice System
Commentary by
Prof. Frances Heidensohn
Summary
The aim of this paper, as the author herself points out, is ‘to contribute to
discussions about women and criminal justice’ in advance of the Tenth United
Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders’.
To this end she provides coverage of policy making in the three areas of women,
human rights and criminal justice; she also indicates issues for discussion, of
concern and for further research. I have commented on each section in turn,
seeking to develop the points raised in order to stimulate debate and further
research and preparation for the Tenth United Nations Congress. On two subsec-
tions, those on women as offenders and women as criminal justice professionals,
I have written at greater length because I think the work already achieved on
these topics contributes considerably to our understanding of them and needs to
be considered.
In conclusion, I draw four key themes from Dr Tomaševski’s work which
should provide a framework for a lively and productive debate. These are:
I Right Approach
What is the right approach to women and criminal justice? Should the questions
be about equal or preferential treatment? Are there other approaches?
II International Perspective
What is the value of taking an international perspective or framework in this
area? Does this have particular advantages? Is it possible to produce universal
prescriptions for action in this field? How do we know what has been achieved?
III Agenda Setting
What is the right agenda for applying to criminal justice systems: What issues
should feature e.g. women as victims? as offenders? as both? as criminal justice
professionals? Where should the focus be: On legal or non legal systems? on
private or public spheres?
IV Questions for the Future
What are these and how should they be addressed?
This sets out some of the key issues to be covered later in the report and introduces
the entirely necessary and appropriate tone of debate of some uncertainty. At the
start the author raises the question of the unlikely influence of ‘the contemporary
international political priorities on policy-making for criminal justice’, a theme
which is central to the later discussion. Another statement made here is that there
has so far been too little research generated thus far to enable such discussions
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to be adequately informed. This is surely too persimistic. Aside from the point
of how much would be ‘enough’ research, there are certainly some relevant
commentaries, some historical and comparative studies which can give substance
to the debate. Later in the summary, Dr Tomaševski mentions ample supplies of
feminist research and writing outside official criminal justice structures, but
regrets that ‘most of it is of Anglo Saxon origin and thus not ‘exportable’ to other
legal and political systems’.
There are several important assumptions being made here, and they recur
throughout this paper: that research findings can either not be replicated and/or
applied outside the system in which they are made, that feminist perspectives are
uniquely Anglo Saxon [a term nowhere defined in the paper or curiously, applied
to Ireland and Cyprus at one point]. Should these assumptions be valid, then the
core aim of the paper is lost from the outset: if we really cannot generalise from
research in one nation or system, we shall be incapable of making progress since
everyone is located in one system or culture.
Nevertheless, I would agree with the author that caution is needed about
aspects of transferring some conclusions and using them as the basis of policy
elsewhere. This does apply not just to projects conducted in the UK or the USA,
although, I shall argue later, there are grounds for believing that successful shifts
of concepts have taken place, but also to the most basic concept of all, of the
category ‘women’. Considerable discussion has taken place in the past decade
deconstructing the term, it has been argued that black women, lesbian women,
working class women, women from countries in the south do not have enough
in common with the white, middle-class women who led the first stages of
modern, second-wave feminism (Ramazanoglu, 1989; Benhabib, 1992). Indeed,
this has led to an extended debate on the notion of ‘standpoints’ in research and
how far a researcher who does not share a subject’s standpoint may validly
represent them through research (Stanley and Wise, 1990). Obviously, those of
us who have the privilege of addressing our thoughts to policy makers or others
who shape and influence politics, must be careful not to speak too confidently;
we can only make modest claims based on knowledge from certain sources. We
can make these available for testing and experimenting.
Introduction
This prefaces one of the longest sections of the paper, that on the international
policy-framework, and outlines a crucial shift which the author perceives. Until
the 1990s she argues, it would not have been possible to focus on women in an
international context as she does in this paper. Prior to this ‘the advancement of
women was defined as a primarily development issue’; now a new human rights
agenda, plus the recognition of the position of victims in the criminal justice
system have all produced a new situation.
Certainly this is true in the specific way described here by Dr Tomaševski.
However, it is important to reflect on some notable historic parallels. The late
1990s are certainly not the first decade during which international campaigns
around the rights and protection of women flourished. The period from the 1890s
to the First World War and again between the wars saw an extraordinary range
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of activities often, but not always, led by first-wave feminists and connected with
women’s suffrage and emancipation. Criminal justice, law enforcement and
trafficking in women were issues which were of particular concern.
The International Bureau for the Suppression of the White Slave Trade held
a conference in London in July 1913 and passed various resolutions, including
one on the need for the appointment of policewomen in order to control this evil
trade. (H.O. file PRO London). In 1914, they were actively lobbying the Home
Office on this issue. By 1920s women activists and their supporters had gained
influence in the League of Nations, so that an Advisory Committee on Traffic in
Women and Children was set up at an early stage. It succeeded in getting the
Secretariat of the League to collect information from member states on the
employment of women in the police, and a report was published in 1927. (The
Policewoman’s Review, Vol.1, No.6, 1927). That this international approach was
not confined to the Anglophone world is demonstrated by a report on the same
topic commissioned by a committee of Dutch women, which was designed to
show the parallels in and value of such preventive work by women of women
and children in German-speaking cities in Europe (Beaujon, 1911).
Today we would find some difficulty in accepting the confident moral pre-
scriptions of these pioneers of female-centred law-enforcement. While they
wished to protect women and young girls from sexual abuse and exploitation,
they could become over-interventionist and were often drawn into protecting
society and men instead. Indeed, there were real conflicts within the groups over
such issues and these can provide salutary lessons for welfare projects even today
(Radford, 1989).
The international campaigns to improve the moral protection of women across
the world had some impact, although the depression of the 1930s, and the rise
of fascism in Europe caused huge setbacks and of course many of the links and
campaigns were destroyed by World War II. Their example is important now
because this is arguably not the first decade in which the situation is propitious
for action within a new universal framework. We should learn from the past what
might be effective. The second reason for referring to this history is as a prelude
to later comments on the position of women in criminal justice professions.
Women entered law enforcement very early in the twentieth century, and by the
1920s they were widely so engaged across the globe. Most importantly, this aim
was achieved by outside pressures, not from governments but coalitions of
feminists, moral entrepreneurs and politicians.
International policy framework
The author provides some discussion here about the terms sex and gender and
notes the ‘terminological maze surrounding gender’. She gives considerable
detail about the often confused and confusing approach by various UN agencies.
It would be helpful to have this set out schematically, and also to have a glossary
of the innumerable acronymic agencies. For the Tenth United Nations Congress,
this will obviously be the key framework and it is valuable to have it. However,
other international bodies are not included and thus an important opportunity is
missed to set the subsequent discussion in a wider context.
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The section on principles of criminal justice policy refers to the Council of
Europe and, in passing, to the role of the European Court of Justice and its role
in effecting changes in the laws of member states on part time workers. What
needs to be explored is the potential for development under the ‘third pillar’ of
the  Maastricht Treaty and the growth of  transnational policing in  Europe
(Heidensohn, 1997; Sheptycki, 1995). References throughout this part of the
paper suggest that differential ages of marriage for men and women exist, and
that there are other differences in access to citizenship. Most of these are
unspecific and unsourced, although most citations elsewhere in this part of the
paper are European. It would be helpful to have data here in tabular form, perhaps
as an appendix, on political representation, age at marriage (and of consent)
citizen rights etc. Since the author herself has introduced the distinction between
‘Anglo Saxon’ and other judicial systems, it might be fruitful to use comparative
models in order to analyse respective systems (see e.g. Bayley, 1985).
Application to criminal justice
In this section there is an extended consideration of human rights, victims rights
and violence against women. Here the author brings together something of a
comparative framework, some key concepts and some examples of practice. She
suggests some theoretical assumptions about how issues relevant to women’s
welfare become priorities and notes that, counter-intuitively, the ‘Anglo Saxon’
countries where tackling violence against women has become a priority did not
have a high level of female political participation. It is probably more appropriate
to use the concept of the ‘femocrat’ in this case and to note how feminists moved
into bureaucratic positions in governments in Australia, Canada and the USA
and changed aspects of the gender agenda (Rock, 1993, Outshoorn, 1995;
Yeatman, 1990). Many people would find it difficult to believe that the period
1979-1997 was one in which the interests of women were advanced in the UK.
Nevertheless, at least one analysis also emphasises the key roles played by
various women’s organisations in changing police policies and practice on rape,
domestic violence and child abuse in Britain in the 1980s. They also highlight
the crucial part played by the media in achieving this (Jones et al, 1994). In
considering how violence against women may become a priority matter in other
nations, these examples are worth reviewing.
A pair of rather unclear tables on legal definitions and responses are a feature
of this part of the paper. As the author points out, data, especially statistical
material, is lacking in this area. There are some useful sources not cited here; for
instance the three International Crime Victimisation Surveys have compared
self-reported exposure of women to risk of sexual assault. (Mayhew and Van
Dijk, 1997). There is, in addition, a range of evaluation studies of new ways of
handling domestic violence cases. While these are predominantly ‘Anglo Saxon’
again, they can obviously be replicated and also have already raised important
issues which need to be taken into account if such policies are followed else-
where. Thus Sherman and Beck’s (1983) evaluation of the ‘Minneapolis experi-
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ment’ in the USA led them to favour a presumption of arrest of offenders in
domestic violence cases and this approach was adopted in several police depart-
ments. However, later research suggests that this may actually increase the
violence experienced by women (Sherman et al, 1992).
Systematic presentation of comparative material of this kind together with
legal frameworks would help fully inform debates of this type. Listing legal
definitions or responses without providing information on how successfully
women have used the system and its remedies is unproductive. We need to know
what works for women and where examples of good practice may be found and
emulated.
Women as offenders
This is a fundamental issue for the themes of this paper and I should like to extend
the range of material which informs these themes. It is an area of criminological
research which has seen major developments in modern times. Thirty years ago,
it  was possible to  argue that  female criminals were  neglected  or severely
stereotyped in the literature (Heidensohn, 1968). Since then there has been an
explosion of studies, many of them feminist inspired. One review found two
hundred and fifty scholarly articles published in English on women and crime
between 1986 and 1993 excluding those on female victims. (Heidensohn, 1996,
XIV). It is thus possible to address some key questions and also to contribute to
policy debates.
While there has been, as Dr Tomaševski notes, a real growth in this field, much
of this work is by American, British and Australian authors and drawn from
material on those countries, there have been several international surveys which
cover the non-English speaking world. Freda Adler produced two such accounts
for the UN in 1975, one for the Fifth United Nations Congress and published a
book on the topic in 1981. I have reviewed the topic across Europe (Heidensohn,
1991). More local and specific studies have become so numerous that they have
been summarised and synthesised (Daly and Chesney-Lind, 1988; Heidensohn,
1996; Morris, 1987; Naffine, 1994). An international Encylopedia on Women
and Crime is due to be published in 2000 (Rafter, ed).
Appraising this extensive activity, it is possible to select some key central
questions which link the material and for which some answers may be found.152.
The foremost issues are the
• gender share of crime,
• gender and justice,
• explanations of female crime.
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152 Rather than cite sources for every one of the following points, I refer the reader to the summaries
already mentioned and to the additional references quoted below.
Gender share of crime
That the female share of recorded crime is very low is a widely recognised
phenomenon. ‘Women are only 10% of the trouble’ is one colloquial way of
putting this. Much effort has been put into trying to reduce the gender gap in
official crime figures. Hidden icebergs of female crime have been so right in
concealed domestic homicide, in theft by servants. Self-report studies do reveal
unreported female crime, but they also indicate that there is much hidden male
crime too. There is some historic evidence that the gender ratio was different in
the past, with a higher proportion of female to male offenders. On the whole the
lower female performance remains a reasonably robust finding.
Contrary to some assertions, women do contribute, albeit modestly, to most
forms of criminal activity. They are less likely than men to be convicted of violent
offences, to be recidivists or to be involved in organised crime. Some criminolo-
gists have argued that it is due to the chivalry of the police and the courts that
women are less likely to be criminalised in most criminal justice systems. This
view has led to lengthy debates and numerous studies (see below).
Explanations
Criminologists exploring female offending have to address two key areas of
explanation: why are female crime rates so low when compared with males? and
why do women offend in the ways that they do? It is increasingly recognised that
the first question should be answered by considering male excess, rather than
female underachievement and there have been several interesting attempts to
explore masculinities, including some with an international dimension (Newburn
and Stanko (eds), 1994; Kersten, 1996). For the second, those interpretations
which focus on factors which are additional to gender, such as poverty, ethnicity
and social exclusion appear to have the most salience. To develop one example
cited in the paper, there is a growing phenomenon of women from third-world
countries who are used as drug couriers by dealers. These women are usually
poor and in debt, have children and are extremely powerless compared with those
who exploit them. It can also be instructive to explore what factors in social
structures and ideologies support female conformity and whether these might be
shifting. Data from several countries suggest that the female share of crime has
been rising faster than the male and that women offenders, especially young ones,
are becoming more violent and predatory. There may indeed be a long-term trend
in this direction, although there also appears to be a pattern of moral panics over
the topic, finding its expression on a previous occasion in the 1970s in the slogan
that ‘liberation causes crime’.
Gender and justice
As the author says, earlier work on the chivalry issue, often called gender bias
or equity studies in the literature, was contradictory. Very extensive recent
reviews (see Heidensohn, 1996, pp.207-8) do not find sound evidence of clear-
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cut gender bias in sentencing. Amongst the reasons for this are greater awareness
of the issues involved. Other research which has focussed on women offenders
themselves has highlighted the ways in which they may feel themselves the
victims of ‘double deviance’ and of stigma in the criminal justice system.
‘Double deviance’and its effects are reported by women who suffer from spouse
or community sanctions or punishments in addition to their official ones. Stigma
and shame are also experienced by women, sometimes very dramatically as in
parts of the Indian subcontinent where they extend not only to a female offender
herself but to her sisters and family.
Other research has charted and analysed the experiences of women in prison.
These include some important international comparative work (Bertrand et al,
1998) as well as single institution explorations and consideration of the alterna-
tives (Carlen, 1990) and the way women cope with prison (Eaton, 1993). Other
major projects are under way. Much debate has focussed around the ‘Cinderella
situation’ since women are only a tiny minority of those in custody at any point,
they  suffer  additionally because facilities are  fewer, they are further from
women’s families, the scope for innovative programmes is less and penal systems
are generally run for male offenders, not females. There are specific issues which
merit consideration and where, since there is no international consistency of
approach, useful comparisons can be made. The Home Office in Britain, for
instance, has recently reviewed the current practices in other countries over
keeping babies and small children with their mothers in prison and found
considerable variation (Caddle and Crisp, 1997).
There are clear policy implications from all of this. Many of the concerns
which can be raised about female offenders and their treatment in the criminal
justice system can be answered, or partially so, by evidence from a substantial
body of research. Moreover, this work has increasingly been reviewed and
challenged, presented to wider audiences and even taken on board by govern-
ments. We can call, for instance, on a range of sources on corrections to inform
any debate on whether this may be a way forward. Official bodies have lagged
somewhat in the wake of international feminist and other groups who have
organised to disseminate and discuss ideas and to promote action, as they did at
the start of the twentieth century (Bertrand et al (ed), 1992; Rafter and Heiden-
sohn (eds), 1995). More research is needed, as is more systematic collection of
data, but we should use what we already have and ensure that it is widely
disseminated.
Women as criminal justice professionals
This topic is covered only very briefly in the paper, although the author acknow-
ledges aspects of its importance in relation to female law enforcement officers
handling rape and domestic violence cases. There are however, other issues to
consider as well and they have wider impact on the subjects in this paper.
First, the length of time over which women have been employed as criminal
justice professionals should be stressed: from 1910 in the USA, 1912 in Germany,
1915 in Britain (all these as police officers). They were also able to practise as
lawyers from about the same time in many jurisdictions. Female prison officers
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(or matrons) have an older history, beginning usually in the early nineteenth
century although they often were not actually in charge of prisons until later in
the century. The entry point varied very markedly, with some otherwise ‘modern’
nations, e.g. Austria, only recruiting policewomen quite recently while a few,
such as Germany, had to restart their units twice in the twentieth century (under
British occupation on both occasions). Secondly, as I have already indicated, the
role of women in policing was very actively promoted by an international
‘policewomen’s  movement’ early in the twentieth century.  Despite  serious
setbacks, their goals were eventually achieved. However, in almost every case,
the tasks of female officers were restricted to their preventive work with women
and children; they were not in main-line police duties (Schulz, 1994; Heidensohn,
1992).
In the latter part of the twentieth century male and female officers were
integrated into one force or department in most systems and the special role of
policewomen abolished. Formal equal opportunity policies usually apply and are
backed by legislation. The percentages of women still remain quite low with no
country yet attaining the 25% ‘level advocated by Moss Kanter as the point of
‘tip over’ into acceptance, although at least one US city, Detroit, has achieved
this, as has Stockholm.
Pioneers of the policewomen’s movement believed that it was vital to succeed
for several reasons: on equity grounds women should be represented in law
enforcement as a career; but they were much more committed to the need to
protect women, children and the public good by making a distinctive, feminine
contribution to social control. From the beginning they were met with hostility
from within police agencies, hostility which still persists in some places. There
is still a real debate about the importance of women’s role in these and other
criminal justice  bodies and its significance  for justice  for women. As Dr
Tomaševski points out, female representation per se does not automatically make
for female friendly or equitable approaches (Martin and Jurik, 1996).
Challenge for the future
The author begins by considering what she calls the institutionalized neglect of
women, especially in relation to their human rights. She contrasts equity and
difference approaches and argues for equal visibility empowerment and partici-
pation of both sexes, of which the first two are easy to achieve but the last ‘an
open question’.
In my own concluding remarks, I should like to return to the summary
questions I listed at the start and drawn from this text and to develop them for
discussions.
I and III The right debate? and its relevance for criminal justice
It will surely never be possible to find answers as to whether men and women
should be treated on the same or different principles. What we can provide are
examples of both sustained discussion of the principles involved and analyses of
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examples of both approaches. Several authors have explored the implications of
providing distinctive forms of criminal justice systems for women. Building on
the work of Carol Gilligan (1982), I discussed a Persephone model of relational
justice, which would contrast with the traditional rational-legal Portia model, but
concluded that such an approach involved too many difficulties (Heidensohn,
1986). Daly pursued this idea (1989) and Masters and Smith (1998) have recently
developed a synthesis of this approach with Braithwaite’s theory of reintegrative
shaming, using empirical material from Japan and from Family Group Confer-
ences in Australia and New Zealand. This paper is presented by its authors ‘as
an encouragement to further debate and theorizing’ (op. cit., 1998, p.5).
Several past experiments designed to provide groups of women with distinc-
tive forms of penal treatment have been analysed by historians. Rafter (1993)
reviewed the Massachusetts reformatory, noting how benign intentions became
exploitative; Zedner (1991) traced the rise and fall of institutions designed for
female inebriates and for those labelled ‘mentally defective’ in Britain. All can
be considered failures, or only partially just. These histories repay consideration.
The future for the debate and the application of principles and experience to
policy lies surely in developing existing approaches such as these.
II International perspectives
The paper contains much material on United Nations organisations and a certain
amount on the Council of Europe. The author is pessimistic about the possibilities
of success, given the very different concepts of gender, equality etc. employed
by various agencies. Instead, perhaps we can look at the effectiveness of other
bodies, especially NGOs, and international links between groups of women. In
this commentary I have already mentioned the late nineteenth century and early
twentieth century campaigns on trafficking in women, the recruitment of police-
women and the protection of juveniles, all of which had some impact. While the
situation is now very different, there are parallels still which can be built upon.
In Europe for instance, the European Network of Policewomen, formed with
Dutch government support in 1989, aims to optimize the position of police-
women in Europe. To achieve this objective it promotes the formation of
networks in European countries. It has NGO status and after the 1995 Beijing
Conference, it has focussed efforts on combatting violence against women.
At quite another level, groups of researchers and campaigners increasingly
link up globally. In 1991, an international conference was held in Montreal on
the theme of Women, Crime and Social Control which included both scholars
and activists with very different perspectives. (Bertrand et al (eds), 1992; Rafter
and Heidensohn (eds), 1995). As Shaw has pointed out, alliances such as these,
as well as those with women who actually experience the criminal justice system,
can provide us with salutary lessons (Shaw, 1992).
Dr Tomšaveski concludes her paper by asking what empowerment of women
might mean in this context. Part of the answer must surely lie in the expression
of voice, of being heard and taken notice of. Women have had a great deal to say
about themselves and how their concerns might be met. We can at least begin to
listen.
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Instituto Andaluz Interuniversitario de Criminología
Universidad de Sevilla, Spain
Introduction
This paper reviews the existing research on indicators of crime and of the
performance of the criminal justice system. It will also outline the methodologi-
cal and theoretical issues related to the definition, measurement and interpreta-
tion of these indicators. Finally, areas related to the indicators that need further
research or development will be mentioned, and suggestions will be made as to
how this component of criminological research may best be used in policymaking.
1 Crime indicators defined
For the purpose of this discussion, crime indicators are measures of the extent
of crime and victimization. They are usually quantitative measures gathered
periodically, expressed in terms of percentages and rates. Crime indicators are
of use both to the criminological research community and to criminal justice
managers and policymakers. They are gathered at different levels: local, subna-
tional, national and supranational. Crime indicators may be ”official” statistics
– those established by criminal justice agencies which reflect, essentially, crimes
and victimizations known to and recorded by these agencies. Crime indicators
may also be measures of crime and victimization obtained through surveys, such
as victimization surveys or self-report surveys. Perhaps one of the most important
contributions of 20th century criminology has been the development of these
complementary measures of crime phenomena.
2 Existing research
As would be expected, a great deal of criminological research exists in the area
of crime indicators. A common question posed to criminologists is usually, ”How
much crime is there?” or ”Are crime rates going up or going down?” While other
disciplines may be able to answer these apparently simple questions of quantity
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relatively easily, they routinely stump criminologists. Indeed, there are a myriad
of ways to define and measure crime and the methodology for doing so is
constantly being updated. Generally, there are three ways to measure crime: you
ask the workers who detect, record and process crime, you ask the victims of
crime, or you ask the perpetrators themselves.
Official crime indicators – those collected by workers in criminal justice
agencies such as the police, courts and prisons – have been around longest and
offer criminal justice historians the most fertile source for looking at long-term
changes in crime. Most countries gather some sort of official crime indicators.
Official crime indicators are gathered at the level of small units (e.g. police
statistics from one neighbourhood of a city; court statistics from one court) so
that they can be said to ”stand for” those units, and they can be aggregated to
”stand for” subnational units or an entire nation. Official crime indicators may
be quite valid for certain crimes which are not captured by other means of
measuring crime. For example, homicide rates drawn from official statistics
(police statistics; public health statistics) are often used by researchers and
policymakers because homicide is usually not included in complementary crime
measures and is such a serious crime that it almost always comes to the attention
of the authorities. Other crimes, such as those where insurance reimbursement
requires that an official report to the police be made (car theft, some burglaries),
can also be quite well counted in official statistics if insurance coverage is nearly
universal. Because crime indicators gathered by criminal justice agencies reflect
different agency priorities and workloads, many of them are appropriate as
performance indicators, which will be discussed in the next section.
Official crime indicators have many disadvantages. Perhaps the most impor-
tant is the fact that not all crimes come to the attention of the authorities; many
victims choose not to report their crimes and many offences are impervious to
police observation. Therefore, official statistics represent only part of the reality
of crime. Furthermore, research indicates that this reality is a biased one. There
are a series of factors which affect the probability of victim reporting, and the
police are not omnipresent. Thus, some crimes are more reported than others,
and some types of victims report more than others, and the characteristics of the
police force and its reaction to crime also influence the degree of reporting.
Official statistics also offer a limited amount of information about the perpetrator
and the victim. They may also be manipulated by criminal justice agencies and
policymakers who may wish to have the numbers higher or lower depending on
political pressures. This manipulation may be quite blatant, and it may be quite
subtle. Police managers may be instructed by their higher-ups to simply deflate
crime statistics by reducing serious crimes to misdemeanors. Or statistics gath-
ered at lower levels may simply be modified once they are centralized. Apart
from manipulation, official crime statistics are prone to error because they
involve many intermediaries (for example, police officers responding to the
crime; police officers in charge of maintaining statistics who put the information
into a computer; police managers who review local monthly reports; other police
managers or researchers in the hierarchy who compile centralized reports).
Furthermore, the compilation of international crime indicators based on official
statistics – such as the United Nations Crime Survey and Interpol statistics – are
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a source of further error since statistics gathered with national definitions must
be redefined into other categories of crime.
The twentieth century has meant the advent of crime indicators that are not
based on official statistics, but rather on surveys that are often closer to the crime
event and involve fewer ”intermediaries” between the crime event and the data
collector. Victimization surveys and self-report surveys are examples of these
data gathering  techniques which also  yield  crime indicators. Victimization
surveys ask the general population whether one has been a victim of crime; about
the type of victimization and repercussion; about police reporting and police
satisfaction; about personal characteristics, fear of crime and attitudes towards
the criminal justice system. National victimization surveys date back to the
1970s. Victim surveys, of course, offer relatively little information about the
offender, do not cover homicide or victimless crimes, and are usually adminis-
tered to adults in private households. Most countries do not routinely conduct
victimization surveys.
Self-report surveys are another complementary data collection technique that
supply us with crime indicators. Self-report surveys are also close to the crime
event and involve fewer ”intermediaries” between the crime event and the data
collector. Self-report surveys ask the general population (usually youthful)
whether one has been involved in a crime or antisocial act; about the charac-
teristics of the act and its possible detection; about consequences of being
detected; about personal characteristics, behaviour and attitudes. Self-report
surveys date back to the 1940s. Self-report surveys, of course, offer relatively
little information about the victim, do not cover homicide or other very serious
crimes, and are usually administered to young people. Most countries do not
routinely conduct self-report surveys.
International victimization surveys were first conducted in 1989, and an
international self-report survey has been conducted once, in 1993. These surveys
use a common instrument and similar sampling designs across countries. It is
not surprising that surveys of this latter type have emanated from European
initiatives given the fact that in recent years the European Union has pushed
nations to homogenize and produce comparable data. A new ”European Crimi-
nology” confronted the issue of existing crime indicators in a continent where
there are many different languages, laws, and criminal justice systems. It seemed
logical that if one wanted to compare crime indicators, it was best to obtain them
directly using similar but culturally adapted methods.
The International Crime Victim Surveys and the International Self-Report
Delinquency Study are examples of European initiatives to build databases of
primary data, in the hopes that such data will be more valid and reliable, and thus
more suited to international analysis and policymaking. Although these methods
present another set of problems, they do at least produce indicators which are
based on similar definitions and samples, and thus, one would hope, contain
fewer errors due to misunderstandings. Furthermore,  they benefit and can
continue to benefit from the methodological developments in victimization and
self-report surveys over the past thirty or forty years.
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3 Methodological and theoretical problems
The theoretical issues surrounding crime indicators are that crime indicators are
deceivingly theory-neutral. In reality, what we choose to gather as relevant
information for determining the quality and quantity of crime is usually based
on some sort of theory, assumption or view of the world. All three forms of data
collection are heavily biased towards street crime that occurs between strangers
in urban or semi-urban settings. White collar crime, violations of human or civil
rights, environmental victimization, family violence – these sorts of events are
not readily captured – but perhaps could be through these data collection
methods. Most of the information gathered through these means is also based on
predominantly sociological theories of crime. Rarely do we see in victimization
surveys questions about the psychological repercussions of victimization, and
rarely do we see in self-report surveys psychological scales measuring impulsiv-
ity, self-concept or moral development.
The methodological problems affecting official crime indicators are their bias
due to uneven victim reporting and uneven police crime detection operations;
error and manipulation due to political pressures; and at the supranational level
(and sometimes at the national level, in federal states), lack of consensus about
shared definitions of crimes.
The methodological problems affecting complementary crime indicators in-
clude sampling error (it may not always be possible to generalize with confidence
to a specific geographic area, and it may not always be possible to analyze certain
rare crimes in a very detailed way); social desirability on the part of respondents,
and telescoping and memory decay; and other variables related to respondents
which affect their reporting a victimization, such as education (see Alvazzi del
Frate et al., 1993 for good discussions of the methodological problems of
victimization surveys, and Klein, 1989 for good discussions of those affecting
self-report surveys).
4 Areas in need of research
A. Coordination and consultation between criminal justice
agencies and the criminological research community
in the production of standard crime indicators.
Although almost every country gathers some sort of official crime statistics, not
every country has an active criminological research community that helps to
make sure that these statistics are well gathered and made public. Furthermore,
few countries conduct regular victimization surveys, and a lack of consultation
is frequently evident between criminal justice agencies and the criminological
research community. Recently the Ministry of the Interior in Spain spent many
tax dollars on a victimization survey which used an instrument which was not
only lacking in quality, but was not comparable internationally. Although efforts
were made to convince government officials to put the money into participation
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in the third international crime survey instead, these efforts were not successful.
In an era of globalization and increasingly transnational crime patterns, crimi-
nologists should push for good national crime indicators that can also be exported
to an international comparative context.
B. Assistance in helping nations develop ”model” research
initiatives which seek to ameliorate or develop new crime
indicators
The most advanced criminological research in crime indicators tends towards
specialization. There are many types of crimes and victims that are not captured,
or are captured insufficiently, in official statistics, victimization surveys, and
self-report surveys. As ”new” crimes and ”new” victims ”emerge” (here I use
quotes because many times what appears to be new has in fact been around for
a long time but had never never noticed), it becomes increasingly important to
have information about these phenomena, and some of the standard methodolo-
gies are not made for capturing this information. For example, victimization
surveys are rarely administered to businesses, to young people, or to prison
inmates. However, there is now research that shows that commercial, juvenile
and prison victimization are serious events with grave repercussions which
should be measured. Specialized surveys of female victimization have been
developed in Canada, the United States, and New Zealand which are based on
instruments geared specifically to the types of crimes that women experience –
sexual harassment, rape, stalking, domestic violence, etc. New sources of crimi-
nal justice data, such as emergency room data and police calls for service data,
provide us with official statistics that are closer to the crime experience. Attitude
surveys may become increasingly necessary if we wish to anticipate crime and
victimization – for example, surveys on racist and xenophobic attitudes, surveys
on vulnerability to pedophilia, prostitution and pornography, especially through
the internet.
Again, in an era of globalization and increasingly transnational crime patterns,
criminologists should strive to develop these new indicators in collaboration with
colleagues from other countries. It is rarely necessary to ”reinvent the wheel”
and it should also be possible to export good national crime indicators to an
international comparative context.
C. Increasing attention paid to translation and linguistic nuances
in the production and interpretation of internationally available
crime indicators
In the constant search for good crime indicators at the international level,
criminologists should be sensitive to language differences. This is easily over-
looked because most international research endeavors occur in English, and we
simply assume that it is everyone’s first language. A careful probe at a recent
meeting of participants in the International Self-Report Delinquency Study
revealed that the translation of an item on the international self-report survey
referring to ”stealing from school” into different languages resulted in differ-
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ences in meaning which could affect results. Different national usages of prepo-
sitions meant that the item varied in different countries from ”stealing at school”,
to ”stealing in school” and ”stealing from school.” Interpol has a homicide
definition which it terms ”murder” in English, which is not necessarily the same
as the concept of ”homicide” in many countries. Other international endeavors
pay closer attention to translation issues, and crime indicators – whatever their
source – would be more valid and reliable if language issues were treated more
seriously.
D. Research in the area of anticipatory crime indicators
Most crime indicators look at crime after it has occurred. Although time series
data can indicate trends, there is a need for indicators that would truly be
anticipatory – indicators that would enable nations to know where possible crime
problems may lie in the future. There is little research on this topic, despite the
fact that ”new” crimes emerge that governments appear unprepared to deal with
effectively (internet crime, environmental crime, football hooliganism, transna-
tional crime, trafficking in women and children, etc.). Crime forecasting through
anticipatory crime indicators would be particularly useful to policymakers.
5 Policy applications of crime indicators
Crime indicators are essential for international criminal justice policymaking as
they provide the empirical support for possible changes in policies and programs
which may work to prevent or control crime. It seems quite difficult at times,
however, to convince policymakers of the necessity of having accurate data on
crime and to invest the funds needed to obtain these indicators. In particular,
while some policymakers are willing to invest funds in improving official
statistics, which they perceive as ”real”, they typically distrust crime surveys,
dismissing them as ”just another unreliable poll”.
Here, again with a perspective from southern Europe, it is increasingly
important to educate policymakers in the necessity of these indicators and of
having them available periodically. We have not yet been able in Spain to
convince the government that periodic victimization surveys with the same
instrument should be conducted, and I am sure that other countries as well show
a lack of institutional ownership of crime indicators, and a lack of commitment
in assuring their continuity and methodological improvement.
It is quite another thing to encourage policymakers to use available data on
crime indicators to shape and plan policy. For example, although the International
Self-Report Delinquency Study offered a number of policy implications, whether
this has had any effect on policy is unknown. In Spain, for example, our data
revealed that should the age of legal majority be raised from 16 to 18, as was
foreseen by the new penal code, an influx of youthful offenders now dealt with
by the adult system would be released into the juvenile justice system, currently
largely unprepared for this more mature class of offender. Yet little has been done
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to prepare the juvenile justice system for this influx. What is probably needed is
a concentrated effort to make research reports easy to read and policy-relevant,
as occurs in some countries. Full results from Spain’s 1989 participation in the
international victimization survey were never even published in Spanish, and few
policymakers at the Ministry of Justice (the sponsor) even knew of the data’s
existence.
In the international context – and particularly the European context as the
focus of this paper – crime indicators can also be a source of friction as opposed
to enlightenment in political arenas. When international surveys are conducted,
few countries like to be in first place for incarceration rates, and in last place for
satisfaction with the police. Instead of fostering the sharing of explanations and
experiences, the publication of crime indicators in international contexts seems
to promote ill will and cultural stereotyping. Here I would emphasize that crime
indicators by themselves are not sufficient in aiding policymakers in addressing
crime problems. Policymakers must be aided by good, in-depth criminological
research on the crime problem; witness the enormous debate among practitioners
and criminologists ensuing in the United States over the crime rate decrease in
New York City. Crime indicators should only indicate to policymakers where
research is needed (for example, see Young and Brown, 1993 for a sophisticated
analysis of international incarceration rates). If rates seem inexplicably high or
low, research should be conducted to ascertain why.
6 Performance indicators of the criminal
justice system defined
Performance indicators of the criminal justice system are those measures which
can be compiled which give feedback as to whether the criminal justice system
is ”doing a good job” or at least doing what it is supposed to be doing. The term
”performance indicator” is relatively new, yet efforts to create performance
indicators and foster their use in policymaking are not. Many countries gather
measures of the effectiveness of the criminal justice system without buying into
this terminology. However, the development of performance indicators is a more
in-depth process which goes beyond computing police arrest clearance rates,
conviction rates, or recidivism rates; most of the literature comes from the United
Kingdom and North America. And most of the recent literature has emerged in
an era of shrinking tax dollars, where public sector services must justify them-
selves to the taxpayers much as a private corporation must justify its actions to
its shareholders.
7 Existing research
There is probably agreement in nations with democratic regimes that the criminal
justice system must be held accountable to the constituency in terms of its actions
and the results ensuing from them. Yet is is a much harder question to determine
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what the real objectives of the criminal justice system are and how much can the
public realistically expect from its police, courts and prisons. There is a certain
fatalism surrounding the purpose of the criminal justice system, and although
few would favor its abolition, many would be hard pressed to say how they would
know if their criminal justice system was ”doing what it is supposed to”. Still
others are convinced that the criminal justice system fails to work consistently
because ”nothing succeeds like failure” (Reiman, 1984). In an era of increasing
privatization of public services (private security, private prisons, subcontracting
of community corrections programs to non-profit groups, etc.) performance
indicators seem to be the key to justifying public expenditures in the right
”language”. But the idea of the ”bottom line” remains a problem.
Performance indicators can be developed internally as outlined in the figure
below or externally, in the fashion of an ”audit”. The prime example of this sort
of performance indicator development and monitoring is that of the Audit
Commission, an independent body in England which monitors the performance
of certain public services there; performance indicators largely reflect what the
public expects of public services. In the United States, performance indicators
are developed either by the agencies themselves or by consulting criminologists,
according to a process which, outlined by Boone and Fulton (1996), consists of
the following steps:
The first step in establishing performance indicators is to ascertain what the
”values” are that guide a criminal justice agency (police, courts, corrections).
These values are often legal mandates, and they are the force behind a ”mission
statement”, which is the overall raison d’être of the agency. While some criminal
justice agencies already have mission statements, others do not (particularly
some non-government organizations that run community corrections programs),
and so, the process of developing performance indicators can have the side effect
of providing a very useful exercise in organizational development.
In order to fulfill the mission statement, agencies spell out objectives or goals,
and in order to come up with performance indicators, it must be possible to carry
out activities  in  order  to  achieve these goals.  The  activities  then  must be
measurable and quantifiable. Often, standards already exist for criminal justice
agencies, such as standards for the fair treatment of prisoners and for effective
probation supervision. In many instances these standards are being converted
into performance indicators, and thresholds of ”acceptable” vs. ”non-acceptable”
limits are being established.
Step 1 Clarify values
Step 2 Define a mission
Step 3 Clarify organizational goals
Step 4 Select activities that support organizational goals
Step 5 Identify performance-based measures
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Although the last step – measuring and quantifying activities – is a fairly
technical one, akin to producing an operational definition for a concept, the
previous steps are real policy decisions which have engendered a new debate on
the purpose of the criminal justice system. This ”new” debate is a shrewd one.
Some criminal justice scholars such as James Q. Wilson (in Bureau of Justice
Statistics – Princeton University Study Group on Criminal Justice Performance
Measures, 1993) feel that the public simply expects too much of its criminal
justice system, which cannot, in his opinion, be held responsible for the failure
of other social institutions (communities, schools, etc.) in preventing crime.
According to him, the police can only do so much to reduce crime rates, since
crimes rates are caused by factors beyond the control of the police. Therefore,
”crime rate” is an inappropriate performance indicator of policing.
The first step in establishing performance indicators of the criminal justice
system is then to establish ”new”, ”realistic” objectives, and then come up with
operational definitions for these objectives. Logan, for example, in the same
publication, delineates eight objectives for prisons (security, safety, order, care,
activity, justice, conditions and management) and activities and performance
measures for each objective. Recidivism rates figure nowhere in his list, because
he believes that recidivism rates are beyond the control of prisons. Who defines
organizational goals, then,  defines performance  measures,  and opens up  a
pandora’s box in terms of vulnerability to public opinion and political reaction
to it. Not surprisingly, Klockars, in a 1997 workshop on performance indicators
attended by police managers and criminologists, warns police that ”anything you
measure can and will be held against you” and that police agencies should
”measure all those things that can be counted to your credit”.
Existing research on performance indicators gives us a myriad of measures to
choose from. Effective policing can be measured by such classic performance
indicators as response times, crime rates, arrest rates, and clearance rates.
However, current debates about the ”rethinking” of policing mean redefining
performance indicators. Such things as public satisfaction, levels of fear of crime,
quality as opposed to quantity of service, presence of victim assistance schemes,
problem-solving strategies used, number of citizen complaints, use of commu-
nity policing, etc. may well be included.
Performance indicators for prisons can be equally numerous. Here I will
highlight representative indicators from Logan’s chapter in the Bureau of Justice
Statistics – Princeton University Study Group on Criminal Justice Performance
Measures (1993). ”Security” objectives could be measured by the number of
shakedowns, positive urine tests for drugs, inmate discipline reports, escapes,
inmate freedom of movement, and perceived lack of security by prison staff;
prison ”safety” could be measured by a prison victimization survey, and official
records of inmate discipline reports, perceived staff safety and official records
of staff injuries; ”order” could be measured by the number of discipline reports,
incidents of staff use of force, percent of discipline reports resulting in a sanction;
”care” could be measured by an inmate stress scale, average number of days
inmates are ill, use and satisfaction of inmates with medical, dental and counsel-
ing, programs; ”activity” could be measured by the number of inmates involved
in work programs, education or training, recreation and religious activities;
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”justice” could be measured by inmate impressions of staff fairness, number of
grievances filed and results of these, including delays in the grievance process;
”conditions” could be measured by crowding measures, internal freedom of
movement, facilities per capita (number of inmates per shower, for example),
”satisfaction” could be measured with data on sanitation and food, noise levels,
visitation rates, and furloughs; and ”efficient management” could be measured
by staff job satisfaction, a job stress index, staff turnover, staff participation in
training, and inmate-staff ratio.
An example of court performance indicators are those set up by a Trial Court
Performance Standards Project, initiated in 1987 by the National Center for State
Courts and the Bureau of Justice Assistance in the United States. It took ten years
for these indicators to be developed. They are based on five simple standards:
(1) access to justice, (2) expedition and timeliness, (3) equality, fairness and
integrity, (4) independence and accountability and (5) public trust and confi-
dence. Measures are not specified exactly, but subdimensions of the standards
are addressed and techniques for measurement are also suggested. For example,
”Public Trust and Confidence” could be measured through surveys administered
to court employees and the general public on their perceptions of court perform-
ance, and through structured group techniques with other justice system repre-
sentatives regarding their perceptions of court performance as well (Bureau of
Justice Assistance, 1997).
8 Methodological and theoretical problems
Establishing objectives is one thing, but defining and measuring them is some-
thing else. Performance indicators require much attention to methodology. First
definitions must be clear and unambiguous, and performance indicators should
not require vast new data collection efforts. That would imply that they cost more
money than they are supposed to be saving. Since performance indicators are
often based on multiple measures, it is hard not to envision the need for additional
data collection. Criminal justice managers should be able to take advantage of
existing records and worker routines in the production of data for performance
indicators. Obviously, some countries would find this easier to do than others.
The federal correctional system in the United States, for example, periodically
conducts a prison social climate survey, which can be used to feed measures for
performance indicators. Other countries would find it difficult to produce these
sorts of measures without devoting more funds for research.
Since the criminal justice system has many contradicting objectives, it is not
unusual to find methodological glitches in the research literature on performance
indicators. For example, Petersilia (in Bureau of Justice Statistics – Princeton
University Study Group on Criminal Justice Performance Measures, 1993)
argues that in the case of community corrections, recidivism rates (which she
does accept as a performance indicator) can indicate both success and failure.
Lower rates from one community corrections program to another may mean that
more offenders are being reintegrated into society; yet higher rates may mean
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that effective surveillance has taken place and community safety has been
improved. By the same token, increasing police presence might lower the number
of crimes known to the police – by increasing deterrence – but it is equally likely
to result in higher detection rates due to increased visibility. Furthermore, if
increasing police presence increases satisfaction with and trust in the police,
crime rates may rise due to an increase in victim reporting of crime.
Another example stems from conflicting objectives in prison, where security
and treatment intermingle. Logan (1993) mentions that the same criteria (free-
dom of inmate movement throughout the prison) counts as a plus for an objective
he calls ”conditions” and a minus for ”security” objectives. Although he terms
this a ”fact of life”, the ramifications are confusing. Would a prison warden then
be wise to provide for more inmate movement, or less?
Performance indicators are based on criminal justice theory, whether this be
explicit or implicit. The new policing performance indicators – which measure
the police’s response to the victim, the application of problem solving strategies,
and fostering good community relations – are based on modern policing theory.
Logan states explicitly that his corrections performance indicators are based on
just deserts theory. This is important to remember, because there are enormous
variations between nations and even within national jurisdictions on criminal
justice theory. Thus, while establishing objectives for the criminal justice system
may be challenging on the national level, due to competing and contradicting
purposes of the criminal justice system, it is even more challenging to consider
establishing international comparative performance measures. Consider the case
of Spain where Article 25 of the Constitution dictates that the overriding purpose
of imprisonment be the reeducation and social re-insertion of the offender.
Spaniards would be offended to have the effectiveness of their prison system
measured by performance indicators of confinement and security. Consider as
well the role of the prosecutor in Spain, which is both in theory and in practice
much more impartial in the court process than is that of the American prosecutor.
Spaniards would indeed be puzzled by having the effectiveness of their prose-
cutors measured by conviction rates.
Performance indicators seem to be thriving in nations where the private sector
is a strong cultural force, and where taxpayers really feel empowered to demand
accountability from their government. In these nations, actions are frequently
evaluated in a cost-benefit framework, and the public demands transparency from
its social institutions. Performance indicators of the criminal justice system are
at home in these sorts of cultures. In other cultures, performance indicators may
be harder to implant. Policymakers may be content to spend money where it
appears to be needed and by being able to give feedback that is not quantifiable
or comparable. Public spending may be so tight that any sort of evaluative
research is viewed as a luxury. Taxpayers may be less organized, less educated
and perhaps less demanding. This may be more likely to occur in nations with
weak or transitional governments. In short, performance indicators are not for
everyone.
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9 Areas in need of research
The existing research highlighted here shows performance indicators at their best
– highly developed, minute measures of carefully thought out objectives for the
criminal justice system. Perhaps the area most in need of research is whether
international standards for policing, the administration of justice and correctional
institutions can be translated into a series of simple, easy to gather performance
indicators. Would this aid us in further monitoring the effectiveness of the
criminal justice system? International human rights agencies already do part of
this task for us. Yet if professional standards exist that could be easily measured,
perhaps we could go a long ways towards helping nations improve their criminal
justice systems – nations whose budgets would not permit them to go to the
lengths of engaging in exhaustive performance indicator development programs.
10 Policy applications
From a research perspective, performance indicators are useful but should never
replace a rigorous evaluation. Perhaps the most important legacy of Martinson’s
1974 ”What Works?” article was that it encouraged evaluations of criminal
justice programs. Evaluations give policymakers a thorough explanation of why
a service or program is working well or not. Performance indicators do only that
– indicate. They may indicate that a program, service or policy is working
particularly well or particularly badly. But a good evaluation will tell us why.
Certainly the results generated by evaluations (see Sherman et al’s ”Preventing
Crime” as a good, user-friendly analysis) are more telling than the myriad of
numbers produced as performance indicators.
Conclusion
Indicators of crime and of the performance of the criminal justice system are
essential to national and international criminal justice policymaking. But they
are not enough. Strong criminological research communities need to be encour-
aged on the national and international level both to demand and monitor the
production of these indicators and to provide in-depth research into the causes
and correlates of crime and the effectiveness of the criminal justice response.
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Indicators of Crime and of the Performance of
the Criminal Justice System
Commentary by
Elmar G.M. Weitekamp
In the first part Barbaret discusses the strength and weaknesses of existing crime
indicators by looking at official police crime data, self-reports, and victim
surveys. It becomes clear that crime classifications are required in order to
ascertain the nature of crime problems and to assess the extent to which the
police, the courts, and the penal system are able to handle the crime problem in
societies. However, as McClintock argued already in 1977, crime classification
cannot be based on legal criteria or else they will be misleading or at best be
uniformative. What we need are more situational classifications, which should
provide a descriptive typology of the nature of crime in its social context.
How difficult it is to get good classifications can be illustrated by the work of
McClintock (1977) who developed a descriptive classification of violence based
upon a large variety of substantially different behaviours in either theory or
criminal policy as descriptions of social reality which looked like the following:
A. Personal violence in  the course  of furtherance of theft (mainly
robbery):
1. Robbery of persons who, as part of their employment, are in charge of money
or valuable goods.
2. Robbery in open places of ordinary citizens.
3. Robbery in enclosed premises (private dwellings or commerical premises).
4. Robbery after preliminary association of short duration between offender and
victim (including circumstances of prostitution and vice).
5. Robbery in cases of association of some duration between offender and victim.
B. Crimes of violence against the person (without theft).
1. Attacks in order to perpetrate a sexual offence.
2. Attacks on police officers, or civilians, intervening to prevent crime or to
apprehend the offender.
3. Attacks arising from domestice disputes, quarrels between neighbours or
between persons working together.
4. Attacks in and around public houses, cafes and other places of refreshment or
entertainment.
5. Attacks in thoroughfares and other public places.
6. Attacks in special circumstances, including attacks on prison officers, injuries
resulting from criminal negligence and attacks by persons of insane mind.
Even these more informative classifications inform only in a general way –
McClintock (1974) developed a classification for violence based upon the
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circumstances of the offences which had no less than 120 subcategories – about
the circumstances of the violent acts. However, if one examines today’s police
statistics, offence descriptions in self-reports and victim surveys one will find
that these rudimentary improvements as suggested by McClintock more than
twenty years ago have largely been ignored and cannot be found especially in
official police statistics. We often do not even find differentiations according to
instrumental violence, interpersonal violence, ideological and political violence,
distructive and sensational violence, and disorderly conduct and public distur-
bances.
Especially the police statistics should be interpreted carefully. First, they
reflect the police work and tell us little about the extent and nature of crime. 80
to 95 per cent of the crimes reported to the police are reported by the victims
and/or witnesses of a crime. However, if one examines the reasons why victims
and/or witnesses are not reporting a crime one can easily come up with twelve
scenarios:
1. The damage is only minor.
2. The victim and/or witness did not think it was a crime.
3. Victim and/or witness do not care or are too lazy to initiate action.
4. The victim and/or witness fears being regarded as despicable for having been
a ”snitch”.
5. The victim and/or witness felt sorry for the offender out of religious or political
reasons.
6. The victim and/or witness despises public institutions.
7. The reputation of the victim might be damaged (e.g. hotels).
8. Fear that the police will not believe the victim in the case of sexual offences.
9. Fear of being compromised.
10. Fear that hidden desires will be made public
(e.g. being the victim of a theft by a prostitute).
11. Fear that one’s own crimes would be detected.
12. Fear of revenge.
These reasons alone can lead to massive misinformation. How misleading
information in the police statistics can be, could be illustrated by the German
crime statistics. In the 1996 statistics we find on page 61 information on the
victims of homicide and learn from the table that 82.4 per cent of the victims
were over 21 years old. We also find that 65.3 per cent of the robbery victims in
Germany were over 21 years old. However, if we examine the risk of being
murdered in Germany, the group of the 18 to 21 years old has by far the highest
risk of being murdered and for robbery it is the group of the 14 to 18 years old
which is the most vulnerable to being victimized by a robbery.
If we look at crimes and want to weigh the injuries of violent crimes or the
financial damage caused by property crimes one we look in vain at police
statistics. Again, I want to illustrate this with German data. If we take the offence
of shoplifting we find that the police statistics indicate substantial monetary
losses. However, Hauff (1992) found that in 95% of all the reported shoplifting
cases no monetary damage could be found since the stolen property was returned
to the shelf. He could also demonstrate that in over half of the auto thefts the car
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was returned and the reported monetary loss did not occur or was negligible.
These measurements do not make too much sense. We can for Germany also
construct the scenario that an offender breaks into an apartment, causes 5000
DM damage on windows and furniture, but steals only 30 marks. This would
appear in the statistic as theft of 30 DM and the real damage would not be counted.
These examples show how careful one has to be in interpreting this kind of
information and we are convinced that this is true for each and every country.
We will not extend the description of these peculiarities to the other statistics
commonly  used  in criminology, such  as self-report surveys, which I have
critiqued elsewhere (Weitekamp 1989) or the victimization surveys which have
been critiqued by Barbaret.
As my next step we move to the performance of the criminal justice system.
We agree with the critical review of Rosemary Barbaret and would extend her
critique further. We think we have very bad tools to judge the performance of a
criminal justice system. Barbaret pointed out that most of the performance scales
and methods were developed in the USA. We find it kind of ironic that in the
Western country with the highest incarceration rate and a country where 38 of
the States are under constitutional supervision because of basic human rights
violations in their prison system, ergo also their justice system, these instruments
were developed and stir a dedate. We think we should be more interested in
developing basic standards for the treatment of offenders, as it is done by the
United Nations, and try to evaluate if these are met by the member States. Also,
people in the criminal justice system are usually only those who were caught for
committing crimes and therefore we measure only the performance of the
criminal justice system for this clientele. We should be much more interested in
evaluating the perfomance of the criminal justice system with regard to how we
treat victims of crimes and what societies do in order to allow their citizens to
live in a safe, peaceful, and secure enviroment. Victim and citizen satisfaction
should be one of the key factors which should be taken into account when we
evaluate the performance of the criminal justice system.
We agree with Sherman et al. (1997) that we need strong evaluation research
in order to find out what works, what doesn’t work and what looks promising.
Also research results based on random experiments are essential, if we really
want to know what works and what might prevent crimes. A much neglected
research area, among many others and one that has been pointed out by Barbaret,
is the interrelationship between offender and victims, meaning offenders as
victims of crimes and victims as offenders of crimes. An analysis of the National
Youth Survey reveals that especially during the young (juvenile) years, the
majority of offenders are also victims and vice versa. Friday (1998) found in his
evaluation of victims of gunshot wounds in Charlotte, NC that 71 percent of them
were also guilty of serious crimes. Knowledge in this area has far-reaching
implications for the measurement of crime, the performance of the criminal
justice system and society at large.
One of the major and most advanced ways in how to measure the real damage
caused by crime and to evaluate the costs of crime is (still!!!) the Sellin-Wolfgang
Index. How useful such an index (in a positive way) is also for criminological
theory, praxis and criminal policy was illustrated by a debate which occurred
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during the 1970s in the context of what is now called restorative justice in its
various forms. According to that debate, the major obstacles for restorative justice
programs in praxis were the restrictions of this approach to certain offender
groups and populations. These limitations were introduced by Schafer (1970)
who based his arguments on the writings of Garofalo (1914), both arguing that
the punishment aspect of a sentence could not and should not be completely
replaced with restorative justice justice models. According to Schafer (1970,
p.126) restitution/restorative justice can be then, at best, an accessory to punish-
ment, never a replacement. His argumentation seems to be quite contradictory
since he also argues that victims of crimes do not enjoy a certain expectation of
full restitution and he refers to the days of the American forefathers when
restitution/restorative was living practice which he considered to be wiser, more
reformatory, more deterrent, and more economical than today’s form of punish-
ment.
Schafer’s rejection of restitution/restorative justice as an alternative to pun-
ishment and incarceration seems to be quite wrong, since the historical develop-
ment of restitution/restorative justice reveals that in the days of our ancestors
models of reparative justice were often used as the sole form of punishment even
for the most violent crimes (see for example: Michalowski 1985, Sessar 1992,
Tallack 1900, and Weitekamp 1989). If we apply the Black’s Law Dictionary
definition of restitution (reparative justice), an offender who made restitution
according to the damage he or she caused would have made good, and there
would be no reason whatsoever to punish him or her further. Making good on
the wrong would be all that is required. Therefore, we do not understand why
Schafer limited his concept of restitution/restorative justice and did not consider
it as a viable alternative to punishment, fines and imprisonment.
Unfortunately Schafer’s ideas were among the most influental ones for the
recent establishment and development of restitution/restorative justice programs.
One can find hundreds of publications about restorative justice (programs) in
which his arguments have been cited without any critical reflection. The sad
reality, however, is the fact that in most of the current discussions about restora-
tive justice and its practical implementation the concepts limit their clientele to
first-time, property and/or juvenile offenders. One can almost always find the
arguments that restitution/restorative justice for serious or even violent offenders
is not feasible, possible, or too problematic to be established on a grand scale.
The main reason for this argumentation is that restitution/ restorative justice
seems to be fine for less serious offences, but in the event of serious, violent
offences it is the obligation of the state to administer the punishment and for the
citizens and the victims to be kept out of the process of punishment. We would
like to refer again to Christie (1978), who considers conflicts as property, argues
in this context that criminal conflicts have become other people’s property,
primarily the property of lawyers, a process in which the victim is a nonperson
in a Kafka play and goes away more frightened than ever before and even in
greater need of an explanation of criminals as nonhuman.
We think that an additional argument by law professionals and criminal justice
administrators is that they claim that the citizens and especially the victims of
crimes want revenge and severe punishment of the offenders in severe criminal
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cases and that this kind of punishment can only be guaranteed through the state
and its legal institutions. Therefore the basic argument used by representatives
of the state is that the public demands revenge and severe punishment through
the state and the state through its criminal law professionals has to administer it
and has to protect the offenders from the revengeful public. We doubt this logic
and think that the public and the citizens are much less vengeful and do not
demand severe punishment as is assumed by criminal law professionals. This
fact was demonstrated quite powerfully in a study by Sessar (1992) in Hamburg.
Quite to the contrary we suggest that the claimed vengeful attitudes and the cry
for severe punishment of the citizens is being used by the criminal law profession
for their own legitimization, which can lead to such disastrous developments as
in the United States of America where right now approximately 2.000.000 people
are behind bars.
One way to illustrate this discrepancy between the historical application of
restitution/reparative justice and the newer establishment and implementation of
this approach, is to look at crime severity studies. Since the question of the
applicability of restorative justice programs to serious, violent offences is such
a crucial one, and since crime severity studies are not discussed at all in this
context, we provide a detailed discussion of the development and results of crime
severity studies.
The Development of the National Survey of
Crime Severity
Criminologists and criminal justice researchers have been interested in methods
of determining the seriousness of criminal events for many years. Until 1964,
however, the year Sellin and Wolfgang published their pioneering study ”The
Measurement of Delinquency” in which they introduced the Sellin-Wolfgang
Index, the measurement of the severity of crimes and penalties remained intuitive
and primitive. Through the application of a psychophysical scaling technique
Sellin and Wolfgang obtained a scale of the severity of offences (for a detailed
description of the Sellin-Wolfgang Index see: Sellin, T. and Wolfgang M.E. ”The
Measurement of Delinquency” 1964/1978; Wolfgang, M.E., Figlio, R.M., Tracy,
P.E. and Singer, S. ”The National Survey of Crime Severity” 1985; and also for
an excellent critique see Alemika, E.O. ”Continuities in the Research on the
Measurement and Scaling of the Perceived Severity of Crime and Delinquency”
1983).
Sellin and Wolfgang’s primary purposes for scaling offences were threefold:
1. to select from multidimensional features of delinquency a single dimension,
taking into account the relative gravity or seriousness of delinquent acts;
2. to produce an empirical, objectively ascertained set of components of delin-
quency that would be examined by socially significant groups whose evalu-
ations could be used as a basis for scoring;
3.  to arrive at a system of weights for  delinquency events for use in the
construction of an index (1978, pp. 236-237).
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Sellin and Wolfgang viewed delinquent events and not delinquent juveniles as
their major focal point for establishing an index of delinquency. They constructed
a sample of descriptions of offences which represented the stimuli that were
presented for rating by the surveyed population. All together they constructed
one hundred and fourty-one offence descriptions which were given to an non-
representative sample of police officers, college students, and juvenile court
judges. Sequence or order effects were controlled through the randomization of
the order in which the stimuli were represented. Although the developing,
conducting and compiling of the results of the severity study was a complex
process using highly sophisticated mathematical techniques, the process of rating
for the respondents was relatively simple. They were given a description of a
crime, ”A person steals a bicycle parked on the street”, and told that the
seriousness of this crime was 10. They were given then a list of other crimes and
told to compare them in seriousness to the bicycle theft; for example: if a crime
seemed to be three times as serious, they were to rate it at 30, if it seemed to be
half as serious, they were to rate it at 5, and so on.
Sellin and Wolfgang used magnitude and category scales in their study and
constructed the final Sellin-Wolfgang Index on the basis of the scores of the
magnitude scales (for a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of
magnitude scales see: Sellin and Wolfgang 1978, Figlio 1979, Bridges and
Lisagor 1975, Shelly and Sparks 1980 and Alemika 1983). These magnitude
scores were then transformed into ratio scales and the raters’variances were also
reduced by performing the following procedures:
1. each individual raters’ variances score for each offence was transformed to its
logarithm;
2. the transformed score for each rater was standardized;
3. the standard measure scores were substituted based on each rater’s mean and
variance for each offence rating; thus all raters had a similar mean and variance
in their rating;
For all the one hundred and fourty-one offences Sellin and Wolfgang obtained a
single severity score by scaling all ratios to the severity of the theft of one dollar.
The pioneering study of Sellin and Wolfgang was later replicated in different
parts of the United States, Canada, China, Germany, etc. The broad findings of
the original study, that considerable agreement over which crimes are serious
and which are not, has been found to hold consistently in the replications.
Although the severity scale has been criticized by various scholars, Stanly Turner
concluded in the introduction of the Patterson-Smith reprint of ”The Measure-
ment of Delinquency” in 1978 that:
”In the decade and half since the pioneering work of Sellin and Wolfgang
many attempts have been made to verify or criticize the scale. What may be
concluded from these efforts? I believe that it may fairly be stated that the
authors’final version (the elements and their additive weights) is not their best
representation of their data. Further it may be conceded that the techniques
for making international comparsions have not been fully thought out. But the
original study has held up under repeat replications on diverse populations.....
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All of this is to say the minimum claim advanced by Sellin and Wolfgang has
not been successfully challenged. The scale (or some version of it) appears
distinctively useful for making decisions about individuals in the criminal
justice system. Of how many endeavors is this true? How many survived
replications and criticism? It may be said of Sellin and Wolfgang’s work what
was said of it when first reviewed: It is probably the most sophisticated attempt
in sociology to measure an elusive yet important variable” [(pp xx-xxi) cited
in Wolfgang, Figlio, Tracy, and Singer 1985].
In 1977 Wolfgang and collegues had the chance to replicate the crime severity
study on a grand scale. Their survey of the seriousness of crime was conducted
as a supplement to the National Crime Survey. The survey, which included 60,000
persons 18 years of age or older, was the largest ever made of how the general
public ranks the seriousness of a wide range of crimes. The National Crime
Survey, a stratified random sample representative of the entire United States, was
conducted over a six-month period beginnig in July 1977. The 60,000 persons
participating in the survey each rated 25 specific  criminal  events. Twelve
different forms were used, each with a different set of items, adding up to 204
different crime descriptions. Some descriptions appeared on more than one form
and five appeared on all forms. Each of the descriptions in the survey is quite
specific as to the details of the crime and its consequences. These consequences
strongly affect the ratings, meaning that the ratings differ tremendously if one
asked about the facts of a crime but changed the consequences of the fact. For
example, the crime description of planting a bomb that goes off in a public
building was scored 72.1, 43.9, 33.0, and 24.5 despite the fact itself being the
same in all cases. What made the differences was that the outcome of the crime
descriptions ranged from 20 people being killed, to one person being killed, one
person injured and to no one is injured.
Results of the National Survey of Crime Severity
In order to pursue our question on how vengeful the public is and if there exists
a cry for severe punishment one can look at the ratings of the crime descriptions
and how and in which context the public ranked them. One has to keep in mind
that the descriptions did not entail any information about the relationship of the
victim to the rater; e.g. the victim was never an acquaintance, family member,
or friend. The victims were always ”neutral” fellow citizens. Also, one can not
distinguish between raters who were never victimized themselves or raters who
have been victims of one or more crimes they had to rate. In addition we have
no information if a close family member(s) had been victimized.
Assuming that a substantial number of raters have been victimized themselves
or a family member(s) of them as the results of the National Victim Surveys tell
us one could expect that these raters would assign higher scores to the items they
are asked about in general and particularly those of which they became a victim.
On the other hand one can assume that the raters who had never been victimized
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themselves and who did not have a family member(s) who had been victimized
would assign lower scores to the crime descriptions they had to rate. Therefore
one can safely assume that all things even out quite nicely, meaning that the
ratings of the 60,000 persons in the survey represent the general public with
regard to the perception of how serious a crime is and how to rank its seriousness
in comparsion to the bicycle theft. This ranking procedure implies also how
punitive the public is, how vengeful and how severe the punishment should be.
An examination of the results of the National Survey of Crime Severity will
therefore allow us to answer the crucial question of how punitive the public is
and if restitution/reparative justice programs have to be restricted to first-time,
juvenile, and/or property offenders or if it can be applied to serious, even violent
criminals.
In order to achieve this, we assigned each of the 204 offence descriptions a
number, where # 1 represents the offence that was considered the least serious
offence (A person under 16 years old plays hooky from school with a ratio score
of 0.25) and # 204 represents the crime that was considered the most serious
offence (A person plants a bomb in a public building. The bomb explodes and
20 people are killed, with a ratio score of 72.10). Since the offence description
of the National Survey of Crime Severity always entails information about the
damage/injury caused by the crime, one can compare offences which describe
the loss/damage in terms of a dollar amount with crimes that lead to injuries/se-
verity of injury or even death.
One crucial aspect of the offence description is whether the assessment of the
circumstances of the crime and the intent of the offender have an influence on
the rater’s perception of the seriousness of the offence or if the external aspects
(amount of injury, theft, or damage) are more influential. Riedel (1975, cited in
Wolfgang, Figlio, Tracy, and Singer 1985) analyzed this problem in a replication
study of the Sellin-Wolfgang Index and came to the conclusion that offence
severity will continue to be looked on as a measure of the costs to the victim
rehardless of whether that victim is an individual, a group, or society in general.
If one examines the results of the National Survey of Crime Severity, one finds
in general a rather interesting trend: crimes of violence, even those that lead to
severe injuries or death, correspond to property crimes of relative low value.
The offence description ”A person robs a victim. The victim is injured but not
hospitalized” ranked # 54 on the severity scale and corresponds to ”A person
picks a victim’s pocket of $100” which is ranked # 55 on the scale, meaning that
the damage of a robbery with an injury is, according to the ranking of the Crime
Severity Scale, equal to a theft of $100. In terms of restitution/reparative justice
this would mean that a robbery with an injury could be compensated through a
restitution payment of $100 since the public ranks and perceives the severity of
these crimes to be equal.
At first glance this may sound strange, but when we examine the arguments
of the restitution/reparative justice debate and the definition of restitution this
makes a lot of sense. Once more, according to the definition restitution is an act
of restoring; restoration of anything to its rightful owner; the act of making good
or giving an equivalent of any loss, damage or injury; and indemnification. While
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it is easy to assess the amount of damage in cases of property damage or loss and
to agree upon compensation it becomes quite difficult to assess the damage in
terms of a dollar value for the damage or injury caused through a violent crime.
This might be precisely the reason why criminal law professionals always argue
that restitution/reparative justice is not feasible for such offences, namely to find
the equivalent dollar amount which might be suitable to restore the damage/injury
caused by a violent crime. The above-mentioned example from the National
Survey of Crime Severity enables us to do just that: obtain an estimate of how
the public perceives the severity of a violent crime in relationship to property
crimes, thus giving us an idea of how to assess damage or injury in terms of a
dollar value which then could be used as an estimate in determining the amount
of restitution the offender has to repay.
Based upon the crime severity scale one can construct a great number of
comparsions between offence descriptions which include a dollar value and
others where the damage is a physical one in order to get a better understanding
about the severity of these crimes and in order to get estimates of what kind of
value needs to be restored. The offence description ”A person, armed with a gun,
robs a bank of $100,000 during business hours. No one is physically hurt” ranks
at # 164 on the severity scale compared to ”Knowing that a shipment of cooking
oil is bad, a store owner decides to sell it anyway. Only one bottle is sold and the
purchaser dies” which ranks at # 166 on the severity scale. Taking the above-es-
tablished logic this would mean that in order to compensate the death of a person
we are in the vicinity of a dollar amount of $100,000, which seems to be
reasonably cheap. Another comparsion reveals that ”A person intentionally
shoots a victim with a gun. The victim requires hospitalization” is ranked # 185
on the severity scale, and is almost equal to ”A person intentionally sets fire to
a building causing $100,000 worth of damage”, which is ranked # 186. The latter
offence description corresponds also to ”A woman stabs her husband. As a result,
he dies” which is ranked # 191 at the severity scale. Once again we find that the
public ranks a murder or death in the vicinity of a crime where the dollar amount
of the damage lies around $ 100,000.
To give some additional examples we found that offences such as ”A teenage
boy beats his mother with his fists. The mother requires hospitalization” which
is ranked # 154 on the severity scale and ”A person robs a victim of $ 1,000 at
gunpoint. The victim is wounded and requires treatment by a doctor but not
hospitalization” which is ranked # 156 and ”A person, using force, robs a victim
of $ 1,000. The victim is hurt and requires hospitalization” which is ranked #
158 rank according to the national severity scale even a bit lower than an offence
such as ”A legislator takes a bribe of $ 10,000 from a company to vote for a law
favoring the company” which is ranked at # 160. The point with these examples
is that the public perceives crimes which involve serious injuries at the same time
as a monetary loss of $ 1,000 to be in the vicinity of a crime where no injury
occurs and the monetary damage does not exceed $ 10,000.
As we pointed out earlier, one of the main obstacles to extending restitution/re-
storative justice programs is the argument that they are not suitable for serious,
violent offences. One of the reasons for doing so seems to be the fact that one
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can easily assess the amount of damage caused through property offences and
thus calculate the amount to be restored. This is not easily done for violent
offences. So far people and primarily criminal justice officials were fishing in
the dark in evaluating the damage and, more important, for identifying the
appropriate form of punishment. Is an armed robbery of a pedestrian who is
wounded in the incident worth 2 or 15 years in prison? We seem to sentence such
an offender in a rather arbitrary manner and dismiss the idea of a restorative
sentence in which we would have to attach a monetary value to the damage done.
According to criminal justice officials, a prison sentence in this case seems more
appropriate, but they do not provide a reasonable explanation why a restorative
sentence has to be dismissed.
One way to iluminate this dilemma is to look at crime severity studies in which
populations are asked to rank a variety of offence descriptions according to the
perceived severity of the crimes. An examination of the results of the National
Survey of Crime Severity revealed surprising results. 60,000 respondents in the
U.S.A. ranked a robbery in which the victim was injured as being as severe as a
pickpocketing of $ 100, serious robberies with injuries and aggravated assaults
which led to hospitalization of the victims were ranked as severe as taking a bribe
worth $ 10,000, and intentionally causing the death of a person and killing a
person were ranked as severe as burning down a house worth $ 100,000.
If one transfers these results to the application of restitution/restorative justice
sentences one can establish quite well some monetary value for serious and/or
violent offences. This value was obtained by the ranking of criminal events by
the public, a ranking which does not seem to be revengeful or interested in severe
punishment, as has been claimed by criminal justice officials. A sentencing
practice based upon the National Crime Severity Scale seems to have a solid
basis. At least this sentencing practice is based on the opinion and the perception
of seriousness by the public and not, as with the current sentencing practice, on
the opinion of criminal justice officials who lack such a basis. Last, the present
sentencing practice sends serious offenders behind bars. After serving the prison
sentence they usually come out worse than they were before, and the victim has
received nothing. If, on the other hand, one would base the sentencing practice
on the Crime Severity Study and implement the sentences within a restorative
justice model, the offenders would be forced to make good the damage/injury
they have caused and the victims would not be the big losers in this process.
This example of restorative justice praxis, which was hampered by theoreti-
cally based barriers, could be illuminated and advanced by a valuable measure-
ment tool, namely the Sellin-Wolfgang Index. It shows the value of good
measurements about the extent and nature of crimes. They can be used to
influence criminal policies in a good and creative way. The same is true about
the fact that restorative justice is at the moment doing better than ever before
during this century, also with regard to violent offences. However, the sad truth
is that in most cases bad measurement and documentation of crimes is the reality
and is being used to look at the performance of criminal justice systems and to
establish criminal justice policies.
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Indicators of Crime and of the Performance of
the Criminal Justice System
Commentary by Anna Markina
Department of Sociology,
Central European University, Warsaw
Introduction
As a researcher who took part in the preparation of several reports on crime
situation in Estonia, I will concentrate my attention mostly on the problems
connected with the indicators of crime. Whenever it is possible, I will illustrate
my views with examples from the Estonian case.
There is general agreement in the criminological literature all around the world
on how could one estimate the extent of crime in the given country. The standard
criminology textbook will definitely contain a chapter on crime indicators. About
three fourths of this chapter will discuss official statistics as the main source of
data. Victimisation surveys would also be described as an alternative to the
official statistics and, at the very end of this hypothetical (typical) chapter, the
self-report study will be mentioned as well. This sequence somehow reflects the
attitudes towards data gathering techniques: statistical data are trusted most of
all, and survey data are acceptable with some reservations. What are the reasons
for such a validation of sources? The historical traditions along with the general
trust to the statistics gathered by the state are probably the most significant ones.
”Official” crime data
The very term ‘official crime data’that is usually used for the number of recorded
crimes (either in absolute numbers or per 100000 of population) shows that
statistics are trusted most of all. This is why, in order to obtain the ‘right’numbers,
the numbers that reflect the reality of the crime situation as precisely as possible
to, are very important.
The main potential sources of errors in the crime statistics are listed in
Barberet’s paper. The disadvantages of the crime statistics are that:
• official statistics represent only part of the crimes actually committed
• crime statistics are biased towards certain types of crimes
• information about the offender and the victim is limited
• the process of data collection involves many instances that could be potential
sources of error
• for international comparison, national statistics should be reclassified.
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I have experienced some of the problems several times while preparing drafts
for the Estonian national crime report in 1995-1996 or in attempts to compare
crime rates in different countries. I use the expression ‘drafts’ because after the
first version of the report prepared by the criminologists, it is usually discussed,
commented and edited, firstly, in the sub-committees of the Estonian Council for
Crime Prevention and, finally, in a meeting of the Council. Every effort is made
in the final version of the report to show that the performance of the criminal
justice system is as effective as possible.
a. The comparability of the statistical data
The extent of crime in a given country is, as a rule, assessed in comparison with
(a) the previous years; and (b) other countries. In countries with a stable justice
system, the former comparison is not a problem at all. In countries in transition,
such as Estonia or the other ex-communist countries, the penal code is changing
all the time. Crimes are always recorded and categorised according to the
criminal code in force at the time in question. This is, however, usually over-
looked, especially when crime trends are analysed. The crimes that belonged to
one category in 1992 could be counted as a different type of crime in 1997. In
addition, some offences have been decriminalised, and others have been crimi-
nalised.
When comparing the level of crime in different countries, a similar situation
emerges. The problem here is not only the linguistic one of how to translate the
local terms (usually into English). Different countries classify crimes differently.
Therefore, the main problem is how to make these categories comparable. To
take just one minor example, in Estonia, there is no simple crime category of
‘theft’. There are two different categories for thefts: ‘secret theft’ and ‘public
theft’. When comparisons are made with other countries, the category of ‘secret
theft’ is usually used as ‘theft’, and ‘public theft’ is either omitted or added to
the category of ‘robbery’. There is no agreed English translation of the terms
used in Estonian statistics, no agreement about how to classify data in order for
it to be comparable with that of other countries.
b. Registration of crimes
The process of recording crimes is not only a potential source of accidental error.
It is also the moment when the number of recorded crimes can be manipulated
deliberately. We should not forget that the clearance rate (the proportion of
cleared-up crimes out of registered crimes) is often used as an indicator of police
performance. The possibility of under-recording crimes in order to obtain better
numbers for police performance is not just theoretical. From an interview with
Andres Anvelt, a senior police officer in Estonia, I learned that during the Soviet
regime it was the usual practice to register only those crimes where the offender
was already known. He also mentioned that, although this is not common today,
in some regions it is still an on-going routine to some extent.
c. The ‘magic’ of numbers
Regardless of whether or not they are collected in the proper manner, crime
statistics have to be interpreted. Here I will quote a small paragraph from the
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Report on the Crime Situation in Estonia in 1997. I am fairly confident that a
corresponding passage could be found in similar reports from any other country.
”In 1997, less then one third of all registered crimes (31.7%) were cleared. In
absolute numbers, the clearance rate for the crimes has increased from year
to year. In 1997, 12,994 crimes were cleared. The number of cleared crimes
has increased by +12.7% in comparison with 1996. However, because of the
15.7% growth in the number of registered crimes, the number of unsolved
crimes increased as well.” (Estonian Council for Crime Prevention, 1998)
The message one could read from this paragraph is that the police are working
as hard as possible to clear the crimes. Every year the police solve more and more
crimes. Due to a variety of reasons, however, the number of crimes grows faster,
and the result is an increase in the number of unsolved crimes.
This message, which is very favourable for the police, is difficult to refute.
Everything is true. Nevertheless, it is also true that in 1996 the clearance rate in
Estonia was 32.5% while in 1997 it decreased to 31.7%. When numbers are
presented this way, the picture is rather negative. And this is the magic of
statistics. The data could be interpreted in different ways. On one hand, the
growing number of registered crimes could be treated as a dangerous social trend.
On the other, it could also be treated as a sign of the greater effort made by the
police to register crimes. To overcome this ‘puzzling’ problem one should avoid
simplistic interpretations. Before making any conclusions, various facts and
social processes should be taken into account.
d. Complementary statistical data
As was mentioned earlier, the official statistical data is the most trusted source
of information about crime. Therefore, every effort should be made to record it
as precisely as possible and to avoid manipulation at any stage of the process of
collected data. One way to improve the reliability of the statistics is to use
available complementary statistical data provided by the different agencies. For
example, as was mentioned in Barberet’s paper, in case of homicide the police
statistics could be compared with the public health statistics. Homicide statistics
are probably the most often used example. The control data for other types of
offences could possibly be found as well.
Victimisation surveys
Victimisation surveys do not cover the entire ‘reality’of crime. They reflect only
specific aspects of the crime situation – crime experienced by an individual. If
the task is narrowed to describe this specific sphere, the victimisation surveys
provide the best description of the situation. Theoretically, if the survey is carried
out accurately, this technique overcomes the major part of limitations described
in the case of statistical data on crime. The possibilities of manipulating the data
are avoided because there is no political pressure. Data is collected directly from
the victims of crime; therefore, numerous stages of data collection, the potential
source of error, are avoided.
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The International Crime Victim Surveys, as is stressed in Barberet’s paper, are
the best way to avoid the above-described problems also when comparing the
crime situation in different countries. As is noted by Barberet: ”these methods ...
at least produce indicators which are based on similar definitions and samples
and thus, one would hope, contain fewer errors due to misunderstandings”.
(Barberet R., 1998)
The main problem with the International Crime Victim Survey in Estonia is
that it is not conducted regularly. No institution in Estonia took the responsibility
of carrying out the survey. The survey was conducted twice, in 1993 and in 1995.
Both times, it was financed primarily by foreign agencies and co-ordinated by
the Finnish National Research Institute of Legal Policy (Aromaa & Ahven,
1995:1).
Victimisation surveys are not only complementary measures of the crime
situation. They also measure the public assessment of the crime problem, and
public attitudes towards the police and the criminal justice system.
Self-report studies
While victimisation surveys could complement our knowledge about crime with
information about victims, self-report studies allows us to learn more about
unreported crime or antisocial acts and their perpetrators. In Estonia, self-report
studies are not commonly conducted. At the beginning of 1990s there was an
attempt made by sociologists at Tartu University to conduct a self-report study
among school children in Kohtla-Järve, a city in the northeastern Estonia. The
attempt failed. Almost all the questionnaires were returned uncompleted. I am
not aware whether other attempts have been made in the former Soviet coun-
tries/republics and whether those attempts were successful or not. The reasons
for the failure of the self-report study in the former Soviet states could be found
in the nature of the relationship between the individual and the state apparatus
that is characteristic of the totalitarian regime. Lydia Rosner, an American
criminologist who has studied criminal activity among immigrants from the
USSR to the United States notes that:
”...[They] distrust written questionnaires, having had only bad experiences
with bureaucratic forms and work papers. Equally, they distrust people who
they perceive as representatives of official agencies. [They] tend to view all
such social agencies or research personnel as an arm of the government...”
(Rosner, 1986:75)
The fear that research such as self-report studies is made in co-operation with
the police and that the police or the other authorities could punish persons for
any unlawful act that they report, is still a real one. Therefore, attempts to conduct
self-report studies in totalitarian or post-totalitarian countries would rather fail.
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Indicators of victimless crimes
All three ways of collecting information about crimes (official statistics, victim-
isation surveys, and self-report studies) have one feature in common. They
mostly reflect so-called conventional or everyday crime. Other crime forms, such
as corporate crime, corruption and organised crime are not well documented
when only these techniques are used.
These ”new” crimes are often issues of great public concern. The lack of a
possibility to grasp the knowledge about corruption, economic or organised
crime is often seen by the public as an inability of the police to cope with this
type of crime. Once documented, this ‘unusual’ crime would become less
frightening in the eyes of the society.
There are additional ways to gain knowledge about these types of crime.
Information about crimes against enterprises, for example, could be obtained
through the implementation of the International Survey of Crime against Busi-
ness  (Aroma&Ahven, 1995: 2-4). Several countries have started to record
organised crime using a specially designed questionnaires. When this method is
used, the police authorities are interviewed concerning their knowledge about a
particular grouping, crime or leader. Each questionnaire describes one group.
(An example of such a questionnaire could be found, for example, in: Contribu-
tion of the Netherlands Delegation, 1994: 63)
A short version of the questionnaire on organised crime was conducted by the
author in the Estonian Security Police. Once the information was recorded and
summarised, the picture of an overwhelming underground society has been
shrunk to a couple of hundred professional criminals. The result has surprised
the policemen themselves (Markina, 1998).
Indicators of the performance of
the criminal justice system
I have very little to add to the overview of the criminal justice performance
indicators presented in Barberet’s paper.
Taking into account the notes considering crime indicators presented above,
I would like to mention that the choice of indicators of criminal justice perform-
ance should not influence the crime indicators (remember the example where the
clearance rate is used as a police performance indicator that could influence the
registration of criminal acts).
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Final words
The indicators of crime and criminal justice performance are needed to describe
the reality of crime as precisely as possible. What is the ‘reality’ of crime and
what is, in this case, the objective of the criminal justice system, is a very
complicated theoretical question. In my opinion the perception of the crime
situation by the public and the fear of crime are the factors that define to a large
extent the crime situation in a given society. This fear is often influenced by the
unknown, by the feeling of being unprotected, by a distrust in law enforcement
agencies, and, the same time, by tremendous crime figures presented by the mass
media. One of the goals of the criminal justice system should be to reduce this
fear.
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”Indicators may be all right but what about
their use(r)s?”
Indicators of Crime and of the Performance of
the Criminal Justice System
Commentary by Kauko Aromaa
1 Two separate tasks
Crime indicators and performance indicators are, in my view, two quite separate
things. One is concerned with grasping something that is ”out there” and tends
to avoid measurement. The other is about monitoring a set of bureaucracies and
related organisations and entities. Some aspects of the real worlds are, however,
shared by both, such as, for instance, the question of the general public´s
participation in activities related to the criminal justice system (saying, in effect,
that the general public actually IS part of the said ”system”, if understood in a
broad frame of reference. So are, indeed, everybody else involved, offenders
included).
Whether indicators in general are good to have or not needs hardly to be
discussed at length. It might, however, be mportant be to point out that no
indicator is ”objective” in the sense that its form and its interpretation would be
independent of underlying assumptions and understandings as to their objectives.
Equally, on the other hand, an indicator is an indicator – of what, remains to be
defined by each (mis)user separately.
Indicators may be quantitative, qualitative, or both. It is primarily the quanti-
tative part that is meant when indicators are being discussed.
2 Basic problems with crime indicators
I wish to introduce this part with an analysis of the idea of ”crime”, its logical
elements. These could be envisaged as providing a framework of description:
which aspects we might like to have covered if indicators were to be satisfactory
with regard to relevance. The question is whether central aspects required for a
”correct” interpretation of indicator rates are available and included, and how far
beyond the actual observable phenomenon (”crime”) the measurement should
be expected to go. If, for instance, ”crime” is understood as the outcome of an
interplay of motivated offenders, suitable targets, and lack of adequate control,
then a ”crime” indicator that just reflects the number of incidents (or victims, or
offenders) that correspond to given event definitions is perhaps not very satis-
factory. If, on the other hand, ”crime” is understood as something that just occurs,
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a simple prevalence/incidence measure suffices. Then, separate interpretations
would need to be made, where this amount would need to have a homogenous
interpretation across incidents. The interpretation, for example, where ”crime”
is related to quality of life concerns, would probably require that high values are
understood as ”bad”, and low values as ”good”. This is, of course, not necessarily
always quite clear, unless the event environment is grasped correctly.
As Barberet points out, all indicators are (mostly implictly and sometimes
even explicitly) based on theoretical assumptions of the nature of the phenome-
non to be monitored. At the same time, however, indicators often are derived –
in a seemingly a-theoretical and decelptively value-free manner – from what is
easily available. This is, in a way, another instance of invisible limitations of
which much of existing research suffers: available data too often tend to dictate
what is being studied, and it is unusual that the data really is being designed
expressly to  meet  the  demands  of the  underlying theoretical objectives of
measurement. This is not really a criticism of research endeavours as such – this
is a matter of realities with which research must cope, and a critical use of sources
is an obvious basic requirement of any scientific endeavour. In the context of
indicators, however, the danger of paying too little attention to this obvious fact
is particularly great.
A further point to have second thoughts about is the choice of individual
crimes: each jurisdiction has defined a more or less unique list of ”crimes”. Which
of these are to be included in an ”indicator” collection? For national purposes
and local assessments of change over time, the solution might be quite different
from what is adequate for cross-nationally comparative needs. Many ”crime”
phenomena are, albeit, quite similar over time and across countries, but many
others are not. Constant development and evaluation work is therefore called for,
as well as critical re-thinking with regard to needs and possibilities of improving
existing solutions. If standardisation and comparability across jurisdictions, on
one hand, and over time, on the other, are seen as important objectives of indicator
development, as they ought to, this matter is one of central importance. No
motivation opportunity target
control
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jurisdiction has been able to retain its list of criminalised acts intact for a long
time. No two jurisdictions share an identical list of criminalisations.
3 The basic problem with performance
indicators of the criminal justice system
Here, an entirely different world is opened, or so it would seem at first sight. The
central value of an analysis of this realm is probably in that it makes it necessary
to ask and aswer basic questions related to the objectives of the criminal justice
system, together with illustrating the need to define what is included in the readily
used concept of ”the criminal justice system” – at this point, it might be
eye-opening to point out that not all jurisdictions even share an independent
expression for this, a concept that seems to have come to much of European
analysis from the Anglo-American tradition. The history of the term might prove
helpful if its target phenomenon is to be understood.
Often, we might likely be saying that this ”system” consists of the bureaucratic
structures that take care of law enforcement, sentencing, and corrections (and
maybe something more). What should be immediately obvious is that this
represents an extremely biased and theoretically unfounded view.
Performance indicators are constructed for a basically different purpose than
indicators of ”crime”. The idea is not to find out how much of something there
is or how it is distributed, or any similar matter. What they share with crime
indicators are ideas of relevance and problems of a technical kind and problems
regarding data sources.
4 Commentaries regarding some details153
II. Existing research: the author does not explicitly mention business victimisa-
tion surveys. By and large, the problems and strengths in this case are not
basically different from such surveys of the general population. This topic is
taken up in part B. of the paper but not discussed in the present context. Some
observations would have been welcome also here, as surveys of corporate
victimisation might be seen as one more important and independent contribution
to the efforts of improving the standard set of tools to be used in creating crime
indicators. This observation actually makes me think of quite another general
idea with regard to the indicators debate: perhaps a central contribution of the
scientific community to this realm of applications is that it develops a balanced
set of approaches, a ”standard tool-box” that could always be recommended
when indicator needs are observed. This contribution could be seen as valuable
in itself even if there has never been very much success in achieving the goal of
188
153 The numbers refer to the sections of Dr Barberet’s paper.
regularly and globally producing similar, standardised and comparable indica-
tors of all relevant aspects of crime (see also IV.A).
One of the unique contributions of self-report surveys is that they are able to
provide information about some victimless crimes. Also, they are able to provide
measures of apprehension/detection that represent a definitely different perspec-
tive to crime than the one provided by the questions on reporting crimes, often
included in victimisation surveys. Admittedly, the author does mention these
items – why I take this point up is that I believe that such information could be
used for important indicators relevant both to crime and to the criminal justice
system.
III. Methodological and Theoretical Problems: a further dilemma has to do
with the generally cross-sectional nature  of crime indicators.  The bulk of
information relates to sudden or short-lived incidents, and thus reflects an
atomised view of ”crime” as a mass of unrelated single incidents. This dilemma
requires in-depth research before much of an improvement could be achieved.
Just by way of example, this dilemma is reflected in authority-based crime data
in the virtual lack of information on criminal organisations or organised criminal
acitivity; or, in victimisation data, it is quite rare that social processes (such as
the events leading to the victimisation, or the consequences of the incident to the
victim or to his/her/its environment) connected with victimisation would be even
touched upon. Similarly, as the author points out, the ”gallup” approach does
suffer from a bias related to, among others reasons, the history of polling, where
the measurement largely concentrates upon superficial items easily and imme-
diately grasped by the ”outside observer”, and thus easily overlooks matters that
are inside and in the history of the informant, or rather on the macro level, outside
of him/her/it. As a matter of fact, the survey techiques typically applied here do
suffer from this kind of restrictions, while they of course at the same time have
clearly represented a major improvement in the development.
IV.C. ...linguistic nuances... The Council of Europe ”Sourcebook” project
deserves special mention in this context. The objective is to produce a crime and
criminal justice data collection that would provide improved possibilities of
comparisons of all Council of Europe member countries. What this project has
made painfully clear is that, even if seriously tried, it is very hard to produce even
elementary data on central traits of the crime scene from the existing sources.
The problem is at the same time linguistic, legal, and cultural.
Such observations have, indeed, been one of the motives for trying to develop
measures that are initially designed for comparative purposes. The warning of
differences in the meanings of seemingly identical formulations is therefore most
relevant.
IV.D. ... anticipatory... This idea strikes me a somewhat strange. I am aware
of initiatives by police authorities where crime forecasting has been given as the
objective, and also seem to remember that such projects have resulted in a
compilation of fears and hopes, spiced with the latest newspaper scares. I am
probably mistaken, and the author might easily be able to straighten this out.
V. Policy applications: A more valuable contribution that the ”indicator
debate” could make to policy is on the macro level: if an indicator perspective is
adopted, then also the basic idea is likely to be received positively that indicator
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rates may be influenced – that there may be ways of changing policies that could
result in changed values of the indicators in question. Additionally, adopting one
indicator set is likely to open the way to constantly questioning the basic
assumptions related to the indicator choices.
In any case, research should be carried out in order to interpret indicators.
Thus, if there is an agreement about the general usefulness of given indicators,
then there also ought to be an option for interpretive research. This does not
always happen quickly but more important is that the option is opened.
VI. Performance Indicators of the Criminal Justice System Defined: This is a
matter different from crime indicators. The basic problem here is the same as
with any bureucracy or organisation. What is decisive is the idea of the main
objectives of the organisation. An analysis of such questions may be most
revealing and, therefore, most disturbing, as the author points out. This is
developed aptly in the following passages (VII).
VIII. Methodological and threoretical problems: Here is the central restriction
that defies most attempts to create totally new regular indicators: the data should
be created as a side-product of normal (administrative) routines, otherwise the
costs involved are often viewed as being prohibitive. Many indicator proposals
clearly do not meet this criterion. What has also become obvious if we consider
points already dealt with in this paper, it seems to be equally clear that indicators
that only rely on existing routines are very unsatisfactory.
Thus, satisfactory indicator development and use is not very likely in other
countries than the most affluent ones. Even in those, the situation is far from
satisfactory. Also, it is likely that future resource investments in this respect are
not going to be made by the ”scientific community” but by representatives of
powerful bureaucracies who wish to protect their autonomous interests rather
than try to achieve some ”common” or ”societal” good.
IX. Areas in Need of Research: This passage presents another difficult di-
lemma: when speaking of ”international standards” we may be tempted to ask
who has the right to dictate what is to be measured? A more acceptable avenue
might be a suggestion for the promotion of democratic and material development
where such ideas are more likely to be accepted and adopted. -An extreme
example of the inherent problem would be the case where a wealthy and powerful
nation exerts pressure against others in order to make them apply a given policy
(say, the death penalty) with regard to a certain crime problem that is seen as a
major problem by this wealthy nation. Of  course, indicators are no death
penalties. But the value dilemma is similar.
X. Policy Applications: could we not think that a good indicator also always
includes thorough information on how it is constructed? Thus, already before
and without an evaluation, the indicator user, whoever it is, would have the right
to expect an open background explanatory note without which the indicator
should not be used.
5 Concluding remark
I found Dr Barberet’s paper highly rewarding.
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Indicators of Crime and of the Performance of
the Criminal Justice System
Commentary by
Gordon Barclay (Home Office, London)
Introduction
This topic area is one of considerable interest to the United Kingdom and to the
Home Office.
However, as I started to read Rosemary Barberet´s paper and those of the other
respondents I felt my role would be that of a defence of official statistics. As
someone who has collected, analysed and disseminated official statistics over
the past 24 years I clearly am aware of both the plus and minus points about their
use. However, there are many other points about this topic that occur to me and
I have therefore divided my comments into three areas:
a) The current Governmental interest within the UK in the use of performance
measures.
b) Some reflections on the use of official statistics for international comparisons.
c) Some thoughts about indicators across the criminal justice system.
a) The UK Governmental interest in performance measure
I welcome the support that Barberet’s paper gives for the use of crime indicators.
However, the response that she has received from policymakers over the invest-
ment of funds into the production of such indicators seems very different from
the current UK position.
The paper has already spoken about the use being made by organisations such
as the Audit Commission in England and Wales of crime indicators. Such
indicators have developed slowly over the last few years. However, they have
had no central co-operation, and so indicators tend to be drawing criminal justice
agencies in different directions without any single measure of success. In all
aspects of life in Britain performance indicators have started to play a major part.
For example, the train that I take into central London each day is now privatised
(and French-owned). It must meet a target of 88 % trains arriving within 5
minutes of the expected time. Last month it achieved 65 % so all commuters are
looking forward to a refund on their season tickets. It is clearly a pleasure to be
in Helsinki without my daily travel problems.
The election of Tony Blair in May 1997 has seen a major change both in the
introduction of better co-ordinated planning (joined-up policies) and in the
setting of clear measurable targets. The Government has set itself the goal of
identifying the clear aims of any policy or Government body (for example, what
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are the aims of the Home Office). It has identified indicators to measure how
these aims are being achieved, and has begun to set measurable targets. Thus it
has started to identify what is meant by success and the Government will be
judged by whether it meets or misses these targets.
For those involved in assisting policy makers in areas being considered there
are two particular points which are important:
a) There is a need to be involved in setting these targets. To take the view that
such targets are not helpful and should not be supported will result in others
less knowledgeable setting them.
b) There is a need to be involved in measuring these targets to ensure that they
reflect truly the successes and failures of the Government. I can see in
advance the problems that may occur when there is a dispute over whether
an indicator has truly judged failure or merely reflects an administrative
change.
Listed in the Annex are examples of these indicators linked to four of the Home
Office aims:
a) Reduction in crime, particularly youth crime, reduction in the fear of crime,
and the maintenance of good order and public safety.
b) Delivery of justice through effective and efficient investigation, prosecu-
tion, trial and sentencing and through support for victims.
c) Prevention of terrorism, reduction in organised and international crime, and
protection against threats to national security.
d) Effective execution of the sentences of the courts so as to reduce re-offend-
ing and protect the public.
Targets have not currently all been set but one of which I am aware of is for
reconviction rates. Here the target for next year is to lower the actual reconviction
rates for all types of non-custodial supervision orders. The aim is to achieve rates
lower than those currently predicted based upon the age, gender and offence of
the offender. Another target is that vehicle crime will be required to drop by 30
% over the next four years.
Such targets will require new or in some cases more frequent collection of
data. For example, consideration is being given to introducing an annual rather
than biannual British Crime Survey to cover the data requirements for some of
the indicators. Extra public money is being set on new policies which aim to meet
such targets.
I would be interested to hear about other countries setting similar targets. In
addition, we may see international bodies developing the use of such targets as
the basis of their work program.
b. Official statistics for international comparisons
Official statistics are normally the product of administrative systems with data
input by operational staff such as police constables or prison officers. For staff
whom are busy with day-to-day tasks involving contact with the criminals or the
victims of the criminal justice process, completing forms or inputting data
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electronically may not appear important except when it is then translated into a
performance indicator. Yet through the knowledge and central involvement of
the staff completing the returns it provides a unique set of data about the current
state of the criminal justice system in any country.
In using such data it is important to remember these points:
– As in surveys, each observation will have an error related to response rate,
sample size and design. Official statistics are similarly subject to error and
vary in quality with the efforts put into validation.
– Statistical rules as well as legal definitions are equally important. For example,
for crimes recorded by the police it is important to know the point of time at
which the observation is made and the rules for multiple offences.
Thus the use of official statistics without knowledge about such factors (often
called meta data) is similar to using survey results without knowing the sample
size. The Council of Europe´s recent survey into crime and criminal justice
statistics (currently being analysed) has tried to collect such meta data from
Member States. Although this has its problems, an acceptance that data and meta
data cannot be separated is essential in any comparative context.
The publication in August 1998 of a Press Notice by the Home Office covering
data on homicides in European and North American cities has illustrated how
even an offence that many would feel has a common definition can create
problems. The data in question was collected (and double checked) with either
the Ministry of Justice or Statistical Institute in each country. However, on release
many countries disputed their own figures mainly on definitional questions. The
result has been that the data recently republished (Criminal Statistics, England
and Wales) are now better comparatively. However, for all countries it was not
the figures that were incorrect, it was their interpretation of the requirement and
the definitions adopted. Many would say, ”use the World Health Organisation
figures for homicides”. However, when I looked at the England and Wales figures
a couple of years ago I found that they undercounted homicides in England and
Wales by about one-third. With two administrative sources you will probably get
two different answers, both of which will be wrong.
Official statistics can give you trends over time on the assumption that other
factors have remained constant (see the trends in recorded crime for the main
OECD countries in Criminal Statistics, England and Wales). For absolute com-
parisons official statistics, although providing a rich source of data, must be
accompanied by a process of validation and definitional checks. Thus work on
such crime and criminal justice indicators needs to follow a similar process with
a cautious approach to any usage.
c. Indicators across the criminal justice system
Indicators that I have seen in previous papers have all related to crime and its
measurement with little attention to cross criminal justice system indicators. I
have two current interests in looking at such indicators across the criminal justice:
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– The Council of Europe´s study of crime and criminal justice statistics.
– Analysis of statistical information on race within England and Wales.
In the case of the Council of Europe, data was collected for 12 countries
originally for 1990 and published in 1995 (Draft Model European Sourcebook
of Crime and Criminal Justice Statistics). This publication used three indicators
covering the use of imprisonment:
– Number sentenced to imprisonment per 100,000 inhabitants.
– Number sentenced to imprisonment per 100 recorded crimes.
– Number sentenced to imprisonment per 100 suspects.
These indicators were looked at for three offences: assault, total thefts (including
burglary) and drugs. Its aim was to try and see at which stage of the criminal
justice process variations in the use of imprisonment developed. Ranking coun-
tries using these indicators for particular offences makes it possible to identify
whether a high apparent usage of imprisonment results from a high crime rate
rather than a high use of imprisonment. Similar types of analysis are being
considered for the full report covering 36 countries and 1990-96.
Turning to the question of race and the over-representation of ethnic minorities
within the criminal justice process: the document published on 8 December 1998
by the Home Office (Statistics of race and the criminal justice system 1998)
brings together information on the position of ethnic minorities based upon
monitoring of the police, prison and probation services. No information is
currently available on the courts and sentencing. However, in order to show cross
criminal justice comparisons, the following indicators are included by ethnicity
for the ten police force areas with the highest ethnic populations:
– Percentage of arrests resulting in a prison reception
– Percentage of arrests resulting in a commencement for a criminal supervision
order.
Such comparisons (Table 1) suggest that variations between forces are far more
significant than those between ethnic groups. However, these are only the first
steps in a process of collecting criminal justice statistics and research. They
nonetheless illustrate that it is important to look across the criminal justice system
and not to restrict indicators to only one part of a complex system.
Conclusion
My conclusions are therefore that this is an area where work is just starting with
a need to develop indicators for the future that can act as a guide for policy
makers. However, we must tie in work on such issues with the methodological
problems that arise in international and national comparisons to ensure that such
indicators can be used safely.
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Annex A
Home Office aims and objectives
a. Reduction in crime, particularly youth crime, and in the fear of crime and the
maintenance of good order and public safety.
– The long run growth rate of crime.
– The fear of crime.
– Reconviction rate for persistent young offenders.
– New measures to be developed for police output and efficiency.
b. Delivery of justice through effective and efficient investigation, prosecution,
trial and sentencing, and through support for victims.
– Time from arrest to sentence or other disposal.
– Time from arrest to sentence for persistent young offenders.
– Needs of victims and witnesses met by the criminal justice system.
– Clear-up or sanction rate.
– Efficiency of the criminal justice system.
– Police discipline-time from laying charge to result.
c. Prevention of terrorism, reduction in other organised and international crime,
and protection against threats to national security.
– Number of terrorist incidents.
– Number of organised criminal enterprises disrupted.
d. Effective execution of the sentences of the courts so as to reduce re-offending
and protect the public.
– Number of offenders serving prison and community sentences completing
programmes independently accredited as reducing re-offending.
– Reconviction rates compared with predicted rates for prison and commu-
nity sentences for all offenders and for persistent offenders.
– Annual unit cost of community orders and supervision on licence.
– Prison average cost per uncrowded place.
– Proportion of relevant supervision cases where breach action taken in
compliance with national standards requirements.
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Police force area Percentage of persons arrested
received into prison
Percentage of persons arrested
commencing criminal supervision
orders
White Black Asian White Black Asian
Bedfordshire
Greater Manchester
Hertfordshire
Leicestershire
Metropolitan
Nottinghamshire
Thames Valley
West
8.9
7.8
5.1
8.2
7.5
7.5
3.3
6.8
10.5
10.4
5
11.8
9.1
10.8
3.6
7.5
8.8
3
4.7
9.1
4.8
5.6
2.4
6.2
9.9
5.6
8.7
11.8
8.4
9.9
8.3
9.6
7.4
5.2
5.9
9
6.7
12.1
5.1
5.8
5.5
3.3
5.5
7.8
4.1
4.6
4.5
4.8
Table 1. Percentage of persons arrested who were received into prison or commenced criminal
supervision orders by ethnicity for selected police force areas 1997/98.
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Public/Private Partnerships
in Crime Prevention
Slovenia: Between Tradition and
Transition; From a Strong State
to a Strong Democracy
Dragan Petrovec (University of Ljubljana, Slovenia)
1 Tradition: strong state – weak democracy
The social system developed by Slovenia after the Second World War could not
differ significantly from the system in Yugoslavia, since Slovenia was a part of
Yugoslavia, with some autonomy, but with more limitations than freedom in
choosing its own destiny. This political system was based on the ideas of
socialism, common or corporate ownership and many restrictions on private
property. This ideology contributed to regulation by the state of most vital areas,
while there was no room for private initiative. The consequences of such an
ideology were mostly bad for the economy. Even so, we have to admit that a
”social state” was being developed in a way that had none of the differences that
we can witness nowadays. People were not very rich, yet they were not poor
either. At least, no social gap could be seen until such a gap had been brought
about by a free market economy with no feeling for social security The spirit of
free enterprise and business brought about a split in society, between a small
number of extremely rich people on one hand, and on the other people with
average incomes, more and more of whom are approaching poverty. The poor
ones are not poor due to their incapability of earning or working properly; they
are poor due to the incompetence of the system in taking care of social issues.
This bears mentioning also in the present connection because it is criminogenic.
The former state that was ”social” in terms of caring for citizens, took care of
crime prevention as well. The police, prosecution and court as the three major
state systems had the task of shaping an adequate crime prevention policy. The
primary concern of the former state was, inter alia, a crime prevention strategy.
Although someone might expect that the legislation reflected the ”almighty
state”, the situation was actually quite different. Although the first Penal Code,
adopted by the Yugoslav assembly in 1947, was for political reasons modelled
on the Soviet Penal Code, the next Penal Code from 1951 and even more so its
amendment in 1959 were closer to European criminal legislation. Eminent
European scholars (such as Marc Ancel) considered the Yugoslav criminal law
to be modern and democratic (Bavcon, 1994; 292).
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In spite of democracy, there was almost no private initiative, in the business
sector or in any other sector. There was no room for partnership in preventing
crime. It was considered most inappropriate to have a system parallel to the state
agencies, which would take over the crime prevention activities.
However, in open defiance of common sense, we witnessed an unexpected
development of the socialist social system.
A theory of the ”withering away of the state” was being developed by leading
ideologists, predicting that most state competence would gradually be vested in
the people. The term used for this was ”socialisation of state competence”. One
of these fields was crime prevention. This idea was in compliance with the
ideology of self-management, a trademark of the Yugoslav socialist social
system.
a) Social self-protection
Ideas and practices related to this social self-protection appeared as a new
ideology of the crime protection and prevention system. After the Second World
War when Yugoslav ideology was closely related to the Soviet system, it was
believed that crime would soon disappear after a new social order had been
established. According to the prevailing attitude, criminality was a remnant of a
bourgeois social order. Yet it was Slovenia and its Criminology Institute that,
during the 1960s, talked about crime as a legal phenomenon that could not be
ignored by socialism. The socialist social system did not in itself guarantee a
society free of crime (Bavcon, L. et al. 1968; 101-104).
Being aware that a strong state with its repressive system causes more evil
than does crime itself, the idea of social self-protection seemed to be quite
acceptable as a new crime prevention strategy.
This idea is very close to the military defence concept which included the idea
of so-called ”total national defence”, which was strongly influenced and
encouraged by positive experiences during the Second World War. Confronted
with the enormously overwhelming military force of German, Italian and
Hungarian armies, the Slovene resistance succeeded only by using partisan
tactics supported by a ”total national defence” strategy.
Although partisan resistance soon became formal resistance, with a military
structure and hierarchy of its own, social self-protection, with only one exception,
remained an informal system of crime prevention.
The ideas of social self-protection were based on the expectation that everyone
is responsible for avoiding victimization. A common denominator in social
self-protection and official crime prevention activities existed in their defence of
the same values, i.e. fundamental rights, personal integrity, property, the social
order etc. Even so, there was an important difference. While crime prevention
activities carried out by the state have always had sanctions to back them up,
self-protection has never involved any such weapons against perpetrators. This
did not mean that the state was excluded from intervening. It only meant that
when prevention failed it was time for the state to appear. Self-protection has
always acted in a preventive way by, to put it simply, always being alert. The
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system of self-protection was actually an ideology. It had roots partly in the
incompetence of the state to fight crime more efficiently. In the language of social
science, it was a process of socialisation that was the opposite of etatism.
The self-protection ideology had the clear advantage of being much less
aggressive, which may contribute to less repression in general. On the other hand,
we have to admit that official crime prevention as carried out by state agencies
has always been based on professional standards and criteria, while self-protec-
tion may quickly turn into emotionally based overreactions leading to several
forms of phobia, including fear of crime, xenophobia etc.
A good example of an exaggeration of the role of crime prevention activities
was to be found in Slovenian legislation dealing with traffic safety. (I presume
that Slovenia was not the only such case, and that such regulations might have
been found also in other states.) A driver who had left his or her car unlocked
(even with no intent) could have been punished for his or her ”provocative”
behaviour, since leaving the car unlocked could encourage a possible thief to
steal the car.
In this case, everybody who does not help in fighting crime, even though they
may fail to do so through negligence and not by intent, are classified as
criminals and are punishable by law.
Another, much more bitter experience with the social self-protection ideology
was during the time of the ”cold war” in 1948, when the conflict between the
Soviet Union and Yugoslavia broke out. There was a high probability of
aggression, as subsequently happened in Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in
1968 and later on in Afghanistan. Until that time there had been a strong
friendship between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, based mostly on Soviet
military assistance in fighting the German army and in liberating part of
Yugoslav territory, including Belgrade, the capital. In 1948 the weakest point
of defence against the Soviet Union seemed to be that very friendship. Many
people, including politicians, were simply unable to suddenly treat Russians
as enemies. Therefore, many sentences were passed according to martial law,
and too many people were sent without being sentenced to concentration
camps in some of the Adriatic islands in complete isolation, where many of
them died. The self-protection ideology, in a way perverted by fear and hatred,
contributed to these convictions. To arrest and even eliminate a person, it was
sufficient that someone went to the police and expressed his or her suspicion
that some other person sympathises with the Soviet Union or even with its
ideas. No further evidence was needed.
The renaissance of the social self-protection idea came during the period of
relative peace during the 1970s, and no negative side effects have been reported.
The people concentrated more on real crime. It is very difficult to evaluate the
impact of this ideology on crime in general. Even so, there are trends that are
worth mentioning. The crime rate in Slovenia is rather low compared to other
European countries. The number of prison sentences passed from the 1970s up
to the middle of the 1990s has steadily decreased from more than 2000 to
approximately 700 per year. (Brinc, 1994; 309). More by mere intuition and not
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by some firm evidence, we might presume that this could contribute to less crime
in general.
b) The Reconciliation Boards
The only exception to the application of the social self-protection idea as
informal social control was to be found in the ”reconciliation boards”, agencies
established by law and consisting of lay members. These boards existed in former
Yugoslavia as well as in Slovenia since 1959. Their task was to arrive at a
compromise between persons in dispute, through the use of informal, non-com-
pulsory and voluntary approach. The Yugoslav constitution classified reconcili-
ation boards as a self-government judicial authority, since self-government was
a trademark of the Yugoslav political system. The role of reconciliation boards
was not to pass judgement or establish the truth; they did not seek to establish
the facts of a case or allocate guilt and responsibility. They were only social
authorities composed of lay members, and they acted only by consent of persons
in dispute. In this way they contributed to the decrease in the repressive function
of the state.
The number of reconciliation boards in Yugoslavia
1964 5,148
1968 6,073
1972 6,696
The number of cases dealt with by reconciliation boards
1963 79,332
1968 70,125
1971 58,904
The number of cases entrusted to reconciliation boards differed very much in
the different republics of Yugoslavia. In Slovenia this number was rather low.
Comparing the number of boards and the number of cases we can see that for
instance in 1971 there was an average of less than 10 (8,8) cases for each board
per year. A study carried out in Slovenia showed that boards were successful in
reconciling the parties in dispute in 24% of cases in urban areas and in 32% of
cases in rural areas (Peàar, 1973; 368).
It has been estimated that reconciliation boards played an important role in
preventing crime for many reasons. They were not compulsory, they had an
educational role by encouraging feelings of empathy, by removing frustrations
and tensions, and even amending the consequences of some criminal activity.
The nature of reconciliation boards did not allow them to broaden their compe-
tence or to make their decisions more formal, for example by issuing formal
orders or whatsoever. Their decisions had to remain informal in order to be trusted
by the parties involved.
Later on the reconciliation boards, especially in Slovenia, gradually left the
stage and the new legislation, since independence has established other, less
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aggressive crime prevention measures, such as mediation within the criminal
procedure. The author’s experience with reconciliation boards is rather unique.
During a four year mandate there was only one case and even then one of the
parties changed his mind and opted for the regular court.
2 Transition: weak state – slow reanimation
of democracy
a) Private security agencies
Since 1991 independence and democracy are supposed to be a trademark in
Slovenia. Both dimensions of a new-born state should be considered rather
carefully. There is no objection to independence in a political sense. Even so,
there are many side effects of independence in economic terms. The Slovene
economy was closely linked to the economy of the other Yugoslav republics. On
the one hand it had been quite expensive to support other, undeveloped parts of
Yugoslavia through constant special taxes, while on the other hand we were able
to sell all our products to the rest of Yugoslavia. The interest was mutual, but
Slovenia always had a feeling of being exploited, a feeling which in a way
fostered a dream of independence. After achieving it we suddenly realised that
running a state is an expensive enterprise, much more so than we had expected.
In respect of crime prevention, the first sign of financial restrictions on
government activities was the withdrawal of the police from providing major
companies with security services. The Ministry of Internal Affairs decided that
the police would disconnect technically protected sites previously connected to
police alarm centres. In addition, they stopped approving requests for new
connections. Because of governmental cutbacks and a limited budget, the police
have been forced to rationalise their work in all fields, but most importantly in
areas where the tasks which are not directly required by law are carried out
(AnŁelj, 1998; 1).
Simultaneously, the Private Security Act was adopted, regulating all sectors
of protection not covered by state agencies. This Act might be considered as an
inevitable consequence of the free market economy and as a new opening for
private initiative, but also as a consequence of the state’s inability to properly
function in all sectors due to the financial restrictions.
Security has suddenly become a commercial commodity that is available to
those who can afford it.
This situation was confirmed by the author’s personal experience. A citizen,
repeatedly threatened and even assaulted by an aggressive neighbour with a
long police record, asked policemen how to be protected in the future since
the perpetrator had always been released after a few hours and did not seem
to stop his criminal activity. He was advised to get a private security agent, as
the police were not able to provide him and his family with any protection.
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The new legislation did not create clear limits between the state and private
security activities (AnŁelj, 1998; 2). They may appear and act simultaneously.
Private  security activity can  help  the police in the investigation  phase  by
apprehending the criminal or by providing useful information about him or her
(Dvorek, 1998; 120). This could be treated as a public/private partnership in
crime prevention.
After the enactment of new legislation many private security agencies were
established. Today we have 11 major agencies in Slovenia with 1763 employees
(ranging between 50 to 355 employees each). Among other tasks they provide
security services for more than 6000 buildings and can field more than 60 mobile
squads. One of the agencies specialised in protecting property in stores has
apprehended more than 3000 perpetrators over the last few years.
The equipment the agencies have at their disposal is often more sophisticated
and expensive than what the police can afford (BalaŁià, 1998; 39).
Some experts within the police system say that the potential for police
deterrence has become limited, but mass crime and organised crime does not
stagnate. The considerable amount of private security activity therefore implies
that the strategic possibility for the police to use those resources which had
previously been used for situational crime prevention, should now be directed
towards the deterrence of organised and other dangerous crime (Dvoršek, 1998;
120).
However, the rise of private investigation and private security systems brings
with it some problems.
Private security has become a business. Unified standards do not exist regard-
ing the ethical neutrality of those in the sector, nor is the ideal of justice strictly
followed. The police are expected to follow the rules and obey the law much
more meticulously than are private agencies (Peàar, 1977).
This opinion seems to be confirmed by the attitudes evident in the following
citation from V. BalaŁià, Director of the Association of Private Investigation
Agencies:
”Reporters who, in the mass media, protect thieves and impostors are con-
stantly endangering the work of private investigators; the reporters are capable
of ruining any private detective or agency if they decide to. On the other hand,
politicians and reporters are protected by court, in that they are never punished
for what they do to private detectives. The work of private investigation
agencies is regulated by law so that they have to comply with the same
standards as the police. That was something the detectives were most afraid
of. Therefore, people prefer to hire ”detectives” without a licence, who
guarantee more discretion and protection of human rights (?!)” (BalaŁià, 1998;
32-34; emphasis by D.P.) BalaŁià continues by suggesting that ”anything
connected with detecting crime seems to be forbidden”, and that ”vigilante
movements that were about to regain their value were regretfully suppressed
a few years ago” (ibid, 39,42).
These statements provide evidence that we should carefully evaluate the
positive and negative effects of private investigation agencies and how much
effort is needed to establish a partnership instead of envious competition in
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preventing crime. We obviously have a lot to learn, since the privatisation of
activities which were formerly within the police jurisdiction is a new phenome-
non for countries in transition.
b) Private initiatives for the protection of victims
So far in Slovenia, victim protection programmes are rather dispersed, and are
primarily run by individual non-governmental organizations. In spite of a few
years’experience, such activities have suffered from an obvious lack of scientific
and professional background. Programmes depended primarily on volunteers
who were interested in dealing with victims.
In the beginning of 1998 a private agency, ”B&Z”, that had been chartered by
the state to help unemployed persons, organised thorough and fundamental
training in helping victims. The program was in accordance with the United
Nations Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse
of Power (General Assembly Resolution 40/34).
The persons who were to become advisers in the victim support programme
were carefully selected, with consideration to such qualifications as integrity, a
humanitarian approach and a university degree. They had to have a good ability
to communicate with people, lead groups, give support and be capable of
empathy. Furthermore, they should not be primarily aggressive towards delin-
quents. They had to undergo several months of training conducted by the leading
experts and university teachers in the field. Their training included subjects such
as victimology, criminology, psychology, penal law, criminal procedure and
sensitivity training.
In July 1998 the B&Z agency established 11 centres for victims of criminal
offences in all the major cities in Slovenia. Simultaneously, a communication
network was established among all the respective governmental organisations
(police,  prosecution,  centres for social  work,  medical institutions, schools,
mayors) and some NGOs in order to inform as many agencies as possible about
the new project and secure the co-operation necessary for its implementation.
The table below shows the increase in the number of victims seeking help
from the newly established centres:
July (1998) 6
August 43
September 96
October 108
These numbers seem small, even though they may show a significant increase
over time. Nonetheless, it should be recalled that Slovenia is a small country with
only two million inhabitants. From this point of view, the total number of 253
victims in less than four months is far from being negligible. When asked for
help, centres for victims react in several ways.. The first is by providing support.
This means that someone is always there when needed. ”Always” means 24 hours
a day and free of charge. The adviser at the centre has to create an atmosphere
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of confidence, benevolence and understanding; he or she must be capable of
providing emotional support and the relevant information. The next phase is
classification. Special knowledge is needed in order to determine which agency
is most suitable for helping victims. Due to the good relations that are established
with the victims, we are able to identify their needs for further treatment. The
final phase is advocacy in terms of social activity and definitely not in terms of
legal activity, since there is no such provision in the legislation. Advocacy as a
social activity means the providing of emotional support and practical help with
contacts with the police, prosecution, investigation, court or when confronted
with the perpetrator (Helping Victims, 1998; 5,20).
c) Vigilante movements
In a small country with a relatively peaceful atmosphere in respect to crime,
public opinion and the mass media are shaken by every major case of violence.
As a consequence of such crimes, even though they are rare, informal ”commit-
tees” have been founded, consisting of anyone who feels able to contribute to
resolving victim/crime problems. The major problem with such committees is
that the initiators are usually those who are somehow closely related to the victim.
Some years ago I discussed the  problem of victims who become  judges
(Petrovec, 1996), and the unavoidable side effects that go with such a change in
roles. This very situation has been confirmed in a few cases we have experienced
in the last two years.
The first was the case of alleged violence against a young 13-year-old girl who
became pregnant after living with her 20-year-old friend for a year. He was
prosecuted for having committed a sexual assault on a child. The problem was
that they were both living in a gypsy community according to their tradition.
It has been well known that most of the girls there are sexually mature at that
age and many of them live married lives in accordance with the gypsy tradition
and have children, even though in the light of criminal law they are themselves
treated as children. In fact, it is not surprising to find 13-year-old girls with
their own children. Two eminent experts who have conducted research on life
in gypsy communities were appointed by the judge to present to the court an
opinion on this case. They both stated that this has been the gypsy way of life,
and has not changed for decades. The judge acquitted the defendant on the
grounds of a mistake of law (error iuris), with the reasoning that the perpetrator
justifiably had not known that such an offence was unlawful.
The sentence aroused much discussion in public; demonstrations were organ-
ised in the capital and even some university teachers were involved, especially
from the feminist movement.
On the appeal of the state prosecutor, the High Court vacated the judgement
and remanded the case to the court of first instance for retrial and new
disposition. In a new trial a suspended sentence was passed on the perpetrator,
and public opinion seemed to be satisfied that justice had been done. Nobody
was aware of the paradox of the sentence:at the time of the trial the young girl
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was already 14 and could not be treated as a minor. This meant that the young
man could not repeat the offence he had been sentenced for.
An overall impression was that the court bowed to the pressure of public
opinion, which had been stimulated by ”moral entrepreneurs”, and the court
rendered a sentence that it never would have in a neutral atmosphere. Finally it
should be mentioned that over the past 50 years this is the single case that has
been brought to court regarding such behaviour among gypsies, regardless of
how unacceptable the practice is to the rest of the community.
Another case, occasionally still discussed in the mass media, including TV,
was the rape of an 11-year-old girl that had happened at school. The girl
identified the perpetrator bon the basis of pictures shown to her. As the offender
seemed to be a 13-year-old boy from the same school, no investigation in terms
of criminal procedure was possible since he was treated as a minor. Neverthe-
less experts in police laboratories tried to find more solid evidence than mere
identification by the victim. The results were not convincing. The Centre for
Social Work, which was the only institution authorised to decide upon the
measures to be taken against the boy, hesitated, since there was no clear
evidence. Meanwhile a ”committee for the protection of victim” had been
founded in order to accelerate proceedings against the boy. The mass media
have repeatedly been informing the public of the fact that the young boy is a
criminal ”beyond a reasonable doubt”. The policemen who investigated the
case (within the limits of their jurisdiction with respect to the minor) and the
state prosecutor who wrote that it was absolutely clear who did it, gave the
very same evaluation. The Ministry for Schools and Education that had to
decide on whether or not to transfer the boy to another school also hesitated.
Four independent experts were appointed to assess the circumstances of the
crime. After careful examination of all the evidence and separate work, all of
them unanimously decided that there was no evidence that this boy had
committed the crime. It was much more probable that another person, not yet
known, had in fact been the offender.
Such a conclusion was totally unacceptable to the committee, consisted of
some persons who once themselves had been victims, and of the victim’s
parents, who still firmly believe that they knew who did it. The conclusion
was also totally unacceptable to the mass media, which could not admit that
it had published false allegations and were engaged in a ”lynching” of the
young boy. Furthermore, it seems that the committee has done more harm to
the victim than the perpetrator himself, whoever it might be. Her parents
namely reject any help offered by experts, psychiatrists, psychologists, until
the boy is treated according to their expectations, which is at least to be
expelled from school.
In spite of the predominantly bitter experiences with overly aggressive and
narrow-minded vigilante committees, often composed of persons who once were
victims, some experts emphasise that these committees have certain positive
influences. The police are less and less able to control crime; therefore a private
or public interest in preventing crime is welcome. Finally, vigilante movements,
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especially in local communities, are said to reduce fear of crime that may be
more noxious than crime itself (Pe ar, 1998; 274).
It seems, however, that we should not expect vigilantes to become a force
parallel to the state agencies in preventing crime. Reactions against crime and
criminals are not tempered; they are based to much on emotion, primarily hatred
and aggression. For this reason it will occur too rarely that actions against crime
are in accordance with the law. In that case, regardless of the best intentions (with
which the road to hell is paved) it is not far from crime.
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Public/Private Partnerships in Crime Prevention
The SSP-Co-operation in Denmark
by Karsten Ive
1 Background
The Crime Prevention Council in Denmark was established in 1971, more by
necessity than by choice. Crime rates had been very stable until the 1960s, but
then in the course of only a few years, there was a veritable explosion in the
number of criminal offences and law-breaking. This situation was very much
similar to what occurred in most countries in the Western hemisphere. At the
same time, during the early 1970s, a major reform of the decentralised structures
in the administration took place. One result of this was that several small
municipalities (1280 in number) were combined into large municipal units (275
in number), and the number of counties was reduced from 25 to 14. The
organisation of the police was also reviewed. This led to a reduction in the number
of police districts from 72 to 54. One consequence (among others) of these
reforms was a weakening of social control and a need to develop advice regarding
co-ordination in cross-disciplinary questions at the local level.
Urbanisation and the disintegration of traditional family patterns and life styles
left their mark; a massive increase in crime was and continues to be a dark side
of modern society.
New avenues had to be explored to stop this development – and the Crime
Prevention Council was established with the following declaration of intent: ”To
work for the prevention of crime by implementing measures to promote security,
by spreading information or by any other expedient means”.
The Council has had a broad foundation from the beginning, with more than
40 public and private organisations providing the 80 members who serve on
various committees. The Council is headed by an executive committee while a
permanent staff – the secretariat – handles day-to-day tasks. The secretariat
co-ordinates the work of the different working groups and handles case work,
teaching, information and co-ordination. The secretariat has a versatile staff
whose backgrounds range from the police to law, sociology, education and social
work.
2 Some basic considerations regarding
crime and crime prevention
It is well documented that different factors have to be present at the same time
before a crime can be committed. These factors include (1) a person (the potential
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perpetrator), who has the ability and willingness to commit a crime; (2) an object
(a person or a physical thing) that seems attractive to the perpetrator; and (3) a
lack of capable guardians in a specific situation, either in the form of formal
control (such as the police or surveillance equipment) or in the form of informal
(social) control, based on the presence of other persons in the area. Other and
more detailed factors could be added. However, these factors have been indicated
in order to stress the need for a multi-sectoral approach in crime prevention.
Crime prevention can not be seen solely as a question of criminal policy or as
a problem that should be dealt with only by the legal system. Crime prevention
covers a range of different areas of policies: policies of social welfare, of
education, of housing, of cultural questions and so forth.
As society is constantly and more rapidly undergoing rather large changes,
one should be keep in mind that new areas of policies should be represented in
crime prevention. To put it in another way, crime prevention strategies must be
under constant review, and the strategies should be very flexible in order to cover
the actual situation. This means that the work on building an efficient crime
prevention programme never ends.
The ”ultimate crime prevention programme” has not been developed, nor will
it ever be.
As pointed out previously, the individual criminal act depends on different
factors on the local level and in society. This means that activities and initiatives
for the prevention of crime must have their point of departure at the local level,
and the activities should reflect the needs and possibilities of the local commu-
nity.
In order to facilitate the local crime prevention work, some type of advisory
board has to be established. The main tasks of this board should be to establish
an overview of the trends in crime and of the causes of crime, to work out methods
of crime prevention that take into consideration the different types of efforts and
activities, and, based on this knowledge, to provide advice to the local munici-
palities and police districts.
3 Crime prevention policies in Denmark
The above-mentioned considerations on crime and crime prevention were fun-
damentally taken into account when setting up the Crime Prevention Council in
Denmark. They continue to characterize the way in which crime prevention is
carried out in Denmark today.
The main headline of crime prevention is that only joint action can achieve
results. This headline is reflected in the way that the Council is organized – as
an umbrella, covering more than 40 different public and private organisations,
bringing into the Council knowledge and experience about various parts of
society. It is also reflected in the way in which crime prevention is organized and
carried out at the municipal level, through the cross-disciplinary SSP Co-opera-
tion.
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The second headline could be described by stressing that crime prevention has
two starting points or domains which, in principle, are very different. These two
domains are of equal importance and should be dealt with simultaneously.
One domain covers what we call prevention of victimization. This comprises
advice to citizens on what measures to take so as not to become victims of crime.
We describe this as ”objective crime prevention”. In the international context,
the phrase ”situational crime prevention” has been used.
The other principal domain covers activities aimed at inducing people, typi-
cally children and young persons, to refrain from engaging in criminal conduct.
Using the WHO definition of health, we call this ”opting for a good life”. This
type of activity we describe as subjective crime prevention, internationally
known as social prevention.
Since the beginning of the 1980s the importance of finding the proper balance
between these two domains has continued to grow due to the development of
new – and reasonably priced– technical equipment designed to safeguard prop-
erty. The use of technical or electronic means of protection can in itself give rise
to a sense of being unsafe in public areas. This could lead to a vicious circle,
where there are constantly escalating demands for more protection.
In this context crime prevention in Denmark is seen as a tool to maintain an
open society as well as a sense of well-being for all citizens. From the crime
prevention point of view, there is an urgent need for stressing this issue of balance
when discussing and choosing the way to handle crime problems.
It can be said that, throughout the years in Denmark, this issue has been a
specific theme in crime prevention policies (as has been the situation also in the
other Nordic countries).
The third basic principle or policy governing the Danish approach concerns
the involvement of citizens themselves. They should not be passive recipients of
a ”public” service; they should contribute actively to providing the framework
for ”the good life”.
In practice this means that the different public services have a duty to provide
information to the public and to specific target groups on crime problems and on
how to prevent crime from occurring. It also means that the professionals – for
example, schoolteachers, social workers and police officers – should be aware
of trends in lifestyle and conditions of life among groups of citizens in order to
develop proposals for preventive activities. It also means that the professionals
should facilitate the possibilities of citizens to become involved in crime preven-
tive activities.
In order to provide the necessary framework for this joint public and private
partnership, in 1975 the Crime Prevention Council established the SSP Co-op-
eration scheme.
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4 The central aim and types of effort
invoved in SSP Co-operation
In Denmark, Schools, Social services and the Police are all directly obliged by
law to carry out crime preventive work in the widest possible sense. At the same
time, it is specifically these three organisations that have a thorough knowledge
of and close contact with children and young people in their local area. To ensure
a relevant and effective effort, it was natural to bring the three parties that are
especially responsible for the well-being and upbringing of children and young
people together in commitment and partnership. In this partnership, the focus is
on finding the reasons why children and young people commit crimes, and on
responding to these causes. This means that the area of crime preventive work
also encompasses the prevention of, for example, alcohol and drug misuse.
However, it is not only the social services, the primary schools and the police
which are in a position to prevent crime among children and young people.
Also other organisations, such as clubs, housing estates and sports clubs have
considerable knowledge of and contact with children and young people. These
organisations should therefore be part of the shared crime preventive effort in
the local area.
SSP co-operation is particularly aimed at children and young people. The
effort is to be initiated as early as possible and preferably before the traditional
sanctions have been brought into use.
The central aim of SSP co-operation is defined as being
• to build up a local network that
• has a crime preventive effect on the daily life of children and young people.
The activities or efforts of SSP co-operation is divided into three different types
or levels of action, depending on the target group and the goal:
The general effort is aimed at target groups that have not shown signs of
criminal behaviour. The general effort is concentrated on working on the causes
of crime among some children and young people.
The specific effort is specifically directed towards groups of children and
young people who have been in trouble with the law or who show signs of
suffering from child neglect with regard to care and upbringing.
The individual effort is individual and directed at people who have already
committed crime. The aim is to prevent a relapse.
In respect of individual efforts, it is generally agreed that this type of action
(due to rules of confidentiality and to the fact that the situation mostly calls for
treatment rather than preventive measures) should be handled by the professional
civil servants. Private organisations and private individuals should be brought in
only with the full acceptance of the child/youngster and his or her parents.
In respect of general efforts and specific efforts, a full-scale partnership
between civil servants and the private sector is possible, and this is generally
recommended by the Crime Prevention Council.
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5 The SSP local network
Based on more than 20 years of experience on what works, the Council today
recommends that the local network be developed on three levels:
• the management level,
• the co-ordinating level, and
• the implementation level.
These three levels should also be clear in the organizational model that is
selected. Local conditions, such as the size of the municipality, the geography
and the composition of the population, should be decisive in deciding how best
to plan the organisation.
On the management level the task is to establish the general framework for
the joint crime prevention effort of the municipalities, and to ensure that it is
possible to fill out this framework. This implies that one works out a joint and
local declaration of intent for the SSP co-operation (and selects the target groups).
It also implies that one earmarks the necessary resources, either in terms of staff
or money (or both). To enhance smooth co-operation, it is also necessary at this
level to clearly allocate competence down the levels of the organisation, so that
the organisation can act quickly and efficiently in the tasks to be undertaken.
Members of the management level should include the (politically elected)
chairmen of the municipal school board and social board, as well as the Chief
Constable.
On the co-ordinating level the most important task is to establish crime
preventive work as laid down in the declaration of intent and within the frame-
work of the resources at their disposal. This is to say that one should ensure that
the work is co-ordinated and that the crime preventive effort in the municipality
is evaluated and followed up. Moreover, it is on this level that contact must be
taken with the people who are to be in charge of the practical crime preventive
effort in the area.
Another important task on the co-ordinating level is to collect information
about the development in crime in the specific local areas. It is also important to
gather general information on the conditions of children and young people in the
municipality. This includes the young people’s use of alcohol and drugs, and the
possibilities of recreational activities that are available for children and young
people.
The co-ordinating level should also gather information on the experiences of
crime preventive efforts in other municipalities. Lastly, it is important to pass on
information, so that the goals of the work can be appropriately adjusted.
It has proved expedient to establishing a co-ordinating committee to handle
the tasks on the co-ordinating level. The members of this committee should be
employed in the school administration, the social administration and the police,
persons who, by virtue of their standing, have the authority to make decisions
regarding what efforts are to be undertaken and how to use the resources at their
disposal.
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In order to ensure that important information is passed on to the entire
organisation, a specifically assigned SSP consultant should be a member of or
secretary of the committee.
The implementation level is responsible for the actual crime preventive work.
One factor that is critical to success is that the management level and the
co-ordinating committee are clear in their instructions.
It is also important that crime preventive work has priority, and is a necessary
part of the work of each individual institution. A crime prevention culture should
be established in the same way as the already existing cultural tradition in
teaching and social treatment has been established.
It is on the implementation level that the staff is in daily and direct contact
with children, young people and their parents. This contact takes place in many
different contexts, such as for example clubs, sports clubs, schools, social
services, the local police, and in residential areas. For this reason it is not possible
to lay down a blueprint for how preventive work should be carried out. This
depends on the specific situation.
The management level and the co-ordinating committee both have their
authority invested in their position. Nonetheless, it is important on the imple-
mentation level to involve all local people and institutions who work with
children and young people in crime preventive work. In addition to repre-
sentatives from schools, the social service and the police, it is relevant on a
voluntary basis to involve people from for example youth clubs, sports clubs,
housing estates, and parents associations.
In the Council’s experience cross-disciplinary district committees in the local
areas or town districts can be a source of inspiration and development for the
work. The composition of such district committees will naturally depend on local
conditions. The composition of the district committee will characteristically be
considerably broader than the co-ordinating committee, and they will consist of
representatives from all the institutions and organisations that work with children
and young people in the local area.
In the autumn of 1998 a survey of the municipalities that has established an
SSP organisation was conducted. This survey showed that about 245 out of 275
municipalities have implemented the SSP partnership as a joint public and private
way of preventing crime.
6 The need for a permanent effort
in crime prevention
Discussions on or the implementation of a crime prevention programme are often
initiated by a concrete problem or situation. The decisions on a course of action
are made with the intent to solve a concrete problem. The organisation that is
established reflects the situation, and when the actual problem has been solved,
no further action is taken.
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These problem solving partnerships may actually solve the concrete problem.
Even so, from the point of view of crime prevention they will not bring lasting
results.
There are several reasons why this type of programmes cannot fulfil the
demands of crime prevention.
First, it should be noted that crime prevention is a multi-sectoral discipline.
This means that a tradition of cross-disciplinary work should be established.
The groups of civil servants involved must get to know, in a broad sense, the
working conditions of the other groups, and a basis of mutual respect must be
established.
This process takes time, and until the necessary common platform is estab-
lished, no co-ordinated action can be taken.
In the meantime the actual problem will be growing – and new problems may
rise that are not dealt with in a proper manner.
Secondly, the problem-oriented approach to the task means that the partner-
ship will come to an end when the actual or concrete problem has been solved.
If new problems should rise – and they will – one must start from the very
beginning once again, by establishing a mutual platform. One consequence of
this will be that efforts can not be initiated at an early stage.
Moreover, the work on crime prevention can not become ”professional”. The
work will be characterized by its random nature and by the way solutions are
developed on an in casu basis.
Regrettably, this has been shown several times in Denmark as well as in many
other countries.
The SSP co-operation is a constant way of structuring crime prevention, a way
that is continuously aware of new trends and that is thus capable of dealing with
new phenomena before they grow to become problems. One could say that SSP
is a ”problem preventive partnership”.
And it is precisely this that is the central point: crime problems should be
prevented at an early stage, and one should not be forced to react to problems
that have already emerged. Should problems emerge – and that will happen –
they must be dealt with. Even so, the overriding aim when developing crime
prevention efforts should be to prevent problems from emerging.
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Crimes Related to the Computer
Network. Threats and Opportunities:
A Criminological Perspective
Dr Andrzej Adamski
Nicholas Copernicus University, Torun, Poland
I Introduction
Crimes of the ”Net” are receiving high profile media coverage and increasing
attention from the authorities. On the other hand, there is little evidence or
scientific analysis on the role that the information technology plays in the
processes of making laws, of breaking laws, and of reacting toward the breaking
of laws. In most European countries, centralised computer crime statistics are
scarcely available, despite the general adherence of much of Europe to the
normative standards regarding computer crime provided by Recommendation
No. R (89) 9 of the Council of Europe (Kaspersen, 1997). The Internet, a
potentially huge area for research into criminal and deviant behaviour, is rela-
tively new. For this reason, research is sparse. Nonetheless, the pioneers in
cybercriminology have already appeared (Mann and Sutton, 1998).
This paper focuses both on the phenomenology and prevention of crimes
committed in the computer network environment. The paper attempts to provide
an evaluation of available data for the purposes of further research and policy
formulation. This will be done in three major steps driven by the basic tenets of
the opportunity theory (Cohen and Felson, 1979), according to which the level
of crime is determined by the availability of suitable targets, the presence of
motivated offenders, and the absence of capable guardians (Clark and Homel,
1997).
Accordingly, at the beginning of the paper, the Internet-related threats to and
opportunities for the use of the computer network, both as the target and the tool
of criminal activities, will be outlined. On the basis of available data some general
observations concerning trends in information technology crime (IT-crime) and
recent changes that have occurred in the ”electronic underground’ among the
population of hackers will also be made.
Subsequently, the issue of the prevention of computer crime will be addressed.
In compliance with the propositions of the opportunity theory, I will discuss not
only technological means and strategies aimed at the reduction of opportunities
to offending, but also factors that increase the risk of apprehension of a computer
offender.
An initial intention in the drafting of this paper was to look at these issues
primarily from the European perspective. However, this turned out to be difficult
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to accomplish, in view of the relative scarcity of criminological studies on
computer network related crime that have been carried out in the ”old world”
countries. For  this reason,  the empirical findings  presented below are  not
confined to Europe, but also come from research conducted in the United States
and Australia – the world leaders in computer rates and computing power per
1000 population according to international statistics (Young, 1993).
It is trite to point out that computer crime could not be committed before
computers were invented, apparently during the late 1940s. It is, however, more
illuminating to note that the history of social control over unauthorised use of
computers dates back to the late 1970s, and follows milestone achievements in
the development of computer technology:
• Batch computing and timesharing during the 1960s;
• Distributed computing during the 1970s;
• Network personal computing during the 1980s;
• Co-operative computing during the 1990s; and we are now moving toward
• Global information utilities of the twenty-first century (Coldren, 1996).
As Hollinger (1997) indicates, the written record about crime and deviance
committed by means of computers can be divided into at least four distinct
periods: the period of the discovery of computer abuse (1946-1976), the crimi-
nalization of computer crime (1977-1987), the demonization of hackers (1988-
1992), and the censorship period (1993-present). Although these periods may
perfectly fit developments that had taken place in the United States, the evolution
that they depict did not occurred at the same time and in a similar sequence in
many other, less computer-dependent countries, with, perhaps, the one possible
exception concerning the last stage in Hollinger’s outline.
During the mid-1990s, national restrictions on the freedom of speech on the
nascent information infrastructures became commonplace among lawmakers not
only in the United States, but around the globe: governments, claiming that they
want to protect children, thwart terrorists and silence racists and hate-mongers,
are rushing to eradicate freedom of expression on the Internet (Human Rights
Watch, 1996). With an estimated 40 million users in 150 countries in 1995, the
Internet has reached its critical mass, and the increasing internationalisation and
commercialisation of this global computer network gave rise to a number of legal,
social and commercial policy questions ranging from pricing and taxation to
privacy, security and prosecution of cybercrimes.
1 Net-related threats
The first computer networks established during the late 1960s were developed
in order to facilitate communication within a relatively small group of scientists
who generally knew and trusted one another. Moreover and for the military
reasons, the network protocols that make data transfer and communication
possible were originally designed for openness and flexibility, not for security.
During the ”Information Age”, the communications systems and computer
networks of commercial, educational and government sectors are increasingly
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intertwined. Just as any telephone in the world can access any other, any
computer system can potentially connect up and share information with any other
networked computer system. Since there are no underlying controls of access
within networks such as the Internet, each individual computer system and
network must maintain its own access control (Anderson, 1997).
Computer technology, while useful and even indispensable in many areas of
human activity, is also vulnerable to various risks. These risks are believed to
increase as society becomes more dependent on information processing and
communication. For this reason, the governments of the societies which are most
heavily dependent on information technology (IT) are most anxious about the
potential for significant loss if their systems are disrupted.
” … the Internet and other advances in information technology do not merely
give criminals new means to commit traditional crimes like theft or fraud.
They also allow criminals and other malicious actors to cause new types of
harm that go well beyond the potential loss to the individual victims and can
affect our national economy and, indeed, our national security” (Vatis, 1998).
Computer networks provide opportunities for the commission of an extensive
range of illegal acts that pose serious threat to the public welfare, morality and
the capability of the criminal justice authorities to protect society from crime. In
addition to traditional crimes such as paedophilia and child pornography, money
laundering, drug trafficking, embezzlements of bank deposits, fraud (credit card
numbers), industrial and political espionage, a number of IT-specific malevolent
attacks against the security of critical infrastructures such as telecommunication,
banking or emergency services may be launched throughout computer networks
across national borders.
In anticipation of these threats, the need for an international plan to investigate
and prosecute trans-national crime related to computer networks was recognised
by Justice and Interior Ministers from the group of P-8 countries (Reuters, 12
December 1997). A similar action has been initiated at the regional level by the
European Commission. Its Action Plan on promoting safe use of the Internet
aims at combatting harmful and illegal content on the Internet and its misuse
through criminal activities directed against a wide range of legally protected
interests such as:
• national security (instructions on bomb-making, illegal drug production,
terrorist activities);
• protection of minors (abusive form of marketing, violence, pornography);
• protection of human dignity (incitement to racial hatred and racial discrimi-
nation);
• economic security (fraud, instructions on pirating credit cards);
• information security (malicious hacking);
• protection of privacy (unauthorised communication of personal data, elec-
tronic harassment;
• protection of reputation (libel, unlawful comparative advertising);
• intellectual property (unauthorised distribution of copyrighted works, e.g.
software or music) (EU Commission, 1996).
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In April 1997, members of the European Parliament proposed the enactment of
legislation against certain cybercrimes (e.g., pornography, paedophilia and racist
material) and introduced other measures such as establishing teams of cyber-
police to monitor the ”Net”, requiring industry self-regulation, and concluding
international agreements on cooperation in enforcement (IELR, June 1997).
Within the framework of the Council of Europe, a recently appointed Commit-
tee of Experts on Crime in Cyberspace (PC-CY) is seeking to identify and define
new Internet crimes. One of the tasks of the Committee is to set standards of
jurisdictional rights and criminal liabilities in respect of the transborder informa-
tion flows on the Internet (http://ww.coe.fr /europa40/e/9710/internet.htm).
A rising awareness of threats related to the use of information technology
within the business sector is reflected in a recent survey of 159 large Australian
organisations, the representatives of which were asked to specify those forms of
computer-related crime that they expect to have an increasing impact on their
organisations over the next five years (Table 1).
In the computer technology field, the past is not a good predictor of the future.
Even so, if we consider the above findings as symptomatic of the most unwel-
come scenario of IT development for the business community, the forecast is
simple: there will be a growing threat of attacks on computer systems via
telecommunications networks, theft of telecommunication services and the use
of computers to commit fraud and crimes of data manipulation.
Type of Computer Crime Number of Respondents
Hacking or system intrusion
Misuse of telecommunication services
Greater use of encryption
Use of malicious code
Theft
Intellectual property offences
Fraud
Increase in potential for virtual crimes
Shift from conventional crimes
Use of false identities
Information warfare
Emergence of a ”black” information market
E-cash theft and counterfeiting
Forgery
Vir tual company crime
Electronic extortion
Emergence of organised crime group
Money laundering
Others
114
90
76
54
53
49
46
30
24
23
21
17
14
12
11
11
9
6
2
Source: Office of Strategic Crime Assessments and Victoria Police 1997 (after Smith, 1998)
Table 1. Computer crime vulnerabilities of the future.
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However, if one poses another question, that of whether or not the current
trends in computer crime justify such predictions, the answer is less definite.
Although some common-sense arguments and a number of surveys support the
view that ”cybercrime surge and pose a serious international threat”, there is also
evidence which suggests that the ”Internet is a pretty safe place” and that there
is no reason for alarm.
2 Categories of crimes related to the computer network
Computer networks such as the Internet or networks providing major on-line
services can in theory be abused by a wide variety of criminals for their purposes.
The wide range of offences in which networks play a part can be divided roughly
into two broad categories:
a) crimes geared specifically to the network and the related data-processing
systems (i.e., offences against computer and information security);
b) crimes for which computer networks provide a new opportunity for the
commission of traditional offences (such as fraud, industrial espionage and
child pornography).
Both of these categories fall within a broader class of ”IT crimes” or ”offences
connected with information  technology”, which encompasses  any criminal
offence in the investigation of which investigating authorities must obtain access
to information being processes or transmitted in electronic data processing
systems (Council of Europe, 1995).
2.1 Computer security offences
Computer and information security is commonly held to consist of three prop-
erties: confidentiality, integrity and availability, of which confidentiality relates
to who gets to read information, integrity assures that data and programs are
exchanged only in a specified and authorised manner, and availability assures
that authorised users have continued access and resources (OECD, 1992).
Availability is the most important attribute in service-oriented business that
depends on information. Malicious overloading of the system with ”spamming”
or ”electronic mail-bombing” are among the most common attacks against the
availability of computing resources. In the case of ”e-mail bombings”, an attacker
floods the target system with nuisance electronic mail (e-mail), which causes the
hard disk of the target system to reach its storage limits, and the system to stop
processing. In effect, so-called ”denial of service” (DoS) occurs. DoS attacks
can range from simple ”ping floods”, which prevent people from using networks
by clogging them with useless packets, to carefully co-ordinated protocol attacks
(such as the recent ”teardrop” attack). Among the most likely targets of DoS
attacks are the Internet Service Providers (ISP). Recent statistics from a large
ISP suggest that 80% of the attacks on it are denial of service and only 20% are
penetrations. In addition, the majority of attacks seem to come from Europe –
and half of those come from the Netherlands (Kabay, 1998).
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Confidentiality and integrity specifically refer to the prevention of disclosure,
alteration or deletion of the information contained in computer files. Integrity is
particularly important for critical safety (e.g., air traffic control), and financial
data used for activities such as electronic funds transfers and financial account-
ing. Confidentiality, in turn, constitutes an important attribute of medical and
insurance  records,  research data,  new product  specifications and  corporate
investment strategies. Unauthorised access, however, is critical for all aspects of
computer and information security. Once compromised, the system is then used
for such infringements of confidentiality and integrity as unauthorised reading
or copying of data, introduction of incorrect data, its alteration, additions, etc.
These infringements may in turn constitute offences and result in criminal
responsibility for their perpetrators (Diagram 1).
In the network environment, the primary security goal is preventing attackers
from taking control of the targeted system:
” (...) the most common type of attack seen on the Internet appears to be
motivated by the objective to gain access to a superuser or root account on a
Unix-based computer system. More specifically, the access sought is to a
command interpreter or shell which has full access to the computer. In other
words, the access sought is to a process that is operating (the shell) and not
necessarily to the files” (Howard, 1997).
By taking control over the system or by compromising this system, the
ultimate objective of an attacker can be accomplished. From this perspective,
computer security extends to preventing crimes such as fraud, espionage, extor-
tion, vandalism, and terrorism – not only the protection of availability, integrity
and confidentiality of information itself.
This is also why some governments and expert groups are currently consid-
ering the criminalization of trafficking in wrongfully obtained computer pass-
words and other information about means of obtaining unauthorised access to
computer systems or various information services (such as coded TV).
Security attribute Type of attack Legal classification
Availability Denial of service Computer sabotage offence
Integrity Deliberate introduction of
a malicious programme into
a system
Damage to computer data
offence
Confidentiality Break-in to the system,
eavesdropping on data
Unauthorised access
offence, unauthorised
interception offence
Diagram 1. Attacks against the security of computer systems as criminal offences.
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2.2 Digital forms of ‘old’ crime
From the law enforcement perspective, the Internet is simply a new medium
used to commit traditional offences. The best example is fraud, which can take
a number of new forms on the Internet, such as impersonation, theft of credit
information from digital communications, fraudulent electronic banking, elec-
tronic gambling or lottery frauds, and e-mail pyramid sales frauds (De-
loitte&Touche, 1997).
The on-line activity of fraudsters is as varied as in the physical world, and may
also include telecommunication and telemarketing fraud, deceptive advertising,
securities fraud and ”carding”. Many of these activities can be deemed to be
Internet-assisted crimes. In other words, the Internet’s capabilities as a medium
for publishing and communication are misused for the commission of criminal
acts. For example:
”The Internet allows a fraudster to set out a site on the World Wide Web
(”WWW”) which claims to be the site of a reputable company or organisation.
Victims are then induced to part with funds via credit card payments, or
induced to reveal valuable information. At least one major international bank
is known, confidentially, to have suffered from this although details of losses
are not available” (Deloitte&Touche, 1997).
Fraudulent schemes on the Internet are monitored by the US National Con-
sumers League. The top ten subjects of reports to its Internet Fraud Watch in
1997 have been related to rapidly developing ”e-commerce” and included:
• Web Auctions – items bid for but never delivered by the sellers, value of items
inflated, shills suspected of driving up bids, prices hiked after the highest bids
have already been accepted;
• Internet Services – charges for services that were supposedly free, payment
for online and Internet services that were never provided or falsely repre-
sented;
• General Merchandise – sales of everything from T-shirts to toys, calendars to
collectibles, goods never delivered or that were not as advertised;
• Computer Equipment/Software – sales of computer products that were never
delivered or misrepresented;
• Pyramids/MLMs – schemes in which any profits were made from recruiting
others, not from sales of goods or services to the end-users;
• Business Opportunities/Franchises – empty promises of big profits with little
or no work by investing in pre-packaged businesses or franchise operations;
• Work-at-Home Plans – materials and equipment sold with the false promise
of payment for piece work performed at home;
• Credit Card Issuing – false promises of credit cards to people with bad credit
histories on payment of up-front fees;
• Prizes/Sweepstakes – requests for up-front fees to claim winnings that were
never awarded;
• Book Sales – genealogies, self-help improvement books, and other publications
that were never delivered or misrepresented (http://www.fraud.org).
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Nonetheless, the Internet  security risks for consumers  seem to  be  grossly
overblown. According to Business Week reports, online fraud is insignificant
compared to ordinary cheque fraud. The American Bankers Association esti-
mates that cheque fraud costs banks $10 billion a year, while online fraud is
running only about 0.05% of that ($5 million a year) (Busch).
”Carding” is the unauthorised use of a credit card of its legitimate holder in
so-called ”card-not-present” transactions where the customer is not physically
present at the merchant’s location and simply gives a credit card number over
the telephone or the Internet. The police in Poland are currently investigating a
case in which a group of young people, mostly university students, have ordered
and obtained under false pretences from the United States ”carding” computer
equipment and other goods worth US$ 122,000.
In the opinion of security experts, hacking a credit card number over the
Internet requires sophisticated programming knowledge. For this reason it is
much easier for an offender to steal a credit card number from a restaurant or gas
station receipt than it is to hack it from the Internet. If asked about the risks of
credit card transactions over the Internet, the reply of experts is usually that the
risk of sending a credit card number unencrypted over the Internet is no greater
than giving it over the telephone or the fax-machine (Busch).
However, there is a risk of ”identity theft” on a massive scale, which is tied to
the concentration of a huge amount of sensitive personal information held on
laptop computers or improperly secured servers. To cite only one example, in
1996 a laptop computer containing 314,000 credit card account numbers was
stolen from the offices of Visa International in California.
In 1997, Carlos Sadalgo Jr., 37, used a computer at the University of San
Francisco to steal 100,000 name, log-ons, credit card numbers and other data
from several Internet providers in San Diego. He encrypted the information
on a CD-ROM and offered it for sale. FBI undercover agents convinced him
they would pay $250,000 for the files. In January 1998, Sadalgo pleaded guilty
and was sentenced to 30 months in prison (O’Harrow, 1998).
Computers have been used to steal funds transmitted electronically between
banks since electronic funds transfer system were first developed (U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice, 1984). Today, with over 2,500 banks currently operating web
sites on the Internet which is also increasingly being used by banks as a delivery
channel for banking and investment services, the security of the information
systems of banks is crucial. However, even large banks are prone to the risk of
security breakdown and electronic theft. For example, Russian hackers made
almost 500 attempts to access computer networks of the Central Bank of Russia
from 1994 through 1996, and stole 250 billion rubles ($4.7M) in 1995 (Itar-Tass,
1996).
Vladimir Levin, 29, a Russian citizen and computer programmer, had gained
unauthorised access to the Citibank’s computers at Parsipenny in New Jersey
and had attempted a multi-million-dollar fraud with a laptop from St. Peters-
burg, in the Russian Federation. He was able to monitor transactions on the
accounts of substantial customers and to insert unauthorised instructions to
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make payment from those accounts to accounts opened by his accomplices in
the Netherlands, Finland, Germany, the United States and Israel. Had the
scheme been successful, sums in excess of $10,000,000 would have been
obtained. Ultimately , the Citibank lost less than $400,000 in the scam. Levin
was arrested during a trip to England and extradited to the U.S. in 1995. In
February 1998, he was sentenced to three years in prison by a U.S. judge
(Simon, 1998).
Computer networks are perceived to play an increasingly significant role in
the new international dimension of organised crime. Money laundering and fraud
are most frequently cited in this context (Adamoli et al., 1998). Whether the same
holds true for pornography, including child pornography, has not yet been
established. With an estimated annual business of $8 to $10 billion, pornography
is regarded as being organised crime’s third biggest money maker, after drugs
and gambling (US Senate Report, 1996). There is clear evidence that Internet is
widely used as a distribution channel for pornography and permits pedophiles to
communicate freely with one another, to exchange photographs and information.
Pornography on the Internet is available in different formats. These range from
pictures and short animated movies, to sound files and stories. Most of this
kind of pornographic content is available through World Wide Web (”WWW”)
pages; but sometimes they are also distributed through an older communica-
tion process, Usenet newsgroups. The Internet also makes it possible to discuss
sex, see live sex acts, and arrange sexual activities from computer screens.
There are also sex-related discussions on the Internet Relay Chat (”IRC”)
channels where users in small groups or on private channels exchange mes-
sages and files. But as with the Web and the Usenet, only a small fraction of
the IRC channels are dedicated to sex. There are more than 14,000 Usenet
discussion groups all around the world, but only around 200 groups are sex
related, some of these relating to socially valuable and legitimate discussions,
concerning, eg., homosexuality or sexual abuse (Akdeniz, 1997).
The issue of child pornography on the Internet has been the subject of little
criminological research. The only possibility of obtaining a general idea about
the dimensions of this problem seems to be through the media reports on the
cyberstring operations undertaken by the police against pedophiles and child
pornographers:
In July 1995, the British police were involved in Operation Starburst, an
international investigation of a pedophile ring which used the Internet to
distribute graphic pictures of child pornography. Nine British men were
arrested as a result of the operation, and other arrests were made throughout
Europe, America, South Africa and the Far East. The operation identified 37
men world-wide. There have been many prosecutions following ”Operation
Starburst” in the UK (for a complete list of child pornography prosecutions
in the UK see: ttp://www.leeds.ac.uk/law/pgs/yaman/watchmen. htm).
At the end of 1995, the FBI initiated its ”Innocent Images” investigation as
an outgrowth of the investigation into the disappearance of ten-year-old boy
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from Maryland. Since 1995, the co-ordinated effort of US law enforcement
and criminal justice agencies has resulted, inter alia, in 162 indictments, 161
arrests, and 184 convictions (Freeh, 1998)
In September 1997, the FBI’s Operation Rip Cord identified more than 1,500
suspected child pornographers trading pictures of minors or soliciting child
sex over the Internet. The 18-month sting operation has led to more than 120
arrests in the United States, Germany and the United Kingdom and to the
prosecution of 31 people throughout the United States. Authorities uncovered
more than 200,000 child porn images and seized over $137,000 in home
computer equipment during the investigation. Investigators were so disgusted
by the material coming across their screens that they once ripped a computer
plug from the wall, giving the sting its name (”Internet sting identifies 1,500
suspected child pornographers”, 30 September 1997, Web posted at: 9:47 a.m.
EDT (1347 GMT).
In early September 1998, the British police co-ordinated Operation Cathe-
dral, the biggest world-wide swoop on pedophiles operating on the Internet.
About one hundred persons were arrested in Europe, Australia and the United
States. In co-operation with 21 national police forces and Interpol, 32 ad-
dresses were raided in the United States, 18 in Germany, 16 in Italy, eight in
Norway, and one or two in Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Portugal and
Sweden. The pedophile ring was originally  targeted by the  UK police,
following a tip from the U.S. Customs Service (Reuters, London, Sept. 2,
1998).
U.S. Customs Service statistics show a rising number of arrests, indictments
and convictions of people who keep or distribute child pornography. In 1996,
U.S. Congress extended the liability of collectors and distributors of child
pornography to those who use computers. This legislative change has probably
had an impact on the following statistics (Table 2).
Most traditional offences can be committed with the aid of computer network
technology; if not in a form of a completed criminal act, then at least as instigation
or aiding in its commission. Even the offence of rape does not constitute an
exception. A man from Vermont who used a computer online service to try to
hire someone to rape and sexually mutilate his wife was charged with two counts
Number of offenders 1995 1996 1997 1998*
Arrested
Indicted
Convicted
48
34
35
136
134
94
173
158
178
104
104
106
* October 1997 through March 1998. Source: U.S. Customs Service
Table 2. U.S. Customs Service data on child pornography offenders.
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of hiring someone to commit kidnapping and sexual assault (Reuters, 12 Novem-
ber 1996).
Although many similar ”stories” are available over the ”Net”, they can hardly
provide an appropriate basis for criminological generalisations.
II ”The availability of suitable targets”
1 More opportunities for abuse
The opportunities for computer abuse arise from the computer technology itself,
its growing availability and its widespread use for a rising number of applica-
tions:
• organisations are becoming more dependent on IT,
• more people have access to computers,
• with each succeeding generation, children are becoming computer literate at
faster rates and at younger ages,
• more personal data and proprietary information is being stored on computers,
wide area networks are growing rapidly, and especially the Internet continues
to grow, and consequently, ”with the connection of each new segment of the
Internet, each new communications satellite launched, the land of criminal
opportunity grows larger and more complex, the job of hacker-hunting more
difficult” (Hay, Hayworth and Stowe, 1996).
All this may increase the potential for computer crime, especially those initiated
by computer hacking. In fact, as some research demonstrates, a growing propor-
tion of computer users are at risk of being invaded and harmed via the computer
network (Table 3).
Year 1996 1997 1998
No. of respondents
Proportion of respondents
experiencing some form of
intrusion within the previous
12 months
N=428
42%
N=563
49%
N=520
64%
Source: CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Surveys.
Table 3. The prevalence of computer-related victimisation among US organisations.
224
2 Computer-related victimisation surveys
Over the past 15 years a number of computer security surveys have been
conducted in the most economically developed countries, the bulk of them in the
United States and the United Kingdom. The findings of these (victimisation-
style) surveys allow the inferring of criminological observations, which would
otherwise be impossible due to the lack of availability of sound criminal justice
statistics on computer crime (Tenhunen, 1994). Survey data may, for instance,
provide a measure of the actual rate of such computer crimes as unauthorised
access, computer sabotage and damage to computer data and programs – three
basic forms of computer abuse included in the so-called minimum list of the
Council of Europe Experts Committee on Computer-related crime (Council of
Europe, 1990), and criminalized in many countries of Europe (Kaspersen, 1997).
From the perspective of the last ten years, the extent of computer crimes
appears to be expanding rapidly. A study conducted by the American Bar
Association in 1987 found that of the 300 corporations and government agencies
questioned, 72 (24 per cent) claimed to have been the victims of a computer-re-
lated abuse in the 12 months prior to the survey. A series of the UK Audit
Commission’s triennial Surveys of Computer Fraud and Abuse have demon-
strated an even more dramatic rate of increase in computer crime (Table 4).
As the above data may suggest, the extent of computer crime in Britain is
doubling every three years. However, if we take into account the distribution of
computer abuse by type in both UK and US surveys, the share of network-specific
incidents in their total volume appears to be low. Hacking, for instance, the most
classical example of network-specific abuse,154 does not exceed 8 percent of the
overall number of incidents disclosed by the British surveys (Table 5).
Year 1990 1994 1998
No. of respondents
Percentage of respondents who
suffered incidents of computer
fraud and abuse within the 3-year
period*/
N=1,537
12%
N=1,073
36%
N=900
48%
*/ The 1990 Survey has covered the 1987-1989 period, and the subsequent surveys, the 1990-1993 and
1994-1997 periods respectively. Source: The Audit Commission, 1994 and 1998.
Table 4. The prevalence of computer-related victimisation among UK organisations.
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154 The Audit Commission defines hacking as a deliberate gaining of unauthorised access to a computer
system, usually through the use of telecommunications facilities (The Audit Commission, 1994,
p.16)
The 1998 CSI/FBI survey has revealed a similar proportion of intrusions into
the system by outsiders (8%). It also demonstrates that as in the UK virus
infections account for the largest number of incidents (28 %) reported by the US
respondents (Table 6).
Perhaps the most important observation that can be made on the basis of the
data contained in table 5 is the high proportion (at least 40%) of incidents caused
by insiders, i.e., employees of the organisations surveyed.. The ”white-collar”
nature of much computer crime has long been recognised. As the American Bar
Association Study of 1984 has shown, the majority of computer abuse (77%)
was perpetrated by a corporation’s own employees (Hollinger, 1991). A similar
proportion obtained by Bloombecker during the late 1980s has lead this author
to the conclusion that ”despite the continued fascination of the media with
mythical computer-genious-type criminals, the data suggest that employees,
those with information about computer loopholes, and those with unusual needs
will constitute the greatest computer security threats” (Bloombecker, 1990).
Type of incident Volume %
1994 1998 1994 1998
total no. of incidents, of which:
fraud
virus infections
theft of software/data
hacking
others*/
537
108
261
31
15
122
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
100
20
48
6
3
n/a
100
13
48
n/a
8
n/a
*/ ”others” include: sabotage, invasion of privacy, illicit software, and private work.
Table 5. Computer abuse by type in the 1994 and 1998 Audit Commission Surveys.
Type of incident Volume %
Theft of proprietary information
Sabotage of data/network
Telcom eavesdropping
System penetration by outsider
Insider abuse of net access
Financial fraud
Virus
Unauthorised insider access
Telcom fraud
Active wiretapping
Total
82
66
45
108
353
68
380
203
75
5
1385
6
5
3
8
25
5
28
15
5
0
100
*/ ”others” include: sabotage, invasion of privacy, illicit software, and private work.
Table 6. Computer security incidents by type in the 1998 CSI/FBI survey.
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Whether the above assertion still holds true or not, is difficult to assess on the
basis of the available data. If we take into account the findings of the 1994 Audit
Commission Survey, the answer would clearly be affirmative: out of 285 known
perpetrators, 242 (85 per cent) were insiders. The results of the more recent US
surveys continue to support Bloombecker’s contention, although to a lesser
degree than the UK figures (Table 7).
The US survey data indicate an increase not only in the prevalence but also in
the incidence of computer intrusions. More than half (60%) of 320 Fortune 1000
companies have experienced over 30 system penetrations in 1997, while the same
rate of intrusions was reported by only 17% of the respondents in 1996 (Table
8).
The rising connectivity to the Internet may account to a considerable extent
for the increase in he number of attacks. The number of organisations that cited
their Internet connection as a frequent point of attack rose from 37% in 1996 to
47% in 1997 and 54% in 1998 (CSI/ FBI, 1998). Again, however, such findings
do not fully correspond to the nature and distribution of reported incidents. As
the data in table 5 suggest, it appears to be authorised users and employees instead
of intruders who pose the main risk to the security of computer systems. Such
an observation gains support also from the other surveys (Table 9).
Type of incident Volume %
Detected attempts to gain access to computer system
by ”outsider”
”Insiders” caught misusing organisation’s computer
system
119
129
58
63
Source: WarRoom Research, 1996, N=205
Table 7. Insider v. outsider incidents according to a recent US survey.
No. of incidents 1996 1997
1 to 10
11 to 20
21 to 30
31 to 40
41 to 50
over 50
42%
25%
16%
10%
5%
2%
2%
13%
25%
52%
6%
2%
Source: WarRoom Research, 1998, N=320
Table 8. Number of successful incidents of unauthorised access by outsiders de-
tected by Fortune 1000 organisations.
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More than 75% of the American respondents surveyed by Ernst & Young in
1997 were found to believe that internal threats are far more common than
outsider hacking. On the other hand, 84% of those surveyed world-wide said that
hackers pose a threat to their organisations, and the number of reported external
attacks has increased. The reasons for this increase, however, remain obscure.
As the authors of the survey conclude, it may well be that the increases are tied
to a greater number of Internet nodes, increased awareness, and increased
monitoring.
In fact, as the recent Dutch study indicates, without adequate detection
measures, only a small part of all incidents are detected. Even such a simple
measure as regular checks of logfiles may increase the number of incidents
reported with respect to the Internet site or the organisation’s internal IT infra-
structure (Table 10).
The following obervation by Dutch researchers appears to be of particular
relevance for further studies on the prevalence of computer abuse:
It has been shown that ”silent” attacks, where the perpetrator merely reads
information without undertaking any further actions that might draw attention
to the incident, were exclusively reported by organisations that have imple-
Type of attack 1996 1997
Sample*/
External malicious attack
Internal malicious attack
N=1,320
18%
29%
N=4,226
42%
43%
Source:http://www.techweb.com/se/dircetlink.cgi/INK 1997090830045
*/ The 1996 Survey included only US participants. In the 1997 Survey, 3,599 IT managers working in 24
countries, including Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, and the Netherlands took part, in addition to 627 from
the United States.
Table 9. External v. internal attacks according to Ernst & Young security surveys.
Environment Percentage of organisations
reporting attacks
(regardless of detection
measures)
Percentage of organisations
reporting attacks
(organisations with
regular log-checks)
Internet
Site
Internal IT-infra-
structure
32% over 18 months (n=99)
29% over 19 months (n=98)
45% over 17 months (n=51)
40% over 20 months (n=47)
Source: Caminada, et al., 1998.
Table 10. Regular log-checks and the percentage of organisations reporting inci-
dents.
228
mented procedures for incident detection. Organisations that do not have
regular security checks, on the other hand, were only reporting incidents with
relatively high visibility, such as where the perpetrator undertakes actions such
as Website hacking, attacks on other sites or modification of system binaries.
Indeed, in criminology the visibility of criminal behaviour has long been
regarded as an obvious precondition for reporting, recording and prosecuting of
crime (Hood and Sparks, 1970). Given the ”invisible” nature of many computer
crimes, problems related to their measurement can successfully be solved with
the assistance of technical means such as audit trials and other network-intrusion
tools that give alarm and preserve electronic footprints left by intruders. On the
other hand, the growing use of network-intrusion tools by computer users155
might account for the rising number of reported incidents.
The Dutch survey indicates a rather small scale of the most typical forms of
Internet-related security incidents that have been investigated by the researchers
(Table 11).
Despite the a relatively high methodological refinement of the Dutch study,
its findings cannot provide a reliable measure of the prevalence of Internet-re-
lated security incidents in the other European countries. It is widely acknow-
ledged in criminology that the level of crime tends to vary in relation to the
number of opportunities for its commission. In this connection, considerable
differences must be noted among the European countries in both opportunities
to commit cybercrime, and, to even a greater degree, to become victim of such
crime.
Type of incident Volume %**/
Unauthorised access
Denial of service
Malicious code
17
4
9
11,7
2,7
6,2
Source: Caminada, et al., 1998. */ No. of responses received.
**/ Calculated by the present author
Table 11. Prevalence of Internet-related incidents according to a Dutch survey
(N=145) */.
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155 According to estimates, US companies bought $65 million worth of network-intrusion tools in 1997
(TechWebNews).
3 Risk of victimisation by network-related crime
The level of computer crime appears to be strongly related to the availability of
computers. Unlike many other, more traditional crime, here the same object can
be both a target and a tool of crime. In case of network-related offending this
interdependence is even more accentuated. At least two machines must be
involved in the commission of an offence. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect
that the number of computers connected to the Internet may have a significant
impact on the prevalence and incidence of network-related crime both nationally
and globally.
This hypothesis, inter alia, implies that the countries with higher rates of
Internet hosts also score higher ranks of network-related crime and security
breaches. Unfortunately, due to the lack of appropriate data this hypothesis could
not be tested. Nevertheless, and against the background of the data provided in
Table 12, one may take for granted that the Nordic countries do experience more
digital crime than, for example, Belarus or Albania. Whether a similar relation-
ship  occurs, for  instance, between  the German-speaking countries and the
Mediterranean is not so clear. It is still more difficult to assess where – in
Stockholm, Paris or Warsaw – the risk of victimisation by computer espionage
or on-line fraud is the highest.
Country Rate Country Rate
Finland
Iceland
Norway
Sweden
Denmark
Netherlands
Switzerland
UK
Belgium
Austria
Luxembourg
Germany
Estonia
Ireland
Slovenia
Hungary
France
Czech Rep.
8460
7889
6847
4285
3792
3100
3008
2116
1788
1644
1613
1562
1428
1297
1054
899
742
686
Spain
Italy
Portugal
Latvia
Greece
Slovakia
Poland
Lithuania
Bulgaria
Russian
Romania
Yugoslavia
Turkey
Ukraine
Bos.&Her.
Belarus
Albania
624
580
488
393
360
342
283
199
108
96
82
62
58
38
11
9
4
Sources: Ripe NCC: European Hostcount; UN Population and Statistics Division.
Calculations by the present author.
Table 12. Number of Internet hosts per 100,000 inhabitants. (July, 1998)
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Future research will certainly address various epidemiological aspects of
computer-related crime. These analyses should to a greater extent take stock of
the fact that such variables as availability of computers or the growth of the
Internet must be controlled by researchers. Otherwise, the Internet-related dan-
gers can easily be exaggerated:
The statistics that do exist on computer crime are questionable and often
twisted or misrepresented to argue one side of the issue or the other – much
like statistics in general. After all, security management is big business, so
some experts, analysts and consultants may be guilty of using scare tactics to
keep and build a client base (Hayne, Hayworth, and Stoewe, 1996)
As a recent study on security incidents on the Internet indicates, the number
of security breaches in relation to the number of Internet hosts has decreased
rather than increased from 1989 to 1995:
A total of 4,567 incidents over this seven-year period were reconstructed from
the CERT®/CC records. This included 268 false alarms (5.9%), and 4,299
actual incidents (94.1%). Most of the CERT®/CC incidents (89.3%) were
unauthorized access incidents, which were further classified on the basis of
their degree of success in obtaining access: root break-in (27.7%), account
break-in (24.1%), and access attempts (37.6%). Relative to the growth in
Internet hosts, each of these access categories was found to be decreasing over
the period of this research: root-level break-ins at a rate around 19% less than
the increase in Internet hosts, account-level break-ins at a rate around 11%
less, and access attempts at a rate around 17% less. (Howard, 1997).
Howard’s research showed that the state of Internet security is not as bad as
some authors have suggested. The growth of Internet incidents in absolute terms
was nearly at the same pace as the growth of the Internet. According to estimates
from this research, a typical Internet host is involved in no more than around one
incident every 45 years. However, some sites and hosts are more attractive to
attack and may be involved in many incidents each year.
Despite the number of possible reservations that can be voiced against this
study, even its critics, such as Dorothy Denning, agree with Howard that Internet
is probably safer than it was previously thought. In other words, if the trends
identified by Howard are valid, and the growth of the Internet outpaces rather
than lags behind the rising number of security incidents, the risk of becoming a
victim of hacking is, on the average, decreasing over time. The most recent
CERT/CC statistics support this point (Table 13).
While CERT/CC statistics show a small reduction in the number of security
incidents,  both Howard’s  analysis  for the  years 1989-1995  as  well as the
CERT/CC 1996 and 1997 annual reports indicate disturbing changes in the type
and scope of attacks that might, in turn, be symptomatic of deeper structural
changes taking place in the ”electronic underworld” or the population of hackers.
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III ”The presence of motivated offenders”
1 Hacker subcultures and the assessment of experts
A traditional hacker’s culture had an anti-establishment orientation, but was
mostly harmless. It was based on the belief that information should be free,
uncensored and shared. However, a core principle of the original hacker ethics
– ”Look, don’t touch” – was not observed by the entire hacker community even
in the early days. Only ”good” or recreational hackers who enjoy the challenge
of breaking into a computer network were seen to follow this rule – as opposed
to ”bad” or malicious hackers who use technology to damage data or steal
sensitive information (Duff and Gardiner, 1996).
As has been rightly pointed out, the public image of the ”typical” hacker has
been transformed from that of a harmless computer enthusiast to that of a
malicious techno-criminal as a result of the changing role of technology in
society (Rosteck, 1994). The reactions of the authorities to the computer under-
world have shown a dependence on old ideas. ”Hacking becomes ‘breaking and
entering’; role-playing games become ‘conspiracies’; exploration becomes ‘es-
pionage.’The dated terms obliterate the difference between the ‘bad’hackers and
the ‘good’ hackers” (Mungo and Clough, 1990, p.226).
Although criminological studies are rare, there is a theory that the hacker
community is currently splitting into a number of distinct cultural groups. The
top level of the ”underworld” hierarchy consists of those who form the elite and
who develop their own tools. Ordinary hackers who employ commonly used
attack tools often take on specific profiles (e.g., crackers, phrackers, script
kiddies, DOS kiddies, etc.) depending on their target or on the attack techniques
Incidents Reported
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1-2Q 1998
1999
Total
6
132
252
406
773
1,334
2,340
2,412
2,573
2,134
1,290
13,652
Source: http:// www.cert.org/
Table 13. CERT®/CC Statistics 1988-1998.
232
that they use. Hackers known as ”darksiders” are involved in predatory and
malicious behaviour. They use hacking techniques for financial gain or destruc-
tion. Two of the most dangerous types of malicious hackers are information
brokers and meta-hackers. ”Information brokers commission and pay hackers to
steal information, then resell the information to foreign governments or business
rivals of the target organisations. Meta-hackers are sophisticated hackers who
monitor other hackers without being noticed, and then exploit the vulnerabilities
identified by these hackers they are monitoring.” (Hayward, 1997).
The exact size of the hacker population is not known. The available estimates
which have been made by computer security experts seem to be based only on
impressions and vague extrapolations rather than on hard facts. Nevertheless,
they are often quite illuminating. According to UK security experts, for example,
some 95% of the overall population of hackers are ”good”, and only 5% are ”bad”
hackers:
Outsiders hacking into company IT systems fall into one of two categories.
(..) 95% of cases are hackers infiltrating a system merely to show how clever
they are to create havoc. These incidents are serious enough for the organisa-
tions affected to be heavily inconvenienced, and they can lose money through
wasted business time. But even worse are the 5% of attacks where hackers set
out to crack passwords in order to alter, steal or erase data. Such acts threaten
the livelihood of companies and even the lives of people (UK: Security, 1998).
Ira Winkler, a leading  US  expert from  the National Computer Security
Association, provides even more precise estimates and deeper insight into the
problem:
Probably less then 1 percent of computer hacking is actually perpetrated for
criminal purposes (Winkler, 1997, p. 88);
Hackers exploit computers through vulnerabilities that are unknowingly built
into the operating systems or programs running on the machines. There are
very few people walking around today capable of finding new vulnerabilities.
Those few who can are the true computer geniuses (...). There are probably
less than 200 of them in the world. These geniuses are the ones who tell other
hackers about the vulnerabilities. There are perhaps 1,000 hackers who can
take that knowledge and develop a tool to exploit it. When that tool is posted
on the Internet for the general hacker community, it becomes available to
everyone. According to my estimates, there are between 35,000 and 50,000
hackers who fall into the ”clueless” ranks. These people would be lost without
the knowledge and the tools produced by their more competent brethren. As
a matter of fact, there have been numerous cases – several of which I have
personally observed- involving hackers who broke into a computer system
using a very sophisticated attack, then did not know the basic commands to
manipulate the system (Winkler, 1997, p.86).
Taking into account the new ranks of hackers emerging in China, which now
has more than 1 million Internet users and the first hacker’s case before court156,
the above estimates may swiftly appear to be underestimated. On the other hand,
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some basic observations made by computer security practitioners are in line with
those made by ”good hackers” and researchers.
”The ratio of real hackers to pretenders is so small now, it has diluted,” said
Matt Hinze, former moderator of an Email newsletter called the Happy Hacker
Digest. ”Scripts are pre-packaged ways to find weaknesses in computer
systems. They’ve been around for years, but the growth of the Internet has led
to higher demand for such tools, especially among a younger crowd dazzled
by recent films such as ”The Net” and ”Hackers”. They are known as ”script
kiddies,” people who want to call themselves hackers but who don’t neces-
sarily want to spend a lot of time glued to a computer. Others theorized that
the hackers simply used a ”packet sniffer,” a program that grabs data off of a
network – that can include sensitive stuff like credit card numbers or pass-
words – and saves it as a file. Nobody can say for sure how large the hacking
community has become or how much of it is made up of script kiddies. But
no one doubts that the number of script kiddies is growing, to the annoyance
of experienced hackers and security experts alike.” (Gornstein, 1997)
As Howard pointed out, his analysis of serious Internet incidents was able to
demonstrate the progressive sophistication of intruders techniques [from simple
user commands, scripts and password cracking, through the use of tools such as
sniffers (1993) and toolkits (1994), and finally to intricate techniques that fool
the basic operation of the Internet Protocol (1995)], which made the intruders
more difficult to locate and identify. A recently published observational study of
two Internet newsgroups trading in information and products that facilitate,
among others, hacking of encrypted satellite television services, has led its
authors to the conclusion that the Internet can be a particularly powerful medium
for criminal recruitment and the dissemination of criminal techniques (Mann and
Sutton, 1998).
Going one step further, it would be possible to conclude that the Internet has
proven to be an ideal learning environment, where hacking behaviour is learned
in interaction with other persons in a process of communication taking place on
a scale and through channels that can hardly have been imagined even by Edwin
Sutherland.
2 Differential associations on the Internet
One can simply take advantage of the vested capabilities of Internet search
engines such as Altavista in order to find and count signs of the popular hacker
culture across World Wide Web sites located in various national domains (Table
14).
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156 ‘China makes first computer hacker arrest’ (Reuters, 14 September 1998).
In hacker’s jargon, the searched term ”warez” denotes a copy of pirated
software. This term has been found by the present author to be a particularly
discriminating sign of the Internet underground culture of so-called ”warez
kiddies”, also for linguistic reasons.
Even a cursory glance at the column of figures in bold in Table 14, a column
that could be taken to represent a rough approximation of the prevalence of
popular hacker culture on a national basis, suggests considerable differences
between individual domains. Whether these differences are reliable or not, and
what it is that they in fact measure, is beyond the scope of the present considera-
tion. The primary goal of this exercise was to show the popular hacker culturally
is expanding internationally, and how relatively independent it is of one’s native
language and national culture. Therefore, no attempt is made to draw generali-
sations from the relatively high ”warez” rates obtained from the Central and
Eastern European domains. As a matter of fact, hundreds of hacker’s pages
offering a wide array of manifestos, guides, tools and links to other ”under-
ground” WWW sites around the world have been set up in Czech Republic,
Hungary and Poland in a relatively short period of time. Their content providers,
usually very young people, seem to be strongly devoted to the idea of the free
flow of information and are quite proud of the part that they are playing in this
international experience. In this context, it would be easy to subscribe to the
following opinion:
There may be differences in the personality profiles of American hackers and
European hackers, although there are no definitive studies of this matter;
rumour has it that European hackers tend to be more politically motivated than
American hackers (Kabay, 1998).
Country no. of hits of
the word
”hacking”
rate per
1000 hosts
no. of hits of
the word
”warez”
rate per
1000 hosts
Austria
Belgium
Czech Rep.
Finland
Germany
Hungary
Italy
The Netherlands
Norway
Poland
Slovakia
Slovenia
Sweden
Switzerland
424
522
179
900
2369
168
707
1818
445
162
96
80
3654
455
3,1
2,8
2,5
2
1,8
1,9
2,1
3,7
1,4
1,4
5,2
3,9
9,6
2
70
242
467
468
7830
166
334
1416
212
495
119
98
4785
350
0,5
1,3
6,6
1
6
1,8
1
2,9
0,7
4,5
6,5
4,8
12,6
1,5
Table 14. Hits using the Altavista search service on the Internet WWW resulting
from a search for signs of popular hacker culture.
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However, a better explanation of this ”internationalisation of hacking” can be
found within the framework of differential association theory with its fundamen-
tal thesis about the learned nature of deviant behaviour and the concept of
normative conflict at the roots of the criminalization process. In addition, the
popular hacker culture is so diverse and ostensibly anarchic that any attempts at
its politicisation could be ridiculous in view, for instance, of recent reports
coming from the Czech Republic where the Czert group of Czech and Slovak
hackers have repeatedly, over a two year period, hacked high profile Web sites
of the Czech Army, a bank, the local UNICEF office, and various ministries:
Some of the latest hacks have boldly taunted the police captain who has the
primary responsibility for catching the hackers. The latest hack, 16 May 1998,
featured a picture purported to be that of the police captain ... it was indeed
the picture of the pleasant and compassionate looking ”sea captain” kind of a
guy featured on packages of ”Captain Igloo” frozen fish sticks. ttp://www.in-
tellitech-media.cz/sa/cee-hack-archive/
Obviously, the above example was not randomly chosen since it perfectly
corresponds to the subject of the following section.
IV The absence of capable guardians
1 What hampers prosecution of IT-related crime?
One of the most concise description of computer crime has been formulated by
a law enforcement official: it is mostly hidden criminality where there is a small
probability of detection, a high reluctance to report, and inadequate security
(Tenhunen, 1994). Indeed, all of these features are well documented by research
on computer security crime.
Experts on information security estimate that about 20 million hacks occur a
year world-wide (Lange, 1997). The chances of their being detected are small.
According to a 1996 study by the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT),
network administrators fail to detect about 80 percent of network hacking. The
FBI’s National Computer Crimes Squad estimates that between 85 and 97 percent
of computer intrusions are not detected. In a test sponsored by the US Department
of Defence, the results were startling. Attempts were made to attack a total of
8932 systems participating in the test. 7860 of those systems were successfully
penetrated. The management of only 390 of those 7860 systems detected the
attacks, and only 19 of the managers reported the attacks (Icove et al, 1997).
The invisibility of computer crime, which has commonly been recognised as
its most characteristic feature (UN Manual, 1994, p.5), is probably not the most
significant factor that hampers prosecution of system hacking and related crime.
As was recognized already some years ago, the victims of such crimes, in
particular in the financial sector, are reluctant to report the crime (Council of
Europe, 1990, p.99).
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This reluctance, as shown by the recent research, is not confined to the banking
sector, but constitutes in fact a much more widespread attitude, quite evenly
distributed among all kinds of organisations, including business organisations.
”Negative publicity” as a reason for not reporting computer intrusions to law
enforcement was most frequently cited by 428 respondents to CSI/FBI Computer
Crime and Security Surveys, where the financial sector accounted for 20% of
the sample (Table 15).
Another study, conducted by WarRoom Research LLC, provides a more
detailed analysis of victim’s motives for non-reporting security incidents to the
police (Table 16).
The reason so few attacks were reported was mainly because organisations
frequently fear that their employees, clients, and stockholders will lose faith in
them if they admit that their computers have been attacked. In addition, compa-
Reason Year
1996 1997 1998
Negative publicity
Competitors would use to advantage
Unaware that could report
Civil remedy seemed best
75%
72%
53%
60%
65%
55%
53%
48%
83%
74%
46%
51%
Source: 1998 CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey
Table 15. The reasons organisations did not report intrusions to law enforcement.
Motives declared by respondents Volume Proportion
didn’t get into system
didn’t want to get person in trouble
didn’t know it was a crime
didn’t want law enforcement in system
take over system, loose productivity
access to sensitive information
don’t think they would be interested
don’t think they would solve it
rime becomes public
loss of client confidence
loss of competitive status
opted for civil remedy
other (specified)
total
4
2
1
13
13
11
0
2
19
18
8
0
0
155
4.4%
2.2%
1.1%
14.3%
14.3%
12.1%
0.0%
2.2%
20.9%
19.8%
8.8%
0.0%
0.0%
100.0%
Source: WarRoom Research, 1996
Table 16. Motives of non-reporting computer intrusions to law enforcement.
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nies where security had been breached were reluctant to go public because they
immediately become targets of hackers who, knowing someone else had found
a way in, also try to break through their security. In the WarRoom research, an
effort was also made to explore the circumstances that determine the readiness
of potential victims to report computer intrusion to law enforcement (Table 17).
As the responses indicate, the respondents regard possible co-operation with
law enforcement as the last resort. Their unwillingness to engage the police in
investigation of the crime seems to be rightly explained by Tseng:
For financial organizations, cost-effective preventive measures are the best
proactive approaches. However, if forced to react, their priorities are clearly
in the following order: 1) recover their (or their customers’) losses, 2) see the
criminal punished, 3) fix the current procedures. This mis-match between law
enforcement and financial institutions means that banks and other victims of
financial crime will turn increasingly towards private investigations and civil
litigation (Tseng, 1995).
This observation gains empirical support from the WarRoom Research survey:
out of 194 respondents asked whose assistance they would choose in the event
of intruder attack on their systems, about two-third (64.4%) pointed to a security
firm and only one-fifth (21.6%) to law enforcement.
Consequently, only a small fraction of detected computer intrusions are
reported to the police. According to the 1996 WarRoom study, of the companies
that detected systems break-in only about 12 percent actually reported the crime.
In the CSI/FBI surveys the reporting rate of computer intrusions to law enforce-
ment was somewhat higher, and amounted to 16% in 1996 and 17% in 1997 and
1998. In the 1994 UK Audit Commission Survey, a similar proportion (18%) of
the overall number (N=319) of perpetrators of computer abuse were found to be
prosecuted. Only 2 per cent of 115 respondents surveyed in Poland in 1994 had
notified the police of a computer abuse to which they had fallen victim (Adamski,
1994). In a recent Dutch Internet Security Incidents Survey, the intruders were
prosecuted in only two (6.6%) out of the total of 30 incidents which had been
reported (Caminada at.al., 1998).
Circumstances Volume Proportion
anytime detected
could report anonymously
only if everyone else reported
only if mandatory by law
other (specified)
total
33
146
105
181
19
484
6.8%
30.2%
21.7%
37.4%
3.9%
100.0%
Source: WarRoom Research, 1996
Table 17. Circumstances under which respondents would be willing to report com-
puter intrusions to law enforcement.
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Against the background of the above empirical findings, two observations can
be made. First, the reporting rates of computer crime, although rather low, do not
generally deviate from the reporting rates for some common crimes such as
pickpocketing, fraud or attempted residential burglary (del Frate et al., 1993).
Secondly, as in conventional crime, the seriousness of computer intrusions, as
perceived by their victims, might have a significant impact on the probability of
reporting of crime. Therefore, it is quite reasonable to expect that with growing
economic losses to the victims, an increasing number of computer crimes will
be reported to police. The case involving Citicorp Bank is almost self-evident in
this respect. On the other hand, in spite of the increased media coverage given
to computer crime, there is no clear indication of a strong negative social attitude
towards this type of crime.
The relatively small number of cases which have been brought before the
courts in the United Kingdom under the 1990 Computer Misuse Act, and the
light sentences imposed on those few offenders who were sentenced under this
Act during the first 5 years of its operation, might reflect this generally permissive
social attitude towards computer crime (Battcock, 1995). Other reasons could be
the technical nature of the crime, which many people, including those who
represent criminal justice, do not understand, or they lack the necessary skills to
investigate, prosecute and adjudicate such crime.
2 Reducing opportunities for computer crime
Information technology crime, by definition, should basically be prevented by
technical means, and in fact is. An entire new industry relating to information
security has developed in recent years in order to provide safeguards against
various form of illegality involving telecommunications and information sys-
tems (Grabosky, 1998). What still remains to be a problem is the low security
awareness and poor access control of information systems within organisations
that use computers and that are connected to the Internet.
A survey carried out by Dan Farmer, a respectable Internet security expert,
shows that over 60% of 1700 inspected sensitive Websites, such as banks, credit
unions, newspapers and government agencies, could be broken into or even
destroyed (Farmer, 1996).
According to the Business Information Security Survey ‘98, developed in the
UK by the National Computing Centre, only 39% of companies have some form
of security policy, and less than half were aware of the Computer Misuse Act of
1990 (ttp://www.ncc.co.uk/). The 1998 Ernst & Young Global Information
Security Survey, which made it possible to look at the security issue from the
international perspective, has produced similar results. Although 84% of the
3,599 respondents from Africa/Middle East, Asia, Europe and South America
believe hackers pose a threat to their organisations, the measures that they
currently use in order to provide Internet security may not be sufficient to prevent
intrusion:
Leading counter measures reported by respondents are password authentica-
tion, at 76%, and firewalls, at 65%. Of those who report that their systems
239
were broken into, only 54.8% had a firewall installed. Nearly 60% (58.25%)
rely on password authentication – which on its own, without encryption and
other stronger techniques, may not be the most reliable method for effective
protection – while 17.8% use data encryption (Global, 1998).
Cryptographic technologies are nowadays widely recognised as an essential
tool for security and trust in electronic communication. Two important applica-
tions of cryptography are digital signatures and encryption. Digital signatures
can help to prove the origin of data (authentication) and verify whether data has
been altered (integrity). Encryption can help keeping data and communication
confidential (EU Commission, 1997). All these services are indispensable in the
Internet-based electronic commerce which is expected to drive economic growth
for many years to come (Emerging Digital Economy, 1998).
Widespread availability of encyption can also prevent crime. The damage
caused by electronic crime (industrial espionage, credit card fraud, toll fraud on
cellular telephones, piracy on pay TV), which in Europe alone is estimated in
billions of ECUs, could have been reduced with the aid of cryptography (Euro-
pean Commission, 1998).
Presently, however, the use of encryption applications and products is limited.
Among respondents to the 1998 Ernst & Young Global Information Security
Survey, for instance, it ranges between 4 to 7 percent:
The numbers are lower for newer, more secure technologies. Only 6.92% use
secure email, 4.66% digital certificates, 4.21% digital signatures, and 3.59%
secure messaging. Approximately 62% of respondents to this question re-
ported using more than one of these technologies.
As was shown in the Howard study, the most serious computer security
incidents are based on a three-phase attack. First, the hacker gains access to an
account on the target system. Secondly, he or she exploits vulnerabilities in order
to gain privileged (root) access to that system. Thirdly, the intruder use this
privileged access to attack other systems across the network (Howard, 1997).
There is, however, wide agreement among computer security experts that with
the aid of three basic security measures such as password authentication, fire-
walls, and data encryption, the risks of computer intrusions can effectively be
mitigated without excessive costs (Adamski, 1997). Above all, computer crime
is not committed by technology but by people and it is reasonable to expect that
increased attention to the basic controls could substantially reduce the incidence
of computer abuse.
High-end technology offers fool-proof solutions which are able to ensure the
total safety of information systems.
Retinal imaging, voice printing, hand geometry readers, and other biometrics
technologies permit authentication of individuals with a precision not pre-
viously considered possible. In the future, PIN numbers are likely to be
replaced by biometrics authentication and identification devices (Grabowsky,
1998).
Although these are not cheap devices today, they will probably become widely
available in the near future along with technological advances.
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3 Increasing the risk of apprehension
Cyber crimes are extremely difficult for law enforcement to trace. This is not
only because hackers can cover their tracks. The logical structure of the
Internet itself, with its numerous pathways through which the ”packets” of
data travel until they are reassembled at the destination, makes it difficult to
trace hackers.
The most proficient intruders develop their own underground network of
compromised systems which enable them to ”leapfrog” through the net from one
system to another before attempting to attack the target system (Anderson, 1994).
Only highly skilled and strongly motivated investigators are capable of tracking
them down as well as gathering and preserving evidence in a manner that makes
it possible to present it to prosecutorial authorities and be considered by the
courts. The need for adequate training of police officers, appropriately equipped
and organised in special teams, is self-evident in this context.
But even the best trained police forces may be unable to deal with an increasing
number of reported crimes. In some European countries, police hot-lines are
sometimes overloaded by the huge number of calls from the victims of computer
intrusions who are asking the police for help.
As companies begin to defend themselves against the computer criminals,
they are being told that dialling 999 to call the police will not do them any
good.
In a speech to a Confederation of British Industry (CBI) seminar in September
1997, Graham Saltmarsh of the South East Regional Crime Squad said the
police cannot help companies beat the digital criminals. ”Funding constraints
will reduce the ability of police forces to support industry,” he said. He
recommended that companies ”develop their own capabilities in investigation
and intelligence gathering” (BBC news, 1998).
Although the above recommendation can not be accepted on legal grounds,
the trend toward ”privatisation” of cyber-policing is visible not only in the United
States and Australia but also in Europe. This tendency covers various forms of
co-operation between law enforcement authorities and a number of subjects who
represent private firms or individuals. Besides more traditional and strictly
regulated forms of co-operation between telecommunication operators and the
police, there are also examples of more informal and even innovative relations
in this area. In some countries, the Internet Service Providers (ISP) and regional
branches of Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERT) already have well-
established relations with law enforcement. New laws adopted in Germany and
Sweden, for example, require ISPs and electronic bulletin board operators to
conduct periodic checks of the content of messages posted to their boards and to
remove messages that violate the law. In less technologically developed countries
where Internet-related regulations are not already in force, attempts at self-regu-
lation often take place. A recent example from Poland is the initiative taken by
the main Polish Internet access provider, TPSA, to monitor and supply the police,
if necessary, with billing lists of all the connections made through its free-line
by Internet users. Just after this free-line had been put into operation it became
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the most frequently used point of departure for Internet attacks. Its number, based
on complaints of injured persons, amounted to 70 in August 1998 alone.
The most curious type of collaboration between private individuals and law
enforcement aimed at suppression of cybercrime is being performed by some
groups of American hackers such as the ”Enforcers,” who allegedly give the FBI
a hand in fighting pedophiles.
When a child porn trafficker responds, the Enforcer finds out his or her target’s
host address, then makes use of any number of programs that can knock him
off the channel. Members also track pedophiles to their hosts, then contact the
systems administrators to lodge a complaint (Pernenberg, 1998).
Special squads of cyberpolice operate in the United Kingdom, Belgium,
Norway and Germany. The first German force to combat Internet crime has been
established in Munich, and according to information provided on their Web page,
in 1996 a team of its five officers had investigated 100 cases of child pornography
world-wide, patrolling the Internet, searching for child pornography and trying
to follow and penetrate groups of pedophiles.
Since the Internet is an open network – a global public place accessible to
everyone – some of its disadvantages for police work (e.g. anonymity, lack of
witnesses, impersonation and disguising) can also be regarded as its advantages.
As an explanatory memorandum to the bill for an amendment of the Dutch
Criminal Procedure Code states:
A clear distinction must be drawn between browsing a network which is
accessible to  the  public and doing  investigative research on  a network,
whereby the citizen’s (constitutional) rights may be infringed. There can be
no objection to the first instance where a police officer signs a subscription
contract with a provider in order to obtain a connection to the Internet. In
addition, police authorities, like all other citizens, are fully entitled to explore
the digital world for available information. This does not necessarily require
suspicion of an offence. In addition, police authorities are under no obligation
to identify themselves as investigating authorities. In the same way as a police
officer, whether in uniform or not, may patrol and look around in the street,
so an investigating officer may look around on the Internet from behind his
computer. No specific legal grounds are required to that end, provided that the
activity can be interpreted as the performance of police duty (see art. 2 Police
Act 1993). (Ministry of Justice, Directorate of Legislation, January 1998)
A matter of particular concern to law enforcement agencies is the anonymous
and borderless nature of cyberspace and the possibility of committing crime from
the offender’s own desk, far away from the target. The reverse, however, is also
true. Police officers, in no less comfortable conditions, may take advantage of
the Internet for the efficient investigation of offenders.
Jefferson County, Ky., police Lt. Bill Baker broke a major kiddie-porn ring in
England even though he never left Kentucky. An E-mailed tip from a source
in Switzerland led Baker to an Internet site in Birmingham, England. After
about three months of investigation that involved downloading 60 pages of
file names related to child porn and 400 images, Baker called on Interpol, New
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Scotland Yard and police in Birmingham, who arrested the distributor (Suss-
man, 1995).
Network-related crime is able to affect several jurisdictions simultaneously
and interactively: systems may be accessed in one country, the data manipulated
in another and the consequences felt in a third country (UN Manual, 1994). This
causes problems which arise from the basic exchange of data between police
forces, liberalisation of extradition laws and admission of evidence procured
from other jurisdictions.
However, harmonisation of laws at the international level is a highly time-con-
suming task. The Justice and Interior Ministers from the group of P-8 countries,
in the communique from their first meeting on 11 December 1997, outlined steps
for improving the international battle against cybercrime:
• Making sure law enforcement agencies have a sufficient number of trained
and equipped personal to fight cybercrime;
• Creation of 24-hour contacts to quickly track cybercriminals;
• Developing faster ways to trace attacks on computer networks and identify
hackers;
• Criminal prosecution in the country a suspect flees to, if extradition is
impossible;
• Steps to preserve information on computer networks to help prevent tamper-
ing;
• Reviewing legal systems in the nations to make sure there are appropriate
criminal statutes for computer crimes and to ease investigation of such crimes;
• Co-operation with the computer industry in order to develop new methods of
detecting and preventing computer crimes;
• Increasing use of new technologies, such as video-links, in order to obtain
testimony from witnesses in other countries;
• Development and employment of compatible forensic standards for retrieving
and authenticating electronic data for use in criminal investigations and
prosecutions (Reuters, 12 December 1997).
As can be seen from the above examples, the ”good old days” of the Internet as
uncontrolled and mostly uncontrollable cyberspace have already gone, and the
lack of capable controllers no longer seems to be a problem.
Final remarks
Due to the popularity of the Internet, hacking, or breaking into somebody else’s
computers, is presently more popular and automated than ever. On the basis of
the present knowledge it is not easy to determine what the size of this phenome-
non is, and whether the incidents of computer crime are vastly underestimated
or not.
Although it might be naive to think that there will not be serious criminal
involvement in cyberspace in the near future, to date there is no convincing
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evidence of exploitation of the Internet by terrorist or predatory oriented cyber-
gangs. The reports about their existence turned out to be a pure fantasy (Hayward,
1997a,b).
The growth of malevolent hacking is one of the social facts that seems to be
self-evident on common-sense grounds, but at the same time it is not so evident
against the background of the present research. As the foregoing analysis of
available research findings suggests, the present world-wide experience is that
the prevalence of computer crime is growing. This tendency is proved by the
victimisation-like computer security surveys, but even to a greater extent by the
opinion surveys by consulting firms carried out on samples of IT managers.
Therefore, the rate of increase in system hacking and related crime is difficult to
establish. In addition, the lack of an appropriate taxonomy of computer security
incidents  reported  by respondents  to  these surveys  makes  any attempts at
evaluating the seriousness of computer intrusions hardly possible.
At the aggregate level, computer crime poses a serious problem for the most
industrialised and post-industrial societies, and  for that reason  it has been
criminalized in many such societies primarily during the 1980s.
In purely statistical terms, the growth of computer crime probably differs
among individual countries and appears to be steeper in those jurisdictions where
the initial level of information technology development was lower than in the
more technologically advanced societies. Nevertheless, in the former group of
countries hacking and other types of IT crime are only incidentally regarded by
the national legislation as offences (Schjolberg, 1996).
It could not be questioned that the new technology is predominantly used for
good, i.e., in a socially acceptable way, and not as a tool of crime or other socially
detrimental activities. Therefore, one should not be surprised with the main
finding of Howard’s study, which is that with the exception of denial-of-service
attacks, security incidents had generally declined relative to the size of the
Internet. In more practical terms, this means that the average user of the Internet
is probably more secure than before and less susceptible to becoming a victim
of network intrusion.
The risk assessment analysis presented by Howard can be recommended both
for decision-makers and researchers. For the latter group, Howard’s study might
provide a methodologically sound starting point for further research aimed at
risk assessment analysis of the most likely targets of attack as well as on the
epidemiology of cybercrime. As concerns those who decide what sort of policy
should be implemented in view of developments taking place over the Internet,
the conclusion of Howard’s study is like a barrel of oil poured over troubled
water.
It is worth mentioning in this context that control over the use of modern
information technology may lead to a Catch-22 situation, in which security
products employed in order to reduce the risk of intrusion and improve the safety
of information may cause the situation to apparently worsen and lead to ‘coun-
terproductive’ effects. Such apparent negative results can be noted after the
security monitoring of the system begins. The measure of system security has
been the number of break-ins or attempts identified. If none are identified, there
is no problem. Under this laissez-faire standard, a product that effectively
identifies unwanted visitors becomes a part of the problem, not a solution.
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Crimes Related to the Computer Network.
Threats and Opportunities:
A Criminological Perspective
Commentary by Antti Pihlajamäki
LL.Lic., Chief District Prosecutor
Prosecutor’s Office of Turku District, Finland
1 Introduction
Finland is one of the most developed countries in the entire world in respect of
the use of information technology in everyday life, and the number of personal
computers and Internet connections in relation to the population is very high. In
this respect, there is quite favourable soil for, on the one hand, committing
computer-related and net-related crimes, and, on the other hand, becoming a
victim of such crime.
Since the early 1980s, Finland has participated in international co-operation
on EDP-crimes, computer crimes, computer-related crimes, information tech-
nology crimes, and, finally, cyber-crimes or crimes in cyber-space. The changes
in the names of this type of crime are very charasteristic of the huge change and
expansion of the entire phenomenon and concept of the crime in question over
the last twenty years.
Finland has been represented in the working groups and committees of the
OECD and the Council of Europe; currently Finland is represented in the
Committee of Experts on Crime in Cyber-space (PC-CY). Finland has also taken
part in the work of the International Association of Penal Law, the United
Nations, and the International Criminal Police Organisation Interpol, and Finland
has contributed to the COMCRIME project of the European Commission. It may
also be mentioned that the International Association of Prosecutors will have
IT-crimes as the main theme of its next annual conference in Beijing 1999, and
there are full reasons for believing that Finland will take an active part also in
this work.
The existing Finnish legislation on information technology crimes157 is very
much based on Recommendation No. R(89)9 of the Council of Europe on
computer-related crime. The Finnish Penal Code has already for many years been
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157 This is the term I prefer, and I will later use the abbreviation ”IT-crime”. According to my view,
the term covers computer-related crimes in the strict sense of the concept, and new cyber-crimes as
well.
undergoing a total reform. The first phase of the reform entered into force in the
beginning of 1991,158 and includes, among others, a few provisions on those
IT-crimes which can be called data crimes.159 – The second phase entered into
force on 1 September 1995,160 and also includes some provisions on IT-crimes,
this time primarily information crimes.161
Some amendments to the Penal Code have been made since then. The
provisions on means of payment fraud have been reformed, and are  now
applicable also to the crimes committed for example in electronic commerce
through the Internet or other networks. A third and quite large part of the total
reform of the Penal Code has already been ratified and will enter into force at
the beginning on 1999.162 This includes, among others, provisions on dissemi-
nation and possession of pornographic and violent presentations. These provi-
sions also apply to crimes committed over computer in networks. – The proposal
to criminalize preparing and disseminating computer viruses and other malicious
codes has been given to Parliament in December 1997. The provision will
perhaps enter into force at the beginning of 1999.
I will later briefly describe the provisions mentioned above. It is not an
exaggeration to say that the substantive Finnish legislation on IT-crimes is very
up-to-date and widely covers action in the IT-environment which can be consid-
ered reprehensible.
The situation is not as good with the procedural legislation. The provisions in
Recommendation No. R(95)13 of the Council of Europe concerning problems
of criminal procedural law connected with information technology have not yet
been implemented in Finnish criminal procedural law, including the legislation
on criminal pre-investigation. Modern information technology has made it very
easy to commit crimes that cross international borders, and this sets and will
continue  to set high  standards for  international co-operation and domestic
procedural legislation. As a prosecutor I am quite concerned about these ques-
tions, and, in my view, the lack of efficient procedural provisions can consider-
ably frustrate the existence of good substantive criminal provisions. In this sense
I have strong faith in the PC-CY of the Council of Europe which discusses, with
great expertise, precisely these matters and will produce a text for a Convention.
Even if the States do not necessarily – at least immediately – sign and ratify the
future Convention, it will give good guidelines for domestic procedural legisla-
tion.
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160 Act 630/21 April, 1995.
161 Computer break-in, message interception, interference, data protection offence, criminal mischief,
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162 Act 563/24 July, 1998.
2 Finnish Legislation on IT-crimes
2.1 Existing provisions
The current provision on unauthorised use163 does not explicitly mention a
computer or a data processing system as an object of the offence, but in the
official justification given for the provision164 the question has been discussed.
According to the provision, hacking can now be deemed liable to punishment on
the basis of the criminalization of unauthorised use, if the offender after pene-
trating a computer system has in fact used the system. If the offender only
penetrates a system without going further, the provision on computer break-in
will be applicable.
A person is guilty of industrial espionage165 if he or she, for example, without
authorization obtains information about a trade secret of another by entering into
a closed space prohibited to unauthorised persons or into a information system
protected from unauthorised persons. Other possible acts of industrial espionage
include acquiring or copying documents or other official records, or some other
comparable act, for instance copying or printing audio, video, or EDP-record-
ings.
A person can be sentenced for forgery166 if he or she prepares a false document
or other piece of evidence or falsifies such a document or piece of evidence in
order for it to be used as misleading evidence, or uses a falsified piece of evidence
as such evidence. The piece of evidence is defined as a document and its
facsimile, a mark, stamp, license plate, audio or video recording, a recording
produced by a plotter, calculator or other comparable technical device, and a
recording that is suitable for data processing.
A person who unjustifiably destroys, defaces, conceals or hides data recorded
on an data device or other recording is to be sentenced for damage to property.167
The concept of ”recorded data” refers to the information given in the data as well
as the marks or symbols interpreting the contents of information; and ”other
recording” refers to the contents of the recording as well as the marks or symbols
of  which the  recording consists. An  offence  called criminal mischief168 is
involved when a person, for example, unlawfully interrupts the operation of
production, supply or communications channels, so that serious danger is caused
to the power supply, general health care, defence, the working of the judiciary
or another corresponding important social function. Criminal mischief can thus,
in some situations, be considered as a special case of computer sabotage offences.
According to the provision on data processing fraud169 this offence is com-
mitted when anyone who with the intention of obtaining unlawful financial
benefit or of harming another person, falsifies the end result of data processing
either by entering false data into a computer or by otherwise interfering with
automatic data processing.
There are also special provisions, reformed some time ago, on so-called means
of payment fraud,170 according to which a person who e.g. uses a means of
payment without the permission of the lawful possessor of the means of payment,
or in excess of his or her rights that are based on such permission, or otherwise
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without lawful right, is guilty of means of payment fraud. Punishable preparation
of means of payment fraud is involved when a person, for the commission of
means of payment fraud, prepares, imports, procures, receives, or possesses a
means of payment form, or device or supplies specially suitable for the prepara-
tion of such forms, or a recording or program specially suitable for the payments
traffic in data networks. A means of payment is defined as a bank card, payment
card, credit card, cheque, or other means or recording which can be used for
making payments, withdrawals or transfers, or the use of which is a necessary
condition for these performances. A means of payment form is defined as a
printed form that is to filled in to constitute a means of payment and that is not
freely accessible to the public, or a card or outline of a card specially suitable for
preparing a means of payment.
According to the provision on message interception163anyone who unlawfully
opens a letter or other closed communication addressed to another, or, by
breaking a protection, obtains information on the contents of an electronic or
other technically recorded message which is protected from outsiders, or obtains
information on the contents of a call, telegram, transmission of text, images or
data, or another comparable telemessage or on the transmission or reception of
such message, is guilty of the offence. This provision thus protects also electronic
mail both during and after the transmission.
A person is guilty of interference of communications,164 when he or she, by
tampering with the operation of a device used in postal, telecommunications or
radio traffic, by mischievously transmitting interferes messages over radio or
telecommunications channels or in other comparable manner, unlawfully hinders
or interferes with postal, telecommunications, or radio traffic.
According to the first paragraph of the provision on computer break-in165 a
person who by using an unauthorised access code or by otherwise breaking a
protection unlawfully penetrates into a data processing system where data are
processed, stored or transmitted electronically or in a corresponding technical
manner, or into a separately protected part of such a system, shall be sentenced
for computer break-in. This provision is secondary and will not be applied if the
act is classified as industrial espionage by penetrating into a computer system,
damage, unauthorised use, fraud, message interception or other comparable act.
2.2 Future provisions
As mentioned before, the new provisions on dissemination of illegal informa-
tion166 will enter into force at the beginning of 1999. A person who offers for
sale or for hire, distributes, or to that end manufactures or imports pictures or
visual recordings depicting children, violence or bestiality in an obscene way,
shall be  sentenced for distribution  of  obscene pictures. A person shall be
sentenced for possession of obscene pictures of children, if he or she has in his
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163 Penal Code, chapter 38, section 3 (578/21 April, 1995).
or her possession a photograph, video tape, film or other visual recording, true
to reality, depicting a child having sexual intercourse or in a comparable sexual
act, or depicting a child in another obviously obscene way. Obscene marketing
is in question when a person for gain markets an obscene picture, visual recording
or object which is conducive to causing public offence, by giving it to a person
under 15 years of age, putting it in a public display, delivering it unsolicited to
another, or openly offering it for sale or promoting it by advertisement, brochure
or poster or by other means causing public offence. – There is no legal definition
of a child in these provisions. It has been said in the official justification for the
provisions167 that child pornography is involved if the picture shows a person
who is not yet sexually mature.
In December 1997 the Government gave to Parliament a proposal for a new
provision on data processing endangerment.168 According to the proposal this
would be punishable when somebody, in order to harm data processing or the
operation of computer or telecommunications systems, (1) creates, makes avail-
able or distributes a computer program or series of program instructions which
is constructed to endanger data processing or the operation of computer or
telecommunications systems, or to damage data or programs contained in such
a system, or (2) makes available or distributes instructions to create such a
program or series of program instructions. In other words, the aim of the proposed
provision is to criminalize the preparation and distribution of computer viruses
and other comparable programs. – The proposal has been before Parliament
already for quite some time, but this is not due to the difficulty of the proposal.
The only reason for the delay is the pressure of work in the Law Committee of
the Parliament.
2.3 The applicability of the provisions to the internet
and other networks
When Recommendation No. R(89)9 of the Council of Europe was being drafted
some ten years ago, the Internet differed essentially from the present. For this
reason, the substantive criminal legislation on IT-crimes, which in Finland as
well as in many other countries is based on the Recommendation, does not pay
very much attention to the threats and possibilities caused by the Internet. In any
case the crimes which can be committed by the use of the Internet of or otherwise
over the Internet are, in fact, the same crimes: the basic structure of the crime
does not change even if the environment changes. Thus, at least in Finland, the
applicability of the provisions described above does not cause major difficulties
in respect of substantive criminal legislation. The situation is very different when
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167 HE 6/1997.
168 HE 233/1977.
we turn to examine criminal procedural legislation. As mentioned before, a lot
of work has to be done on this area.
The provisions on computer break-in, unauthorised use, data processing fraud,
IT-forgery, industrial espionage and damage to property cover, to a large extent,
also offences such as hacking committed by means of the Internet and smaller
local, metropolitan or wide area networks (LANs, MANs or WANs). The new
provisions on means of payment fraud are specially planned to be applicable also
to transactions in networks.
In respect of content-related crimes, the provisions cover actions connected
with the obscene and violent contents of the information. Disribution of computer
viruses and other harmful programs will be covered by the proposed provision.
The provision on data processing endangerment will provide protection for
instance against so-called macro viruses which spread with attached files of elec-
tronic mail messages and represent today the most common type of ”malware”.
3 Conclusions
IT-crimes quite often remain unreported and undetected. No studies on the
reasons for this phenomenon have been conducted in Finland, but obviously at
least the fear of ruining the reputation of the victim, the fear of heavy expenses,
and a lack of confidence in the capabilities of the investigating, prosecuting and
adjudicating authorities have influenced the attitudes of victims.
The last-mentioned reason is unfortunately a very real one in Finland, and
probably in many other countries, as well. At the moment it can be said that only
the police have sufficient know-how for dealing with IT-crimes. During 1999,
the Office of the Prosecutor General will start up a training schedule on IT-crimes
for prosecutors, but no such training for judges has yet been even planned. In my
view, this present lack of the expertise will mean a real threat to the success of
the fight against IT-crimes. If such basic elements as, e.g., the functioning of
different operating systems or file systems are totally incomprehensible for the
law enforcement authorities, there are no grounds to expect proper and reason-
able decisions from the courts.
It is impossible to say what the exact number of investigated IT-crimes is,
because the police does not compile separate statistics on IT-crimes. The IT-crime
Unit of the National Bureau of Investigation (the Central Criminal Police) has
been involved in the investigation of 200-300 cases each year, either as the
responsible investigator or as an expert in investigations conducted by the local
police authorities. This number continues to increase. The number of investiga-
tions being conducted only by the local police authorities is unknown.
Most of the IT-crimes that have been prosecuted have been copyright offences
and different types of hackings, mostly defined as unauthorised use. There seems
to be a clear need for some new criminalisations especially with respect to the
Internet; for instance actions called ”spamming”169 and ”spoofing”170 become
more and more common in the net environment and can be quite harmful. The
present provisions on interference and forgery do not cover these specifically
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net-related actions, at least in full. Also trafficking in passwords is a phenomenon
which could be a subject of a new criminalisation.
In the international fora considerable attention has been paid to content-related
crimes, especially child pornography. In addition to that, also the criminalisation
of other forms of content-related actions should be discussed, e.g. questions of
racial hatred and international terrorism. As such, these phenomena are not very
problematic from the Finnish point of view because the applicability of the
criminal provisions in this area is usually not bound to the tools or the environ-
ment of the crime. Nonetheless, in a globall perspective, these content-related
actions may cause a lot of damage. However, prior to criminalisations the
responsibility of the Internet service providers and also the users should be
underlined.
Today it is quite impossible to imagine in what kind of a IT-environment we
will live, say, ten years from now. That is why it is impossible to create permanent
solutions in the criminal legislation, and it can be maintained that the legislation
will always be more or less behind the real development. In order to keep this
gap as narrow as possible, close and continuous cooperation between the law
enforcement and legislative authorities is required, as well as active following of
the technical development. Because of the transnational nature of IT-crimes,
international cooperation is also very significant. Without the wide harmonisa-
tion of criminal substantive and procedural legislations it will be quite impossible
to obtain any satisfactory results in the fight against the IT-crimes in general and
net-related IT-crimes in particular.
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169 Spamming, bombing and flaming refer to the sending of data to a particular person in such a form,
size or frequency that it may deprive the addressee of all or part of his or her communication facilities,
i.e. of his or her ability to send or to receive messages (Patijn, A. and Kaspersen, H: Spamming and
Transparency of Communication Networks, PC-CY [98] 14).
170 Spoofing refers to the falsification of traffic data in a telecommunication network open to the public,
with the intent to prevent the establishment of the source or the path of the communication. (Patijn
and Kaspersen, PC-CY [98] 14).
Crimes Related to the Computer Network.
Threats and Opportunities:
A Criminological Perspective
Commentary by
Prof. Dr Henrik W.K. Kaspersen
To start with, I owe an apology to the author as well as to the readers of my paper.
I am a lawyer and not a criminologist. Consequently, my appreciation of Mr
Adamski’s paper may not do full justice to its content or to its author but this will
not keep me from expressing my opinion. I have read Mr Adamski’s paper with
great interest and found interesting references to other articles and publications.
The author should be complemented for his collection of statistical sources of
computer crime as published in different national fora. Most of these sources are
very recent and provide all kinds of interesting information. Also Mr Adamski’s
scientific courage to tackle a complicated and extremely difficult topic such as
computer crime should be praised. In 1990 I mtself was in the situation of
conducting a major victimization survey on computer crime in the Nether-
lands171, of which the results still seem valid today, and some of the findings are
also largely reflected in Mr Adamski’s paper.
According to the introductory paragraph Mr Adamski’s paper intends to be
ambitious and according to its aims and scope, cover a broad area. As his central
theme, Mr Adamski has adopted the phenomenology as well as the prevention
of crimes in the computer environment. In addition, the paper provides an
evaluation of available data on behalf of further research and the development
of (prevention) policies. Although the paper does not claim to provide final
solutions for the supposed problem of computer crime – the main object seems
to be to provide some material for further studies – the question arises what
exactly the merits of the paper are. The expectations raised by the language in
its introductory section seem not to have been fully met. Instead of bringing
clarity to the concept or phenomenology of computer crime, the paper seems to
create more confusion instead. In its analysis of computer crime or computer-re-
lated crime, it leaves a number of important questions unanswered, even if it
makes possible deeper insight in what moves the perpetrators of computer crime.
Therefore, the proposals concerning the prevention of computer crime necessar-
ily lack specificity and are not particularly innovating. However, the author is
not to blame for this. As mentioned in his paper and as known from other sources,
very little reliable data are available on computer crime. Victims are not neces-
sarily aware of having been a victim of computer crime. Even if they are, in most
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171 F.H. Charbon, H.W.K. Kaspersen, Computer crime in the Netherlands, Den Haag 1990.
cases they do not report to the police. And even when they do, the police in most
cases will not find start an investigation and if they do there is only a small chance
that they identify a perpetrator who in some cases will be tried before a court.
Despite these multiple top-of-the-iceberg syndrome, I would like to make some
observations on the methodology as well as on the content of the paper. These
will be divided into three main topics: the phenomenology of computer crime,
the analysis of the person and motives of the perpetrator of computer crime, and
the crime-enhancing factors.
A phenomenology of a type of crime requires a set of definitions. Donn
Parker172- to whose work a mandatory reference should be made in any paper on
computer crime – made a distinction between computer crimes (at the time he
used the term ”abuse”  because of  the absence of  applicable  criminal  law
provisions) where the computer and its content are the object, the instrument,
the environment of the abuse or where the computer has been used as a symbol.
Apart from the latter category, which has lost its meaning today, very little seems
to have been changed, not even by the emergence of global electronic commu-
nication networks: Parker’s remaining categories are all still valid. In the field of
criminal law, very few attempts are undertaken to find a proper definition for
computer crime, except perhaps by the OECD173. Its ‘definition’, however, was
already abandoned in the work on the Recommendation of the Council of Europe
of 1989, where it was admitted that a computer-related crime, as it was called
then, could in fact be any criminal conduct related in the broadest sense with
electronic data processing. Studies on computer crime or computer-related crime
use definitions depending on their purposes: for legislative purposes, crimino-
logical or forensical purposes, for purposes of the analysis of security threats or
conditions for insurance etc. As an example, in my own study on criminalisation
of computer abuse174 I proposed as the definition of computer crime a narrow
concept, that of conduct involving unauthorised or otherwise illegal interfering
with electronic data processing (computer crime in a narrow sense). This group
of crime looks at the modus operandi of the perpetrator and is largely covered
by Parker’s first category object of the crime. Other forms will include the
remaining Parker categories instrument or environment of the crime. Parker’s
categorisation was mainly aimed at the modus operandi of the crimes and the
technical skills of its perpetrators. Of course, this categorisation does not go along
with the classical categories of crime. Computer-related crime may encompass
many of those traditional crimes, such as property crimes, violations of private
life and all kind of content-related crimes against public order, public moral and
private interests. In particular with regard to the latter categories there is much
more resemblance with the classical crimes. Therefore, it should be clear from
the outset what the purpose of the study is, before one starts to define all kind of
categories and subcategories. One should also deal with the question of whether
257
172 Donn B. Parker, Susan Nycum S. Stephen Oüra, Computer Abuse, Washington 1973, 30-32.
See also Donn B. Parker, Fighting Computer Crime, New York 1983.
173 OECD, Computer-related Crime, Paris 1985.
174 Henrik W.K. Kaspersen, Strafbaarstelling van Computermisbruik, Deventer 1990.
the different types of crime that are being analysed in fact possess adequate
corresponding qualities in order to justify such treatment.
In his introduction Mr Adamski enters into a discussion on the development
of a categorisation of computer crimes, which he eventually undertakes in section
2 of the chapter. Several elements are presented here as arguments, without a
clear relation with one another, or it is otherwise unclear why they are present in
this paragraph. Firstly, the development of IT is mentioned as a potential factor
for new types of harm. As such it may be that this is not untrue, but the examples
given in the next paragraph are not very pertinent and not very striking in support
of this thesis, and they do not provide further means for analysis, e.g. to what
extent they contribute to those developments. In my opinion, one should in
particular distinguish between crimes closely related to new technological de-
velopments and examples related to new applications and services. Mobile
telephone fraud – by manipulation of SIM-cards – is an example of the first
category, illegal electronic betting may be an example of the latter. The emer-
gence of the Internet brought some new forms of abuse, but the major problem
is rather the scale of crimes, the ease by which they can committed and the poor
possibilities of finding the responsible perpetrator, which in turn are due to a
number of other factors, such as the globalisation of communications, diver-
gences between national law, the lack of adequate legal instruments at the
national level and on mutual legal assistance, lack of expertise among the police
units and, last but not least, a low priority in investigation. Quite a number of
these factors and their interrelation are not considered in the paper.
In principle, one can not disagree with Adamski’s dichotomy of computer
crime, even if it it is not made clear for what purposes this dichotomy is useful.
From a criminological point of view such a distinction may be useful because
there are two groups of perpetrators, different objects, different technical skills
are required, different motives or incentives are at stake or the crimes have
different impacts. From a legal point of view I can only refer to the categorisation
of crimes adopted by the PC-CY committee175 in order to establish the areas for
detailed binding regulation and other areas. With regard to substantive criminal
lawa distinction is made between so-called c.i.a. offences, computer-related
offences and content-related offences. The first group represents the target:
interference with IT-systems and its data content, the second group the unauthor-
ised usage of IT-functionality or applications, and the third group the other usage,
which may even include authorised usage. In the first category, the protected
related interests are the integrity, availability and confidentiality of automated
data  processing; in  the second category the  lawful interests related  to the
particular IT-application. The third category may represent any interest.
In Parker’s days computer networks were still emerging. Today they are quite
common and indispensable. Mr Adamski emphasises the importance and risks
of networks, to which one can only agree. In my opinion, however, the emergence
of global information networks does not substantially change the nature of the
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crime, even though networks provide other and better opportunities to commit
computer crimes. This may be different with regard to crime related to the
traditional telephone network, a target to telephone phreakers and other exotic
abusers of telecommunication facilities. The technical convergence between
computing and telecommunication has caused changes to the forms and targets
of telecommunication criminality. It would be interesting to know whether and
to what extent also the groups of perpetrators of the converging types of crime
have themselves ”converged”.
In some international fora, such as the G-8, the concept of computer crime is
broadened to high-tech crime, in order to be sure that this notion includes a wide
range of criminal behaviour, against or by means of traditional computer systems
as well as complex satellite communication systems. In the European Union176
computer crime is even considered a part of organised crime because of the
expectation that organised crime will use the opportunities offered by the Internet
to set up a safe system for criminal communications. One could expect some
guidance from the  author  onhow to  deal with  these  new  trends  and  their
background.
Nevertheless Mr Adamski’s study contains quite a number of elements which
could serve as instruments for an analysis of the crime problem. In my opinion,
however, they do not result in a methodologically justified analysis that allows
further (criminological) research or the establishment of crime prevention poli-
cies in the broadest sense possible. The statistical material found in different
countries, at different times and from different sorts of studies and sources, seems
hardly to make possible any comparison and establishment of hard facts for the
simple reason that it is not clear what the underlying definitions are and how they
were interpreted when these statistics were composed. The author copies – and
thereby adopts – the use of different wording, notions and definitions without
any effort to establish common or comparable elements. In the paper statistics
can be found on computer crime vulnerabilities, computer crime incidents,
computer security incidents, malicious attacks, etc. which could include crimes,
attempts at crimes, etc. but probably also non-criminal conduct. Comparison
without reference to the national criminal legislation by which this conduct has
been penalised is hardly possible.
One can agree with the author that the summing up of the crimes he gives in
paragraph 2.2. of digital forms of old crimes is not a good basis for criminological
generalisations and, perhaps, the representation of this data does not even provide
a basis for any analysis. They could have been excluded from the research from
the beginning. But since the author deals rather extensively with this crimes, one
may assume that he had something particular in mind. The more the commission
of ‘old crimes’ in an electronic environment is less technology relevant or
dependent, the better will they will fit within classical criminological approaches
which will undoubtedly provide for effective tools for analysis and prevention.
Why not propose on behalf of future analysis a categorisation along the lines of
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the classical categorisation? E.g., why not say that the distribution of child
pornography material is not done by ”computer criminals” but by traditional
criminals who by chance avail themselves of new, advanced communication
facilities? One could, for example, study whether the existence of the WWW,
IRCs and e-mail induces a higher rate of criminality in relation to abuse of minors
or whether there is only a shift from traditional media to electronic media,
whether the crime are more visible, whether there is greater societal awareness,
or any combination of these factors.
The role of the Internet is also important with regard to the core computer
crime offences. The paper could have analysed whether there is any provable
relation between the rate of Internet-subscribers in a country and the risk of being
a victim of a particular computer crime or if a higher rate of Internet-subscribers
in a particular country also leads to a higher number of (reported) computer
crime, or if other factors are relevant. The paper suggests dealing with several
categories of computer crime, but in fact, the study appears to limit itself in the
end to the crime of hacking, indeed a popular activity if one can belief the scarce
statistics. Some systems seem to be extremely attractive to hackers. E.g. the
NASA claims over 250.000 attacks yearly of which a small part manages to enter
(a part of) the system. Whether this activity is criminal depends from the way
the related provision in the law is drafted (many legislations require the breaking
of security or do not penalise attempts at illegal access). It should be mentioned
that a very large portion of these attacks is undertaken by the same hacker because
he makes use of a hacking device which systematically ”tries” the validity of
passwords.
In relation to hacking one would like to know why there is a distinction
between ”innocent” hacking and hacking with malicious intent? Hacking of-
fences do not take into account the intent with which a hacker accesses a computer
system without authorisation: any successful illegal access causes some form of
damage, because at least the confidentiality of particular data is violated and
because the security measures are compromised. ”Responsible” hackers do avail
themselves of the necessary expertise to restrict the damage caused to a mini-
mum, others (e.g. the ”whiz-kids”) are not in a situation to realize the effects of
their acts, as has been shown in a number of cases such as the Morris case in the
US, and recently in a case where a young hacker knocked out a telephone switch,
as a result of which all communications with the local airport were cut off for a
couple of hours. Indeed, one should take into account that hacking has the nature
of a pre-stage offence that may include all kind of criminal behaviour. Therefore,
the paper should not lay the emphasis on hacking but on the underlying criminal
intent.
At one point  in the paper  Dutch computer  hackers were  alleged to  be
responsible for nearly fifty percent of the total number of attacks at a particular
USA-computer system. This fact could have been verified by studying informa-
tion from the Dutch hacker scene, which is quite open-minded. Even after the
criminalisation of hacking by the Dutch Computer Crime Bill in 1993, Dutch
hackers continued to organise hacking days where they exchange experience,
tools and other information and where Dutch law enforcement authorities try to
keep updated as well. The Dutch hacker undergroud is not the only ‘organisation’
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still in existence. Also in Germany as well as in many other countries the hacker
culture is being kept alive. In addition, many first generation hackers have
become serious computer experts, active in the security industry and the provider
world. One would have wanted to learn more from the paper about these groups
and their history.
On the international level law enforcement authorities share the view that the
globalisation of communications requires adequate instruments for international
criminal offence operation in the field of criminal investigations to computer-re-
lated crime. In this respect, the work of the Lyon group of the G8 seeks to develop
principles and  rules for international co-operation concerning mutual legal
assistance. The Council of Europe PC-CY is prepares a draft Internet Convention.
The European Action Plan on the safe use of the Internet is of a quite different
order. Traditional criminal acts should be reported to the police. Further the plan
relies very much on self-regulation of ISPs (internet service provider) and the
information industry. ISPs are supposed to develop a system of watchdogs that
report criminal activities at the content level to ISPs. If the responsible person
refuses to remove the material from the net, a report to the police can be made.
In the case of harmful content, the European Commission realises very well that
regulation in an open environment such as the Internet is neither technically nor
legally feasible. Therefore, a system of self-regulation is proposed together with
the enhancement of user involvement in order to create the circumstances under
which individual users can avail themselves of the means to filter certain forms
of content.
To conclude I have some remarks to make on a number of text fragments:
• In his introduction Mr Adamski follows Hollingers and others in saying that
the period from 1993 can be qualified as the censorship period, even in
countries other than the US. In my opinion today, except perhaps in some
exotic non-democratic countries such as China, Iran or even Singapore, the
recent developments, both in the US and in other parts of the world such as
Europe, point away from censorship of information distributed through com-
puter networks. In the US the Supreme Court in 1997 rejected the Commu-
nication Decency Act as being unconstitutionally vague. In the EU an Action
Plan on the safe use of the Internet was developed in order to prevent private
and public censorship. It promotes self-regulation of the industry and user
empowerment in order to provide the public with tools to select the informa-
tion that they want to receive. Further in the EU, a draft proposal on Electronic
Commerce177includes a clear non-liability provision for intermediaries such
as Internet-providers. Most legislators are amending their law in order to have
these apply to the electronic environment in an equivalent manner as they do
already apply to the paper or traditional media environment. All together, it
is not censorship that is at stake but rather the problem of how and by what
means the consequences of the misuse of the facilities of the Internet can be
fought. If the period of time from 1993 to the present should be characterized
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by a particular name or notion, it would be better to use a positive notion such
as the ”information explosion period”, because in no earlier historical period
has information been made available so easily and quickly. However, from a
criminological standpoint one may argue in favour of a notion such as the
”period of lost control”. The occurrence of the Internet coupled millions of
inadequately secured private systems, by means of an unsecured communi-
cation protocol. As a consequence the Internet is a hide-out for some irrespon-
sible people who not only can commit all kind of new crime variants but also
have a good opportunity to evade their responsibility, because their identity
cannot be revealed or because they operate from jurisdictions in which they
are protected.
• The Council of Europe did not intend to invent a new categorization of
computer crime in its Recommendation of 1995 when it defined IT-offences
as any crime of which evidence can be found with a computer system or
computer network, solely for the purposes of this Recommendation on the
needs for specific coercive powers and relating requirements in order to enable
investigations to and securing of electronic evidence.
• The security notions of integrity, confidentiality and availability in order to
categorise computer crimes does not originate with the OECD but with the
Dutch government committee which proposed the Dutch Computer Crime
Bill.178 The approach was referred to and copied in the Explanatory Memo-
randum to the 1989 Recommendation of the Council of Europe on Criminal
Substantive Law.
• For quite some time, U.S. federal law (s. 1030 USC 19) has penalised
trafficking in computer passwords.
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